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Abstract
Banned opposition movements dedicated to the overthrow of repressive governments have 
existed for centuries. In the second half of the 20th century, while some terrorist 
organizations in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan have resorted to violence 
in pursuit of their goal of world revolution, others, particularly, in the Third World, have 
engaged in acts of resistance, including violence, for the attainment of their democratic 
rights.
Today, the more serious opposition movements are able to obtain support from outside 
sources for the pursuit of their aims.
This thesis, deals first with the fundamental theoretical questions germane to the study 
of any opposition movement in current times (Chapter 1). Thereafter, as a researched case 
study, it focuses on "The National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR)", led by 
Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar which was the first political movement to come out in opposition to 
the theocratic dictatorship in Iran. The thesis recounts Bakhtiar’s political background 
(Chapter 2) and gives a detailed account of his activities in NAMIR from July 1979 until 
his brutal assassination in August 1991 (Chapters 3-6).
Finally, it is hoped that this researched presentation will facilitate for students of 
international politics a better understanding of some of the critical concepts and issues 
relevant to the role of banned opposition movements in contemporary international politics.
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PREFACE
Banned opposition movements dedicated to the overthrow of governments have 
existed for centuries. In modem times - i.e., in the second half of the 20th century 
- the most notorious groups were the terrorists in Europe. They used robbery, 
kidnapping, and murder to undermine democratic governments in Italy, Germany, 
and Spain. While some terrorist organizations in Western Europe, the United 
States, and Japan have rejected their own democratic societies and resorted to 
acts of violence in pursuit of their goal of world revolution, others, particularly in 
the Third World, have engaged in acts of violence for the purpose of attaining (or 
re-establishing) their democratic rights.
It follows that organizational goals can vary a great deal amongst opposition 
groups. Some groups are purely nationalistic. The Provisional Irish Republican 
Army wants the British to get out of Northern Ireland and to unite the two Irelands 
into a single nation. The Puerto Rican Armed Forces of National Liberation 
(FALN) wants an independent Puerto Rico with a socialist government. Basque 
terrorists in northern Spain would like to establish an independent homeland. In 
the Middle East, most Palestinian groups seek to undermine Israel and recover 
lost territory; and since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the advent 
of Ayatollah Khomeini, there has been a plethora of religiously motivated political 
groups in the Islamic world that have resorted to hostage taking and other acts 
of extreme violence for purposes of promoting their political agendas.
At on stage, most opposition movements resorted to such acts as robbery and 
kidnapping for ransom in order to secure the funds needed for their existence. 
W hile some still engage in such activities, the more significant opposition 
movements in the present international environment, also receive large amounts 
of money from outside sources such as foreign governments and international 
business consortiums - e.g., some oil -rich Arab nations continue to provide 
substantial funds to some Palestinian groups.
Furthermore, it is a reality that many Third World countries are governed by 
extremely inefficient, repressive, and corrupt regimes, few of which have 
achieved notable success in improving the quality of life in their country. They 
largely depend on money provided from external sources for development, but 
much of the money is diverted into personal bank accounts by their corrupt rulers. 
Repressive regimes are rarely stable. They are vulnerable to internecine power 
struggles, insurrections and, as happened in much of Latin America, guerilla 
warfare. Ironically, many Third World countries that have experienced revolution 
usually find themselves no better off, as new governments turn out to be as 
repressive and ineffectual as their predecessors.
Consequently, in the post colonial era, the dramatic increase in the number of 
newly independent countries has been synonymous with a commensurate 
increase in the number of opposition groups committed to an agenda which 
differs from that of their functioning regimes.
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This thesis, deals first with fundamental theoretical questions relevant to the 
study of any opposition movement in contemporary international politics (Chapter
1), and is thereafter focused on a researched study of "The National Movement 
of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR)"1, a liberal-democratic political movement 
formed to oppose the theocratic dictatorship that had superseded the Iranian 
monarchy following the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the creation of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. It is thus a study of a banned opposition 
movement that is neither revolutionary nor violence oriented by nature. It is the 
study of a movement, representing secular traditional forces and values in Iranian 
society2.
The history of NAMIR for the period chosen - i.e., 1979-19913 - is closely 
interwoven with the personality of Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, the last Iranian Prime 
Minister before the Islamic Revolution, who founded the organization and 
remained as its leader until his assassination in August 1991.
Bom in 1914 to a distinguished tribal family, which had been active in the struggle 
for the establishment of liberal democracy in Iran, Dr. Bakhtiar received his
1"Nehzate Moghavemate Melli-e Iran"
2The fact that NAMIR was capable of appealing to a mass audience, in turn 
restricted its options in that - unlike some revolutionary opposition groups such as the 
People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran - it could never contemplate resort to arbitrary 
acts of violence against the functioning regime, given that any such action would have 
been at the cost of undermining its future political prospects by alienating its own 
constituencies at home.
3NAMIR was not disbanded following the death of Dr. Bakhtiar, and has 
continued to remain active.
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education in Iran, Beirut, and at the Sorbonne in Paris. During the Second World 
War, he served with the French Army's Orleans Battalion and was an ardent 
opponent of fascism. He returned to Iran in 1948 and became a Minister of State 
in Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh's cabinet in 1951. After the fall of the Mossadegh 
Government, he was imprisoned for his political beliefs on a number of occasions 
and was also banned from leaving Iran for a period of some ten years. Having 
been a leading member of the opposition to the late Shah of Iran for over twenty 
five years on constitutional and democratic grounds, Dr. Bakhtiar accepted the 
almost impossible task of forming a civilian government in the dying days of the 
imperial regime. During his 37 days in office, he disbanded SAVAK, the secret 
police, freed all political prisoners, allowed total press freedom and began the 
process of establishing a modern democratic state in Iran. Although, his 
government was swept away by the tide of revolutionary fervor that was fully 
exploited by Ayatollah Khomeini, his record as a man who had resisted the 
excesses of both the late Shah and had at the same time refused to yield to the 
uncompromising demands of the Ayatollah, made him the natural leader of many 
Iranians who were opposed to the unfolding events in their country.
The ensuing chapters deal at length with Bakhtiar's political background (Chapter
2) and with a detailed account of his activities in NAMIR, which began following 
his escape from Iran in July 1979 and ceased when he was brutally assassinated 
in his home on the outskirts of Paris in August 1991 (Chapters 3-6).
Furthermore, the thesis, apart from focusing on the particular case of NAMIR,
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also aims to present an academic understanding of an important phenomenon -
X
namely banned opposition movements - which have come to play an increasingly 
important role in the current international environment4, by providing answers to 
such questions as: How do individuals or groups who are banned from expressing 
their political beliefs and social preferences strive to achieve their aspirations? 
How can they establish credibility and, thereafter convince their own people as 
well as the international community of the legitimacy and justice of their struggle? 
What kind of organization and infrastructure do they require in order to achieve 
these fundamental objectives and therefore pose an effective challenge to their 
functioning regimes at home?
Thus it may be surmised that the impact that banned opposition movements are 
able to make on their own communities as well as a wider international audience 
are contingent upon a number of important factors with which a political 
movement must come to grips if it is to be taken seriously. In the case of NAMIR, 
the most important liberal-democratic movement to range itself in opposition to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, these factors 
(apart from a deep conviction about the righteousness of its cause) included the 
following:
1. The leadership of an accepted and popular national figure, who was
known and generally respected in the outside world.
2. Access to substantial funds (raised in the first instance through
*rhis has been most evident in a number of major international capitals such as 
London or Paris, where hundreds of exiled opposition movements are active in 
promoting their agendas.
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indigenous means and later through international donations). This allowed 
the organization to engage a professional team to promote its objectives 
by formulating policies designed to promote the movement's political, 
economic, social and cultural message with the objective of mobilizing the 
necessary support- whilst at the same time providing the organization with 
the ability to supply its membership and its potential supporters with crucial 
propaganda material containing an elaboration of its policies (i.e. using 
newspapers, books, tapes, meeting, seminars, conferences, etc.).
3. Access to major foreign policy makers, and the opportunity for 
presenting its case.
4. Access to a number of radio stations, providing it with the ability to 
communicate with the Iranian public on a daily basis.
5. Access to a dedicated and loyal membership which was willing to make 
sacrifices for the promotion of the movement.
Thus, any political movement, unable to obtain access to all or some of the basic 
prerequisites cited above, is likely to encounter great difficulty in establishing the 
credibility or acceptability that is essential for the projection of its image.
However, an inability to meet these criteria has not deterred many banned 
opposition movements from entering the arena. Those which have been more 
sincere, have contended themselves with a gradual approach to attaining these 
required attributes, while the more cynical, have sought to use their position as 
a platform for obtaining financial hand outs and other short term gains, ignoring
9
the higher goals they have espoused publicly. But, it must be stressed that, as 
demonstrated in the case of NAMIR, even a banned opposition movement which 
is able to fulfill all the basic criteria, including wide public appeal (as was the case 
with Dr. Bakhtiar, particularly in the mid-1980s) is not guaranteed success.
Ultimate success for an opposition movement is to a great degree also dependent 
on factors such as the durability of the functioning regime (i.e., one that is 
determined to cling on to power to the "bitter end" as opposed to one that is likely 
to be more accommodating once it has become aware of the hopelessness of its 
position), as well as the degree of genuine international support that it is able to 
muster from external sources5.
Finally, it is hoped that this researched presentation which addresses a number 
of critical theoretical concepts associated with this topic, such as Legitimacy, 
Obedience, ideology, organization and leadership as well as the more empirical 
factors associated with the existence of opposition movements in general such 
as strategy and funding, will facilitate for students of international politics a better 
understanding of some of the critical issues relevant to the role of banned 
opposition movements in contemporary international politics.
5Here, for example, one can distinguish between the support that was provided 
by the US to democratic forces in Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland), as opposed to Iraq 
(whose opposition was encouraged during the preceding months to the start of the 
Persian Gulf War and then severely let down). On the hand, should external forces 
have a vested interest to support a particular regime for strategic reasons or other 
considerations, then it is obvious that movements opposed to that functioning regime, 
no matter how popular or just, have to contend with a whole host of other obstacles as 
well (here one can make slight reference to the case of the opposition movement 
opposed to the Saudi Arabian regime, whose leader has found it difficult to even obtain 
asylum or refugee status in the UK).
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Chapter 1: Banned Opposition Movements in Contemporary 
International Politics: A Conceptual Framework and its Application to 
the Case Study_____________________________________________
S u m m a r ize d  s u c c in c t l y  in t h e  D ictio nary  o f  So c ia l  Sc ie n c e s , "Th e  
O p p o s it io n , in any p lu r a list  s o c ie t y , normally means a  c o h e r e n t  g r o u p ,
REGULARLY ACTING TOGETHER, AND ABLE TO PRESENT THEMSELVES COLLECTIVELY 
TO THE ELECTORATE AS AN ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT WITH AN ALTERNATIVE
p o l ic y ". Th u s , In undem o cratic  s o c ie t ie s , w h e r e  a ll  fo rm s  o f  p o l it ic a l
DISSENTION ARE BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED, OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS, LIKE 
THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN PLURALIST SOCIETIES, STRIVE TOWARDS THE ATTAINMENT 
OF THE SAME OBJECTIVES, USING OTHER MEANS.
While the concept and history of "revolution", has been a subject of meticulous study 
by numerous scholars since the closing days of the eighteenth century (resulting in the 
compilation of a great deal of rich and pertinent literature on the various aspects of this 
phenomenon), actual and specific literature on the subject of banned opposition 
movements in non-democratic societies is at best limited and quite scattered. To a 
large extent this insufficiency can be overcome by taking an inverse look at any piece 
of researched study on the subject of successful or unsuccessful revolutionary activity, 
given that it can help to assist in tracing the origins of any significant political challenge 
to a functioning regime and to opposition movements and the individuals who 
constituted the bulk of their membership. Furthermore, it can be seen that mere 
numbers - i.e.. the size of a committed membership in any such movements, has never 
been a determining factor in ensuring a successful outcome. Lenin in 1917, and Castro 
in 1959, are perhaps good examples that underline this particular point6.
&,ln November 1956 Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and eighty revolutionaries set out 
for Cuba in the Granma, and were immediately trapped in a vicious ambush which 
reduced their forces to twelve men. After a series of dramatic escapes they reached the 
Sierra Maestra - and there for two years they fought a guerrilla campaign which swept 
the whole of Cuba in one of the great national liberation struggles of the twentieth 
century" (printed under the heading of "Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary 
War", at the last page of Che Guevara's book, Guerrilla Warfare [Penguin Books Ltd., 
UK, 1961].
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In contemporary times, banned or restricted opposition movements and their 
leadership, are also capable of making a significant impact within, and in some 
instances well beyond, their own immediate political environments, by attracting 
significant national and international attention, even without having secured victory in 
their political struggles. Furthermore, even under conditions of severe repression and 
with their leaders behind bars, opposition movements have shown themselves, in 
certain instances, to be resilient and capable of displaying great moral strength, by 
winning support among their own people as well as that of the international community. 
In recent times, this has been demonstrated by the likes of the "Solidarity Movement" 
in Poland, and the "African National Congress" in South Africa, whose incarcerated 
leaders - Lech Walesa and Nelson Mandela - were both, subsequently, able to emerge 
as heads of state in their respective countries. Similarly, figures like, 'Aung San Suu 
Kyi1, the opposition leader under house arrest in Burma, as well as the Dalai Lama of 
Tibet, represent highly respected, and internationally recognized personalities with 
substantial political impact, despite the fact that neither holds any office and wields no 
real power in their respective homelands7.
Why People Actually Rebel:
the "Raison d'etre” of Opposition Movements_____________________________
Throughout the course of history, people have repeatedly rebelled against their rulers, 
as a means of attaining their aspirations. In contemporary international politics, public 
order is put at risk, and the chances of organized resistance increased, whenever
7The Dalai Lama lives in exile, while 'Aung San Suu Kyi', is under house arrest 
in Burma, which is now also referred to as "Myanamar", courtesy of the military 
government in that country.
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individuals are prohibited from, and deprived of the means of expressing their 
discontent. According to statistics collected by T.R. Gurr, during the period from 1961- 
1968, "some form of violent civil conflict reportedly took place in 114 of the world's 121 
countries". Based, on these figures, Gurr concluded that for that given period of time, 
"violent attempts to overthrow governments were more common than national 
elections"8.
As seen from the eyes of scholars such as Theda Skocpol, who has investigated the 
various aspects of 'revolution', "Changes in social systems or societies9, give rise to 
grievances, social disorientation, or new class or group interests", thus creating the 
potential for collective mobilization10. This potential then has the ability to develop itself 
into a "purposive, mass based movement, coalescing with the aid of ideology and 
organization - that conscientiously undertakes to reform or altogether remove the 
existing government, and perhaps the entire social order"11. In the final analysis, the 
opposition movement - be it peaceful or violent - confronts the ruling elite or the 
authorities of the dominant class, and if it is able to secure victory, it then proceeds to 
assert it own authority and implement its own program of action.
In another study entitled, "Why Men Rebel", T.R. Gurr, presents the same proposition
8Gurr, T.R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
1970, p. 3.
9ln contemporary international politics, lack of changes - i.e.. the static nature 
of the political system in face of new demands for forward movement, that need not 
necessarily have originated from within their own societies, could present similar 
challenges (e.g. the call for the establishment of a "Shora" in Saudi Arabia).
10Skocpol, T., States And Social Revolutions - A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia, And China, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 14.
11 Gurr, T.R., Ibid., pp.12-13.
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in slightly different terms, by stating, ’The primary causal sequence in political violence 
is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of discontent, and 
finally, its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors". He 
elaborates between three stages he associates with violence: "Turmoil" (spontaneous), 
"Conspiracy" (organized but limited participation), and "Internal War" (organized and 
widely supported), and establishes that the greater the degree of discontent in any 
society, the greater is the likelihood of the violence that is associated with any 
fundamental socio-political change that might take place12. According to Gurr, 
discontent is a product of "relative deprivations", which he in turn, defines as the 
"perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and value capabilities13. 
Based on his conclusion, one sees an emerging and inevitable role for opposition 
movements, who serve as the main vehicle for pursuing these aspirations, by 
•channeling any widespread discontent14, into some form of organized and collective 
action that might ultimately include violence as well15.
Finally, while Chalmers Johnson16 describes the inevitable steps taken by a disoriented
12Gurr, T.R., Ibid., p.11.
13According to Gurr, "Value Expectations" are the goods and conditions of life 
to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. "Value Capabilities", on the other 
hand, are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or 
maintaining, given the social means available to them.
14Charles Tilly, in his book entitled, From Mobilization to Revolution (McGraw Hill, 
New York, 1978, p.207) amplifies this point by also referring to T. Gurr and underlining 
that" a general condition for rebellion is a widening of the expectation-achievement
gap"-
15Gurr maintains that "most discontented men are not revolutionaries. They may 
be angry, but most of them probably prefer peaceful means for the attainment of their 
goals to the privations and risks of revolutionary action" (Ibid, p.355).
16Skocpol. T., Ibid., pp.. 11-12. According to Chalmers Johnson it is the "Macro- 
sociological theory of societal integration and change". But change is required when
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populace towards revolution, as stemming from "a conversion to the alternative values 
put forward by a revolutionary ideological movement that then clashes with the 
authorities that be"17.
What these writers have all presupposed in their analysis, is that ultimate resort to 
violence (the level of which has not been specifically defined) between an organized 
group of disenchanted citizens18, which is in competition for "sovereignty" with the 
government, is inevitable19. However, recent experiences in Eastern Europe (with the 
exception of Romania), suggest that in contemporary international politics, the break 
down of internal methods of control in any non-democratic state, can be attained 
without necessarily resorting to the scales of ’bloody violence' normally perceived, and 
associated with revolution20. Indeed, it has been quite amazing to note that in countries 
such as Iran in 1978-1979, and Czechoslavakia in 1989, how the customary methods
a society become "dis-synchronized". Once dis-synchronization set is, people become 
disoriented and hence open to conversion to the alternative values proposed by a 
revolutionary movement. As this happens, existing authorities lose the legitimacy and 
have to rely more and more on coercion to maintain order. But they can do this 
successfully for a while. Only through reform, can they re-synchronize values and 
environment. But if the authorities are stubbornly "intransigent", then the revolution will 
accomplish change violently
17Skocpol, T., Ibid., p.15. In her writing, Skocpol, indirectly relates to 'Opposition 
Movements', by making reference to Karl Marx, who considered Revolutions to be the 
"locomotives of history" (which transform state organizations, class structures, and 
dominant ideologies at a national level, while spreading their victorious ideology to 
remote places, at an international level), and who also adhered" to a version of the 
premise that revolutions are made by "purposive movements".
18i.e.. an Opposition Movement.
19Skocpol, T., Ibid. But while, resort to violence is generally considered to be a 
common feature, it is not an imperative requirement, given that on can cite a number 
of examples where the desired transition has been generally "peaceful", resulting in a 
minimum loss of life - e.g.. the transfer of power in 1986, from Ferdinand Marcos to 
Corozon Aquino in the Philippines.
20Here, it is important to note that levels of post-revolutionary violence, can at 
times be much more bloodier than the revolution itself.
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of internal control, that had been very effective for a great number of years, proved 
increasingly inadequate as the crisis in both countries deepened21. As a consequence, 
not only was the desired outcome, at the time - i.e.. a complete overhaul of government, 
fully achieved, but also its violent aspects were generally restricted. Yet, once a new 
government had been installed in Teheran (1979) and in Prague (1999), their 
subsequent resort to violence for various reasons (e.g.. stemming from ideological 
ones to mere punishment for the remnants of the previous order) were significantly 
divergent22.
Disobedience, Legitimacy And Opposition
Questioning "Legitimacy" and "Obedience1' : In his book entitled, "Civility and 
Disobedience", Burton Zwiebach states that 'opposition' or 'resistance" takes place, 
when any act of disobedience is directed against a regime. This act, can then be 
further reinforced by the claim that the regime is 'illegitimate', and as such not entitled 
to claim our loyalty23. Zwiebach relates loyalty,(as an act of political obligation24) directly
21Farhi, F., States and Urban-Based Revolutions - Iran And Nicaragua, University 
of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1990, p. 51.
22ln that while the one in Prague was bloodless, the one in Teheran, was, in 
terms of brutality, without precedent in the country's modern history.
23Zwieback, B., Civility And Disobedience, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (UK), 1975, p. 192.
24According to Zwiebach (Ibid., p.68), "obligation derives from the imperative of 
survival, which as human life involves not merely physical existence but the presence 
of those specifically human capacities we summarize by phrases such as "moral life", 
must be seen to include the survival of that level of human association which makes 
"civility" - political association, culture, and moral life - possible. Consequently, the 
justification of obligation, entails an evaluation of the extent to which a particular set of 
political arrangements assures at least minimal attainment of these things. The most 
interesting and important questions regarding obligation concern the worth of the social
I 6
to the extent that a regime is willing to commit itself to "supporting the values of 
civility25 and the common life" in any given society. Thus, the argument that a regime 
ought not be supported or obeyed can be sustained in any place where it can be shown 
that the conditions of 'obligation1 have been violated. However, according to Zwiebach, 
the mere violation of a condition of obligation, normally only justifies disobedience, and 
not resistance. Resistance or opposition, on the other hand, is justified only when it 
appears that violating the 'condition of the common life' is the condition for the 
existence of the regime. Hence, legitimacy is called into question not merely when 
rights are violated, but where it seems that there is no way to correct that violation 
within the existing political processes. Thus, to justify resistance or opposition, it is 
imperative to establish that repression is both systematic and persistent. Hence, 
resistance assumes the assertion that the regime does not merely deny rights, but it is 
incapable of adequately redressing the evil, even when it has been brought to its 
attention. Zweibach concluded, therefore, that in principle, "it is difficult to avoid raising 
questions of illegitimacy, once rights have been denied by any regularity"26.
Towards a Clearer Concept of "Opposition"______________________________
While opposition movements have always played an important role in world history, and
order demanding obedience"/
25According to Zwiebach (Ibid., p.68), "Civility means more than survival, stability 
and the existence of culture: It is also and necessarily concerned with moral life, for the 
outlawing of barbarism and violence and involves the understanding and the 
attainment, and the transmission of moral ideas; the justification of mutual restraint in 
interpersonal undertakings; and the consequent association of human action with moral 
decision making and free moral judgement".
26Zwieback, B., Ibid., p. 196.
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are by no means a phenomenon of modern times27, their whole disposition, particularly 
their evolution to their current form in non-pluralist societies, as "banned* political actors 
on the international stage, has undergone a significant transformation since the end of 
the Second World War, and the start of the de-colonization process, particularly, in 
areas that have now become the Third World. Thus, as more nations gained their 
independence from their former colonial masters - and in most cases, without the 
necessary state of preparedness for the assumption of the types of responsibilities 
associated with statehood and independent self rule - there has been a general influx 
in the number of disenchanted groups and movements opposed to the policies being 
carried out by their functioning governments. However, this steady increase in the 
number of disenchanted, and generally 'banned* or restricted opposition groups, has 
not by any means, remained confined to the newly emerging states. Indeed, during the 
course of this century, apart from Russia and China, opposition groups - using both 
peaceful methods, as well as armed conflict28 - have been able to successfully dislodge 
many other previously established independent governments, such as Cuba in 1959, 
Iran in 1979, and South Africa in 1994. Although, there are some countries in the Third 
World, in which some form of legal and peaceful opposition to government policy has 
been tolerated, there are, nonetheless, too many countries, worldwide29, where 
democratic forms of dissention from the official state policy line are banned, and those 
wishing to persist with their conflicting views and political agenda are arrested or
27 According to Ted Gurr, "Men have rebelled against their rulers for a millennia" 
(Gurr, T.R., "Why Men Rebel", Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 
1970.).
28According to Che Guevara, only when "People see clearly the futility of maintaining 
the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate", and until such time "A 
government maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla 
outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not been 
exhausted" ( Guerrilla Warfare, Penguin Books Ltd., UK, 1961, p.14.).
29Particularly in the Middle East.
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otherwise dealt with. But, this has not deterred many, who cannot resort to democratic 
means for the attainment of their social, economic, and political aspirations, from 
engaging in various forms of organized resistance or opposition. In particular, during 
the course of the past three decades, this has led to a significant rise in the number of 
individuals and groups, in various countries, who have contributed to the formation of 
a whole new breed of actors in the international political arena30.
Classifying "Opposition”______________________________________________
According to Leonard Schapiro31, the word "opposition", in its English usage, is, so far 
as politics are concerned, of eighteenth century origin, with a peculiarly English 
connotation. It belongs to a period when, in the aftermath of the Revolution and the 
doctrine of Locke, the idea took root that the "Party" of opposition stood 'opposed' to 
the administration of the day, the 'party' of government, ready and anxious to take its 
place32. According to Schapiro, this originally English notion, has just the same, been 
successfully adopted in a number of democracies with very different party systems 
from that of England33. However, in focusing on the subject of his own study at the time 
( namely, the communist regimes of the former Soviet Union and the 'Eastern Bloc'), 
Schapiro states categorically that the term "opposition", in a political sense is ill
30A sample of this can be seen in Revolutionary And Dissent Movements - An 
International Guide, A Keesing's Reference Publication, Longman Group UK Ltd., 1988.
31Schapiro, L., Political Opposition In One-Party States, The McMillan Press Ltd., 
London, 1972, p.3.
32lbid.
33Here, Schapiro (Ibid.)has drawn on other writings, such as Professor Robert 
A. Dahl's, Political Opposition in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, New 
Haven & London, 1966).
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adapted to countries in which rival political parties are not tolerated34. Nevertheless, 
based on Schapiro's general analysis, it can be deduced that disagreements with, or 
opposition to, an existing administration in any authoritarian, or non-democratic, 
country can manifest itself in one of the following forms:35
1. That of "All Out Rejection" of the whole incumbent system of rule, coupled with 
a desire to set up some alternative form of rule. This form of 'opposition' - while not 
necessarily homogeneous - rejects all forms of compromise with the incumbent regime 
and devotes itself fully to its overthrow36.
2. The Concept of "Power Struggle", where one leader at the highest national 
level, attempts to oust another. It thus follows that a "Power Struggle" will almost 
invariably be associated with some fundamental question of ideology or policy. Another 
main feature of a "Power Struggle", is the way in which the displacement of one leader 
by another is succeeded by executive changes of key personnel, which enables the 
new leader to provide himself with a following of adherents who are likely to support 
him in power37.
^Ibid.
35Schapiro, in addressing his writing to the communist countries of the late 
1960s, stresses the fact that the boundaries between different categories which he has 
outlined, are not necessarily permanent or clearly distinct (Ibid., p.3).
36ln a post-revolutionary Iranian context, this is the option that was chosen by 
nearly all of the exiled opposition movements, including NAMIR.
37Despite the fact that in writing about the concept of "Power Struggle",Schapiro 
was thinking about the communist countries of the 1960s, nonetheless, his description 
in its broader sense has particular meaning in the post-revolutionary Iranian context as 
well. While, it can be said that power struggles are not always a universal 
accompaniment of leadership change in such regimes (e.g., like in the former Soviet 
Union following the death of Brezhnev), "Power Struggle", in the sense that has been 
described has manifested itself, on at least three separate periods in post-revolutionary 
Iran. It first manifested itself in 1980-1981, when the then President, Abol-Hassan Bani 
Sadr, was attempting to assert himself on the Iranian political scene. Following 
Khomeini's death, "Power Struggle", in the sense described manifested itself again, 
with President Hashemi Rafsanjani, taking charge and placing all his trusted advisers 
in key positions. And finally, since 1992, we have seen a similar pattern unfolding
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3. That of "Dissent", which is apolitical in the sense that its exponents do not 
advocate the overthrow of the regime, or the replacement of the administration by 
another. They assert the right which they claim derives from the law, to criticize actions 
and policies which are contrary to the constitution of the land38.
4. Various "Interest" or "Pressure" Groups that can operate under the restrictions 
imposed, bearing in mind that they are usually deprived of operating freely without 
government interference39.
T.R. Gurr, looking at the same problem, classifies society under three separate 
categories, by taking into account the intensity of its member's politicized discontent. 
According to him, the "loyalists" are those committed to using "regime-approved" means 
for remedying or protesting deprivations, while the "actively dissident" are those 
committed to the use of illegal means. Finally, according to Gurr, the "neutrals", 
consisting of a majority of most populations, are apathetic or ambivalent about the 
means of action, committed neither to the regime nor to active, illegal opposition40.
again, only this time, with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei attempting to assert himself. In all the 
examples mentioned here, "Power Struggle", has been associated with a fundamental 
difference in both ideology and policy.
^In an Iranian context, this was the very term which was used frequently by Dr. 
Shapour Bakhtiar to describe the People's Mojahedin Organization in the early 1980s.
^See Appendix 3, which is a report prepared by the writer, entitled "The Second 
International Conference on Human Rights - Vienna, 14-25 June 1993". In this report, 
which was prepared following the writer's visit to Vienna during the conference, and his 
interviews with a number of participants, particularly within the ranks of the NGOs, 
specific reference is made to "The Society of Women of the Islamic Revolution", led by 
'Azzam Taleghani' (daughter of the late Ayatollah Taleghani), as well as "The Iranian 
Women Society", represented by Farideh Hakimy, who both fit this category. While, 
both organizations lobby for certain "privileges" for Iranian women, they are not acting 
against the incumbent regime and can thus be categorized as 'friendly interest groups', 
with their activities closely scrutinized by the Islamic authorities. Another Iranian 
participant in the Vienna Conference, fitting this category was "The Iranian Journalist 
Welfare Syndicate", represented by Mohammad Hassan Sazegara and Nader Kavoosi.
40Gurr, T.R., Ibid., p.276.
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Opposition Movements As Transnational Actors
In recent times, even the most militantly internationalist movements have been 
established on a national basis and act as alternative national regimes41. Consequently, 
all revolutionary organizations - aspiring to project themselves as counter-states in 
important international circles - operate almost entirely as actors within their own 
national framework or as an exile from national power42, until such time that they are 
able to secure power at home. But this is not to say that they cannot aspire to greater 
global achievements43, while at the same time using the international stage for the 
promotion of their goals and ideals. This is an important evolution which has taken 
place in the form, as well as the presentation of opposition movements, and one which 
has provided them with a new role in the international arena, for the explicit purpose 
of assisting the promotion of agendas within their own national boundaries.
Opposition Movements as "Pressure Groups": Also, within the modern international 
setting, the plight of all opposition movements, which are barred from open political 
participation in any non-democratic country, is today greatly enhanced and assisted by 
technology and the various dramatic developments that have taken place in the field
41Bell, J.B., "Contemporary Revolutionary Organizations", in Keohane, R.O., & Nye, 
J.S. (Edited), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 153.
42lbid., p. 154.
^Be they the promotion of world revolution or the enhancement of world peace, etc. 
But, according to J. Bowyer Bell (Ibid., p. 168), for those truly committed to 
"transnational revolution" - e.g.,. Khomeini's initial hopes of establishing an "Islamic 
Empire", devoid of any national boundaries (along the lines suggested earlier in the 
century by the Moslem Brotherhood who sought to overthrow atheistic regime, in the 
name of universal Islamic state) - the prospects look as bleak as ever.
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of mass communication. These developments44, can be used to go "over the heads" of 
incumbent governments, by establishing a direct link and 'rapport' between various 
opposition movements, and the ordinary citizen who form their constituency. Thus, it 
is possible for opposition movements to utilize these means for painting a more 
accurate picture of the socio-economic and political realities in their respective 
societies, and for communicating their views to the general population and also their 
vision of a better system of government. The examples of the dismantlement of the 
former Soviet Union, and the fall of the Berlin Wall have demonstrated in vivid terms 
that it is, in fact, possible to defy the pundits and attain what may have appeared to be, 
only a short time before, a seemingly impossible task. So, whether by peaceful means 
or by some form of violence, past experience has demonstrated a great adaptability 
on the part of banned opposition movements to overcome formidable difficulties and 
ostensibly insurmountable odds, by the ultimate achievement of their stated objectives. 
Backed by realistic policies, and agendas which are in conformity with the general 
aspirations of their compatriots, there is reason to hope that this established trend will 
continue to manifest itself in the future.
In this international environment45, one of the most suitable venues, which opposition 
movements can use for the promotion of their agendas, is amongst the growing 
multitude of "Nongovernmental Organizations", or NGOs, as they are more commonly 
referred to.
Indeed, ever since the very inception of the United Nations, Article 71 of the its Charter,
^Radio Broadcasts, Satellite TV, Fax, Phone etc.
^Given, particularly, its interdependent nature, and bearing in mind that events 
in one country can have profound effect on others.
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makes specific reference to nongovernmental organizations, and in all the years that 
the United Nations has been in existence, a great number of serious and major 
contributions, particularly, in the field of human rights have been made by a number of 
important NGOs. These contributions, have simultaneously provided opposition 
movements with unique opportunities for drawing the full attention of the international 
community to many issues related to their agendas. In the past, this has been achieved 
by using either the good offices of a suitable "promotional pressure group"46, like 
Amnesty International47, or a sympathetic member state48. Alternatively, it is possible
46Willetts, P., Pressure Groups in the Global System - The Transnational Relations 
of Issue oriented Non-Governmental Organizations, 1st Edition, Frances Pinter 
(Publishers), London 1982, p.3.
^Organizations such as Amnesty International, the Anti-Apartheid Movement and 
Oxfam have all obtained consultative status with ECOSOC under category II. According 
to Peter Willetts (Ibid., p.214), of the 640 NGOs which have been granted consultative 
status, 31 are in category I (composed mainly of major organizations, with members in 
a large number of countries, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions), 215 in 
category II (e.g.,. inclusive of such important NGOs, as the International Commission 
of Jurists, International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Socialist International), 
and 394 are on the Roster (the overwhelming majority of which are highly specialized, 
such as the International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in 
Southern Africa).There are three ways of gaining a place on the Roster: 152 NGOs 
have been approved by ECOSOC; 28 have been recommended by the UN Secretary 
General; and 214 are on the list by virtue of having consultative status with specialized 
agencies or other UN bodies.
48ln April 1981, the writer was empowered by Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, the Leader of 
the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR ), to approach the President 
of Panama, in order to seek his government's assistance for urging the forthcoming 
session of the UN General Assembly to consider the issue of human rights violations 
in Iran. The idea was that a Panamanian representative in the General Assembly's 
Third Committee, would make a strong speech condemning human rights violations in
Iran, and would then urge the Committee to place this item on its agenda for annual 
consideration. While there was never any particular affinity between NAMIR and the 
government of Panama - bearing in mind, specially, that only a year before there were 
strong rumors that the Panamanians were intending to hand the exiled Shah back to 
the Islamic authorities in Iran - an arrangement was reached whereby NAMIR could 
receive the type of publicity it was trying to promote, while the Panamanians would, at 
the same time, be awarded "certain compensation" for their efforts. The negotiations 
were successfully conducted in Panama city, but the whole arrangement fell apart a 
few months later, in the aftermath of the accidental death of the Panamanian strongman 
General Omar Torijos, who had approved the agreed package.
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for opposition movements to present their cases directly - provided they have obtained 
consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or Observer 
status to the UN49. However, making direct representation to a formal meeting of an 
international agency, is a privilege which is not readily available to a great majority of 
opposition movements. Therefore, most opposition movements, like any other NGOs, 
have the opportunity of holding "fringe meetings" during the course of any important 
international gathering where they are able to present and publicize their cases with 
almost equal effect. For example, during the course of the Second International 
Conference on Human Rights, which was held in Vienna in June 1993, more than one 
hundred different personalities and political organizations - led by such respected 
international figures as the Dalai Lama of Tibet - acting in opposition to their national 
governments were allowed to set up 'Presentations Desks'50 and disseminate their own 
information material and assessments about various problems that confronted their 
compatriots in their homelands, with the explicit aim of mobilizing international support 
for their agendas51.
Thus, NGOs, in their "diplomatic" interpretation, meaning "organized groups of people 
who wish to influence political decisions"52, have come to acquire another useful
^e.g.,. The PLO does not have consultative status with ECOSOC, but can address 
ECOSOC in its capacity of an observer to the UN. Since 1977, the PLO has also 
enjoyed full membership of the subsidiary Economic Commission for West Asia.
“ Supplied with photographs and literature.
51 In this context, "women's groups, which form a distinct sub-category among the 
communal groups" or opposition movements, can further augment the efforts of a 
particular organization, by using the same forum in order to exert extra, independent 
pressure on certain issues, that have the ability of attracting enough attention by 
themselves.
“ According to Willetts (Ibid., p.1), diplomats have come to choose this terminology 
over "lobby" or "interest groups", which "carries a strong sectional interest towards 
considering sectional economic interests as being more important or influential". He
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function by promoting, on an international scale, the aims and objectives of numerous 
disaffected national groups seeking to implement change within their own national 
boundaries. This function has been of particular benefit, since in the last two decades, 
there have been far fewer countries that have required liberation from the "yoke of a 
foreign oppressor", and many more that have needed liberation from "the scourge" of 
a multitude of repressive domestic regimes53.
Therefore, in summarizing the arguments presented, it is possible to establish that, in 
contemporary international politics, political opposition to un-democratic rule, can 
manifest itself in at least one of the major categories outlined above54.
"Banned" Opposition Movements And The Stakes Involved_________________
As previously stated, "Banned Opposition (or Resistance) Movements", as actors on 
the international stage, are a phenomenon of modern times. Moreover, the history of 
all successful revolutions, particularly those in the twentieth century, can be traced to 
a particular group or set of individuals, who formed the original core of a movement that 
was eventually able to impose its views.
states that some NGOs, by trying to bring about social change, acquire the features of 
a "pressure group', and he concludes that it is the act of applying "pressure" that brings 
them into the political sphere.
53According to Willetts, based on this analysis, whenever a claim is made for 
international recognition of the 'national right to self determination', a domestic 
communal group has in effect converted itself into a liberation movement. In an Iranian 
context, the main objective of NAMIR, and all other liberal-democratic movements, has 
been the removal of the provisions of Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of "Velayate 
Faghih" from the Iranian constitution. Such an achievement would be the first step 
toward to the establishment of a system which enshrined the concept of the 'national 
right to self determination' in its most supreme document - i.e.. its national constitution.
540ne must allow for instances where there is some overlapping.
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While, an analysis of the net benefits to society of any "fundamental socio-political 
change accomplished through violence"55, apart from those for national independence 
against foreign domination, is a separate subject for debate, there is a great deal of 
evidence to suggest that there has been a huge increase in the number of potential 
actors in this area56 (particularly in the post-colonial period), committed57 to the setting 
up of a new order in their various countries58. Just the same, the role associated with 
banned opposition movements in contemporary international politics is a precarious 
one, due to the enormity of the stakes that are involved. If victorious in their efforts, 
leaders of opposition movements achieve the ultimate, in a political sense - i.e., they 
win, and thereby form the government of the day; define the ideals; set the national
55The definition of revolution according to T.R. Gurr (Why Men Rebel, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, p.4).
^Bell, J.B., "Contemporary Revolutionary Organizations", in Keohane, R.O., & 
Nye, J.S. (Edited), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 168.
570 r 'allegedly' committed. The point trying to be made is that, in terms of 
international politics, "Opposition Movements", across the board, have been somewhat 
of a "growth industry".
58This can be quantified in various ways. One simple way is by determining the 
increase in number of opposition groups that have been registered in the Second 
Edition of Revolutionary And Dissident Movements - An International Guide [A 
Keesing's Reference Publication, Longman Group UK Ltd., 1988]. It should be borne 
in mind that this particular reference book does not contain information about all the 
existing groups that are opposed to their incumbent governments, but concentrates 
mainly on those which have been more prominent in projecting an image of themselves 
through various means, such as the ability to engage in lobbying efforts in major 
international centers, such London, Paris, or Washington (e.g.. in its section on Iran, 
no mention has been made of numerous monarchist splinter groups scattered from 
areas bordering Iran in Turkey and Pakistan, to the suburbs of major cities in Western 
Europe and the United States). Another important yard-stick is reference to the 
abundant presence of tens of opposition and "interest groups" (such as the Bahaiis), 
all with different backgrounds, but united in their opposition to their incumbent 
governments- under the banner of a Non Governmental Organization (NGO) - during 
the course of the Second International Conference on Human Rights that was held in 
Vienna Austria in June 1993. This was a stark contrast to the First International 
Conference on Human Rights, held in Teheran, in 1968, where virtually no opposition 
group was represented, under any category.
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agenda; dispense the patronage; and govern the people. If unsuccessful, they 
invariably weaken in resolve, become fragmented, and eventually degenerate into 
insignificance.
For the true believers who associate with any such movements, the desire to succeed, 
and the fear of extinction are, in most cases, the only two real alternatives that will 
confront them in their endeavors. However, for some who are more cynical and less 
idealistic, there is also a third. Indeed, there have been many political movements in 
this century whose so-called leaders have never intended (or were intended) to become 
victorious in the true sense. Instead, victory for this category of individuals has normally 
meant the securing of adequate funds to run their various bureaucracies, or to provide 
for their own subsistence. It is also a fact that this objective has suited many 
governments, major international business concerns and private individuals: they have 
funded such opposition or resistance movements for the sole purpose of promoting 
their own agendas, which are often far more selective than the stated goals and 
objectives of the earmarked recipient organization59
^In the present Iranian context, an Iranian exile group by the name of "Derafsh-e 
Kaviani" (Flag of Freedom Organization of Iran)- recently renamed as "The Iranian 
Organization for the Defense of Basic Freedoms and Human Rights"- has been funded 
by the US Government (USG) for the "alleged" purpose of overthrowing the Islamic 
dictatorship and establishing a democratic order in its place. However, this 
organization, much like the 'proverbial man', has been too light to do any heavy work, 
and too heavy to do any light work. As a result, not only does it not have any credibility 
with the Iranian people, its existence has also come to reinforce the belief that its 
continued existence (based on the supposition that without USG funding, it would 
cease to have a membership of even one!), indicates the limits of American intent 
against the Islamic Republic. The clear meaning of such an interpretation is that far 
from threatening to overthrow the Iranian regime, this American sponsored group has 
been created and kept afloat only to remind the Iranian authorities of the continuing 
potential of an American threat (i.e., which can always be "heated up"). Based on this 
analysis, it is hardly surprising to note that apart from persons receiving direct salaries 
from this organization, the outfit has failed to attract a following, and is generally 
isolated in Iranian circles, and devoid of credibility.
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Yet, despite the difficulties and the enormity of odds that usually confront such 
movements, comprable opposition struggles have persisted, and opposition movements 
have continued to mushroom on the international scene. Nonetheless, a realistic 
assessment of the stakes involved - i.e., a full understanding on the part of both the 
leadership and the membership, of the risks and rewards inherent in their efforts - is 
a matter of crucial importance in both the establishment and the enhancement of 
organizations which are capable of presenting a serious challenge to any functioning 
regime.
Structural Requirements for a Credible Opposition Movement_______________
The ultimate criteria forjudging the potential of any political opposition movement is its 
ability to present itself as a credible force capable of exerting a decisive influence on 
the political atmosphere in which it operates. The ability of a movement to generate this 
is, in turn, contingent upon a whole series of other factors, such as its ability to 
mobilize and organize those sections of the population, who sympathize commensurate 
with its aspirations. Thus it is essential that an opposition movement should create a 
structure, in which the potential of endowing itself with such credibility can become a 
possibility.
While an analysis of what is generally referred to as 'mobilization' and 'organization', 
may assist in explaining what is structurally required by any Opposition Movement, it 
is important that reference also be made to a number of other vital factors, such as 
leadership, membership, vision, strategy, and trust, all of which are essential for the 
projection of 'credibility', without which no movement can ever cherish any realistic
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hope of attaining its stated objectives.
In his book entitled, "From Mobilization to Revolution", Charles Tilly says that "by a 
'movement', we often mean a group of people identified by their attachment to some 
particular set of beliefs. While groups constitute the basic unit for the study of 
'collective action', the notion of a movement, is usually more complicated than the idea 
of groups and events"60. According to Tilly, collective action takes place when people 
begin to act together in pursuit of common interests, which in turn stems from a 
combination of what he terms as "interest", "organization", "mobilization", and 
"opportunity"61. However, Tilly is of the view that the most persistent problem faced in 
analyzing collective action -i.e., joint action in pursuit of a common end62 - is its lack of 
"sharp edges", in that people vary continuously from intensive involvement to passive 
compliance, and interests vary continuously from quite individual to nearly universal63.
In this regard, the prospects of any aspiring political opposition movement are to a very 
large extent dependent upon avoiding the types of common contradictions and 
confusions, to which Tilly has referred. Hence, it is vital for any such movement to 
ensure that its message, and the collective action it espouses, are both sharp and
60Tilly, C., From Mobilization to Revolution, McGraw Hill, New York, 1978, p. 10.
61According to Tilly, Ibid., p.7, these components have been described as 
follows: Interest: a groups' goals and ideals; Organization: a group's structure which 
most directly affects its capacity to act on its interests; Mobilization: the process by 
which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for common 
action; and finally, Opportunity: is the relationship between the group and the world 
around it.
62lbid., p. 84. Tilly further elaborates this matter by pointing out that the extent 
of a group's collective action is a function of (1) the extent of its shared interest (2) the 
intensity of its organization (3) the extent of its mobilization (i.e., the amount of 
resources under its control).
63lbid., p. 10.
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unambiguous. By striving for clarity and unambiguity, any opposition movement can 
thus present a feasible challenge or threat to any functioning regime, provided it is able 
to project a credible image of itself with the aid of ideology and organization, prior to 
actual confrontation64.
The Role of Ideology in Any Opposition Movement
The role ideology plays in mobilizing masses for socio-political change in any society65, 
is of pre-eminent importance66. It thus follows that in ideological mobilization, certain 
ideas and slogans come to represent the struggle against a regime. Moreover, it is the 
process through which a particular view of society comes to dominate the rhetoric and 
the way in which the status quo is altered or a new social order is created67.
A very important ingredient necessary for the success of any opposition movement, lies 
in its ability to bridge the ideological gap between its 'intellectual elites' and the rest of
^Confrontation can be either peaceful of with the use of force.
65 e.g., Islamic activism in Iran, and Sandinista socialism in Nicaragua.
“ According to G. Therbom (The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology, New 
Left Books, 1980), "ideology serves to set a common agenda for a mass of people.... 
Such mobilization develops through a breach of the regime's matrix of affirmations and 
sanctions, which in normal times ensures compromise of acquiescence and the 
successful sanctioning of oppositional forces.... A successful ideological mobilization 
is always translated or manifested in practices of political mobilization".
67Farhi, F., Ibid., p. 101. According to Farhi, "the most important presupposition 
is the rejection of ideology as a system of ideas. Instead, ideology is conceived as a 
dynamic, ongoing social process through which subjects are created and yet, at the 
same time, is subject to transformation by the willful actions of more or less 
knowledgeable actors". Hence, according to her, ideology must be understood by 
aligning it not with mere political beliefs or ideals, but with the large cultural systems 
that preceded it and out of which, as well as against which it came into being." (Ibid., 
p.83).
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society, while at the same time, being "creative" in so far as allowing individuals and 
groups to articulate and pursue different visions of the past and the future. But, while 
ideology can help to stimulate unity of purpose and thereby general mobilization within 
any society, it is incapable of explaining a revolutionary outcome by itself68 - being 
entirely dependent upon the full backing of a well structured organization and a 
dedicated membership to fulfil its role. But, the fact remains that the future prospects 
of any well structured and dedicated political organization is similarly dependent upon 
the type of ideology which the movement comes to represent. Stated more clearly in 
terms of the current study, the prospects for any opposition movement with a popular 
ideology and a weak organization are just as bleak as those of a well structured and 
efficient organization with an unpopular ideology69.
The Role of Organization in Any Opposition Movement_____________________
For "counter-elites acting in unison and creating instability"70 to produce multiple 
sovereignty, and thus force a stage of political crisis (or revolution), commitment to 
them must be activated in the face of constraints or contrary directives imposed by the
“ Ibid., p.101.
“ This proposition best manifests itself through a simple, cursory look at the 
current political opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although, the liberal- 
democratic ideology professed by the 'Iranian Constitutionalists', is potentially very 
popular, nonetheless, the latter have not been able to make a significant impact on the 
Iranian political scene, mainly as a result of their failure to be represented by a well 
structured and efficient organization. On the other hand, despite being endowed by an 
efficient and experienced political organization, the radical Mojahedin have also failed 
to make any serious headway, simply on the grounds that the ideology they profess 
(and despite the fact that it is being constantly diluted) is generally perceived as being 
too unpopular. Thus, a conclusion can be made that only through a happy marriage 
between ideology and organization can any serious movement develop realistic hopes 
of entering into a potentially successful confrontational campaign with an existing 
regime.
70T.R. Gurr's definition of an opposition movement.
functioning regime. The existence of a coherent organization makes a crucial difference 
at this particular point, in terms of facilitating the initial seizure of control and activating 
the commitment already made by specific men71.
While according to Charles Tilly, the first main determinant of a group's mobilization72, 
is its organization73, T.R. Gurr goes further by suggesting that different degrees of 
organization can, in turn, affect the degree of civil strife and instability in any 
undemocratic society.
According to T.R. Gurr, apart from structural characteristics like "scope, cohesiveness, 
and complexity", it is the organization's capacity to provide their members with "value 
opportunities, satisfaction, and the means for expressing protest", that can assist in 
providing patterns of action that can have rewarding consequences for any 
movement74. According to him the 'scope' of an organization is determined by the size 
or proportion of the population that is likely to participate in any anti-regime activity 
sponsored by the opposing movement75. Furthermore, the scope of the potential 
opposition against a functioning government, is likely to determine "the form of strife",
71Tilly, C., Ibid., p.208.
72The word mobilization conveniently identifies the process by which a group 
goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant of public life. 
The extent of a group's collective action (i.e. joint action in pursuit of common ends) is 
in turn, a function of (1) the extent of its shared interest, (2) its mobilization, and (3) the 
extent of its organization.
730ther main determinants include, "its interest in possible interaction with other 
contenders, the 'current opportunity' and the group's subjection to repression" (Tilly, C., 
Ibid., p. 56).
74Gurr, T.R., Ibid, p.274.
75lbid., p.283.
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that will need to be adopted by a particular movement. Similarly, according to Gurr, 
'Cohesiveness' is the extent of goal consensus and cooperative interaction among 
members, while 'complexity', is the extent of hierarchial and functional differentiation 
within a movement itself76.
The scope, cohesiveness and complexity of organized groups also affect their ability 
to carry out functions of any kind such as seizure of power and satisfaction of popular 
expectations to name but a few. Aspiring opposition movements must generally strive 
to have a high degree of both cohesiveness and complexity within their organizations. 
While neither is a necessary condition for the other, they are, nevertheless, both 
considered to be reinforcing conditions essential to the successful outcome of any 
movement. Finally, it is also essential for organizations to develop the capacity to 
provide their members with value opportunities, satisfaction, as well as the means for 
expressive protest77.
The Role of Leadership
76lbid., p. 285.
77lbid., p. 274. What needs to be addressed are the factors that lead to the 
establishment of disenchanted groups which eventually become opposition movements. 
Here, a lack of democratic means for critical expression, ideology and repression, are 
perhaps the simplest examples that come to mind. But there are others. When formed, 
the shape and size of the movement, and the way in which it proposes to carry out its 
objectives, are the next factors that warrant consideration. If a group chooses to resort 
to violence for the achievement of its objectives, then even a small group can create 
significant problems and be taken seriously on both the national and international 
levels- the best examples that come to mind are "Action Direct" in France, "Hezbollah" 
in the Lebanon, and the "Mojahedin Khalq" in Iran. All these organizations gained 
international fame for their opposition to the established governments of their 
respective countries. Here, it would be essential to look at the role of terrorism as a 
political instrument for the achievement of policy by some opposition movements [e.g.,. 
the I.R.A.]
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The development of leadership, cadres, differentiation of organizational functions, and 
the establishment of formal bodies to carry out functions greatly facilitate the survival 
and effectiveness of opposition movements78. In this respect, the role assigned to 
leadership is of critical importance. This is due to the fact that it is primarily the function 
of leaders to articulate various doctrines, help raise and maintain morale, and convince 
their followers to continue with their struggle in adverse circumstances, particularly in 
times when there might be no alternative but violent confrontation with the functioning 
regime79. It thus follows that in times of crisis, competent leadership and complex 
organization may be used to minimize, and contain the extent of political violence.
Other organizational functions to which leadership contributes are the provision of 
normative and physical support for followers, thereby increasing group cohesiveness. 
A major function of doctrines articulated by leaders is to provide their followers with 
normative justifications for opposition. Leadership also plays an important role in giving 
the necessary momentum to attain the "revolutionary outcome" desired - i.e. "the 
displacement of one set of power holders by another"80- for which the opposition 
movement was initially formed. In the final analysis, given that leaders should be 
endowed with the potential for guiding members' discontents into a variety of relevant 
activities, leadership must provide patterns of action that have predictably rewarding 
consequences for their followers, and it is ultimately against such a yard stick that 
leaders are either retained or superseded by any dynamic movement.
78lbid., p.290.
79According to T.R. Gurr (Ibid., p.292), "highly competent leadership is necessary 
i for the creation and direction of persistent organized violence".
80Tilly, C., Ibid., p. 193.
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However, problems for opposition movements emerge when there is a huge gap in 
terms of personality and prestige between a 'leader' (a problem which is less often 
associated with a collective leadership), and an organization's membership. The net 
result, in such circumstances, is that the movement is likely to become totally reliant 
and fully identified with its leader, who is most cases is likely to be a colorful person 
of great charisma. The net effect is such cases can be both positive and negative: 
positive, in the sense that a charismatic leader of national or international fame is likely 
to attract greater attention which might help accelerate the growth and popularity of a 
movement. Alternatively, should something happen to that leader, or should the leader 
become too self-centred and irrational, then the movement as a whole will suffer and 
probably become insignificant.
Why People Participate in Revolutions:
The Role of Membership_______________________________________________
One cannot discuss the issue of membership without some form of a more general 
reference to the whole issue of what motivates people to participate in opposition 
movements. It is a fact that every social scientific treatment of revolution includes a 
theory of motivation and a psychology of the revolutionary behavior.
According to Michael S. Kimmel, two sources of motivation - despair and hope - propel 
people into revolutionary activity and motivate their behavior. These sources are 
mutually reinforcing in that while despair may make revolutionary activity necessary it 
is hope that transforms a rebellion or revolt into a purposive and visionary movement 
that is capable of transforming the social foundations of political power81.
81 Kimmel, M.S., Revolution - A Sociological Interpretation, Temple University 
Press, Philadelphia, 1990, p. 12.
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It thus follows that one cannot fully consider an opposition movement aiming to 
implement change in any one society, without taking into consideration the role of its 
membership, who are expected to be the 'vanguards' of their societies for carrying out 
this work82. People become revolutionary or active members of an opposition 
movement, when they become desperate enough to mobilize themselves politically to 
overthrow the existing system, and when they become hopeful enough to believe that 
by mobilizing themselves to take political action they have some reasonable prospect 
of success. Thus, according to Kimmel, "when people make revolutions, they are acting 
on their dreams"83.
Therefore, to fully grasp the requirements of mobilization, apart from the structural 
theories of revolution, adequate attention must also be paid to the role of revolutionary 
psychology -i.e. structural theories84 which tell us much about the causes or the 
consequences of revolution, which need to be augmented with factors pertaining to the 
social psychology of a particular society. This in turn, begs some consideration for the 
role of "culture" in times of change or revolution.
It is a fact that opposition movements are successfully organized in proportion to the 
strength and relative unity of their cultural basis. Cultural questions inevitably involve 
values, a socially derived morality that people apply to the institutions and structures 
which exert such inexorable power over their lives. Here, loss of legitimacy, affected by 
any cultural imbalance, in ensuring the downfall of a particular regime is important, if
82lbid., p. 188.
83lbid., p. 193.
84i.e. the causal role of the international system, class relations, levels of 
productions, etc.
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not more, than economic difficulties or the disintegration of the ruling regime's coercive 
apparatus. Thus, far from being necessarily a retardant of social change, tradition, 
culture, and values may propel a people towards revolutionary challenge. Based on 
this assertion, Kimmel concludes by insisting that "down playing human agency, also 
downplays the role of the individual as a human actor"85. Kimmel is, therefore, of the 
view that it is important to focus on the capacity of individuals to act together, to make 
strategic choices, and to influence one another. This is in turn related to the role that 
is played by charismatic leaders which cannot be fully understood without taking into 
account culture and ideology on the one hand, and "individual agency" on the other86. 
This is due to the fact that charisma involves the rejection of convention, of established 
political order, and creates possibilities for new and different forms of rule. The fact that 
opposition movements often do succeed without "charisma", does not mean that one 
should disregard the enormous potential which charisma theoretically possesses for 
mobilizing individuals or a membership87. Thus, charisma - i.e. "this non-rational form 
of authority"88 - has the ability to "mobilize, activate,' and politicize" emotions, assisting 
membership in any opposition movement to the types of social upheaval that it is trying 
to create for the attainment of its final objectives. But, the role that is effectively played 
by any membership can at the same time vary according to the scope, as well as the 
strategy of opposition chosen by any one movement.
Visions
85Kimmel, M.S., Ibid., p. 190.
“ Ibid., p. 191. Kimmel goes on to say that charisma is a capacity to revolutionize 
people "from within", offering a "revolutionary will" as an alternative to legal or 
traditional orders.
87lbid., p. 191.
“ Ibid., P. 192.
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One of the most difficult tasks confronting any leadership and indispensable to its 
success, is the provision of an inspiring "vision" of the society that is to be created, 
once the movement has successfully completed its mission. This vision must be 
capable of capturing the hearts and minds of the membership, in the first instance, as 
well as winning the trust of other important sectors of the society at a later stage, and 
should transcend the day to day rhetoric of mediocre politicians. No amount of 
organization, planning, or discussion can supplant this primary requirement. Thus, for 
any aspiring opposition movement and its leadership to establish themselves as the 
future successors of existing regimes, it is absolutely essential that they articulate and 
inform their populations of this important requirement, thereby promoting the notion that 
the movement is able to play the role of "savior" with the ability to address all their 
legitimate needs and desires.
Strategy_____________________________________________________________
Twentieth century opposition movements have discovered their strategies quite 
independently, based on their own experience, instinct, and of course, native traditions. 
According to Laqueur89, in discussing guerrilla warfare, there is nothing in the purely 
military pages of Mao or Che Guevara which a traditional band leader would regard as 
other than simple common sense. If so, the novelty of twentieth century guerilla warfare 
would seem to be not so much military as political. Therefore, by "Strategy", we mean 
calculated courses of action that are available to an opposition movement, the pursuit 
of which may or may not ultimately achieve the desired outcome.
89Laqueur, W., Guerrilla - A Historical and Critical Study, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, London, 1977, p. 385.
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In the twentieth century, while studying the success of the Bolshevik movement in 
Russia, the communists in China, Ghandi in India, and Khomeini in Iran, it can be seen 
that different tactics were used by the respective victorious leaders to achieve 
mobilization and the types of collective action best suited for the fulfillment of their 
strategy. It thus can be concluded that major change can come about and ruling 
authorities can become supplanted through a number of different modes, depending 
on the overall strategy pursued by a movement, such as a coup d'etat, guerrilla warfare, 
civil disobedience, or a national uprising which is triggered by urban insurrection.
This entails an undertaking that gives serious account not only to the various assets 
and potentials that are available to a movement, but, more importantly, also to the 
resources which are at the disposal of the functioning authorities, against whom the 
campaign is being conducted. Success or failure depends on numerous variables that 
require calculation90. Thus to ensure success, strategies require effective leadership, 
organization, and communication among all participants. Strategies of resistance 
movements vary a great deal from one another according to the existing disposition of 
their 'opposing forces'. In the final analysis, to achieve success, the opposition 
movement and its leaders must overcome barriers before them through reliance on 
their own strategy91, as well as the ingenuity displayed by the movement's membership.
"Johnson, C., Ibid., p. 140.
91 According to Chalmers Johnson, whatever the final form of strategy - e.g. a coup 
d'etat or guerrilla warfare, etc. - the first requirement is to organize the aspiring party 
itself - i.e. the movement to whom the active membership will owe their primary 
allegiance and from whom they will take their orders. A second requirement of this 
strategy is to identify and exploit issues that will lead to greater acceptability in the 
international arena, and greater cooperation on the home front with other disenchanted 
social groups within the country- i.e. the notion of striving for a "united front". This 
notion has also received some important mention by Michael S. Kimmel. It is important 
to bear in mind that all strategies in such matters contain extremely large elements of 
risk, even when calculated in the most careful and realistic manner.
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Sustaining An Opposition Movement
To sustain an opposition movement, what is required most, apart from ideology, 
motivation, and organization are funds and 'other resources', which are essential to 
sustain the activities of any opposition movement by allowing it the room it needs to 
grow and attain the stature necessary for making credible demands. The level of funds 
and other resources available, will in most cases, determine the likely outcome of any 
opposition. For example, in many cases, securing funds may be only adequate to 
enable an opposition movement to maintain a profile. However, if serious attempt is 
likely to be made at overthrowing an established system, then even large amounts of 
funds, alone, may not be adequate. Other resources, such as broadcasting facilities, 
key personnel92, arms, communication equipment, and training might also be 
necessary. Finally, the degree of recognition that an opposition movement receives 
from external sources is another important factor [diplomatic support prior to acquisition 
of power, and diplomatic recognition following its acquisition].
Concluding Observations on Conceptual Framework
Opposition movements may affect the course of political action by existing
92The mention of the term "key personnel", open a very important issue with 
which Charles Tilly (Ibid., p. 170) has dealt in some detail, while discussing the choice 
between "loyalty and effectiveness" in any membership. According to Tilly, effective 
employees or members often use their effectiveness to serve themselves, while loyal 
employees or members are often ineffective. To strive for effectiveness, apart from the 
whole notion of loyalty, an organization sometimes requires specialized professionals, 
for which it hen requires to allocate resources according to the type of assignment that 
is required. For example, tasks such as coming up with a contingency plan for 
disrupting water and electric utilities or broadcasting on an effective frequency, are 
specialized jobs, which might form a key part of an opposition movement’s strategy. If 
ultimate success is hinged on the ability to carry out such a task, then the opposition 
movement must come up with the required resources and the key personnel must be 
recruited.
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governments. Thus, they may have an impact on the wider political field, irrespective 
of their being successful in attaining their stated political objectives.
Furthermore, one can elaborate the ways in which 'home' and 'foreign' governments 
have dealt with an opposition movement in order to achieve their own objectives. 
There are times when a home government [meaning the government of the country 
which the opposition movement is focused against], itself, uses opposing forces to 
enhance its own position domestically. In the case of Iran- and the same may also be 
applied to other countries- certain key personalities in the government of the day 
[mostly in SAVAK] developed an interest in the 1960s to use the "myth" concerning the 
Tudeh party which by then had become virtually non-existent [due to arrest, execution 
and the exile of the bulk of its leadership in the late 1950s], to fund and indirectly 
control a number of leftist/communist dissidents. Though this was clearly aimed at 
promoting the ambitions of a certain few, it did nevertheless involve the Iranian 
government as a whole, and it did create the false impression both at home and abroad 
that the left was in fact dangerously active inside the country. This arrangement was 
clearly of benefit only to a number of government officials who had devised the scheme, 
and there was never any question that the so-called opposing forces were a source of 
threat to the government93
More commonly, however, opposition movements are funded and assisted by external 
governments who wish to use them in pursuit of their own national interests94. Of
93This matter was mentioned in a number of discussions that have been held in 
recent years in London between the writer and Lt. General Mohsen Mobasser, the 
former Head of the Iranian Police Force.
^During the past three decades countries such as the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have all played a role in this respect. Also, In the Arab 
world, many such movements have often been controlled or promoted for irredentist
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course, the national interests of an external power need not necessarily be in conflict 
with the national interests of a country on whose behalf a particular opposition 
movement is engaged. But, there are also times when an opposition movement acts as 
a fifth column for the aspirations of an ambitious external power, such as the various 
communist movements that acted as clients of the former Soviet Union in a number of 
countries. Again, in the Iranian context, since 1979, we have seen how scores of 
foreign countries have tried to make use of various opposition movements for various 
reasons in order to meet their own particular objectives.
The prospects of success by any opposition movement, are also viewed with particular 
attention by many others who are likely to experience some change - either positive or 
negative - should that movement succeed in acquiring power. Thus, the activities of any 
credible opposition movement warrants consideration at three different but interlocking 
levels. This is due to the fact that a successful opposition movement can affect the 
political environment at the home, regional, and international levels. Therefore, all 
opposition movements with an eye to success, must clearly gear themselves to confront 
the various obstacles which may be placed before them during the course of their 
struggle, from all these levels. Hence, the perceived view and policy objectives of the 
functioning regime, regional governments, and the 'major powers' vis-a-vis any 
opposition movement is of paramount importance. A failure, on the part of any 
opposition movement, to comprehend the significance of coming up with a political 
strategy that is capable of meeting these challenges can be very serious. In particular, 
they must come up with policy positions that give full consideration to both regional as 
well as 'major powers' perceptions (now that we no longer have a bi-polar world).
reasons, aimed at acquiring chunks of disputed territory or settling some other form of 
feud.
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Relating Conceptual Framework to the Chosen Case Study
The Islamic Revolution in Iran, which began with a small uprising in January 197895 and 
ended successfully in February 1979, was the first major break in the Third World from 
the revolutionary model of protracted armed struggle (e.g., China, Vietnam, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, etc.) for one of mass insurrection96. Moreover, it was a revolution which 
itself, had incorporated much of the conceptual framework, to which the preceding 
paragraphs have alluded.
In short, it materialized mainly because by 1978, all sectors of Iranian society seemed 
discontented with the Shah and with their own situations97. Thus, according to Theda
95According to Sir Anthony Parsons, "A few days after President Carter’s 
departure, the government inadvertently lit the fuse that was to detonate the mine 
which, a year later, would destroy the Pahlavi dynasty and all it stood for. For some 
time the authorities had been getting worried about the inflammatory effect on public 
opinion of the clandestine Khomeini cassette recordings. In early January, someone
decided that Khomeini must be openly discredited A long article was published in
one of the leading newspapers traducing in lurid detail Khomeini's personal 
background, his private morals and his religious credentials... On January 9th serious 
rioting broke out in the holy city of Qom, Khomeini's spiritual home. The situation 
passed beyond the control of the local police. Troops were called in, and whether 
through panic or by design, they fired into the crowd... The whole country was shocked 
and staggered by the incident and a crisis developed between Muslim religious 
leadership and the government..." (The Pride and the Fall - Iran 1974-1979, Jonathan 
Cape, London, 1984, p. 61).
^Eqbal Ahmad's Comments on Theda Skocpol's, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam 
in the Iranian Revolution", Theory and Society. May 1982, p.293.
97ln many interviews conducted by the writer at the time just prior to the start of 
the Iranian Revolution (at the time a doing research at the IISS), this point was 
generally validated, and applied even to very senior figures in the Shah's 
administration. So much so, that it was commonly stated that general discontent was 
such that "a street sweeper thought that he had been swindled into sweeping the street, 
and should instead had been a more senior official in the local council; the more senior 
official at the local council felt that he was swindled, and should instead have been a 
more senior figure in the ministry; the more senior figure at the ministry thought he
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Skocpol, the Iranian Revolution was a product of social disruption, social disorientation, 
and universal frustration with the pace of change98. This state of dissatisfaction had 
gradually transformed itself into an extra ordinary series of mass urban demonstrations 
and strikes which grew continuously in size and ultimately rendered the regime's only 
source of defense, namely its coercive organizations, totally ineffective - without 
having suffered defeat in any external war or come under pressure from any external 
source99. But, irrespective of its distinct features100, the Iranian Revolution also 
incorporated, in one form or another, nearly all of the theoretical concepts generally 
associated with revolution, to which the major portion of this chapter has been devoted 
(e.g. concepts such as disobedience, legitimacy, ideology, mobilization, collective 
action, etc.).
Once the broad and heterogeneous coalition that had been formed around Ayatollah 
Khomeini had triumphed in Iran, the general perception on the part of most Iranians as 
well as many Western observers, was that Western oriented liberal-democrats, would 
shape the new regime and implement the types of reforms, particularly advocated 
during the preceding months (i.e. the establishment a democratic order with respect for 
popular sovereignty and basic freedoms, etc.). Indeed, the appointment of Mehdi
should have been the minister, the minister thought that he should have prime minister; 
the prime minister thought he should have been the Shah, and the Shah felt that he 
was God!". The point being made, that irrespective of the fact that from street sweeper 
to the Shah himself, all Iranians had begun to have material privileges never before 
available to their society as a whole, no one was satisfied, and there were a general 
feeling on the part of everyone that they had been swindled out of their fair share of 
things.
98 "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution", Theory and Society. 
May 1982, p.267.
"Ibid.
100e.g. Shia Islam was both organizationally and culturally crucial to the making 
of the revolution against the late Shah.
45
Bazargan, as Prime Minister of the 'Provisional Revolutionary Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran', seemed a step in that direction, and the overwhelming 
majority of the Iranian people seemed happy with the outcome of their struggle, and 
were optimistic about their future, as they prepared for their "Spring of Freedom" 
("Bahr-e Azadi"), that was to prove all too fleeting.
Apart from the numerous gruesome executions of senior military officers and senior 
officials of the previous regime, whose bullet riddled bodies were the subject of nearly 
all front page news (a process which began only a few days after the consolidation of 
the revolution in mid February), the first item on Ayatollah Khomeini's 'hidden'101 
agenda manifested itself during the course of a referendum on 30 March 1979 and 
converted Iran into an "Islamic Republic". Although, there is little doubt that the majority 
of people would, at that time, have backed Khomeini's appeal on this issue, 
nevertheless, the way the whole campaign was conducted alienated many Iranian. This 
was mainly due to the fact that all potential opponents of an "Islamic Republic", were 
barred from campaigning in support of their own preferred form of government, and 
every effort was also made to prevent any form of discussion that might possibly 
undermine the creation of an Islamic Republic that was incompatible with Khomeini's 
own personal visions102. Subsequently, as the months of 1979 went by, the liberals and
101The truth is that there was nothing 'hidden' about Khomeini's agenda. He had 
written and preached about his beliefs, long before his accession to power. 
Nonetheless, there was this sense of false belief amongst all the various political forces 
that had joined him in the struggle against the Shah, that Khomeini would some how 
abstain from any involvement in the Iranian political scene by withdrawing to Qom, and 
leaving politics to the politicians. However, when contrary to their expectations, 
Khomeini refused to withdraw, talks about Khomeini's hidden agenda began to emerge 
as an excuse by leading politicians for their own failures in having been outwitted by 
the shrewd Ayatollah.
102For example, in an interview outside the Iranian Consulate in London with the 
BBC Persian Service on 30 March 1979, even personalities such as General Fereidoon 
Djam - the second most senior Iranian military figure in exile (only General Bahram
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the National Front lost out completely to clerical and lay proponents of an avowedly 
Islamic republic, with strong powers for a supreme religious leader, (i.e. through the 
incorporation of the doctrine of'Velayate Faghih' which essentially negated the concept 
of popular sovereignty) and for Islamic jurisprudence written into the Constitution. 
However, other members of the 'Grand Coalition' which had toppled the Shah, notably 
such organizations as the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, decided to continue 
to go along with the mullahs, with one specific objective i n mind - i.e., to reach the 
general public and build a mass movement organization103.
While for many liberals, the start of total disillusionment with Iran's revolutionary 
outcome and the beginning of a new struggle to rid Iran "from the yoke of a theocratic 
dictatorship" began in earnest with the closure of the "Ayandeghan" newspaper in July 
1979, it was not until the closure of the Tudeh Party Offices in May of 1983, that the last 
remaining member of the victorious coalition against the Shah were "weeded out" by 
the religious authorities, and power and political participation totally monopolized by 
the clergy. Even then, political power was to reside solely within the domain of only 
those in the clerical constituency who were committed to Khomeini's visions of an 
Islamic regime104.
Aryana was at the time more senior than him) - had stated that he had participated in 
the referendum and voted for an Islamic Republic, because Iran was both Islamic and 
a republic. This notion of an Islamic Republic shared by Djam and many other Iranian 
intellectuals, was quite different to that of Ayatollah Khomeini. While, almost all 
envisioned the creation of a secular, liberal democratic republic, with particular 
consideration for Islam in general, and Shia Islam in particular (much like the 1906 
Constitution), Khomeini's notion was clearly the creation of an theocratic 'Islamic 
Republic' based on his own personal interpretation of 'Velayate Faghih' or "Islamic 
Government".
103Abrahamian, E., The Iranian Mojahedin, Yale University Press, New Haven 
and London, 1989, p. 186.
104During Khomeini's reign as Iran's 'Supreme Ruler' from 1979-1989, the most 
clear examples of intoleration within clerical ranks were displayed against the persons
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Banned Political Movements in the 
Aftermath of the Iranian revolution
It was against such a background of rapid extremism at home coupled with militant anti- 
Westemism, that Dr. Bakhtiar began his campaign in exile against the Islamic regime, 
following his escape from Iran in July of 1979. He began his campaign in exile because, 
irrespective of his total disassociation with the-excesses of the Shah's regime which he 
had genuinely opposed for the previous 25 years, his failure to submit to Khomeini 
during his brief period tenure as the imperial government's last Prime Minister105, had 
made him a hunted man in Iran, whose fate would have no doubt met the sharpest 
edges of revolutionary justice, had he been caught. Under those prevailing 
circumstances, and contrary to general international opinion at the time106, it was
of a number of Grand Ayatollahs such as Kazem Shariat Madari, Hassan Qomi 
Tabatabii, and finally, Khomeini's own chosen successor, Hossein-Ali Montazeri. 
Interviews conducted by the writer with a number of leading clerics from Qom, Teheran 
and Mashhad, underlined the generally unspoken reality that by the early 1980s, 
despite a marked improvement in the status of all mullahs throughout Iran, no more 
than 10% of the clerical constituency were supportive of an Islamic Republic based on 
Khomeini's personal interpretation of the doctrine of 'Velayate Faghih'. Apart from 
certain 'Iran experts’, who were capable of detecting this matter, many outsiders, 
particularly in the international media, were unable to comprehend this development, 
due mainly to their lack of understanding of how the only form of opposition - namely 
'Passive Opposition' - manifested itself amongst the conservative clergy, and as a 
result symbolic gestures of opposition, such as 'maintaining a silence' or 'not declaring 
open support' for many of the government's well publicized stands, were not generally 
picked up.
105For a period of only 37 days between January and February of 1979.
106Unlike the example of the Eastern bloc countries or Russia itself, where former 
communists were allowed to continue remaining active in politics, either under their 
former banners as communists or alternatively, under the more euphemistic banner of 
'new socialists', no such consideration was given to anyone in Iran with political 
connections to the previous regime. The image thus created by the new Islamic 
Republic was that there were no longer any support for either constitutional monarchy, 
or the advocates of the '1906 Constitution minus its provision for monarchy' in Iran. It 
is a very important consideration to note that in no referendum or elections of any sort 
conducted in the history of the Islamic Republic - and in particular during the early 
years, when efforts were being made to draft a new constitution for Iran - have 
candidates supportive of a "Constitutional" platform been allowed to participate (the 
term "Constitutionalists" in its current form refers primarily but not exclusively to
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obvious that neither Bakhtiar, nor any of his close supporters would have been 
permitted the opportunity of forming a political organization, representing his views. 
And so it was that, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was less than two years old, when on 
5 August 1980, Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar announced the formation of the National 
Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR). Although, Bakhtiar was without question, 
the first and most important Iranian public figure to come out in open opposition to the 
newly created regime in Iran, nevertheless, the power and the prestige of Ayatollah 
‘Khomeini, as well as the aura of the Iranian Revolution at the time, were far too great 
for his message to make any serious impact beyond a small circle of Iranians, 
composed mainly of the more educated classes (inclusive of some middle class 
elements, former elites, and intellectuals).
In the international community, despite a feeling of general respect and sympathy that 
had, by and large, been generated for Bakhtiar by the international media during his 
brief period of tenure, most political pundits, still in a state of shock following the rapid 
disintegration of the imperial order in Iran, gave negligible credibility to the 
seriousness of Bakhtiar's early challenges to the Khomeini regime that began in 1979. 
However, by mid-1980, Bakhtiar's position was to some extent receiving greater 
scrutiny in the wake of the American hostage crisis and Khomeini's overt attempts to 
promote Islamic fundamentalism, particularly in the more traditional states of the 
Persian Gulf (e.g., Bahrain). These matters were being considered at a time when there 
continued to be overt signs that the Iranian people were still charged with revolutionary 
fervor, with the Islamic regime continuing to display great ideological strength and 
impressive power in acts of mass mobilization, particularly following the start of the
supporters of constitutional monarchy, as well as advocates of the 'spirit' of the 1906 
Constitution).
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Iran-lraq War in September 1980.
NAMIR: Origins, Aims, And Purpose_____________________________________
The National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) represented the 
convergence of three streams of political principle, nationalism, constitutional liberalism 
and opposition to theocracy. While, all of these were not without precedent in modern 
Iranian history, NAMIR was setup with the clear intent of bringing them all together in 
a torrent of resistance to Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Nationalism and constitutional 
liberalism in NAMIR were further complemented by a strong commitment to secular 
government which, whilst respecting the central place of Islam and religious feelings 
in national life, resisted the tyranny of theocracy as strongly as any other form of 
autocratic government107.
NAMIR, as the first political movement to point out the totalitarian consequences of 
clerical rule in post-revolutionary Iran, was therefore dedicated to extinguishing the 
terror that had replaced the first democratic government in Iran for more than 25 years, 
and to ending the futile war with Iraq which had brought so much misery to the people 
of both countries. The movement intended to achieve this aim by becoming a broad- 
based coalition of Iranian people, both inside and outside the country, who were 
pledged to replacing the Islamic Republic with a liberal and democratic government, 
committed to free elections, respect for the rule of law, and guaranteed protection for 
human and minority rights.
NAMIR's most immediate objective and first priority was the overthrow of the Khomeini
107NAMIR - National Movement Of The Iranian Resistance. A brochure produced 
by NAMIR-UK, 1985.
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regime and its replacement by a government of national unity. In order to achieve this 
objective, NAMIR by early 1982108,had started to operate clandestinely inside Iran, 
paving the way for a controlled and popular uprising against the Khomeini regime109. 
As a consequence, NAMIR was gradually able to achieve the successful build up of 
substantial support amongst the armed forces, the tribes, as well as in important 
sectors of Iranian society in the cities (such as the professional middle classes, civil 
servants, and the Bazaaries [merchants]). The general population were also kept in 
touch with NAMIR's activities through its radio stations, which broadcast clandestinely 
to Iran, as well as underground publications and an informal network of friendly 
contacts.
Outside Iran, NAMIR's activities were directed towards exposing the brutalities of the 
Islamic Republic, and highlighting the plight of the Iranian people. The movement was 
also engaged in lobbying public opinion and policy makers, using its offices in North 
America, Western Europe and Asia, and its newspapers which were published in a 
number of different languages.
Ultimately, following the downfall of the Khomeini regime, the main tasks to be 
undertaken by a NAMIR inspired government of national unity, would have included the
108lt is important to note that despite announcing the creation of NAMIR as early 
as August 1980, Bakhtiar - well aware of the general popularity of Khomeini in the early 
years of the revolution - was more hopeful of overthrowing the Islamic regime by using 
more immediate avenues, such as a military coup. Indeed, it was not until such time 
that all these possibilities were fully exhausted, that he gave serious consideration to 
structuring NAMIR such that it could play its intended role (hence the gap between 
1980-1982, when NAMIR began functioning in an active manner).
109Given the Iranian regimes brutal and repressive nature, resort to armed 
support was never ruled out for such an uprising. By the mid-1980s, reliance on military 
support was to become the main component of NAMIR's overall strategy for the 
acquisition of power.
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following items from the movement's well publicized agenda: the restitution of human 
rights; removal of controls over political activities; abrogation of press censorship; re­
opening of schools and universities; restitution of trade union activities; and the 
enforcement of temporary measures to alleviate the country's acute economic 
problems. Finally, the government was to pave the way for holding free elections to a 
constitutional assembly - within a period of 18 months - whose main function would be 
to review the constitution110.
In the sphere of foreign policy, the discarding of Khomeini's policy of interference in the 
internal affairs of neighboring countries and active support for international terrorism, 
plus respect for all accepted norms of international behavior, were promised as the 
hallmark of such a transitional government, which would also have sought a quick and 
just termination of the war with Iraq.
Because NAMIR was envisioned as a democratic coalition, the basis of its membership 
was never governed by any ideology. Its structure - e.g., A Council representative of 
all major interest groups in the movement, which was chaired by Dr. Bakhtiar - thus 
included liberals, conservatives, and democratic socialists, as well as monarchists of 
a constitutional nature. Therefore, the policies and beliefs designed to unite this diverse 
membership was an unequivocal faith in democracy, independence, and the rule of law, 
and detestation of the bloodstained tyranny which had shattered the image of Iran. 
Early Indications of Disenchantment With the Regime______________________
110According to NAMIR - National Movement Of The Iranian Resistance. A 
brochure produced by NAMIR-UK, in 1985, the transitional government was to rule 
according to the provisions of the 1906 Constitution, in order to ensure legitimacy for 
its actions..
52
From the outset, the short term prospects of organizing a popular, exiled based, 
movement against the newly installed Islamic regime, were bleak. There was no 
question that during the initial years, particularly prior to the start of the Iran-lraq War, 
iboth Ayatollah Khomeini and the 'revolution' were extremely popular, particularly 
amongst the lower classes of the general population111.
Nevertheless, the waves of indiscriminate executions and other forms of "revolutionary 
justice" being administered around the country, were, by and large, as shocking to the 
people in Iran as they were to the outside world. Furthermore, it soon became 
apparent, that a majority of these decisions were being taken by certain revolutionary 
authorities, who were acting independently of the provisional government . The 
situation became further exacerbated when, contrary to every expectation, a process 
of "general cleansing" - which was nothing more than a witch hunt intended to rid the 
bureaucracy of all non-lslamic elements and 'women' was initiated in all government 
departments. As a result, the impression that began to take shape amongst a majority 
of the liberals and intellectuals who had supported the revolution, was something quite
111While there were signs of middle class and intellectual discontent about the 
direction which the revolution was taking, this was of no real concern to the regime. To 
enhance support for its policies, the Islamic authorities were using the entire 
sophisticated propaganda infra-structure which they had inherited from the Shah to 
great use. The effectiveness of their internal propaganda campaign - which essentially 
concentrated on representing the regime as the interest bearer of the "deprived ones" - 
the so-called "Mostazefin" , was a tremendous source of assistance to them for a 
number of years (it was only after the termination of the war with Iraq, when contrary 
to general expectations, economic hardships began to accelerate, that the shine in the 
regime's propaganda began to wear off ). According to Bakhtiar's Minister of 
Information, Dr. Cyrus Amuzegar (conversation with the writer), "It was the propaganda 
strategy of the Islamic regime which made it effective - While the Shah's propaganda 
material was one which was sneered at by the educated classes, and not understood 
at all by the lower classes, the message from the Islamic regime tended to generally 
ignore the educated classes, while conveying the impression that it was concentrating 
on catering to the needs and wants of the lower classes".
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different to what they had originally envisioned. Indeed, even liberal-democrats such 
as Mehdi Bazargan who were always greatly influenced by religion112, discovered that 
Khomeini's agenda, was not one of 'business as usual minus the Shah and the abuses 
of his system". The rapid growth of this impression among many important sectors - 
such as the middle class and the intelligentsia - who had been at the forefront of the 
revolution against the Shah, were further solidified by the mounting acts of violence and 
revenge that were erupting in provinces such as Turkman-Sahra, Khuzistan, and 
Kurdistan, prompting, in each instance, a strong reprisal against their instigators. Thus, 
the combination of these events, quickly dampened the general public's state of 
euphoria, greatly affecting public perceptions of the new regime, to which everyone 
had originally been prepared to pledge their loyalty. By the time the government of 
Mehdi Bazargan had been hounded out of office, the revolutionary feeling which had 
unified the nation only months before, had been seriously and irreversibly dented.
This situation was further aggravated, when the Islamic authorities began a campaign 
for the establishment of new social order in Iran, dominated completely by Islamic 
values113. These measures were to create immediate backlash effects amongst the 
middle classes and the intelligentsia, preventing the regime from solidifying the basis 
of its legitimacy amongst them. Nonetheless, the uneducated masses were generally 
untouched by these developments, and it was not until much later, and due mainly to 
reasons of economic decline and an unpopular war, that the message of critics such 
as NAMIR was able to make its impact felt amongst a much wider audience.
112Bazargan was always greatly influenced by Islam, to such an extent that he 
was commonly referred to as an "Akhund" by many of his contemprories (discussion 
with Dr. A. Alebouyeh, one of Bazargan's classmates in France).
113Particularly against women.
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NAMIR's Available Options
Based on Leonard Schapiro's classification of opposition movements, outlined earlier 
in this chapter, NAMIR, as an opposition movement, clearly fell into the category of 
those movements which totally rejected the whole incumbent system, and were fully 
committed to setting up some alternative form of rule. Thus, in line with Schapiro's 
analysis, NAMIR's form of 'opposition' was one that rejected all forms of compromise 
with the incumbent regime, preferring instead to devote all its resources towards its 
overthrow.
In view of 'scope' - i.e., the likely size or proportion of the population that could 
realistically be mobilized to participate in various anti-regime activities sponsored by 
NAMIR, the actual "form of strife", that was decided upon for attaining the desired 
outcome, was eventually arrived at following a great deal of consultation and debate 
that followed a specially prepared "Working Paper" that was commissioned for 
discussion purposes in early 1983. The working paper contained the following114:
"Projected Options Available to the Iranian Opposition
1. Political Settlement
a. With the collaboration of Khomeini during his life time.
b. Without the collaboration of Khomeini, after his death
(i) Through the formation of a coalition between leftist elements 
within the Islamic Republic, and leftist secular and "semi-secular" 
elements in exile, led by the Bani-Sadr/Mojahedin group115.
(ii) Through the formation of a working relation between the majority
114 Prior to Bakhtiar's first visit to Saudi Arabia in April 1983. As it turned out, the 
paper (prepared by the writer) was never discussed, though its conclusions later formed 
the basis of what was to become NAMIR's plan of action.
115 In the early 1980s, prior to the breakup of their relationship, prior to the 
expulsion of the Mojahedin from France and their admission to Iraq..
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of Khomeini's religious constituency, and the secular, traditionalist 
elements led primarily by Shapour Bakhtiar (NAMIR), and 
incorporating other personalities such as Reza Pahlavi II, and 
others.
2. Violent Settlement
a. Military Coup - before the termination of the Iran-lraq War.
(i) From the armed forces - with either leftist/rightist outcome116
(ii) From the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) - with 
likely radical and anti-Western consequences117.
b. Military Coup - after the Iran-lraq War
3. National Uprising
a. To be initiated by leftist groups and gaining momentum, and then 
leading to some form of possible military support (armed forces or 
IRGC).
b. To be initiated by nationalist elements, with support from segments 
of both the military and the religious constituencies.
4. Continuation of the Status Quo
Indefinite perpetuation of the Islamic Republic, and the exclusion of 
all other political element, irrespective of their ideologies.
An Assessment of the Above Options
1. In the case of Political Settlement:
Option 1a: totally unrealistic, and virtually impossible118.
Option 1b: Must be considered under two separate circumstances:
In Khomeini's lifetime:
11&The composition and the state of mind of the armed forces, was such that both 
possibilities existed. The chance of a leftist coup was given greater credence when a 
Tudeh party member was able to slip through various nets, by becoming the 
Commander of the Iranian Navy.
117The IRGC, in the 1980s, was a very radical-lslamic organization, consisting, 
particularly in the initial years, of hard line Khomeini supporters.
118At the time of the briefing, this option was considered virtually (though not 
totally!) impossible. The reason being that if the opposition was to have gained weight 
and credibility, to such a level as to truly threaten the Khomeini system, then the 
Ayatollah might have accepted some form of a compromise. He demonstrated this type 
of flexibility in 1988, when he accepted UNSCR 598, by making a speech in which he 
said that accepting a cease fire, was like drinking poison.
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Option 1b(i): The attainment of some kind of a political settlement with the 
Islamic Republic, without Khomeini's personal blessing - most unlikely119. 
Option 1b(ii): While, there may be a willingness on the part of some 
elements within the ruling clique of the Islamic Republic, to reach a form of 
settlement (for purposes of protecting their own long term interest), any 
advance of this nature is unlikely to occur, so long as the Ayatollah is either 
alive or in sound mind.
After Khomeini's Death:
Option 1b(i): The same arguments made above would continue to apply. 
Option 1b(ii): Certain Difference could occur- the religious constituency 
might try and exploit this option more seriously, once it is no longer inhibited 
or intimidated by Khomeini. Should this option receive meaningful diplomatic 
support in the form of certain signals to key individuals, through third party 
diplomatic channels or any other effective action, that would indicate 
'general international support' for such a move, it is quite possible to obtain 
very remarkable results in a very short span of time. It is important to note, 
that in this regard, diplomatic efforts from important outside players is 
crucial.
2. In the case of Violent Settlement
Option a(i): Any action while the war is still continuing present great 
difficulties. This is because of the various other national priorities, such as 
fighting the aggressor Iraqi army, etc., need to be taken into account. 
Nonetheless, the continuation of the conflict, after 1982 when the enemy 
had been evicted from Iranian territory, was considered by many in the 
armed forces to be contrary to national interest. All the same, the ability to 
inflict a mortal blow on the regime in Teheran, from units not actually 
deployed at the front is one that can be exploited.
Option a(ii): Both the state and the IRGC have a vested interest in the 
perpetuation of the Islamic regime. Thus, unless the IRGC, was to see its 
own position to be under some kind of a threat, it is unlikely that they will 
ever oppose the regime. Moreover, it is likely that they would conceivably be 
deployed against any attempt by the regular military to launch a coup, 
despite the fact that their realistic chances of survival, given their state of 
readiness, is considered by many experts to be limited.
119Due to the fact that elements such as Bani Sadr and the Mojahedin, represent 
'dissident' elements of Khomeini's own regime- albeit that they had tried to use his 
system to advance their own ideologies. However, given that they were eventually 
purged by incumbent religious parties in the country, destroyed any probability of 
reconciliation with them - even had they never indulged in any acts of violence against 
the regime, and had continued to remain in Iran.
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Option 2b: With the war over, the state might move to swiftly disband the 
existing armed forces, purge its heroes while integrating the rest into the 
IRGC. Such a move, would in the short term, decrease the chances of a 
military coup from rightist elements of the army and increase chances of a 
leftist coup following Khomeini's death. Thus, as far as the liberal- 
democratic opposition is concerned, all possible calculations would have to 
made while the armed forces continues to remain intact. Should the armed 
forces not become disbanded following the war, the same calculations as in 
2a(i) and 2a(ii), will continue to remain valid, with the difference that the 
army would feel more free and less inhibited to move under the right 
circumstances.
3. National Uprising
a. The "Frying Pan" Option
Chances of a leftist uprising are minimal and quite extinct. Here, it is 
important to point out that with Bani-Sadr as President and Commander in 
Chief of the Iranian armed forces, and the Mojahedin having the benefit of 
open political activity inside the country, for a period of more than two years, 
neither were able to arouse 'mass support', for the promotion of their 
objective. It is clear, that had they been able to generate any kind of large 
scale public support for their positions, prior to fleeing the country, then the 
outcome of events could have been significantly different. Since, fleeing to 
exile, their joint120 'resort to dramatic bombings and assassinations" against 
senior Islamic figures, has alienated many ordinary Iranians, and decreased 
their popularity.
b. A Democratic Option
Such a movement, in support of a moderate, democratic option is very 
possible in the aftermath of Khomeini. This is because an overwhelming 
majority of the religious constituency121, according to all indications, are 
opposed to Khomeini's personal doctrine of "Velayate Faghih". Thus, while
120lt is important to mention that Bani-Sadr, was hand in hand with the 
Mqahedin, and the nominal head of their joint organization, while horrendous terrorist 
attacks were launched against key people inside the country. This is something, that 
Bani-Sadr cannot disassociate himself from.
121 Led at the time by (the now all dead) Grand Ayatollahs, Khonsari, Shariat- 
Madari, Marashi-Najafi, Golpayeghani and Khoii, as well as the still living Grand 
Ayatollah Qomi Tabatabaii - who were all against Khomeini's interpretation of the 
universally accepted concept of Velayate Faghih. All of the above senior clerics, 
rejected Khomeini's concept of an "Islamic Government", and considered the 
perpetuation of such a government to be in the long term detriment of the Shiite 
Moslem clerical community in Iran.
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their opposition will always continue to be passive in nature, there is little 
doubt that under the right circumstances, the majority of senior clerics in 
Iran will actively support any popular uprising by moderate nationalist 
elements - inclusive of the middle classes (i.e.. bureaucrats, technocrats 
and intellectuals). Their participatory role is of crucial importance to the 
armed forces, and will serve to strengthen their hand, by giving them the 
public support they need to fulfill their ultimate role in joining up, and 
defending the uprising of the people.
4. Continuation of the Status Quo
It is impossible for the Khomeini system, as he created it, to survive him in 
the long term.
NAMIR's Strategy
Based on the preceding analysis, the following options are not in conformity 
with NAMIR's Objectives, as stated above, and are as a result dismissed 
from consideration:
Options: 1a; 1b(i); 2a(ii); 3a; and 4 
Thus, the only remaining options are:
Options: 1b(ii); 2a(i); and 3b
The attainment of NAMIR's objectives, based on any of the above options, 
will be to achieve total victory, in a fashion that involves the least amount of 
risk, the least amount of cost (human and material), with the least amount of 
disruptive effect in both regional and international calculations. Based on 
this thesis, NAMIR's preferred order of Options would be:
1. Political settlement, carried out quietly between NAMIR and the 
religious constituency, with effective international diplomatic support 
[Option 1b(ii)].
2. National Uprising of Iranian Nationalists, with clerical and military 
support, fuelled externally by diplomatic and propaganda pressures 
from the West on key clerical figures.
3. Military Coup, requiring in the first instance "international" 
diplomatic and logistical support, which would then be followed by 
diplomatic recognition, and media support."
In the end, it was decided that NAMIR should give serious consideration to each of 
the above 'Options' - i.e., preparing preliminary plans of action, simultaneously, for 
all of them. Such a course of action, would then allow NAMIR, the privilege of
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exercising the "cheapest" option, whenever that availed itself.
Conclusion
The fact that the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR), as a banned 
opposition movement, with its leadership having no alternative but to operate from 
outside the country, was unable to achieve any of its main objectives, is not a full 
reflection of either of the movement's true potential - particularly prior to the 
assassination of its leader, Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar122, nor of its true credibility and impact 
on the Iranian political scene. Thus, to judge NAMIR, solely on the basis of the tangible 
results it was able to achieve, can be misleading, and oblivious of the complexities that 
surround organizations of this nature, in contemporary international politics.
In this regard, it is possible to make a useful comparison between NAMIR and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) - which is usually acknowledged as one of the 
world's most successful "opposition movements"- in terms of noting their actual 
achievements123. Such a scrutiny would demonstrate that like NAMIR, the PLO's record 
as a liberation movement, prior to the Start of the US-Soviet sponsored peace 
conference in Madrid in October 1991, had been one of a conspicuously unsuccessful
122ln the aftermath of Bakhtiar's death in 1991, the movement as it had existed 
before disintegrated in to several small groupings. One these small groupings, which 
inherited the organization's title, is still operative, although its activities are more or less 
confined to the occasional (sometimes monthly) publication of NAMIR's old bi-weekly 
newspaper, Qvame Iran.
123While, the PLO can claim to command the support of a majority of Palestinians 
living under Israeli rule, Dr. Bakhtiar equally claimed the support of a majority of 
Iranians following the successful response he received to his call for a general protest 
in 1985. However, in terms of international recognition, the fact that since 1974 the PLO 
was accepted by other Arab states as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people, had perhaps more to do with the other Arab states, than with the 
PLO on the basis of its achievements against Israel..
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movement due to the following reasons:
1. the PLO had failed to liberate a single inch of territory
2. Its energies were diverted more in inter-Arab struggles than the war against Israel
3. Ultimately, the success of the organization depended on its ability to convince
public opinion in Europe, and more importantly in the U.S.124
Nonetheless, the fact that the PLO, "was around" and the issues they were committed 
to addressing had continued to remain "very much alive", meant that the organization 
and its leadership could deploy different tactics and continue pursuing their aims, at a 
more conducive time. The same can also be said of NAMIR, because of the fact that 
so long as Bakhtiar was alive, the organization continued to pose the most serious 
threat to an Islamic regime that was beset by an increasing number of problems which 
it could not remedy. Unfortunately, the gap in stature between Dr. Bakhtiar and other 
members of the NAMIR Council was so great, that the organization was totally 
dependent on having Bakhtiar as its head. Thus, once he was no longer around, the 
organization could not rally around any other individual, and given its diverse nature, 
it soon disintegrated into small factions and became irrelevant as political opposition 
movement. Hence, the study of NAMIR from 1979-1991, is tantamount to the study of 
an organization which was a personification of its leader. Therefore, Bakhtiar's role as 
an individual was just as critical to the development of NAMIR during the period with 
which this study is concerned, as was his death to the demise and growing irrelevance 
of a promising organization which could not endure without him.
At the same time, it is also appropriate to mention that due to Dr. Bakhtiar's prestige 
and personality, something that he was able to exploit to the full during his brief period
124Gilmour, D., 'The Creation and Evolution of the PLO" in Willetts, P., Pressure 
Groups in the Global System - The Transnational Relations of Issue oriented Non- 
Governmental Organizations, 1st Edition, Frances Pinter (Publishers), London 1982, 
p. 59.
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of office in Iran, NAMIR was the only liberal-democratic movement to receive financial 
assistance in the proportions necessary for cultivating a dedicated membership, while 
striving for credibility, mobilization and collective action. Yet, the movement was to 
display a great deal of serious flaws in both its decision making and organization, 
which, together, served to undermine many of its true potentials. Nevertheless, no other 
liberal-democratic political "opposition movement" in Iran, has received as much 
national and international attention as NAMIR, and what is more, 
no other organization has been as well equipped as NAMIR to deal with the task which 
it had set for itself. Thus, in line with T.R. Gurr's assertions, NAMIR was the only 
opposition movement of a liberal-democratic persuasion to the Islamic Republic, which 
apart from structural characteristics like "scope, cohesiveness, and complexity", also 
possessed the capacity to provide its members with "value opportunities, satisfaction, 
and the means for expressing protest"125.
The ensuing chapters, which are a product of substantial research and many years of 
close personal contact with the activities of Dr. Bakhtiar and NAMIR, clearly 
demonstrate that, for a period of more than one decade, NAMIR was a significant 
political actor, whose presence could not have been ignored in any serious calculation 
concerning Iran, at both national and international levels.
Subsequent assertions by many, that by the time of his assassination in August 1991, 
Bakhtiar was essentially a "finished politician, planning to withdraw gracefully, in the 
sunset of his career"126, while not totally without foundation, were nevertheless nothing
125Gurr, T.R., Ibid, p.274.
126This was a view that widely held by many Iranians, including very senior 
figures in NAMIR. In particular, it had been given special credence in the aftermath of 
Bakhtiar's second marriage and the birth of his young son, only a few years before his
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more than gratuitous cliches. Indeed, the same could have been said about many 
notable Western personalities such as Winston Churchill, Charles De Gaulle and 
Richard Nixon, not to mention Ayatollah Khomeini, himself, all of whom had defied 
similar predictions. Indeed, in terms of Iranian politics, Bakhtiar, as a national figure, 
was as substantial a figure as they were127, and even without acquiring power, Bakhtiar 
- much like 'Aung San Suu Kyi' or Nelson Mandela - was a political personality that 
could not have been ignored. Thus, his death, only months after the assassination of 
his close aide and colleague, Dr. Abdol-Rahman Boroomand, was a critical blow, from 
which NAMIR was never able to recover128.
assassination. As a result, it was universally endorsed, in nearly all the interviews that 
were made with Iranian personalities of all political persuasions. As a matter of record, 
the writer had called the Iranian Embassy in London, as an act of protest, and had 
asked a member of the Embassy who was later deported from the UK, as to why the 
Islamic regime had perpetrated such a nefarious act. The response from the Embassy 
official (M. Soltani), who expressed denial that the regime had any thing to do with the 
murder was, "Why should anyone want to kill a harmless old man!".
127it is worth noting that no one, only a year before the Iranian Revolution, could 
have predicted the fall of the late Shah, or the accession to power of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Indeed, there were many leading clerics and politicians alike in Iran, who had 
made similar suggestions regarding Khomeini, from the time that he was first expelled 
from Iran.
128The fact that NAMIR ceased to be a major political movement, once Bakhtiar 
was dead, was a boost for the Islamic regime, for it no longer had to contend with a 
political organization that was led by a prominent figure of national and international 
reputation. NAMIR's subsequent descent into the world of political oblivion underlines 
this point.
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Chapter 2: Shapour Bakhtiar - Principles: Frustration of Opposition 
Politics: leeting Success and Continuing Struggle________________
Introduction
"... But I, as your Sovereign, having sworn to maintain Iran's 
territorial integrity and national unity, and to uphold the religion of 
duo-decennial Jaafari Shia’ism of our country, now hereby, repeat 
my oath to the people of Iran, and I solemnly vow that the mistakes, 
illegalities, cruelty, and corruptions of the past will not be repeated, 
and that these mistakes will be redeemed. I shall undertake the 
creation of a national government to establish fundamental 
freedoms, and the conducting of free elections, as soon as order 
has been restored, so that our national constitution, the offspring 
of our constitutional revolution, may fully come into its own. I, too, 
have heard your revolutionary message..."129
Extract of a radio broadcast made by 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi 
to the Iranian nation,
Teheran, 5 November 1978 
* * *
In a historic statement to the Iranian people made in response to a series of mass 
protests that were having a crippling effect on every aspect of life in Iran, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran, tacitly acknowledged the very reasons why his 
previous administrations had come to lose public support and confidence. He admitted 
that despite the great economic achievements of the previous quarter of a century, his 
failures strictly to abide by the strict provisions of the Iranian Constitution of 1906, and 
his refusal to allow greater political participation in the decision making process, had 
created a situation where, public discontent had reached a crisis level.
Whether he might have been able to maintain control by resorting to more extreme 
measures - an option that was readily available to him at the time - will always remain 
a subject of speculation. However, there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that at no 
time did he contemplate unleashing the armed forces against the people in order to
129Source: Press Release dated December 1978, issued by the Imperial Iranian 
Embassy, London.
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prolong his rule130. This is in sharp contrast to the line adopted by his successors in the 
Islamic Republic who, on occasions, have been ruthless in their methods to contain 
public discontent131.
Furthermore, it is now evident that as soon as matters had appeared to get out of 
control, serious efforts were made by the late Shah to form a civilian government that 
would strive to regain public confidence by addressing the same critical issues to which 
he himself had made reference in his now famous "Apologia"132 of 5 November 1978 - 
ie. the establishment of constitutional government, the correction of certain major 
"mistakes, illegalities, cruelties, and corruptions", along with "respect for fundamental 
freedoms, and the conducting of free elections", etc.133
Indeed, between November and December 1978, the main thrust of the Shah's policy 
had been to find a suitable candidate, with "national" credentials - ie. not associated 
with his own political constituency, to assume the premiership, and lead the country out 
of crisis, while keeping the institution of constitutional monarchy intact. To achieve this
130Parsons, A., The Pride and the Fall-Iran 1974-1979, Jonathan Cape, London, 
1984, p. 150.
131Such as the mass protests in Mashhad in 1992 and in Gazvin in 1994.
132This is the term used by many hard line supporters of the Shah, to describe 
his November 1978 statement, in which he had acknowledged having made certain 
mistakes in the past. Indeed, those normally associated with having had a "say" in the 
drafting of that statement - such as Empress Farah and her cousin Reza Ghotbi, the 
Head of the National Iranian Radio and Television, have been the subject of severe 
criticism, on the grounds that they had contributed to weakening the Shah's position, 
by allowing his vulnerabilities to become a subject of exploitation by the opposition.
133Extract of a radio broadcast made by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to the 
Iranian nation, Teheran, 5 November 1978 (Source: Press Release dated December 
1978, issued by the Imperial Iranian Embassy, London, p.2).
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aim, the Shah had little choice but to approach a number of key "loyalist critics"134, such 
as Dr. Ali Amini, whom he had kept in political wilderness since the early 1960s, or to 
turn alternately to former supporters of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh in either the 
National Front or the Freedom Movement. However, as early as October 1978, during 
the course of a meeting with senior members of the Iranian Majles, the Shah had 
indicated a clear preference for wanting to hand the government over to the outright 
opposition 13S.
As a consequence of the crucial negotiations that were to follow, having failed to come 
to terms with more senior figures in the National Front, such as Dr. Gholam-Hossein 
Sadighi or Dr. Karim Sanjabi, the Shah could only obtain the consent of Dr. Shapour 
Bakhtiar to accept the challenge of forming a government at that critical period, and of 
steering the country away from the revolutionary turmoil that was disrupting every 
aspect of Iranian life.
While Dr. Sadighi had made his acceptance subject to the formation of a "Regency 
Council", with the Shah continuing to remain in Iran, a condition which was totally 
unacceptable to the monarch136, Dr. Sanjabi had made his acceptance subject to the 
approval of Ayatollah Khomeini137. On the other hand, Sanjabi's deputy in the National
134From the early 1960s, a situation had arisen where being simply loyal to the 
Shah was not enough. Nothing short of total obedience had been acceptable by the 
Shah.
135lnterview with the former Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Majles, Dr. Mostafa 
Alamouti, London, 4 February 1995.
136This suggestion, while practical, was nevertheless most degrading for the 
Shah, in that it was tantamount to stripping him of all his authorities, including those 
legitimately invested in him by the constitution.
137According to Dr. Mostafa Alamouti, Sanjabi and Daryush Forouhar (another 
National Front leader), are known to have campaigned strongly for Dr. Sadighi not to
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Front, Shapour Bakhtiar had consented to forming a reform government, on the basis 
that a Regency Council, performing the functions of the Shah, would come into 
operation only when the Shah had actually left the country on an open ended 
"vacation". Dr. Bakhtiar had also insisted that the Shah should not leave until both 
Houses of Parliament in Iran had given his government a vote of confidence138.
So it was that at six minutes past one, on the afternoon of 16 January 1979, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, "the Shanhshah Aryamehr"139, left the country, abandoning 
the fate of the Iranian nation to the hands of his relatively obscure new Prime Minister, 
Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar.
Bakhtiar: Heir to a Constitutionalist Tradition____________________
The decline and the eventual overthrow of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979, was 
accompanied by the rise and eventual prominence of two men, who were destined to 
represent the opposite poles of Iranian politics for the next decade. While Ayatollah 
Rouhollah Khomeini, was able to rise from relative obscurity to international fame, and 
even notoriety, by leading the Islamic Revolution to victory in Iran, Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar 
achieved his fame and popularity, by emerging from the shadows of the internal secular 
opposition, whose fate and frustrations he had endured during the previous 25 years.
accept the Shah's offer of forming a government, under any circumstance (Interview, 
London, 24 February 1995).
138lt was felt by many, including Dr. M. Alamouti (the Deputy Speaker of the 
Iranian Majles in 1979 - Interview, London, 24/2/95), that without the Shah in Iran, the 
Bakhtiar government would not receive the necessary vote of confidence.
139Meaning the Light of the Aryans - a title bestowed on him in the late 1960s by 
the Iranian Majles.
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His immense courage and unswerving commitment to constitutional government were 
the main assets which led him to accept - against all odds - the challenge of forming a 
new government, at a time of turmoil and civil unrest on a scale unprecedented in the 
history of Iran. Althoug his government was ultimately unable to withstand the tide of 
revolutionary fervor that had swept the nation for more than 37 days, it did not take long 
for a disappointed nation to appreciate the substance of the message he had tried to 
convey during his abortive tenure of office. In the 12 years prior to his untimely death 
at the hands of a group of assassins, Shapour Bakhtiar, much as in the previous 
quarter century, was to continue carrying on the struggle for freedom and justice in Iran.
Two important factors are important in describing the circumstances in which a political 
personality, such as Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, was allowed to emerge as a major actor on 
the Iranian political scene:
1. A glance at the historical record of the development of Modern Political 
Thought in Iran during the 20th Century,
and,
2. The Roots of Bakhtiar's Political Making, and the traditions of the political 
constituency represented by him.
1. A Glance at the Historical Record of the Development 
of Modern Political Thought in Iran During the 20th Century
The Iranian Constitution of 1906 was a modern and liberal document on the pattern of
European democracies which contained the proviso that no legislation could
contravene the tenets of Shiite Islam. Although in existence for more than seventy
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years, the Constitution140 did not fulfil its envisioned role. In fact, shortly after its 
proclamation, an attempt was made by the new monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar, 
a ruthless despot who bitterly resented the constitutional limits to his rule, to overthrow 
it completely141.
However, whatever the ideological attractiveness of the Constitutional Movement for 
Western liberal societies of the time, political realities and Great Power rivalries in the 
region were to have a serious effect on its development. It is important to note that in 
the historic context, the growth of this reformist movement was also impeded by the 
prevailing political situation at the time. This was dominated by the concern shared by 
the two imperial powers of the day, Britain and Russia, that Iran should not upset the 
delicate balance that existed between them in the Middle East, particularly at a time 
when they were both being threatened by a major challenge from Imperial Germany.
Thus, Britain and Russia were able, over the objections of the newly emerging Iranian 
nationalists, to establish through the 1907 Convention, zones of influence in the 
country, thereby ensuring internal stability and preventing the reformist movement from 
disrupting their mutual entente. In this battle against the Constitutionalists, the Imperial 
powers were not without domestic allies.
The history of twentieth century Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution, has two persistent 
features: First, the effort to establish a Constitutional Government, and second the
140Thus, contrary to general perception, the constitution was, in effect, a non­
secular document.
141 As a result the Shah was deposed and sent to exile in 1908. He was replaced 
on the throne, by Ahmad Shah Qajar, who was himself deposed and exiled by Reza 
Shah I, who founded the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925.
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effort to raise the nation to the plane of a modern industrialized state. A prevailing 
characteristic of government since 1900, including the post- revolution period, is that 
governance has been by the actions and initiatives of individuals and groups of 
individuals rather than by the enactment and the observance of laws. Such 
circumstances, it is clear, were distinctly unfavorable to orderly evolution of 
constitutional government.
Based on what has been stated above, the chronology of the events that shaped the 
direction of Iran's destiny prior to the downfall of Bakhtiar's government in 1979, can 
be set out as follows:
1. Until the end of 1906, the government of Iran was a despotism under the 
ruling monarchs.
2. On 30th December 1906, as a consequence of what has come to be termed 
the "Constitutional Revolution of Iran", constitutional government was granted 
to a population devoid of an experience in democratic government, and lacking 
any understanding of the basic concepts associated with majority rule142.
3. Although a counter-revolution led by Mohammad Ali Shah against the 
Constitution in 1908 was crushed resulting in the deposition of the Shah and the 
continued "formal" existence of the Majles and the Constitution, later monarchs 
"were able to regain the positions which they had previously held"143. These 
events became further complicated in the aftermath of the decisions taken by 
Russia and Britain in 1907 to divide Iran into two separate "Zones of Influence",
142This was despite the fact that there had been some measure of local self- 
government in the villages and among tribes, on the basis of the existing feudal system.
143Halliday, F., Iran - Dictatorship and Development, Penguin Books, London 
1979, p.22.
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keeping Iran in a state of turmoil till 1914. With the advent of the First World War 
and following a Turkish invasion in 1914, despite Iran's declared neutrality, the 
country became an arena of conflict. Russian troops and local forces under 
Russian command occupied large areas in the North, while British forces and 
local forces under British command, did the same in the south of the country. 
After the Russian Revolution, troops under British command were also moved 
into Northern Iran and constituted the only significant force for the maintenance 
of order in the country. However, by September 1921, all foreign troops had 
evacuated Iran144.
4. From 1921-1941, the Iranian government was under the progressively 
autocratic rule of Reza Shah I, who, following the deposing of Sultan Ahmad 
Shah Qajar, had succeeded the Iranian throne in 1925, thus establishing the 
new Pahlavi dynasty.
5. From 1941-1946, Iran was again occupied by foreign armies: the Russians in 
the north; the British and Americans in the south. The last Soviet troops were not 
withdrawn until May 1946145.
The period since 1946, can be divided into three distinct phases:
1. The period of parliamentary rule, climaxed by the Mossadegh era, and the
144"Modern Political Thought: A Historical Glance at Iran's Record in the 20th 
Century", Voice of Iran. Issue No. 6, February/March 1983 (This article, was inspired 
greatly by the writings of Professor Joseph M. Upton ("The History of Modern Iran: An 
Interpretation", Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960). In his 
book, Upton also argues against hopes that a single individual can emerge to lead the 
people. He argues, that "No individual can change the character of Iran", and sees 
political instability arising from foreign intervention and the individualist character of 
Persians. As a side note, it can be said that the same - ie. foreign interventions and the 
individualist character of Persians, has certainly played an important part for preventing 
the establishment of an effective and coherent opposition movement against the Islamic 
Republic.
145After a good deal of pressure that was placed on Stalin by President.
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nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, up to his eventual overthrow in 1953.
2. The period of rising royal power under Mohammad Reza Shah, highlighted 
by the implementation of the "White Revolution" in 1963, and the emergence of 
the late Shah as the supreme policy maker.
3. The overthrow of the late Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, in 1979 under Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and his successors.
During this entire period, the cause of nation building in Iran has always been 
confronted with varying degrees of pressures exerted as a consequence of:
1. National disunity, stemming principally from ethnic and geographic diversity 
and social customs.
2. Foreign intervention and influence.
3. Lack of personal integrity coupled with opportunism on the part of some elites 
who have been keen to advance their own set of objectives and agenda, 
oblivious of the country's national interests146.
2. The Roots of Bakhtiar's Political Making
Bakhtiar entered Iranian politics during an exceptional time in Iranian history, when as 
a consequence of the abdication of Reza Shah I, and the accession to the Iranian 
throne of a young and politically naive, Mohammed Reza Shah in 1941, a period of, 
more or less, true parliamentary democracy was in progress. The main political actors 
of this period were the elder, "elite" statesmen of the Qajar period, such as Ahmad 
Gavam (Gavam Saltaneh) and Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh (Mossadegh Saltaneh), who
146This was particularly apparent in the years prior to the accession of Reza 
Shah I.
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had all held senior positions prior to the accession of Reza Shah Pahlavi to the Iranian 
throne in 1925147. Under Reza Shah's increasing autocratic rule, the notion of 
Constitutional rule, albeit at an elite level as championed by these men, had been put 
aside, and it was not until the Shah's forced removal from power, as a consequence of 
the Allied invasion of Iran in 194114S, that the stage was once again set for the re- 
emergence of these political figures.
The main theme that was the cornerstone of Bakhtiar's political ideology, was the 
theme of "Constitutionalism", as advocated by his ideological mentor, the nationalist 
Iranian leader, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh who had championed the anti-colonial 
struggle of the Iranian people through the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, 
while at the same time leading a dedicated crusade against royal corruption and the 
pillage of public funds by the bureaucracy149. It is ironic, that after a quarter century 
following the downfall of the Mossadegh government, in which Bakhtiar had served as 
an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Labour, Bakhtiar's platform at the time of his 
accession to the premiership in 1979, was almost identical in its main themes to that 
of his political mentor, some 25 years before150.
147ln fact Reza Shah had served as Minister of War in a cabinet led by Gavam, 
in which Mossadegh had been the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the early 1920s, prior 
to the dissolution of the Qajar Dynasty and its replacement by the Pahlavi Dynasty in 
1925.
1480n the pretext that Reza Shah was harboring pro-German sentiments.
149Diba, F., Mossadegh - A Political Biography, Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1986,
p. 82.
150While this was reflective of the fact that certain basic problems within Iranian 
society in 1978 were the same as those in 1953, the draw back, in later years, was that 
Bakhtiar was too complacent, about focusing on other issues that were born as a 
consequence of the Islamic Revolution. Thus, in his capacity as resistance fighter, 
there was always a situation in which Bakhtiar seemed to be fighting old battles. On 
one occasion in 1986, Dr. Ali Amini complained to the writer that Bakhtiar had boasted 
about the fact that "his position on various political issues had remained unchanged for
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Therefore, like his mentor before him, Bakhtiar based his struggle for law and freedom 
on the upholding of the provisions of the 1906 Constitution. This Constitution, along 
with its 'Supplementary provisions of 1907, constituted the basic laws of the land, and 
much like Mossadegh, Bakhtiar had also felt that it was the duty of every citizen - 
including the monarch - to uphold the application of these principles. Indeed, it was for 
the retention and application of this belief, that Bakhtiar dedicated the most significant 
part of his adult life, first in opposition to the late Shah, because of his increasing 
disregard for the provisions of the Constitution, and later in opposition to Ayatollah 
Khomeini for his absolute negation of the concept of popular sovereignty151.
Following the tradition set by Mossadegh, Bakhtiar was of the view that the Majles, as 
a center of power, had to be totally separated from any outside interference in its 
workings from the monarch and the royal court. His commitment to this belief, following 
the removal of Mossadegh from power in 1953, landed Bakhtiar in a great deal of 
trouble, and was the source of his imprisonment on several occasions. In fact, from 
1953-1978, Bakhtiar was to spend a total of five years and eight months behind bars, 
and prohibited from travelling abroad for another seven years152.
Bakhtiar, the "Iran Party", and the National Front_________________
the past 30 years". Dr. Amini had felt that this was not something to be proud of, "since 
matters had moved on from the previous 30 years!".
151Ayatollah Khomeini, by incorporating his personal doctrine of "Velayate 
Faghih" - which declared that all Iranians were "minors", who required the guidance of 
the clergy to determine what was socially, legally and politically best for them - into the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, had manipulated a situation, whereby 
Iranian citizens, had themselves voted in a national referendum to deprive themselves 
of the right of self-determination and popular sovereignty.
152Amirshahi, M., Yekrangi, Farsi translation of Albin Michel's Ma Fidelite, Paris, 
1982, p. 96.
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In his own autobiography, Bakhtiar states that during his days as a student he become 
greatly inspired by the political views of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, and having 
returned to Iran he immediately joined the liberal, democratic "Iran Party", which 
according to him was, later, to become the main skeleton of the "National Front"153.
In the same autobiography, Bakhtiar admits having been received in an audience with 
the Young Shah, shortly after his return to Iran in 1946154, who had encouraged him to 
help in the process of developing the country. He goes on to say that up to the late- 
1950s, his cousin Soraya Esfandiary, was also married to the Shah, and through her 
there was also great deal of encouragement for him to forge closer affiliations with the 
royal court155. Nonetheless, it was his devotion to Mossadegh in the years prior to 
1953156, and his commitment to Constitutionalism, that was to keep Bakhtiar and the 
Shah in opposing camps. Indeed, it was not until such time that his throne was actually 
on the line and every other conceivable options was exhausted, that the Shah had 
turned to Bakhtiar, and chosen to appoint a man he had once termed as a "Natural born 
traitor"157, as Prime Minister of Iran.
153lbid., p.59.
154lbid., p.34.
155A matter referred to on several occasions in discussions with the writer.
156The year in which the Mossadegh government was overthrown as a 
consequence of a military coup.
157This, according to Parviz Khonsari (and many other senior figures in the 
Shah's regime), was a term that the Shah had used shortly after his return to Iran in 
1953, in order to describe Bakhtiar. Parviz Khonsari (the writer's father), had been the 
acting Minister of Labour in the government of General Razmara, and had on the Prime 
Minister's direct order, removed Bakhtiar as Director of the Ministry of Labour's office 
in Abadan (for the province of Khuzistan). The Razmara government - which was a 
predecessor of the Mossadegh government, and as such a target of his un-assailing 
attacks, had felt that Bakhtiar, an ambitious politician, was agitating unrest amongst the
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The Origins of the National Front And The Iran Party
The origins of the National Front can be traced to the sitting-in at the royal court on 14 
October 1949, during the course of negotiations between the then Minister of Court158, 
and a delegation of 20 leading public personalities (who were all united at the time in 
their support for the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran)159, headed by Dr. 
Mossadegh. They had come to lodge a protest with the Shah, against election 
tampering in Teheran, during the course of the 16th (1949-1951) Majles (parliamentary) 
elections. Five days after the sit-in protest by Mossadegh and colleagues began on 19 
October, the Shah promised to hold an enquiry into this matter. However, when Court 
Minister Hazhir was assassinated on 4 November, 1949, the Shah immediately 
consented to holding new elections for Teheran, which resulted in the election of some 
7 new Deputies representing the newly created "National Front"160.
labour force in the oil industry, at a difficult time when the government was trying to 
work out a reasonable new agreement with the Anglo-lranian Oil Company (to which 
Mossadegh was opposed). Bakhtiar was, thus, brought back to Teheran (and replaced 
by Mohammad Moshiri who was later to become a senior figure in NAMIR), and against 
the Prime Minister's directive that he should be sacked, he was made a Consultant to 
the Ministry of Labour. When asked by General Razmara, in a cabinet meeting, as to 
why his orders had not been fully implemented, Parviz Khonsari had responded by 
saying that "by not sacking him, Bakhtiar can only work against us half the time, for he 
is forced to spend all his working hours under my nose, where we can all keep an eye 
on him".
158Abdol-Hossein Hazhir, who, at the time, was also responsible for the 
supervision of the elections.
159According to Rahim Sharifi ("Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian 
Journal of Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 146), the delegation of leading 
Iranian journalists accompanying Mossadegh in the protest against unfair elections in 
Teheran, included the following: Dr. Hossein Fatemi (Publisher of Bakhtar Emrouz). 
Ahmad Maleki (Publisher of Setareh). Abbas Khalili (Publisher of Eahdam). Amidi Nouri 
(Publisher of Daad). Engineer Ahmad Zirakzadeh (Publisher of the "Tribune of the Iran 
Party", Jebheve Azadi). and Jalaledin Naini (Publisher of Keshvar).
160Mossadegh, M., Khaterat Va Taalomat Mossadegh, Entesharate Elmi, 
Teheran, 1985, p.246.
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Pursuant to this sit-in at the royal court, a Four point Charter announcing the creation 
of the National Front was announced by the protesting twenty man delegation161, 
headed by Mossadegh, which contained the following provisions:
1. The National Front is formed by its founding members and all other 
"nationalist" groups that believe in social justice and the retention of the Iranian 
Constitution.
2. The original founders will constitute the National Front's Board of Directors, 
and other "nationalist" groups will all select a representative, who along with 
local representatives whose credentials have been certified by the Board of 
Directors, will sit in the Front's Council.
3. The National Front aim is the establishment of a Nationalist government 
through free elections and free thought.
4. No single individual will be permitted to join the Front, and membership of all 
individuals will be subject to their membership in a group or an affiliation that 
has, itself, obtained recognition and membership by the National Front162.
Subsequently, the founding Members of the National Front, elected Dr. Mossadegh as 
their leaders, and appointed a committee to draw a constitution for the new political 
organization. Though a first announcement by the newly created National Front on 24
161 Apart from Dr. Mossadegh, the other original signataries of the National Front 
Charter were: Ayatollah Gharavi, Haerizadeh Yazdi, Abdol-Ghadir Azad, Hossein Maki, 
Dr. Ali Shayeghan. Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Mahmoud Nariman, Dr. Mozafar Baghai, 
Shamsedin Amir Alaii, Amidi Nouri, Engineer Ahmad Zirakzadeh, Dr. Hossein Fatemi, 
Dr. Reza Kaviani, Jalaledin Naini, Abbas Khalili, Ahmad Maleki, Dr. Shamsedin 
Jazayeri, Arsalan Khalatbari, and Yousef Moshar (Source: Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe 
Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 
13, p. 147).
162The emphasis on Groups as opposed to Individuals, was something that 
Mossadegh was very insistent upon. This issue, also became a subject of major 
contention between him and other Front leaders, during the years in which the Second 
and Third National Fronts were bring formed in the early 1960s.
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October 1949, announced "Free Elections, Free Press and the Abolishment of Martial 
Rule163", as the organization's main objectives, it was not until 1 July 1950, that the 
Constitution and the Front's Political Program - calling for free elections, 
implementation of the National Constitution, social justice, and economic reforms - were 
announced. Furthermore, a "Central Committee" was placed in charge of the 
management of the Front, and on Mossadegh's particular insistence, all memberships 
of the Front was limited to associations, trade unions, and political parties (ie. not 
individuals)164.
It was in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections held after the creation of the 
National Front, that legislation for nationalizing the Anglo-lranian Oil Company were 
presented to Majles165, prior to its ratification on 30 May 1951.
During this entire period, the role played by Bakhtiar was essentially confined to that 
of being a follower of the "anti-colonial, pro-national" policies of Mossadegh166, and 
membership of the "Iran Party", which was founded by many of Mossadegh's front line 
supporters in what had become the National Front. These included, personalities such
163Which had been in place since the abortive attempt a year before to 
assassinate the Shah. The Tudeh Party had been blamed for that incident, and as a 
consequence all its activities had been declared illegal.
164Rouhani, F., Zendeghi Siasi Mossadegh DarMatne Nehzat Melli Iran, NAMIR, 
1986, pp. 127-127.
165According to Rahim Sharifi, a prominent member of the Iran Party and a close 
Bakhtiar aide (Interview, Paris, 23 November 1994), defections in the original ranks of 
the National Front, began as early as the time that the nationalization legislation was 
being discussed in the Majles. Amongst early defectors were the journalists Amidi Nouri 
(Publisher of Daade Melli). and Ahmad Maleki (publisher of the Setareh). The latter had 
later claimed that the National Front had been an American creation.
166Morahe Toufan (A NAMIR Publication printed in 1980), p.9.
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as Allahyar Saleh167, Kazem Hasibi168, Karim Sanjabi169, and Gholam Ali Farivar170. In 
fact, the origin of the Iran Party dates back to the period immediately after the 
abdication of Reza Shah I, in September 1941, when "Kanonone Mohandesin" 
(Engineers Association) was formed by number of foreign and domestic trained 
intellectuals. However, by 1943, when elections for the 14th (1941-1943) Majles were 
being conducted, this essentially professional association, became extremely 
politicized, and as a consequence, its membership was split in half. Those of a more 
radical persuasion joined the Tudeh Party, while a group of 15 moderates - all 
European trained intellectuals and technocrats - formed what came to be known as the 
Iran Party171. The Iran Party was to remain faithful to the National Front, even after the 
collapse of the Mossadegh government.
However, according to Homa Katouzian, a Mossadegh sympathizer, the Iran Party "was 
not so much a political party, as a collectivity of mainly European educated younger 
technocrats with European-style liberal and social democratic leanings"172. Putting the 
actual importance of the Iran Party, in some kind of a perspective, Katouzian further
167The Mossadegh government's Ambassador to Washington, and a leading 
member of the "Second" National Front, elected to the 17th Majles from Kashan, at the 
height of election tampering in 1961.
168A close Mossadegh aide, and a leading member of the "Freedom Movement", 
headed by Engineer Mehdi Bazargan.
169A close Mossadegh supporter who later became the Leader of the National 
Front, and served as the first Foreign Minister of Iran, in Engineer Mehdi Bazargan's 
Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
170A close Mossadegh supporter, who later became the Islamic Republic's first 
Ambassador to Switzerland.
171Rouhani, F., Ibid., pp. 127-128.
172Katouzian, H., The Political Economy of Modern Iran, Despotism and Pseudo- 
Modernism, 1926-1979, Macmillan, London, 1981, p.147.
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states, that, "Although the Iran Party improved its membership because of its pro- 
Mossadegh attitude and the greater political participation of the public, it still remained 
numerically small173, and "ideologically" dependent on Mossadegh and the broad 
popular movement behind him, that came to be known as the National Front"174.
The description given by Katouzian, best describes the milieu in which Bakhtiar, as a 
supporter of Mossadegh (who has been described as "never having become or been 
a party politician"175) had felt most comfortable, in all his political years in Iran, and later 
up to the time of his untimely death in exile. The direct consequence of this was that for 
all the time spent by Bakhtiar in Iran from 1946 to 1979, he only moved around in either 
the elite, intellectual circle of his European trained contemporaries, or within the 
confines of his family clan176. Bakhtiar's contact with people outside of these two 
scopes, despite his years of activity in the Iran Party and the National Front, was 
incredibly limited. This limitation first manifested itself in a major way when Bakhtiar 
was called upon to form a cabinet, and later when it came to choosing his close network 
of advisers in exile. In both instances, Bakhtiar had to rely on secondary advice and 
suggestions from close and trusted associates, whose advice proved most often to be 
less than satisfactory177.
173According to Amir Hossein Amir Parviz, himself a one time member of the Iran 
Party, total membership of the Party never exceeded the several hundred figure 
(Interview, London, 13 February 1995)
174Katouzian, H., Ibid., p.170.
175lbid., p. 148.
176This was constituted of people from all the echelons of the Bakhtiary tribe.
177This topic was a matter of particular reference between the writer and Bakhtiar 
during the course of six hour car journey from Los Angeles to the residence of former 
President Gerald Ford, in January 1984. During this trip, Bakhtiar so much as admitted 
that during all his years in Iran, his movements were limited to only a few destinations 
(he never went anywhere other than to the home of some close friends or relatives, and
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Apart from the Iran Party, the National Front was originally supported by three other 
main political organizations: The "Hezbe Zahmatkheshan Iran" (Toilers Party); The 
Mujahedin Islam; and The Iranian Nations Party. By the time of the overthrow of the 
Mossadegh government in August 1953, the National Front had been abandoned by 
both the Toilers Party178, and the Mojahedin Islam, led by the Ayatollah Seyed 
Abolghasem Kashani. The more insignificant Iranian Nations Party, an ultra-right wing, 
nationalist group led by Daryush Forouhar179, remained loyal, though its contribution 
was of minor significance180.
The Rise of Bakhtiar As A Key Opposition Figure 
And The Resurrection of the National Front
In the aftermath of the 19 August 1953 military coup, that finally removed Mossadegh's 
active participation in Iranian political life181, almost nearly all his senior colleagues in
the elite French Club, on whose Board of Directors he had served), and that at all 
times, his range of friends and colleagues had remained very narrow and confined (ie. 
rotating around people who visited him at his home, family friends, and political allies 
whose movements and mingling with the general population was in any case limited 
during the last 25 years of the late Shah's rule in Iran).
178The Toiler's Party was to split into two separate factions, of which a splinter, 
'Titoist Group", that came to be known as "Nirouye Sevom" (Third Force), that was led 
by Khalil Maleki, continued to remain faithful to Mossadegh and the National Front. 
However, the Toilers Party itself, led by Mozafar Baghai, broke off with Mossadegh and 
by August 1953, were supportive of his downfall. Later, when Bakhtiar was nominated 
to form a government, Baghai was amongst the first, outside the traditional National 
Front, to condemn his nomination, and by letting it be known that he was, himself, 
available to form a cabinet.
179That called for the restoration to Iran of the provinces forfeited in the 19th 
Century to Russia, and the like. However, Forouhar, himself, would later play an 
important role in the future activities of the National Front, as well as the provisional 
Islamic government of Engineer Mehdi Bazargan in 1979.
180Rouhani, F., Ibid., p. 132.
181 Following his removal from office, Mossadegh was tried and sentenced to 
three years solitary confinement in the prisons at the Eshratat-Abad headquarters of 
the 2nd Armored Battalion. In 1956, he was freed and sent to his residence outside
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cabinet, as well as many in the National Front, were not only arrested and put in prison, 
but were also barred from any future participation in politics182. The net implication of 
this action that was taken at that time by the military government of General Fazlollah 
Zahedi, was that the path was made clear for the emergence into the political limelight 
of a number of "second tier personnel" from within the ranks of the National Front and 
its political affiliates. Amongst the prime beneficiaries of this development were figures 
such as Bakhtiar, and Engineer Mehdi Bazargan, who with a number of others began 
immediately to pursue their activities under the guise of a hastily arranged, clandestine 
organization, under the main auspices of a leading Mossadegh supporter within the 
ranks of the clerics, Ayatollah Reza Zanjani, which went by the name of 
"Moghavemate Melli" meaning "The National Resistance Movement"183. Within a pre- 
SAVAK Iran, this new movement was able to organize occasional demonstrations (at 
the trial of Mossadegh and against the negotiations with the international oil 
companies, etc.)184. More importantly, they organized a demonstration against the 
restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and the UK on 7 December 1953 (as well as 
the visit to Teheran of Vice-President Nixon, which took place two days later on 
December 1953), in which three students were shot dead. The annual marking of this 
event, was to become a ritual and a symbol of anti-Shah protests up to the time of the
Teheran, where he was effectively restricted from any public communication (Diba, F., 
"Mossadegh - A Political Biography", Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1986, p. 192). 
However, it is important to point out that the 1953 coup, did not spell an end to 
Mossadegh's involvement in Iranian political life. Up to the time of his death in 1967, 
Mossadegh continued to be influential in the affairs of all his supporters, and did 
continue to have, mainly through written communications, great input in the affairs of 
the National Front.
182Diba, F.,lbid., p. 190.
183lnterview, Sadegh Amir Hosseini (An influential colleague and Supporter of 
Mehdi Bazargan in the Liberation Movement), London, 24 January 1995.
184Zonis, M., The Political Elite of Iran, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1971, p.70.
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revolution in 1978185.
According to Bakhtiar, himself186, he was approached as early as 2-3 weeks after the 
arrest of Mossadegh, and urged to continue the new struggle for the restoration of 
democracy and Constitutionalism, by forming new underground cells of resistance and 
producing a series of newsletters187. At the same time, Bakhtiar was also made a 
candidate by the Iran Party188 to contest a seat in the Majles, which was being elected 
to ratify the new oil consortium agreement signed with the major companies by the 
incoming Zahedi Administration.
However, several weeks prior to polling, Bakhtiar was arrested on trumped up charges 
of having violated the security of the state, having collaborated with the Tudeh Party, 
and written an article in which he had insulted the sovereign189. Thus, under "section 
5 of the Rules of Martial Law", he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. Later, 
his sentence was commuted, and he was released after two years in prison190.
185lnterview, A. Esna Ashari, London, 17 February 1995.
186Amirshahi, Ibid., pp. 94-96.
187Entitled, "Rahe Mossadegh" (meaning Mossadegh's way) and "Moghavemate 
Melli" (meaning national resistance).
188lt is important to mention that the Iran Party was not banned as a political 
movement in the immediate aftermath of the Mossadegh, mainly due to a tactical ploy 
it employed by publicly endorsing the anti-communist "Eisenhower Doctrine". As such, 
it was allowed to field candidates for the Majles elections (Interview: A. H. Amir Parviz, 
London, 13 February 1995).
189 According to Bakhtiar,(Amirshahi, Ibid., p.96.), the unpublished article, which 
had said that the Shah should "reign and not rule", was found during the course of a 
search that was made of his home. During this time, Bakhtiar was also falsely accused 
of having had intimate collaboration with the banned Tudeh Party.
190Amirshahi, Ibid., p.96.
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By the time Bakhtiar was released from prison, the infamous "Sazemane Ettelaat Va 
Aminyate Kheshvar", more commonly known as "SAVAK", had already been 
established191, and with it, the entire "milieu" of political activity in Iran had undergone 
a fundamental change. Consequently, it was not until such time that the Shah was 
experiencing trouble abroad - particularly in Washington - that the climate was, once 
again, conducive for the National Front and other former supporters of Mossadegh to 
resurface. This opportunity presented itself, when President John F. Kennedy, took 
office in January 1961, and it was hastened by the appointment of the reform seeking, 
Dr. Ali Amini, as Prime Minister, later in that same year (May 1961).
Previously, in August 1960, the Second National Front, had been reconvened following 
an invitation that was issued by Dr. Gholam-Hossein Sadighi, in which Bakhtiar (along 
with personalities such as Allahyar Saleh, Karim Sanjabi, Abdol-Hossein Khalili and 
Mohammad Ali Keshavarz Sadr) had been elected to its Executive Committee192.
The Council of Second National Front was composed of a series of dignatries with no 
party affiliations, and a number of senior members representing the Iran Party, the 
Freedom Movement, and a breakaway faction of Khalil Maleki's "Nirouye Sevom", that 
had come to be known as the "Jame-e Socialist-ha"193. The Second National Front, was 
beset with internal strife from the time of its inception. Not only was Khalil Maleki and
191 It was ironical that the new organization should have been headed by 
Bakhtiar's own cousin and contemporary, General Teimur Bakhtiar. Indeed, in his own 
autobiography, Bakhtiar mentions that one of his proudest achievements as Prime 
Minister, was to abolish an infamous institution that had been established by another 
member of his family (Amirshahi, M., Ibid., p.98.).
192Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of 
Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 154).
193Meaning the "Socialist League".
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his organization’s membership rejected by the new Council, in defiance of Maleki's 
years of devotion, loyalty and support for Mossadegh194, but it also marked the last time 
that Engineer Mehdi Bazargan and his close associate, Yadollah Sahabi (who six 
months later founded the "Freedom Movement")195, were to participate as active 
members of the Front196. According to the opinion of Homa Katouzian197, "the Front 
eventually became dominated by Dr. Mohammad Ali Khunji - a prominent intellectual 
who had been a very close associate of Khalil Maleki..., and Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, a 
strong-willed lesser light of the Mossadegh era. In effect, Khunji became the theoretical 
strategist, and Bakhtiar the practical operator of the 'line' which finally led the Front, 
and the Iranian people who gave them loyal support, straight into a complete political 
catastrophe, although this should not mean that the others - and, especially, the
194According to Katouzian (The Political Economy of Modern Iran, Despotism and 
Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979, p. 218), fears of Maleki's "superior analytical powers 
and organizational abilities", coupled with "the illusion on the part of some Front 
leaders - most notably Bakhtiar - that any direct association with Maleki would lose 
them the Tudeh Party Vote' during the next election", were critically important in the 
decision to keep Maleki out of the National Front.
195Founded in 1960, the Liberation Movement of Iran declared its objectives in 
the following terms: "We are Moslems, Iranians, Constitutionalists, and 
Moassadeghists: Moslems because we refuse to divorce our principles from our 
politics; Iranians because we respect our national heritage; Constitutionalists because 
we demand freedom of thought, expression and association; Mossadeghists because 
we want national independence". (Source: Abrahamian, E., Iran Between Two 
Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982, p.450.)
196According to Rahim Sharifi (SAHAND article), differences of view regarding 
tactics against the Shah, resulted in the publication of an article by the Freedom 
Movement, in which an acrimonious attack was made at the Front and its leadership. 
The recriminations were such that a split between the two organizations became 
inevitable. From that time onwards, the Freedom Movement never again acted in 
unison with the National Front, and instead chose to promote its objectives 
independently.
197Katouzian's book contains a great deal of comments that relate more to the 
author's likes and dislikes. These "unacademic" comments, sometimes, needlessly, 
devalue an otherwise well researched piece of work.
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prominent leaders can be absolved of their own responsibilities"198.
Nonetheless, major opportunities did arise, whose timely exploitation by the National 
Front leadership, essentially camouflaged the state of inner turmoil that was being 
experienced as a result of their various internal disputes. The most prominent of these 
was in February 1961, when with Bakhtiar in charge of the Front's Youth Organization, 
5000 students were induced to stage a very impressive sit in at Teheran University in 
protest against unfair practices in the second round of elections to the 20th Majles199. 
However, some Front sympathizers have questioned Bakhtiar's judgement in calling off 
this important protest after only "a single night"200. This challenge to Bakhtiar's 
credibility, reflective of the type of inter-organizational tensions that had existed at the 
time, were explicitly rejected in an official NAMIR pamphlet distributed in 1980. In a 
long essay written by an unnamed Iran Party colleague, the blame for the decision to 
call off the sit-in at Teheran University was fully placed on all the other members of 
National Front's Executive Committee. The article said that while Bakhtiar was, in fact, 
the only member to have opposed that decision, he had, nonetheless, yielded to a 
majority decision, and having been in charge of the Front's Youth Movement, it was up 
to him to inform the students of the final decision. The same essay, also criticizes other 
Front leaders, for not having had the moral courage to set the record straight at a later 
date201.
198Katouzian, H., Ibid., pp. 216-217.
199lbid., p. 214.
200lbid. Dr. Mozafar Baghai, later accused him of having acted on the orders of 
his cousin, General Teimur Bakhtiar, who was at the time the Head of SAVAK, with 
much higher aspirations (Alamouti, M., "Iran Dar Asre Pahlavi", Vol. XIV, ("Akharin 
Rouzehaye Zendeghi Shahe-Shahan Va Sarneveshte Akharin Nakhost Vazir Shah"). 
Paka Print, London, (November)1992, p. 17).
201Morohe Toufan. NAMIR, 1980, p. 12.
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In summary, despite all the internal problems, it can be said that mounting internal 
problems in Iran, coupled with the inability of the government to deal effectively with 
them, had provided the Second National Front with an opportunity to begin reasserting 
itself in Iranian political life. According to Homa Katouzian, the emerging climate of 
internal liberalization that had been prompted as a result of a growing economic crisis 
and the public humiliation of an earlier aborted election for the 20th Majles, had even 
created the possibility of the Shah turning to the National Front for the creation of a 
reform oriented government202. Although, the Shah eventually opted for the 
appointment of Dr. Ali Amini - mostly as a move to appease his critics in the new 
American administration - it was, nevertheless, an undeniable reality that the newly 
reconstituted National Front, had, once again, been able to resurrect itself so as to 
pose a serious challenge to the Shah, who had managed, in the course of the previous 
seven years, to set the stage for transforming a "Conservative Plutocracy into a 
personal dictatorship"203.
The stage was thus set for the convening of the First "Congress" of the National Front 
in December 1962, and the election of the Council of what came to be known as the 
'Third National Front". This time, all the previous internal bickering - to the delight of 
the authorities - was compounded by a personal message of Mossadegh to the 
Congress, stressing the need to avoid naming individuals, devoid of organizational 
representation to the Front's Council (i.e., constant emphasis on developing the role 
of groups and organizations, as opposed to promoting personalities who are devoid of
202Katouzian, H., Ibid., p. 213.
203lbid., p. 193.
87
any organized following)204. This message proved to be most damaging, since of the 
33 members elected to what was to become the Third National Front's Council, 19 
were individuals devoid of any party affiliation205. Of those with party affiliations, ten 
members, including Bakhtiar, were members of the Iran Party, while the other three 
spots were occupied by Daryush Forouhar of the Iranian Nations Party, Engineer 
Noushin of the "People's Party", and Engineer Mehdi Bazargan of the Freedom 
Movement, whose membership was eventually rejected following an impassioned 
criticism of his Movement's "radical wing", by Dr. Gholam Hossein Sadighi206.
Responding to Major Issues: 
Bakhtiar And the National Front (1961-1963)
The period 1961-1963 was a critical period in the modern political history of Iran, given 
that the eventual outcome of certain major events, would lead to a consolidation of 
royal power, resulting, perhaps, to the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini and the victory of 
the Islamic Revolution in 1979. There is no question that the National Front did have 
a role to play in all of these events, and there is little doubt that the Front failed in all 
its assessments of the various challenges that were placed before it during those 
critical years. A case can also be made, that following its failure to prescribe a suitable
204Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of 
Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 158. Sharifi goes into great detail about 
Mossadegh's opposition to individual membership of the Front, and the wrangling that 
had gone on between him and the Front's leadership. He states that Mossadegh's 
disagreement over these constitutional issues was a significant factor that contributed 
to the overall failure of the Second and Third National Front.
205Prominent among these figures were: Ayatollah Mohammad Taleghani, 
Gholam Reza Takhti (an Olympic Gold medalist in Wrestling), and Fereidoon Mahdavi, 
who later became the Shah's Minister of Commerce, and Deputy Leader of the 
Rastakhiz Party in the 1970s (Ibid.).
^According to Rahim Sharifi (SAHAND article, p. 156), Dr. Sadighi, himself, later 
resigned from the National Front in 1963.
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course of action to the various political challenges of the early 1960s, the National 
Front's withdrawal from front line politics for an extended period, was crucial in creating 
a political vacuum that was to be exploited by various Islamic groupings. Hence, by the 
time that the Iranian Revolution was well underway, it was the Islamic tendencies, and 
not the National Front, that were able to exploit the various possibilities that availed 
themselves, as the Shah's regime began the count down of its own disintegration.
Some of the most critical challenges confronting the National Front, in whose Executive 
Committee, Bakhtiar had become a powerful voice in this period were the following:
1. Their posturing vis-a-vis the reform government of Dr. Ali Amini (1961-1962).
2. Their disposition towards issues that were subsequently incorporated in the 
Shah's "White Revolution" (1962-1963).
3. Their disposition towards positions adopted by Ayatollah Khomeini (1963). 
The subsequent positions that were adopted by the National Front, on each of the items 
cited above, were to have serious implications on the future disposition of the Front, as 
well as a direct bearing on the political agenda of the Bakhtiar government that was 
later formed, as a last line of defense, to halt the tide of the powerful revolution that 
was to sweep the country.
1. The National Front And the Government of Dr. Ali Amini
The appointment of Dr. Amini as Prime Minister, in May 1961, was a welcome 
opportunity for Bakhtiar and the leadership of the National Front, to promote many of 
their own stated goals and objectives. Amini was known to favor limitations on the 
power of throne, and was reputed to be devoted to general civil liberties207.
207Zonis, M., Ibid., pp.49-50.
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Furthermore, Amini himself was prepared to grant important concessions to the 
National Front, in order to promote his own agenda of reforms: these included the 
curtailment of royal power and interference in the affairs of the government208. Indeed, 
for the first time since 1953, Mossadegh's picture was allowed, with Amini's personal 
blessings, to appear in print on 7 May 1961209. In another sign of goodwill, Amini, who 
had himself served in the first Mossadegh government, allowed the National Front, for 
the first time since 1953, to stage an open-air meeting , which attracted an estimated 
100,000 people. The first three speakers were Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Dr. Gholam-Hossein 
Sadighi, and Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, though the latter's attack on the record of the 
various governments since the downfall of Mossadegh, was undoubtedly, the most 
blistering210. At the same time, while Amini had allowed for all press restrictions on the 
National Front to be lifted, there were certain guidelines which he had insisted upon. 
For example, during the course of the open-air meeting in the "Jalalieh Stadium", each 
speaker was permitted to mention the name of Mossadegh only once during the course 
of his entire speech211.
Despite, these gestures of tolerance, the Front began turning its guns directly against 
Amini's government212, whose primary concern at the time was the land reform program
208According to Katouzian, Amini was even prepared to offer some cabinet seats 
to the National Front.
209Bill, J. A., The Eagle And The Lion - The Tragedy of American-1 ranian 
Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988, p. 142.
210Payame Iran. No. 410, 17 November 1991 (Special Bakhtiar Rememberence
Issue).
211Diba, F., Ibid., p.193.
212Many observers including Dr. M. Alamouti and A.H. Amir Parviz (Interview, 
24/2/95), believe that Bakhtiar, was perhaps, Amini's sharpest critic in the National 
Front. Many of those opposed to Bakhtiar, such as Mozafar Baghai, attribute this to his 
collusion with his cousin, General Teimur Bakhtiar, who was, at the time, suspected of
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that it was trying to implement. Pressing their opposition, the Front's insisted that the 
article of the Iranian Constitution which provides that new elections must follow shortly 
after a Majles has been dissolved must be enforced213, and made plans to hold a 
massive demonstration in Teheran on 21 July?14 In the end, their opposition to the 
Amini government, based on the miscalculation that they would be in line for forming 
a successor government, left Amini with little option but to act on the eve of their 
planned demonstration, by arresting and imprisoning 15 members of the National 
Front's Council for a period of seven and half months215.
During this entire period, Bakhtiar was a part of a leadership that was plagued by 
disorganization and political naivete. In terms of a policy program, other than its call for 
free elections, a neutral foreign policy and "Melli" (ie. democratic-nationalist) 
government, the Front had failed to come up with anything more specific. This 
emphasis, on generalities, was a main feature of the political culture with which 
Bakhtiar was to become accustomed in his opposition to the Shah. Unfortunately, this
wanting to mount a coup against both Amini and the Shah.
213Less than a week after becoming Prime Minister, Amini had obtained the 
Shah's approval to dissolve the Majles.
214Wilber, D. A , Iran - Past and Present, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey, Eighth Edition, 1976, pp. 154-155.
215Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of 
Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 156. In a number of discussions with the 
writer during the course of a trip to the US in 1984, Bakhtiar spoke affectionately about 
his relationship with his cousin Teimur. During the course of his stay in Los Angeles, 
he had Teimur's son come and spend a great deal of time with him, and in 1985, he 
personally attended his wedding in Geneva. During the course of a particular 
conversation, Bakhtiar vehemently denied a comment made by General Mohsen 
Mobasser (Teimur's Chief of Staff, during his period as military governor of Teheran in 
the early 1950s) that Teimur randomly resorted to extortion in order to mass a personal 
fortune for himself. Although it cannot be substantiated, many believe that there might 
have been close collusion between Bakhtiar and his cousin Teimur, particularly during 
the Amini administration.
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was a sad relic, that was to last with him in all his days when he was in opposition to 
the Islamic Republic as well216.
2. The National Front And the Shah's White Revolution
Having himself manipulated the fall of the Amini government in July 1962217, the Shah 
had set the stage for his own emergence as the uncontested political master of Iran. 
Having appointed a trusted and loyal servant of the crown, Assadollah Alam, as Prime 
Minister, and having secured American support for himself, the Shah needed better ties 
with Moscow, and a comprehensive and progressive socio-economic and political 
program at home, to ensure stability and continuity for his rule.
Soon, he was able to begin the process of normalizing relations with Moscow218, and 
by January 1963, he was able to put his reform package that was commonly referred 
to as the "Program of the Revolution of the Shah and the People" (or "White 
Revolution"), to a plebiscite, in which it was overwhelmingly approved. This program 
contained "Six Points of Principle"219, which were by any standard, progressive
21&The fact that Amini had ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Bakhtiar, was 
an experience that was never forgotten by Bakhtiar, and during the course of various 
discussions with Amini in the 1980s, it was something that Bakhtiar jokingly alluded to 
on numerous occasions to many intermediaries, including the writer. However, this 
matter did not affect Bakhtiar's relations with Amini during their various negotiations in 
the early 1980s.
217Benefiting indirectly from the actions of the National Front.
218This meant that Moscow put a stop to damaging propaganda and other 
agitations, and above all, it curtailed and limited the activities of the Tudeh Party inside 
Iran. ,
/ 219The six points were the following: Land Reform; nationalization of forests; 
electoral reform - including the granting to women of the right to vote and to be elected 
to Majles; denationalization of state monopolies to finance land reform; company profit 
sharing for industrial workers; and the creation of a 'literacy corps' as part of the 
'campaign against illiteracy in rural areas.
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measures for the time. Therefore, the passage and adoption of the Shah's 'White 
Revolution' Agenda, resulted in the disarming of most of his secular political critics, 
including the National Front, and paved the way for a major confrontation with the 
traditionalist conservative clerical tendencies of the day, that were led by an emerging 
Ayatollah Khomeini.
However, in an attempt to secure the cooperation of the National Front leadership, prior 
to the announcement of the Shah's new political agenda, Prime Minister Alam paid a 
visit to Allahyar Saleh, and to the astonishment of many observers, told Saleh that the 
Shah was interested in incorporating the views of the National Front for the 
administration of the country. Alam was even prepared to assign cabinet seats to Front 
nominees and to assure the election of their representatives to the next Majles220. After 
several further meeting and an invitation from the prime minister to meet directly with 
the Shah, the Front refused to be co-opted by the Shah, and issued a three point plan 
that once again re-iterated its solemn belief that the Shah should "reign" and not "rule" 
, and that the center power of power should pass to a freely elected Majles221.
Having broken all negotiations with the government, a confrontation point was once 
again reached when in January 1963, faced with growing publicity for the referendum 
to determine the future of the Shah's "White Revolution" proposals, the Front held 
another National Congress, which, for tactical reasons, ultimately urged the people of 
Iran to boycott the January 26 referendum.
At a substantive level, the National Front's response to the provisions of the Shah's
220Zonis, M., Ibid., p.74.
221 Ibid.
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White Revolution was both vague and inadequate. This was mainly due to the fact that 
the Front could not bring itself to adopt a unified course of action in response to the 
Shah. Thus, there was a tendency on the part of some to publicly criticize the Shah - 
as was done by Khomeini on 4 June 1963 - while others did not consider such a course 
of action to be 'tactically wise' or in line with the ultimate interests of the organization. 
There was also another faction that was convinced that the Shah 'had stolen' his 
platform from views and opinions expressed previously by the Front222, and were of the 
view that while the Front should give its affirmation to the content of what was being 
offered, it should emphasize that the corrupt and repressive government of the day was 
incapable of carrying them out.
Finally, a statement was issued attacking the Shah, but failing to come up with a 
convincing assessment or criticism of his program. The statement concluded, "We must 
say NO to the arbitrary rule of the Shah, his interference in the affairs of the state, the 
rule of terror and SAVAK atrocities, colonial domination of the country, police violations 
and gendarmerie oppression and the overlordship of government officials in towns and 
villages"223. This rejection of previous overtures made to the National Front which 
followed the sacking of the head of SAVAK, General Teimur Bakhtiar, was more than 
the Shah's tolerance could take, and led to the rounding up of all the National Front 
leadership224.
^ h e  National Front's internal discussions about such issues as land reform or 
the right of women to vote was never communicated to the Iranian people. On the 
subject of land reform, by the time of the announcement of the White Revolution, there 
was not a single view that was shared by all members of the Front's Council.
223Zonis, M., Ibid., p.74.
224Laing, M., The Shah, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1977, p. 171. Once the 
National Front leaders had been arrested, the Shah went to Qom on 24 January 1963, 
the hub of the religiously inspired opposition to his rule, and distributed land reform 
deeds in the face of the hostility of the ulema. He blasted his opponents, and branded
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Thus, the Front's moralistically clumsy, and wholly inadequate, response to the most 
important political challenge of the day, had played straight into the hands of the Shah, 
and served only to strengthen his position, while at the same time, highlighting the 
existing incompetence within the ranks of his most legitimate opposition225.
3. The National Front And the Religious 
Opponents of the White Revolution
The most vocal opposition to the 'White Revolution' came from the clerical 
constituency, mainly as a result of the provisions calling for land redistribution in rural 
areas, and for granting of voting privileges to women. With respect to the latter, there 
were many statements by religious leaders, including Khomeini, that equal rights for 
women were a violation of the Shari'a226. It is important to note that the disputes of 
1963 had come about following the vocal clerical protests regarding the passage of a 
'local election bill', that had sparked open disturbances in October 1962. In that 
instance, confronted with massive and unexpected protest against the local election bill, 
the government had been forced to back down and annul the legislation227, but in 1963, 
the Shah's resolve and the intention of the government to implement the provisions of 
the "White Revolution", was not in any way amenable to compromise. Given that the 
clergy interpreted the referendum as a rejection of its demand for greater influence in 
the government and as a further attempt to curb on its social influence and political 
role, a major confrontation with the government had become unavoidable.
them "100 times more treacherous than Tudeh".
225Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of 
Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 174.
^Keddie, N.R., Religion And Politics in Iran, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1983, p. 66 (article by Azar Tabari).
227lbid., p.68.
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The clergy next made a call for the boycotting of the referendum (like the National 
Front), but Ayatollah Khomeini went much further, by calling the referendum 
"Unconstitutional", and stating that it was held under an atmosphere of intimidation, 
repression, and fear, while at the same time underlining that "People do not understand 
the full implication of their vote"228.
Continuing agitation from the clerical constituency led by Khomeini, in face of the 
government's strict refusal to make any concessions, ultimately resulted in repeated 
clashes between the army and the religious students, culminating in Khomeini's famous 
public denunciation of the Shah in his 'Ashura" speech of 3 June 1963. His subsequent 
arrest sparked large scale riots and demonstrations, that were decisively crushed by 
the army. During the course of the protests in Teheran, a significant development was 
that, apart from the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini who had come out in great numbers 
into the streets229, while the Bazaar was shut down in protest, students from Teheran 
University had also joined the ranks of the protestors. These students were led by the 
Student Committee of the National Front - initially organized by Bakhtiar - which was 
by then, the only remaining active wing of the disintegrating National Front230. While,
228lbid., p.69.
229Led and organized by Tayyeb Haj Rezaii, a powerful figure in south Teheran's 
Fruit and Vegetable Market, who in 1953 had been very active in support of the Shah. 
Tayyeb was later arrested, tried and executed for his role in the "15 Khordad" uprising. 
Later, he was proclaimed by Ayatollah Khomeini to be the "First Martyr" of the Islamic 
Revolution. Tayyeb's eldest son, who was arrested and imprisoned along with him in 
1963, later revealed many details regarding this matter to the writer, although, he 
always maintained that it was never his father's intention to be disloyal to the Shah.
230According to A. Esna Ashari (a National front activist and trusted Bakhtiar 
subordinate, Interview, London, 17 February 1995), at the time of the 15 Khordad 
Demonstrations, all the Front leadership was in jail, and the students that acted in 
conjunction with the clerics, were former Front students, who were more sympathetic 
to the Freedom Movement, whose membership of the Front had earlier been turned 
down.
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they did not support the clerics in their opposition to women suffrage, they did 
participate in the demonstrations, promoting their own slogan of: "Reform, Yes! 
Dictatorship, No!". Sadly, the lack of any meaningful presence by the Front at the time, 
provided an opportunity for their student supporters to look in the direction of religion 
as a more practical symbol of opposition to the Shah. What this meant, was that with 
socialism and secular nationalism in total disarray, only an unscathed and widely 
respected Islam was proving itself more capable of challenging a system that was 
coming to rely on the incompetence of its secular opponents, as a main ingredient for 
its own survival.
With the rebellion crushed, and more than 250 persons arrested, including other 
National Front supporters, members of the Tudeh Party's Revolutionary Committee, 
and religious leaders throughout Iran, it was decided, in January 1964, to put the 
detainees before a military tribunal. But, in the end of all the detainees, only the leaders 
and founders of the Freedom Movement were actually prosecuted231. Other Front 
leaders, having already served a year, were then released.
The Fourth National Front____________________________________
From 1964-1977, the National Front slide into a period of deep hibernation, with all 
activities, barring some statements from certain prominent Front individuals, coming to 
a full halt232. One reason for this inactivity was due to the fact that in the aftermath of 
the "15 Khordad" incident, the government no longer tolerated any trace of dissent,
231 Engineer Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani were both 
sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.
232eg. Condemnation of the legislation introduced by the Mansour government 
in 1964, giving American technical advisers immunity from trial by Iranian courts.
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having arrested and imprisoned all its potential opposition. By its action in this regard, 
the government had essentially blocked every open channel that had hitherto existed 
for the expression of dissent against state policies. The natural outcome of this was 
the decision on the part of many militant supporters of the National Front to continue 
the struggle by going 'underground'. However, this was not a decision that was 
welcomed by all the traditional elements in the Front, who saw their constitutional rights 
being compromised by an increasingly dictatorial regime. But, at the same time, they 
considered 'going underground’ or bearing arms, also to be contrary to the spirit of the 
very constitution, whose principles they were espousing to champion. As a result, they 
chose the more mundane option of remaining inactive, but true to their own principles, 
until such time that it was once again possible for them resurface again233. This 
decision on the part of the main stream leaders of the National Front, such as Sanjabi 
and Bakhtiar, was not universally welcomed and led to the emergence of major 
divisions within the organization, which ultimately led to the formation of a number of 
splinter groups, such as the "Fadayan-e Khalq" and the "Mojahedin Khalq" 
organizations, who were dedicated to the violent overthrow of the regime234.
It was not until the election of Jimmy Carter to the Presidency of the United States, and 
his call for the injection of human rights as a main foreign policy criteria, that the rigid 
political atmosphere in Iran was, once again, relaxed, and the Shah, "encouraged" into 
taking a new initiative by announcing the creation of "Fazaye Baze Siyasi" (open
233lnterview with A. Esna Ashari, London, 17 February 1995.
234Bakhash, S., The Reign of the Ayatollahs - Iran and the Islamic Revolution, 
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1984, p.11. It was during this time that the 
"Liberation Movement" also began increasing its activities abroad, by forming Islamic 
Student Organizations and printing a number of anti-Shah newsletters. Later the 
writings of Ali Shariati, a leading Liberation Movement intellectual, also played a crucial 
role in using religion as a vehicle for promoting change.
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political atmosphere). According to Gary Sick, "the election of Jimmy Carter came as 
a blow to the Shah of Iran...Carter had adopted as two principal campaign themes the 
issue of human rights and reduction of U.S. arms sales, each of which could be 
regarded as critical of existing relations with Iran"235. By this time, inflation and other 
growing economic pressures that had arisen as a result of an over heated economy, 
coupled with the Shah's decision in 1975 to abolish the, albeit obedient, multi-party 
political system, had created an atmosphere of discontent, which, assisted by Carter's 
stated concern for human rights, emboldened the political opposition to resurface once 
again236.
Bakhtiar And The Fourth National Front_________________________
In June 1977, in compliance with the wishes of their now deceased founder, 
Mossadegh237, the National Front was once again revived, and its very first session was 
conducted on 12 June 1977, in the residence of Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar238. The new 
National Front, kicked off its new political campaign with a daring open letter, 
addressed to the Shah and signed by Karim Sanjabi, Shapour Bakhtiar, and Daryoush 
Forouhar. In this letter(dated 22 June 1977) which pointedly avoided the use of the
235Sick, G., All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter With Iran, Random House, 
New York, 1985, p.22.
236Amongst the main political groups that exploited this emerging situation were: 
the National Front, led by Dr. Karim Sanjabi; the Freedom Movement, led by Engineer 
Mehdi Bazargan; the Radical Movement, led by Rahmatollah Moghdam-Maraghei; 
Junbish, led by Ali Asghar Haj-Seyed Javadi; the Iranian Group for the Protection of 
Human Rights, led by Bazargan, Sanjabi, and others; and the Society of Iranian 
Lawyers, led by Hedayatollah Matin-Daftary and Hassan Nazih.
237calling for the National Front to be an association of organizations, and not 
individuals - something which had been ignored by both the Second and Third National 
Fronts.
238Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of 
Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 163.
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Shah's "imperial Calendar"239, the Shah was forewarned of an explosive situation that 
was fast developing in the country as a result of his arbitrary rule, and was urged to 
relinquish dictatorship by accepting the limits imposed on him by the Iranian 
Constitution240. He was also urged to abolish the single Party system, by granting 
immediate freedom of expression, while at the same time respecting the human rights 
of all Iranians, irrespective of their political leanings, releasing all political prisoners as 
well as allowing all political exiles to return to the country. According to Bakhtiar, 
himself, copies of this letter were hand delivered to the Shah Personal Office ("Daftar-e 
Makhsous-e Shahanshahi) and to the SAVAK headquarters in central Teheran241.
For the next several months, the Front held weekly meetings, also publishing a weekly 
newsletter for its sympathizer. By early 1978, when the political atmosphere had 
become fully charged up, the Front's leader, Karim Sanjabi following a meeting with 
Allahyar Saleh, recalled a number of former colleagues to the ranks of a new Council, 
that came to be known as the Fourth National Front. Once again the 31 man Council, 
contrary to what had originally been explicitly demanded by Mossadegh, was composed 
of 18 personalities devoid of any official political affiliations. Of the remaining 13 
members, 12 were members of the Iran Party242, and the other was the leader of the
239The imposition of the 'Imperial Calendar' was a highly provocative act 
instituted by the Shah which changed the Islamic character of the Iranian calendar, and 
based it, instead on the history of monarchy in Iran, which went back to some 2500 
years. This act provoked a great deal of hostility in religious quarters, and its 
revocation, as a first act of the Sharif-Emami government in the Summer of 1978, was 
seen as the first major sign of retreat by the Shah.
240Sharifi, R., Ibid., pp. 163-166.
241 Private discussions with the writer.
242Whose Secretary General was Shapour Bakhtiar.
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Iranian Nations Party243.
The next major development that was to have a devastating effect on the status of the 
National Front took place in the Autumn of 1978, when in the midst of all the 
disturbances that was taking place on the home front, Dr. Karim Sanjabi - without the 
explicit authorization of either the National Front Council or its Executive Committee, 
was lured into a signing a Three Point statement, on 5 November 1978, which 
expressed overt opposition to a continuing monarchy. To the surprise of many Front 
leaders, Dr. Sanjabi who was to represent the National Front in an international 
Conference of the Socialist League in Canada, had unexpectedly turned up in Paris, 
where after a meeting with Khomeini in his place of residence at Neuphe-le-Chateau, 
the following text was released244:
"In the Name of God, Sunday, 5 November 1978
1. The current monarchy in Iran with its history of disregard for the provisions of the 
constitution, and its constant imposition of injustice in an atmosphere of repression and 
corruption and submission to foreign political intrigues is devoid of any legal or moral 
legitimacy.
2. The Islamic Movement of Iran will never consent to the retention of the current 
monarchy under any set of circumstances.
3. The form of a national government in Iran, based on Islamic and democratic values 
must be freely decided upon by a national vote.
Dr. Karim Sanjabi"245
243lncluded in the new Council were figures such as Abdol-Rahman Boroomand, 
Rahim Sharifi, and Mehrdad Arfa-Zadeh, who were all destined to join NAMIR at a later 
stage. At Bakhtiar's insistence, Admiral Ahmad Madani was also included in the new 
membership.
244Translated into English by the writer.
245NAMIR, 37 Rooz Pas Az 37 Saal: Chand Goftegoo ba Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar 
DarDooran Zamamdariash (37 Days After 37 Years), 1984, p. 143
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This statement, unilaterally decided upon by Dr. Sanjabi, was considered as an act of 
total betrayal by both Bakhtiar, and Dr. Gholam-Hossein Sadighi, whose main condition 
for having rejoined the Front had been that no single individual, including its leader, 
must announce any binding policy on behalf of the Front without the express mandate 
of the National Front Council246.
At the about the same time as the announcement of the declaration by Sanjabi, 
Bazargan on behalf of the Liberation Movement , declared that "the mass 
demonstrations of the previous year had shown that the people followed Ayatollah 
Khomeini and that they wanted the monarchy to be replaced by an Islamic system of 
government"247. Therefore, through their actions, Bazargan and Sanjabi, representing 
the devout but lay Liberation Movement on one hand, and the secular National Front 
on the other, had allied themselves fully with Ayatollah Khomeini.
Amongst the National Front's senior leadership during those tumultuous days, only Dr. 
Gholam-Hossein Sadighi and Bakhtiar, feared the clergy and the type of rule that they 
would represent, more than the Shah and the military regime which he had represented 
for the previous 25 years. During numerous meetings with the Shah, first Dr. Sadighi 
and later Bakhtiar, had laid down their conditions for accepting to form a civilian cabinet 
to try and salvage the country from further strife and unrest. As conditions laid down by 
Dr. Sadighi, the Shah's first choice to head a new government, were too humiliating for
246Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of 
Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 168.
247Abrahamian, E., Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1982, p.520.
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the Shah to accept248, the task of forming a new government was in the end offered to 
Bakhtiar249.
Bakhtiar's acceptance of the challenge that was put before him, at a very critical time 
in the modern history of Iran, resulted in his immediate expulsion from the National 
Front, in whose Executive Committee and Council, he had loyally served since the 
overthrow of the Mossadegh government. In a further move, orchestrated against him 
by Sanjabi, the Iran Party was also asked to remove him as its Secretary General, prior 
to expelling him altogether from the party. However, this was an act that Sanjabi was 
unable to fulfill, as the matter was referred to a party investigating committee, that was 
never assembled due to the rapid pace of developments.
While Bakhtiar, remained hopeful that his colleagues in the National Front, would 
eventually come to his assistance in trying to protect and promote the secular nature 
of government in Iran, it was becoming more evident with each passing day, that the 
majority of his old colleagues were beguiled by the tempting promises of a very shrewd 
holy man, who was perhaps the only figure in the Iranian political scene of the day, who 
had a clear vision of the exact agenda that he was proposing. In this respect, the 
National Front's sycophantic statement on 23 January 1979, welcoming the return of 
Khomeini to Iran, was a devastating blow to the hope's of the Bakhtiar government, and
248Sadighi wanted the Shah to remain in Iran, but to transfer all his authority to 
a regency council. This was tantamount to an admission that the Shah was unfit, even 
to reign - a condition that the Shah could under no circumstance accept. Bakhtiar on 
the other hand, asked that a regency council be set up, but that the Shah, himself, 
should leave Iran on an open ended "vacation", until such time that it was possible for 
him to come back again.
249Bakhtiar's candidacy was also supported by Empress Farah, with whom 
Bakhtiar had had a private discussion meeting in the early Autumn, when there were 
no signs that the Shah was willing to hand power to any of his opponents.
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an even more devastating blow to the long-term credibility of National Front and the 
memory of Mossadegh250.
The Bakhtiar Government: 37 Days After 37 Years________________
In a book entitled, "Iran - Dictatorship and Development", that was released in the 
Autumn of 1978251, Professor Fred Halliday of the London School of Economics, 
enumerated four separate but realistic options that could still have been considered 
plausible, given the rapidly disintegrating state of affairs in Iran. According to Halliday, 
the four "capitalist options" - ie. barring a Soviet type, socialist take over, were the 
following:
1. Continued dictatorship by the Pahlavi monarch...
2. Modification of the Pahlavi regime to allow for a degree of political freedom and 
some participation in government by civilian politicians - a return to the situation in 
1961 -1962, and the in the period up to 1953.
3. Military dictatorship, after the complete removal or political neutralization of the Shah 
and his family.
4. A bourgeois dictatorship, under a republican regime, or with a monarchy that is of 
a purely constitutional kind.252
In this respect, the decision by the Shah to appoint a member of the official opposition,
250Sharifi, R, "Darbarehe Jebheye Melli", SAHAND - A Persian Journal of 
Political & Cultural Studies. Vol.4 -No. 13, p. 168-171.
251 At a time when no one could have predicted the final outcome of the Iranian 
revolution, given that the manuscript must have been completed by at least several 
months prior to publication and distribution.
252Halliday, F., Ibid., p.300.
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as head of a civilian government, meant that the Iranian monarch had opted for the 
second of the four options suggested by Halliday, at the same time that he had firmly 
rejected option 3, which would have imposed a military dictatorship in the country.
At a time when Dr. Karim Sanjabi and Engineer Mehdi Bazargan had joined the 
Khomeini bandwagon, while Dr. Gholam-Hossein Sadighi, had not been able to work 
out a satisfactory arrangement with the Shah, Bakhtiar was the next most senior figure, 
with enough stature in the ranks of the National Front, to be asked to form a 
government. Given the circumstances of the time, while there was a feeling that the 
Bakhtiar government could not prevent the advent of a new order, there was 
nevertheless, general acknowledgement that Bakhtiar had proven his superior courage 
and determination by having accepted the difficult task of placing himself squarely 
between the Shah and the emerging Ayatollah253.
Thus, on 6 January 1979, after more than 25 years of frustration and hardship, Shapour 
Bakhtiar accepted the Shah's "Farman" to become the "Forty Third Constitutional Prime 
Minister of Iran", and the Thirty First (and last) Prime Minister in the reign of 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi254. On 11 January 1979, Bakhtiar presented his
253Afkhami, G. H., The Iranian Revolution: Thanatos On a National Scale, The 
Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 107.
^Alamouti, M., Iran DarAsre Pahlavi, Vol. XIV, ("Akharin Rouzehaye Zendeghi 
Shahe-Shahan Va Sarneveshte Akharin Nakhost Vazir Shah"). Paka Print, London, 
1992, p.3. In his book, as well as in an interview with the writer (24/2/95), Dr. Alamouti 
has stated that, once news concerning the formation of a Bakhtiar government became 
public, a number of well known opposition figures, not affiliated with either Sanjabi or 
Bazargan - ie. for reasons of their own, began quietly to form an anti-Bakhtiar lobby. 
According to Dr. Alamouti, one of these figures, Hossein Maki, even called him at his 
office in the Majles, and asked him to vote against Bakhtiar. The other senior figure, 
with ambitions of his own for forming a government, was Mozafar Baghai, who issued 
a statement condemning Bakhtiar, and accusing him of many 'anti-national' activities 
in the past, with special reference to Bakhtiar's "Labour pact" with the Anglo-lranian
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government255, and his program of action to the Majles. In a comprehensive 17 point 
program, Bakhtiar pledged to dissolve SAVAK immediately, to end martial law, and to 
support Palestinian and Arab Causes256. Another important component of Bakhtiar's 
program was the release of all political prisoners (with compensation to the family of 
those who had lost their lives either in prison or in any anti-Shah struggle), freedom of 
press and expression, as well as the arrest and trial of all those responsible for the 
violation of the rights of the Iranian people257. And, finally, on 13 January 1979, Bakhtiar 
announced the formation of a nine-man Regency Council that would rule in the Shah's 
absence. The council was headed by former Senator, Seyed Jalaledin Tehrani, and
Oil Company, during his days as the Head of the Labour Ministry's Office in Khuzistan, 
in return for the alleged support that he was promised for his election to Majles, as a 
deputy from that province.
255Stempel, J. D., Inside the Iranian Revolution, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1981, p. 158. According to John D. Stempel, a serving American diplomat 
in Teheran at the time, "the Bakhtiar cabinet was generally an unimpressive lot, 
consisting of technocrats, relatives, and minor figures who had been out of active 
politics for years". However, what this description fails to point out is that no leading 
personality of the day was willing to risk accepting a position in a cabinet that no one 
expected to last but a few weeks. This was highlighted by Bakhtiar's decision to 
nominate General Fereidoon Djam as Minister of War, and Admiral Ahmad Madani as 
Minister of the Interior. While, Djam refused to accept the position offered on the flimsy 
ground that the Minister of War, in the political system of the day, was a figure devoid 
of any authority in the armed forces, Admiral Madani, despite a weekly luncheon 
appointment with Prime Minister Bakhtiar in his office, refused to accept his portfolio, 
waiting to take his chance on a more solid ground (he was subsequently appointed 
Minister of defense in the First Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
that was headed by Mehdi Bazargan).
256lbid., p. 162.
^Alamouti, M., Ibid., p.39-43. According to Alamouti (a serving member of the 
Iranian Majles at the time), in a private meeting that was held at Bakhtiar's request in 
his villa, Bakhtiar had informed his hosts (all serving members of the Majles and the 
Senate), that he felt a number of key senior figures should be arrested and even 
executed for their roles in having consistently violated the rights of the Iranian people. 
In specific terms, he had singled out former Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveida, in 
order to high light the point that he was trying to make. When challenged on this matter, 
that executing Hoveida was rather a harsh punishment to hand out, he had reiterated 
his view that this was nothing less that what he deserved for having so flagrantly 
violated the Iranian Constitution for a period of 13 years (Ibid., pp.4-6).
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included personalities such as NIOC258 Chief, Abdollah Entezam, Court Minister Ali-Qoli 
Ardalan, and General Abbas Gharabaghi, the Armed Forces' Chief of Staff. Once, 
Bakhtiar's government had received its vote of confidence from the Senate (15 
January) and the Majles (16 January), there was no longer any impediment barring the 
departure of the Shah from Iran. However, by 21 January 1979, in a visit with Khomeini 
in Paris, Seyed Jalaledin Tehrani, had submitted his resignation as head of the 
Regency Council, and switched his allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini. Although, this act 
by itself, was not a decisive factor in the final outcome of events, it was nevertheless, 
another serious blow that was to further undermine the credibility of the Bakhtiar 
government259.
In retrospect, it was perhaps Bakhtiar's insistence for the Shah to leave the country, 
that was to serve as the main factor undermining the eventual survival of his 
government260. Here, it is important to note that so long as the Shah, himself, was in 
Iran, the rioting and other disturbances were generally controlled - ie. despite strikes
258National Iranian Oil Company.
259ln a recently published book, entitled Davary (Judgement - Some Remarks 
About SAVAK), by General Manouchehr Hashemi, the history of animosity between 
Seyed Jalaledin Tehrani and the late Shah, has been extensively addressed (Hashemi, 
M., "Davary - Sokhani Dar Karnameh SAVAK", Aras Publications, London, 1995, pp. 
298-326). In this book, General Hashemi, a senior SAVAK officer has revealed how 
Tehrani, who was the governor of Khorassan at the time of the Shah's White 
Revolution, had plotted with opposition clerics (and in particular, with Grand Ayatollah 
Qomi, who is today under house arrest in Mashhad) to undermine the Shah. His 
appointment, therefore in 1979 to the Regency Council, was as much a matter of 
surprise to those who had known him, as was his subsequent resignation in Paris.
260This is a point that has been conceded by many, who were in the close 
entourage of Bakhtiar in those tumultuous days. In particular, Bakhtiar's Health 
Minister, Dr. Manouchehr Razmara has been the most vocal about this point (interview, 
Paris, 23 November 1994).
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which were having a crippling effect on the economy261, law and order had been 
generally under control. More importantly, it was evident from the beginning that 
Bakhtiar's survival was contingent on him having the support of the armed forces. So 
long as the Shah was in Iran, and supportive of the Bakhtiar government, the armed 
forces, stood a much greater chance of remaining intact and supportive of the 
government262. On the other hand, it was very difficult, as Bakhtiar found out to his cost, 
for the army to transfer a life time of devotion and loyalty from the person of the Shah 
to someone who had nothing but a history of utter contempt for him and his rule. At the 
same time, by insisting for the Shah to leave, Bakhtiar was also, indirectly, playing into 
the hands of Khomeini, who would not have been as ready to make a triumphant return 
to Iran, had the Shah not already left the country263.
In the end, despite all the maneuvering that went on during Bakhtiar's final stand of 37 
days, in line with every speculation that had earlier been made, it was the loss of 
support from the armed forces that was to spell the end of his tenure as Prime Minister 
of Iran.
261 It is important to point out that at that particular time, the country was fully 
liquid, and in the "black", to the tune of some US$15 billion, in foreign currency 
reserves (equivalent almost to a year's income from oil!).
262Some writers have in the past pointed out to a number of defections from the 
ranks of the armed forces, as well as armed insurrections in certain instances (eg. a 
machine gun attack In the mess hall of the Ground Forces HQ in Lavizan), as a sign 
that the armed forces was in a state of disintegration. But, given the size of Iran's armed 
forces, defections at the scales reported would not have made any major difference 
(bearing in mind that according to all military experts, a single Brigade of the Imperial 
Guards could have held out against any potential threat), so long as the armed forces 
command would have remained united and intact. Only the Shah, as Supreme 
Commander, could have held the armed forces together, and it is generally agreed by 
many senior military officers of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, that the departure 
of the Shah from Iran, on 16 January, was tantamount to the surrendering of the armed 
forces to Khomeini.
263This is a point that General Gharabaghi was adamant to refer to -Interview, 
22 February 1995.
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Bakhtiar and the Armed Forces
There was never any question from the very start, that the whole future of the Bakhtiar 
administration was fully dependent on the outcome of his relationship with the armed 
forces. This cooperation was particularly essential, given that all of Bakhtiar's previous 
allies in the National Front and the Liberation Movement, as well as the religious forces 
allied with Ayatollah Khomeini, had never recognized the legitimacy of his government. 
This situation was further exacerbated when, four days after returning triumphantly to 
Iran on 1 February 1979264, Ayatollah Khomeini nominated Engineer Mehdi Bazargan 
as his chosen candidate for the office of Prime Minister, at a time when Bakhtiar was 
still in search of some form of a political compromise with his former colleagues in the 
National Front and the Freedom Movement265.
While, Bakhtiar, was himself, more aware than any one else, of the crucial role that the 
army would have to play, in giving him the necessary time to win a measure of public
264This was the first point of disagreement between Bakhtiar and the military, who 
were opposed to allowing for Khomeini to return. The threat by General Gharabaghi 
to resign, forced Bakhtiar into preventing Khomeini from returning to Iran on 26 
January, as originally planned. But later, alleged assurance by the Ambassadors of 
Britain and the U.S., that Khomeini would return to Qom, persuaded Bakhtiar to 
subsequently lift all restrictions (Ibid.). In an interview with the BBC Persian Service 
(Documentary entitled the "Tale of the Revolution"), Gharabaghi accuses Bakhtiar of 
having collaborated with the supporters of Khomeini in Iran, by asking the Commander 
of the Air Force to participate in, and assist with the "Imam's Welcoming Committee". 
Gharabaghi, maintains that it was as a consequence of this directive issued by 
Bakhtiar, without his knowledge, that a helicopter was provided to take Khomeini from 
Tehran's Mehrabad Airport to 'Behesht Zahra' cemetery, where he was able to launch 
his campaign. The implications of this act, according to the General, contained 
interpretations that were contrary to both Bakhtiar's mandate as well as interest.
265According to Abdol-Rahman Boroomand (personal conversations with the 
writer), Bakhtiar was meeting on an almost daily basis with Abbas Amir Entezam, who 
was his intermediary with Bazargan, and Rahim Sharifi, who was his intermediary with 
Sanjabi and other former National Front figures. Bakhtiar never met with directly with 
Sanjabi or Bazargan during his time in office.
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support and confidence, prior to holding free parliamentary elections that were 
scheduled for the Summer, he had been beset by certain major problems from the very 
outset. First and foremost, while Bakhtiar had been generally in favor of the fact that 
the Shah had bypassed certain hard-line officers such as General Gholam Ali Oveissi, 
by appointing General Abbas Gharabaghi as Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
he was, nonetheless, taken aback by the fact that the Shah had failed to consult him 
in advance, prior to making his choice266. Matters of this nature were always a sore 
point with Bakhtiar, who as a devoted disciple of Mossadegh, was fully conscious of the 
bitter debates that had taken place between Mossadegh and the monarch, over similar 
issues, more than a quarter of century before. However, prior to the Shah's departure 
from Iran, Bakhtiar had insisted on a joint meeting between himself and the Chiefs of 
the armed forces, in the presence of the Shah, in which the Shah would state 
categorically that all future "orders" would given by the new head of government.
Consenting to Bakhtiar's request, the Shah convened a meeting on 13 January 1978 
(three days prior to his departure), in which General Gharabaghi and the Commanders 
of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces, Air Force, and Navy, and few other senior 
officers were in attendance. There, in front of Bakhtiar, the Shah had said that in all 
matters pertaining to the government, all orders would be issued by Bakhtiar, and on 
questions related to "his office", the Regency Council would relay their messages to 
him and provide them with the appropriate response267. However, both General 
Gharabaghi and Bakhtiar had left that meeting with substantially different
266During the course of many discussions with the writer, Bakhtiar had said that 
he had not challenged the Shah's choice at the time, in order not to upset the delicate 
state of affairs. However, he was intent on relieving General Garabaghi and nominating 
his own choice, just as soon as "things had calmed down".
267Afkhami, G.R., Ibid, p. 124.
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interpretations of the Shah's statements268, which neither had been willing to scrutinize 
any further, for reasons of good will269.
Despite the acrimonious recriminations that were to take place later in exile between 
Bakhtiar and his supporters in NAMIR, on the one hand, and General Gharabaghi, on 
the other270, it is a fact that the working relationship between the two men had, on the 
whole, been as well as could have been expected, by even the most cynical observers. 
In fact, the serious difficulties that were to arise, had more to do with events developing 
outside their realms of control. That is not to say that mutual suspicions did not exist, 
but that other more complicated events having to do with the activities of the Ayatollah 
and his supporters, as well as the arrival in Teheran of Deputy Commander of NATO,
268This is particularly highlighted in the books that were subsequently published 
by both Bakhtiar and Gharabaghi in exile, and has since become a subject of great 
contention between the supporters and opponents of Bakhtiar. In their books, the 
dispute regarding this matter has been discussed in page 145 of Albin Michel's Ma 
Fidelite (Paris, 1982),
and page 204 General Gharabaghi's, Haghayegh Darbarehe Bohrane Iran (Paris, 
1984).
269According to General Gharabaghi, a second point of contention between him 
and Bakhtiar (the first being over their disagreement to allow for Khomeini's return to 
Iran) arose, once Seyed Jalaledin Tehrani had resigned as Head of the Regency 
Council. General Gharabaghi had called for a meeting of the Regency Council, in order 
to appoint a successor to Tehrani, so that he could sign all the military documents 
requiring the signature of the monarch. Bakhtiar had said that this request was 
unnecessary and that he, himself, would sign whatever that was needed. The General 
had disagreed, and insisted on holding the meeting, assuring Bakhtiar that he had no 
objections to him signing any document, so long as the Regency Council, had vested 
him with that authority. In the end, the meeting was held, and Mohammad Ali Varasteh, 
who was Mossadegh’s Minister of Finance, was chosen as Tehrani’s successor.
270Resulting in the publication of a number of books and articles, containing 
charges and counter-charges of betrayal and treachery, that could only harm the cause 
of all opposition forces, at home and in exile.
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General Robert Huyser, "with specific messages for the military chiefs"271, were far 
more crucial in determining the final outcome of events. In the end, as the Ayatollah's 
movement gained the greater momentum, Bakhtiar's position became increasingly 
tenuous, until such time that he had little choice but to make serious hints regarding his 
willingness to opt for a republic, albeit through non-revolutionary and legal means. 
Once, serious violence broke out on 9 February, requiring strong reprisals from the 
Armed Forces272, it was because of these previous hints by Bakhtiar 273, that the military 
chiefs felt compelled to withdraw their support from the Bakhtiar government on 11 
February 1979, by signing a "Declaration of Neutrality"274.
271Urging hard line commanders not to contemplate carrying out a military coup, 
while at the same time supporting the Bakhtiar government. However, as the 
Ayatollah's position became more enhanced at Bakhtiar's expense, Huyser message 
could have only promoted the victory of the revolutionaries, and the disintegration of 
the armed forces.
2720n 9 February, at Farahabad and Doshan Tappeh air bases in Teheran, a 
group of Air Force Warrant Officers ("Homafars"), having given salute to Khomeini at 
the cost of outraging the Shah loyalists, proceeded to barricade themselves in the 
base's armory and began to openly defy their commanders. To deal with this situation, 
units from the "Guard Javidan" ("The Immortals", who were the Shah's personal guards) 
were dispatched to quell the uprising. This led to the Homafars being reinforced, and 
the situation getting out of hand. It was at this point - ie. by 10 February, that the curfew 
was increased, and Bakhtiar, personally, asked the airforce commander, General Rabii 
to bomb the locations where the Homafars were holding out - something which General 
Rabii was unwilling to do at the time. The General's failure to act decisively, had 
effectively sealed the fate of the Bakhtiar government, and had paved the way for the 
meeting on 11 February in which the armed forces was to declare its" neutrality" (All of 
the above have been corroborated in private discussions between the writer and Dr. 
Bakhtiar).
273General Houshang Hatam, the Deputy Commander of the Joint Chiefs, had 
argued that both Bakhtiar and Bazargan wanted to create a republic. While, one had 
public support, the other did not. Thus, given that what they sought, was ultimately the 
same, and given that Bakhtiar had been moving away from his original mandate given 
to him by the Shah, General Hatam had argued that it was pointless for the armed 
forces to back one against another (This statement from General Hatam, who was 
executed shortly after the revolution has been quoted by General Gharabaghi in his 
book, and has been corroborated by a number of senior generals in exile, who were 
present in that meeting).
274Afkhami, G.R., Ibid., 1985, p. 139.
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Given that the maintenance of the integrity of the armed forces, was the primary 
consideration of the Generals in wake of the deteriorating political circumstances, the 
following document was eventually signed by them on the morning of 11 February 
1979:
'The Iranian Armed Forces has always been charged with the defense of the integrity and 
the independence of the beloved country, and so far in any internal unrest, it has always 
striven to do its best to support the legal government of the day.
Given, the recent developments in the country, the High Council of the Armed Forces held 
a meeting at 10.30 on 11 February 1979, and for purposes of avoiding further unrest, and 
bloodshed, unanimously agreed to declare its neutrality, and subsequently ordered all its 
units to return to their barracks.
The Iranian Armed Forces has always been and will continue to be a supporter of the 
honorable and patriotic people of Iran, and will continue to forcefully honor and support 
the wishes of the honorable people of Iran.
signataries: Generals Gharabaghi, Shafeghat275, Fardoust276, Hatam, Moghaddam277, Najmi-Naini, 
Mohagheghi, Badre-ei278, Rabii279, (Admiral) Habibolahi280, Massoumi-Naini, Saneii, (Admiral) Mohsen- 
Zadeh, Jahanbani, Kazemi, Kabir, Bakhshi-Azar, Khajeh-Nouri, Amin-Afshar,, Khalatbari, Farzam,
Pezman, Khosrowdad281, Firoozmand, Rahimi-Larijani, Rahimi, and Tabatabaii."282
275General Jaafar Shafeghat, the Minister of War, first signed the document, but 
given his position as a member of the cabinet, later asked that his name be crossed 
out.
276Chief of the Imperial Inspectorate and close confidant of the Shah, who 
allegedly helped set up the Islamic Republic replacement of SAVAK.
277Head of SAVAK.
278Commander of the Ground Forces, and Acting Commander of the Imperial 
Guards, assassinated later in that same day.
279Commander of the Air Force.
280Commander of the Navy.
281Commander of the Elite Special Forces.
282Translated into English by the writer.
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Once a decision was made to issue the "Declaration of Neutrality"283, the message was 
dispatched for immediate broadcast to the offices of the State Radio. Once informed 
o f the content of the declaration, the Minister of Information, Dr. Cyrus Amouzegar, 
appreciating the consequences of this statement, gave specific orders that the 
message should not be broadcast284. Meanwhile, apart form the Information Minister 
himself, employees at the Radio station had also informed Bakhtiar of its content. Thus, 
by the time General Gharabaghi had, himself, contacted the Prime Minister over the 
telephone in order to inform him of the decision which had been reached, he was told 
by Bakhtiar that the message was being read to him over another telephone line285. In 
that same conversation, Bakhtiar had informed Gharabaghi that he would give orders 
for the message to be broadcast in the next hour286.
In that same conversation, it was agreed that General Gharabaghi and Bakhtiar would 
meet at 4 pm in the same afternoon (11 February 1979), at the residence of Senator 
Kazem Jafroudi, in order to meet with Bazargan. It was expected that Bakhtiar would 
then hand his resignation to Bazargan, allowing for a peaceful transfer of power, now 
that the armed forces were out of the equation. The question of Bakhtiar's resignation,
283Since "neutrality" did not mean "Submission", many senior officers have 
criticized the fact that nearly all the Generals failed to turn up at their posts the day 
after the declaration had been announced.
284lnterview, Paris, 10 August 1994.
285lnterview, Paris, 10 August 1994.
286AII radio messages were carefully scrutinized by Bakhtiar's office, and all 
statements issues by the Office of Teheran's Military Governor, were sent directly by 
the Prime Minister's Office, without the consent or even the knowledge of General 
Gharabaghi and his staff - ie. The State radio, itself would not broadcast any message 
- including the "Declaration of Neutrality", without the specific consent of the Prime 
Minister.
114
something that was always denied by him and a number of his close advisers287, 
despite having been broadcast by the BBC World Service on 11 February, was again 
recently confirmed by Engineer Abbas Amir Entezam, who later became Deputy Prime 
Minister under Bazargan and Ambassador to Sweden, before being arrested and 
imprisoned by the Islamic authorities288. If, the authenticity of these remarks can 
become validated, then greater credence would have to be given to General 
Gharabaghi's account of affairs, which would then imply that there was a far greater 
degree of collusion between Bakhtiar and his former colleagues, irrespective of the fact 
that they "double-crossed" him in the end.
The interpretation given by many, including General Gharabaghi, of the fact that 
Bakhtiar had given his consent for the armed forces' "Declaration of Neutrality" to be 
broadcast by the state radio, clearly implies that he had come to some form of an 
understanding with Bazargan and his associates - something that was subsequently 
denied most strenuously by Bakhtiar and his associates. However, the fact that he 
allowed for the message to be broadcast, and went into hiding upon leaving his office 
shortly afterwards, without turning up at the scheduled meeting with Bazargan and 
Gharabaghi at 4 pm, meant clearly that he was aware that everything had been lost, 
and that his brave and daring attempt to prevent a theocratic takeover - something that 
he had foreseen in advance of every other politician in Iran289, had failed.
287This suggestion was (again) vehemently denied by A.G. Bakhtiar, during the 
course of a conversation with the writer on 23 February 1995.
288Amir Entezam, a close associate of Mehdi Bazargan, is still being held in 
prison in Iran. Excerpts of a book, attributed to him (which has allegedly been smuggled 
out of prison)entitled, "Dar Jostejoye Haghighat" (In Search of the Truth), have been 
published in Nimrooz (Printed in London). Specific reference to Bakhtiar's resignation 
has been made in Issue No. 300, dated 20 January 1995.
28*This statement was acknowledged by a BBC Persian Service report (08/08/91) 
that presented a brief biography of Bakhtiar following his assassination (Interview,
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Conclusion
As a consequence of Bakhtiar's efforts during his 37 days in office, and the world wide 
publicity that he had attracted, his whole disposition had undergone a major 
transformation. This exposure had turned Bakhtiar into a national figure, who was 
subsequently accepted by many Iranians, as a leader who would aspire to rid the 
country from the theocratic dictatorship which had been imposed on them by Ayatollah 
Khomeini.
In effect, as a result of his brief tenure of office, Bakhtiar, had acquired the prestige and 
recognition, qualities needed by a nationalist leader to lead the secular, democratic 
opposition to the Islamic Republic. This was a challenge which Bakhtiar readily 
accepted, as soon as he was to leave Iran in the Summer of 1979, and this was a 
challenge that he relentlessly pursued until August 1991, when he was brutally 
assassinated in his home by agents of the Islamic regime.
Bagher Moin, London, 4 May 1995).
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Chapter 3: The Initial Period (1979-1983)
In the aftermath of the euphoria of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the start of 
open dissent against the newly established Islamic regime in Teheran, Dr. Shapour 
Bakhtiar (1915-1991), was the first, and the most internationally known and respected 
political figure to challenge the regime from exile.
Having made a daring escape from Iran following the release of his first taped message 
condemning the referendum that officially converted the country into an "Islamic 
Republic"290, Dr. Bakhtiar's message was the most credible voice that was uttered in 
opposition to a regime, whose true credentials were not yet clearly revealed. This was 
particularly significant, given the fact that at the time, each and every other political 
group previously in opposition to the Shah, was still enjoying a period of "political 
honeymoon", with Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers.
In 1979, Dr. Bakhtiar was the first major Iranian political figure to openly challenge the 
Islamic regime. However, by July 1981, he was joined in exile291, by a whole host of 
other political figures representing the entire Iranian political landscape from left to 
right292. However, what continued to make Bakhtiar stand out as the most favorite
^O n  10 'Farvardin 1358' (30 March 1979), a referendum was held in Iran that 
officially changed the status of the country from a "Constitutional Monarchy" to an 
"Islamic republic".
291Mostly in Paris, France.
2920n the left, these figures included Abolhassan Bani-Sadr (the deposed 
President of the Islamic Republic), and the Mojahedin Khalq leader, Massoud Rajavi, 
who together had escaped from Iran on board an Iranian Air Force plane. On the centre 
and the right, these figures included Admiral Ahmad Madani, the first Defense Minister 
and Navy Commander of the Islamic Republic, along with Generals Gholam Ali Oveissi 
(the former Commander of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces) and Bahram Aryana 
(the former Chief of the Imperial Supreme Military Staff). Shortly, thereafter, another
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opposition candidate, were his credentials as a man of great integrity and culture, with 
an undeniable democratic background. By the Summer of 1979, when Bakhtiar had 
already launched what was to become the "National Movement of the Iranian 
Resistance" (NAMIR)293, he was, perhaps, the only follower of the late and celebrated 
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had somehow remained untarnished (and 
true to the ideals preached by him and his followers during the previous 25 years) in 
the sense that he had not allowed himself to become engrossed or associated with the 
emerging order under Khomeini. This point is particularly underlined, when such people 
as then Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan294, and Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the 
National Front, as well as Dariush Forouhar, the leader of the "Iranian Nation Party", 
had become deeply involved and implicated with the deeds of a regime, whose 
supreme leader was rapidly displaying his utter contempt for Mossadegh and his whole 
philosophy of government.
Despite the fact that, contrary to his own assertions, Bakhtiar had risen from relative 
political obscurity to assume the Premiership of Iran in the fading days of the imperial 
regime, and in view of the substantial amount of media coverage that had been given 
to the crisis in Iran -ie. the actual disruptions and civil unrest in the country, as well as 
the publicity awarded to the Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris - his name had, in a very short 
space of time, become a household name in both Iran, as well as many important
former Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Ali Amini, also joined the ranks of the 
so-called "leaders of the Iranian opposition in exile".
293The slogan used by Bakhtiar at the end of all his statements was the Farsi 
equivalent of "Iran Will Never Die". The term "NAMIR", meaning "Do Not Die" in Farsi 
was coined by the writer as an appropriate acronym for the organization in 1981, in time 
with the launch of its English "Organ", the Voice of Iran.
^Prime Minister of the "Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran" 
from February to November 1979.
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centers in the international community. This, coupled with Bakhtiar's general 
"comportment" during the final days of his government, greatly assisted his reputation 
as a "National Leader", who was universally recognized and respected for his 
democratic credentials and general political outlook.
By the Summer of 1979, when the initial feelings of euphoria in Iran and the 
international community, had begun to somewhat subside as a consequence of the 
brutalities displayed by the Islamic regime, Dr. Bakhtiar's star began its true rise, in that 
he was able to project himself as the "unquestioned Leader of all the Iranian 
Opposition", with the full weight of the international media behind the thrust of his 
message295. This role was assisted by the fact that with the late Shah still alive and 
living in exile, his entire constituency, too hesitant to voice their support for him, were 
solidly behind his "last appointed Prime Minister". At the same time, by his refusal to 
join the Khomeini bandwagon296, Bakhtiar had also managed to remain as the only 
"untainted" follower of "Mossadegh's path", and as such, he had tacitly come to take 
over the mantle of leadership within the National Front itself. This became more 
apparent when by May 1979, more hard-line elements within the Bazargan government 
forced the resignation of the, increasingly discredited, National Front leader, Karim
^ I t  is important to note that by this time - ie. mid-1979 - in the aftermath of the 
wave of political executions, the highly acclaimed revolution that was to have reversed 
the previous regime's disregard for human rights, was fast losing its tarnish.
296While, this notion has been generally accepted, General Abbas Gharabaghi, 
the last Commander in Chief of the Imperial Military Staff under the late Shah, contests 
this. General Gharabaghi asserts that Bakhtiar, during the entire period of his tenure 
as Prime Minister, was trying to appease Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters led by 
Mehdi Bazargan, whom he used to term as "a personal friend, with whom they shared 
many occasions in prison" (Gharabaghi, A., "Eterafat General", Nay Publications, 10th 
Edition, Teheran, 1988, page 363).
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Sanjabi as Foreign Minister from the Provisional Islamic Government.297
Thus, by the time Bakhtiar arrived in Paris for his first Press Conference in the French 
capital's Hotel Bristol, he was the first Iranian leader since Mossadegh to have the 
support of both the majority of Mossadegh's constituency as well as that of the Shah298. 
Bakhtiar also had the additional advantage of having general media support and 
Western intellectual sympathy, and as such he was in a formidable position to launch 
an effective organization needed to oppose the Islamic administration in Iran.
Creating An Effective Organization______________________________________
Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, only forces of the 'political left', who were 
eventually forced to go underground, had seemed capable of creating an effective and 
efficient political organization299, not dependent upon the central government for any 
fiscal requirements. These included the Tudeh Party in the 1940's and the 1950's, and 
the radical Marxist groups the "Fedayeen Khalq" and the "Mojahedin Khalq" in the 
1960's and the 1970's300.
297The only senior figure from the National Front to also remain untainted was 
Dr. Gholam Hossein Sadighi (Mossadegh's Minister of Interior), who had refused to 
accept the Premiership under the Shah, while at the same time he had refused to 
become associated in any way with new regime as well.
298The maintenance of this coalition was crucial for the future of Bakhtiar's 
movement.
299This has to be differentiated from the religious centers of opposition, which 
were financially self-sufficient, whilst also enjoying a much greater degree of 
independence in their general disposition.
^W hile  the Tudeh Party was for a number of years allowed to operate freely, 
prior to disbandment as a legitimate political organization, all the other political 
movements/organizations were of a underground/clandestine nature.
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Two factors had generally dominated the politics of the center and the right in modern 
Iran301: The dominant nature of certain key political figures, around whom certain 
coalitions or political parties had become assembled302, and the total dependence of 
all political parties and organized political structures on direct government funding 
during the last 25 years of the late Shah's rule303. It is thus fair to say that members of 
all these parties, with the possible exception of a certain few in the National Front, were 
generally part and parcel of the main governing establishment.
In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, particularly in the honeymoon period of 
1979-1981, when all the previous opponents of the late Shah were still active on the 
internal political scene, the only people opposing the regime and struggling to establish 
a credible political organization aimed at challenging the clerical regime, were 
comprised totally of those previously 'established" figures who had absolutely no real 
or tangible experience of creating an effective organization which was not supported 
by a huge and unlimited financial purse. It is fascinating to note the extent to which the 
setting up of an efficient political movement or organization, with a platform of 
establishing a democratic and just government was confused with a bureaucracy - 
much like before - in which the political leaders, played the roles of established cabinet 
ministers, while the followers and activists consigned themselves to playing the role of
301ie. Post Reza Shah I (abdicated in 1941).
^e g . Mossadegh's National Front, or Ahamd Qavam's Democratic Party.
303Prior to the establishment of a one party system in Iran (The National
Resurgence Party of Iran -"Rasatakhiz"- which was totally dependent on the state for 
every shade of its activities (ie. meetings, publications, as well as salaries for all its 
employees), the other existing political parties, particularly after the late Shah's 1963 
"White Revolution" (eg. "Iran-e Novin", "Mardom", and "Pan Iranist") all shared the 
same political platform -ie. implementation of the Shah's policies as enunciated in the 
programme of the White Revolution", and were all dependent on government funding 
for all their political activities.
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good bureaucrats. Hence, so long as sufficient funds were available for sustaining this 
kind of a relationship, then the association could endure. But, once the bosses were, 
for one reason or another, incapable of meeting the financial requirements of their herd, 
then the organizations would soon disintegrate and become liquidated304.
Bakhtiar's Dilemma___________________________________________________
The period from June 1979, when Dr. Bakhtiar, following his escape from Iran, 
effectively began his campaign against the Islamic Republic, until August 1991 when 
he was assassinated in his private place of residence on the outskirts of Paris305, can 
be broken into three distinct stages.
Each stage, with its own distinct features, covering the rise and decline of Iran's, 
hitherto, most active democratic political opposition movement, when studied carefully, 
is capable of addressing some of the most important questions that have been raised 
in this study.
The Initial Period (August 1979 - July 1983)_______________________________
Bakhtiar, having slipped away from the grip of Islamic authorities at Teheran's 
Mehrabad airport in July 1979, under the guise of a French businessman, and having 
safely arrived in Paris306, was more than sufficiently motivated to begin the task of
^ h e  fact that no one has attempted to activate any of the former Iranian main 
political parties in exile, is a tangible evidence to substantiate the point that has been 
made.
villa located on 37 Rue Cluseret in Sursene.
306Where his son, Guive Bakhtiar, an Inspector in the French Police Force was 
waiting for him.
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organizing an effective opposition to the newly installed "Provisional" Islamic 
government, and its clerical supporters. He felt strongly that he had narrowly missed 
the opportunity of containing the revolution, within the parameters set by his own 
reformist government307.
He also felt confident that had the armed forces remained intact and loyal to his 
government308, or alternatively, had the late Shah had appointed him to his position at 
an earlier phase, Khomeini would never have had an opportunity of making any sort of 
a serious impact on the Iranian political scene309. Although, in his book "Mission to 
Iran", William Sullivan, the last American Ambassador to Teheran, has accused 
Bakhtiar of having wanted "to hijack the Iranian Revolution", it is a fact that Bakhtiar not 
only felt antagonistic to this notion, but, quite differently, he felt strongly that Khomeini 
and his henchmen had illegitimately hijacked and "usurped the true and democratically 
motivated uprising of the Iranian people against dictatorship and corruption". This belief 
was subsequently reinforced when the first major operation pursued by Bakhtiar in 
order to regain power, was through a military coup that was to have been organized by
^ I t  is important to note, that while had received his legitimacy from the Shah, 
in the sense that the was appointed by him to his position, he felt that events had 
forced the Shah to make the move that he had. Hence, he saw his government, as the 
first "truly national" government (meaning without royal interference) to have been 
formed in Iran since the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh, some 25 years before.
308This is a point which is highly contested by General Gharabaghi, who claims 
that Bakhtiar played a very important "surrogate" role, in contributing to the 
disintegration of the armed forces. General Gharabaghi claims that Bakhtiar was 
instrumental in allowing Khomeini to return to Iran, and by providing assistance, 
through ordering the Commander of the Imperial Iranian Air Force to have a liaison 
officer in the "Imam's Welcoming Committee", that resulted in the supplying of an Air 
Force helicopter to transport the Ayatollah from Mehrabad Airport to Beheste Zahra 
Cemetery. This incident, for which Mr. Bakhtiar has been blamed, according to General 
Gharabaghi, was a great symbolic victory for the revolutionaries (Gharabaghi, A., 
"Eterafat General", Nay Publications, 10th Edition, Teheran, 1988.).
^ ^ h is  is a matter to which Bakhtiar has referred in a number of interviews, as 
well as in many private conversations with the writer.
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an Organization called "Neghab" (meaning "mask" in Farsi) was the acronym for 
"Nejate Ghiame Iran-e Bozorgh", meaning "the Saviour of the Uprising of the Great 
Iran". Hence, it was evident by its title, that this internally formed and based 
organization, like Bakhtiar, was fully supportive of the uprising of the people of Iran for 
greater democracy, up to the point that Shah was forced to leave the country, having 
relinquished his powers to a lawfully appointed government which had been able to 
secure a vote of confidence from the Iranian parliament.
However, having fled from Iran, with essentially his life, Bakhtiar, with the exception of 
himself, who had as a consequence of the events of the preceding months become a 
well known and charismatic figure with the international media as well as many Iranians 
who had admired him for his courage and resistance against Ayatollah Khomeini310, 
was devoid of all the paraphernalia, normally associated with becoming a credible 
opposition. More precisely, having arrived in Paris, Bakhtiar was neither in possession 
of a proper organization, nor was he in possession of adequate funds necessary to 
form or sustain such a political organization.
It is a fact that having arrived in Paris, Bakhtiar was not even in a position to maintain 
himself, and were it not for the forthcoming financial support of his 'National Front' 
friend, Abdol-Rahman Boroomand311, the actual task of organization building would, no
310lt is a fact that Bakhtiar by the time Khomeini has arrived in Iran, had 
inadvertently become the last main bastion of hope for the supporters of the imperial 
regime. Despite his many differences with the royalists, it is also fact that all throughout 
his time in France, Bakhtiar's main constituency of support continued to spring from 
royalist quarters, as the majority of republicans felt more comfortable with other 
organizations.
311Who became one of the founding members of NAMIR, and was himself 
assassinated in 1990. Dr. Boroomand, came from a wealthy family in Isfahan. He and 
his brothers were partners to Assadolah Rashidian (an important crony of the late Shah 
and one of the main tools of British intelligence in Operation "Boot", which had ousted
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doubt, have been seriously delayed312.
With Bakhtiar safely placed in a Paris apartment, a collection of his close friends 
assembled around him, and together they began the long and somewhat time 
consuming task of debating about the whole subject of how the movement should be 
started. Perhaps the only issue in which they were all in unanimity was the fact that 
immediate fund raising efforts should precede everything else. This was a task in which 
Dr. Abdol Rahman Boroomand took the lead, and in association with his old colleagues 
and former business partners (such as Assadolah Rashidian and Azimi) he was able 
to raise, with relative ease, an initial contribution of some US$500,000313. There were 
other major donators at that time, particularly from the Iranian business community, 
such as Parviz Amir Parviz, who took over Bakhtiar's operations in the United Kingdom, 
and began promoting his cause from an office set up and totally funded by himself314.
Bakhtiar's Strategy in the Initial Period
the Mossadegh government from power in 1953), and through his strong connections 
with the Imperial Court, they had secured a very large construction contract in Isfahan 
(known as the "Shahin Shahr" development), which was one of the most lucrative 
construction contracts in pre-revolutionary Iran.
312According to Bakhtiar (personal conversations), he had arrived in Paris with 
a total of US$ 1500. Once in Paris, he was moved to an apartment rented for him by Dr. 
Boroomand.
313Shortly afterwards, following a meeting between Bakhtiar, Boroomand, and the 
Shah's twin sister, another contribution of US$ 500,000 was made by Princess Ashraf 
Pahlavi, though relations between them had always been bad in the past, and failed to 
improve even after the Princess's contribution.
314lt is important to note that the time (ie. 1979-80), many Iranian businessmen 
were still very well off financially, and the thought that the Iranian regime led by 
"Mullahs" could be easily overthrown was one that was widely believed.
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From the very outset, Bakhtiar was beset with the dilemma of having to cope with a 
longer term strategy of having a well structured organization, capable of enlisting all 
potential sympathizers for a protracted political struggle, while at the same time being 
able to exploit more short-term or spontaneous circumstances that might result in 
overthrowing the Islamic regime.
From the time that he launched his campaign, during the course of a press conference 
held at Paris's Bristol Hotel in August 1979, only days after his escape from Iran, the 
mounting state of chaos in Iran was already aggravating his dilemma in terms of making 
it unclear as to which alternative, he should give the greater precedence. Eventually, 
Bakhtiar decided to pursue both avenues simultaneously, but separately. This decision 
was assisted by the fact that any "action oriented" operation inside the country would 
have to be conducted in an "underground" fashion requiring a whole host of other 
actors, who were entirely separate from those he would task in Paris for the creation 
of his political organization.
The most important incident that was to change the direction of Bakhtiar's strategy 
during the first 18 months of his campaign in exile, was the occupation of the U.S. 
Embassy in Teheran by a group of radical students315, and the taking of American 
diplomats as hostages316. This actions that was immediately followed by the resignation 
of the first, "Liberal-Democratic" Islamic government, headed by Mehdi Bazargan,
315The so-called "Followers of the Line of Imam".
316Something that was to last for 444 days, from 4 November 1979 to 20 January
1981.
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cleared the way for the rise of loyal Khomeini-oriented clerics317 to positions of high 
office, and has come to be commonly referred to as the starting point of the "Second 
Revolution" which according to Ayatollah Khomeini, himself, was even "greater in 
iimportance than the first"318.
The international outrage caused by this action in Teheran created a period of crisis, 
whereby Iran was effectively placed under immense international pressures, which 
further exacerbated an already chaotic situation which had resulted as a consequence 
of internal disorganization, purges, ideological battles, and displacement of competent 
leadership that had accompanied the revolution. According to Gary Sick, a member of 
the U.S. National Security Council monitoring Iran at the time, "Oil exports were running 
below one million barrels per day, less than half the level required to sustain operating 
revenues of the government. Inflation was rampant, unemployment was running near 
40%, investment in manufacturing had fallen to zero, industrial production was off 50- 
70%, and the gross national product was down at least 20% from pre-revolutionary 
levels. The sanctions imposed by the U.S. and other nations were not the cause of
317lt is important to distinguish between clerics supportive and Khomeini within 
the clerical constituency, and the clerical constituency as a whole. It is a fact that at the 
time of the take over of the U.S. Embassy, there were six other Grand Ayatollahs, 
besides Khomeini, who were considered as "Marjas" (Source of Imitation), who each 
had their own constituency within Iran. They were Grand Ayatollah Kazem Shariat 
Madari (Qom), Grand Ayatollah Golpayeghani (Qom), Grand Ayatollah Marashi Najafi 
(Qom), Grand Ayatollah Khoi (Najaf), Grand Ayatollah Qomi (Mashad), and finally, 
Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Khonsari (Teheran). A prominent feature of Iranian politics 
following the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was the rise of the 
"Supporters of the Line of Imam", who have continued to set the political scene even 
up to the time of this writing. More significantly, what this has meant in real terms is 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the clerical regime in Iran has not been one 
which has represented the constituency as a whole, but one which has been 
exclusively representative of those within the ranks of the clerics who have been 
unswerving supporters of Khomeini's interpretation of "Velavate Faahih".
318lnstitute For Political Research, Kodetaye Nojeh, 2nd Edition, Spring 1989,
p.57.
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these conditions, but the sanctions immensely complicated the task of Iran's new and 
inexperienced managers who were attempting to cope with multiple crises 
simultaneously. At the same time, internal dissention was on the 
increase....Simultaneously, the border tensions with Iraq was heating up, the Kurds 
were once again in full revolt, tribal opposition was growing throughout the country, and 
sabotage in the oil fields became almost a daily occurrence. Top military commanders 
were shuffled and reshuffled (the top ranks of the air force were purged on the grounds 
that they had been accomplices of to the U.S. rescue attempt319), and there were 
occasional defections of trained military personnel. The regime seemed to be on the 
verge of political, economic, and military collapse..."320.
Based on the above premises, a notion that was generally shared in all informed 
circles, it was no great surprise to find that Bakhtiar was more keenly anxious to exploit 
this 'extra-ordinary situation' in order to promote his cause, and using the military as the 
main vehicle for replacing the regime.
A glance at the chronology of significant events from August 1979 to August 1983, 
clearly illustrate the circumstances, as well as the possibilities which were open to 
Bakhtiar during this period:
DATE EVENT
07/79 Bakhtiar launches his campaign in Paris.
08/79 First major pro-Bakhtiar rally held in London.
11/79 U.S. Embassy in Teheran is occupied and American
319The aborted attempt by the U.S. in April 1980 to rescue the U.S. hostages
held in the American Embassy in Teheran.
320Sick, G., All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter With Iran, Random House, 
New York, 1985, p. 307.
diplomats are taken as hostages.
04/80 U.S. attempt to rescue hostages is forcibly aborted.
05/80 Bakhtiar's clandestine "Radio Iran" begins
broadcasting from Baghdad.
07/80 Pro-Bakhtiar coup attempt is foiled and a number of military officers and
civilians are arrested.
08/80 Unsuccessful attempt is made on Bakhtiar's life by the Lebanese terrorist,
Anis Naccache.
08/80 The establishment of NAMIR is announced.
09/80 Iraq invades Iran, and 8 year long Iran-lraq War begins. Despite his
relations with Iraq, Bakhtiar in three separate statements dated 25 
September 1980, 14 November 1980, and 16 February 1981, calls a 
cessation of hostilities, and the commencement of peace talks on the 
basis of the 1975 Algiers Treaty.
07/81 Bani Sadr and Rajavi arrive in Paris. Bakhtiar condemns both and rejects
any notion of cooperation.
08/81 The Iranian Naval Vessel, "Tabarzin" is hijacked on the high seas by
members of the "Azadeghan" Organization, led by General Bahram 
Aryana (22 August).
08/81 Bakhtiar and Aryana declare in separate statements their decision to work
in unity for the liberation of Iran. Bakhtiar asks all his "military supporters" 
to report to Aryana.
09/81 Aryana moves his HQ to Turkey, near the border with Iran.
10/81 NEHZAT. the political organ of the National Movement of the Iranian
Resistance (NAMIR) begins the publication of its first bi-weekly issue.
12/81 GHYAME IRAN, the second Bakhtiar bi-weekly, aimed at a less
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'doctrinaire' audience is published.
08/82 VOICE OF IRAN, the political Tribune of the National Movement of the 
Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) in English, begins the publication of its first 
monthly issue.
09/82 LETTRE PERSANE. a pro-Bakhtiar monthly in French is published.
12/82 Publication of Admiral Ahmad Madani's statement in NEHZAT.
01/83 NEHZAT condemns communique issued following the meeting between
Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tareq Aziz and Mojahedin Leader, Massoud 
Rajavi.
02/83 Bakhtiar's begins the campaign of urging all Iranians inside the country
to participate in "Negative Resistance".
03/83 Bakhtiar's open call for support to former colleagues in the "National
Front".
04/83 NAMIR supporters in Sweden are successful in bringing up the topic of
"Trade Boycott"of Iran for the first time.
04/83 Bakhtiar's message to the Socialist International - this marks the first
concerted effort on the part of NAMIR to promote its cause by contacting 
various important international bodies.
04/83 Bakhtiar's first secret visit to Saudi Arabia.
04/83 NAMIR first major assessment of the state of the Iranian Economy is
published and distributed in a major conference in London321.
04/83 Bakhtiar's first secret visit to Saudi Arabia.
321 The Conference which overtly sought to promote trade with Iran, was 
organized by NAMIR, as a way of seeking attention, and then humiliating the Islamic 
regime. This ploy was to a major
extent successful, and the British Charge in Teheran (Sir Nicholas Barrington) was 
brought in, and to his embarrassment, was subjected to a situation well beyond his 
expectation.
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05/83 Bakhtiar's first trip to the U.S. and meeting with U.S. officials. In a meeting 
with Iranian supporters in Los Angeles, he declares his support for a 
restoration of constitutional monarchy in Iran.
05/83 Bakhtiar's first visit to the United States, where he is the first major Iranian 
figure to address the Council on Foreign Relations.
07/83 Bakhtiar and Amini sign their "Agreement of Principles".
07/83 Bakhtiar signs a 5-Point Agreement on a "Declaration of Principles" with 
Dr. Ali Amini.
08/83 The Fourth Anniversary of the founding of NAMIR is celebrated in Paris 
in the presence of Bakhtiar, Amini and General Aryana.
08/83 First peaceful demonstration by the masses against the regime on 
Constitution Day (August 5), as called by NAMIR's clandestine radio 
broadcasts.
From this chronology, it can be clearly deduced that during the course of the 'Initial 
Period', Bakhtiar was most preoccupied with keeping up with the internal crisis, and 
assisting those elements that were secretly lining up from within the armed forces to 
move against the regime. Furthermore, it can be seen that whilst NAMIR, as a political 
organization, announced its presence on the political scene as early as August 1980 
(almost exactly a year after the arrival of Bakhtiar to Paris), it was not until October of 
1981, that its official publication, Nehzat. first appeared. Hence, it can be deduced that 
during this interim period, as well as the period before it - ie. from August 1979 - 
October 1981, Dr. Bakhtiar felt more compelled to give priority to matters, which were 
clearly more pressing than the setting up of his political organization in exile. It is a fact, 
that until such time that the possibility of attaining any tangible result from those options 
were not seriously eroded - ie. effectively after when the Iraqi advance into Khuzistan 
had been halted, Bakhtiar was not willing to divert his full attention to NAMIR. (Blaming
Bakhtiar for giving added encouragement to Saddam Hussein to attack Iran, once his 
own plans for gaining power by using the military had come to nothing, the Islamic 
authorities have accused Bakhtiar of having wanted to set up an Iraqi supported puppet 
regime in the "oil rich" province of Khuzistan, comparing him to the former leader of 
Katanga, Moussa Chombe, who was accused of murdering the Congo's independence 
leader, Patrick Lumumba322).
Bakhtiar's First Major Opportunity______________________________________
As stated, the occupation of the U.S. Embassy by radical students, and the taking of 
American diplomats as hostages, had given Bakhtiar a God sent opportunity to infiltrate 
and recruit disenchanted (though somewhat subdued323) personnel from within the 
military, with the aid of his clandestine political-military organization "Neghab", with the 
ultimate aim of launching a military coup against the Islamic Republic.
However, all plans for such an eventuality were being shadowed by other plans, drawn 
in Washington, for the rescue of the American hostages held in the American Embassy 
in Teheran. While, these plans were completely separate and independent of one 
another, the ultimate fate of the rescue mission that was launched on 24 April 1980, 
was not without significance to the outcome of the plans that were being advanced by 
"Neghab"324. As it turned out, through an "in credible series of mishaps"325, the failure
^Institute For Political Research, Kodetaye Nojeh, 2nd Edition, Spring 1989, p.
108.
323Given the humiliation that had been handed to the armed forces by the 
victorious revolutionaries.
324The Islamic authorities suggest that the CIA had tried to coordinate both 
operations, suggesting also that the CIA was responsible for planning "Nojeh" - 
(Institute For Political Research, Kodetaye Nojeh, 2nd Edition, Spring 1989, p.63).
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of the rescue mission was unable to promote a more favorable atmosphere for the 
advancement of Bakhtiar's plans326. Nonetheless, the ease with which Iranian airspace 
had been penetrated, and Iranian radar bypassed, was cause enough for fingers to be 
pointed at some elements within the military, such as General Hadi Shadmehr, the 
Chief of Staff327, and General Bahman Amir-Baqeri, the Commander of the Air Force328. 
General Amir-Baqeri who was subsequently arrested in June 1980, was particularly 
accused of having transferred anti-aircraft batteries from Teheran to Kurdistan only 
days before the American operation, and for subsequently ordering the destruction of
325Carter, J., Keeping Faith - Memoirs of a President, Bantam Books, New York, 
1982, p.518.
326lt is an interesting speculation to think how "Neghab's" chances might have 
been enhanced had the American rescue mission not have been the dramatic failure 
that it was - ie. if the operation had managed to even get to Teheran, as opposed to 
becoming aborted in the desert. Had the rescue operation succeeded, it is possible to 
envisage several factors, which could greatly have enhanced the prospects of the types 
of military intervention that was being sought at the time: (1) Tremendous loss of 
prestige, and great humiliation for the regime (similar to that inflicted on Idi Amin, 
following the Israeli raid on Entebe in 1976); (2) Such a loss of prestige would have 
greatly encouraged all disenchanted elements within the armed forces, boosted their 
morale and increased their chances of participation in any planned coup against the 
regime; (3) The fact that the blow - i.e., the military initiative taken to free the hostages - 
had been planned and executed by 'America' would have been interpreted as a positive 
encouragement for the military, in that there would no longer be any illusion that this 
was a regime 'which was brought to power and protected by the Americans' (this was 
to some degree achieved even though the mission failed); And finally, (4) the degree 
of chaos and disruptions that would have had to be created for purposes of distractions 
in Teheran in order for the plan to succeed, would in all probability have set the stage 
and assisted the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the execution of any military 
plan in the future. However, as it turned out, the net result not only failed to achieve any 
of the factors mentioned above, but instead served to bolster the image of 'Iran's 
invincible revolution', leading to a serious loss of morale amongst all potential forces 
opposed to the regime. This feeling of extreme depression was further exacerbated by 
Khomeini in his famous statement when he said, "Carter Ghalati Nemitavand 
Bokonadl", meaning that "Carter cannot do a damn thing!
^W ho was to lose his job over the incident, though (then President) Bani Sadr 
kept him on as his "Military Adviser".
328Bakhash, S., The Reign of the Ayatollahs - Iran and the Islamic Revolution, 
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1984, p. 118.
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the abandoned American helicopters left at Tabas329. Furthermore, both Generals Amir- 
Baqeri and Shadmehr were also accused of "having adopted an aggressive tone vis-a- 
vis Ayatollahs Montazeri and Meshkini330 "only one day prior to the American 
operation", and "for having revealed certain pro-monarchy sentiments"331.
Obviously, while neither Generals Shadmehr and Amir-Baqeri were not in any way 
involved with "Neghab", their continued presence in their respective positions, would 
most likely have been of enormous benefit to the plotters. As it turned out, their removal 
from office only weeks before the launch of the coup, must, in all likelihood, have had 
an adverse effect on the morale of the plotters. This was later exacerbated by the 
announcement on 25 May of a thwarted coup announced by a clandestine radio 
broadcast from Iraq332, and subsequent announcement by the Chief Judge of the 
Military Revolutionary Tribunal, Mohammad Reyshari that another attempt, planned by 
the Paris Based organization of General Gholam Ali Oveissi for 12 June, had also been 
discovered333 .
^Insinuating that by doing so, he had allowed for the destruction of all evidence 
left over by the fleeing Americans to be completely destroyed. Also, a great deal of 
capital was made because of the fact that during the course of the bombing, an Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard, Mohammad Montazer Ghaem, who was the Commander of the 
"Pasdaran" in Yazd, was killed. Apart from Amir-Baqeri, the then Islamic President, 
Abolhassan Bani Sadr was also blamed for having sanctioned the bombing.
330Both very close to Khomeini (Montazeri being his chosen heir at the time).
^Daneshjoyan Mosalman Payro Khate Emam, Neghareshi Bar Majeraye Tabas, 
Teheran, 17 June 1981, 143-145.
^Hiro, D., Iran Under the Ayatollahs, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985,
p. 155.
333Bakhash, S., The Reign of the Ayatollahs - Iran and the Islamic Revolution, 
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1984, p. 118. However, this assertion has 
been denied by Colonel Ahmad Oveissi, brother of the late General Oveissi (interview: 
31/08/94)
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Nonetheless, irrespective of these setbacks, coupled with the regime's extreme 
vigilance primarily because of the failed American rescue attempt, plans that were 
finalized by Bakhtiar and "Neghab", as far back as March 1980 were neither postponed 
nor canceled, and according to the Islamic regime, the plotters had also obtained the 
benediction of Grand Ayatollah Shariat Madari, and had even gone as far as renting 
a house for him in Teheran334 335.
The Nojeh Project
It is now established that Bakhtiar intended, and was successful in compartmenting the 
proposed "Operation Red Alert"336, to launch a plan with military support, centered at 
the "Nojeh" Air Base near Hamadan337, which aimed to swiftly seize power by striking
334lnstitute For Political Research, Kodetaye Nojeh, 2nd Edition, Spring 1989, 
p.37. (It should be pointed out that in order to discredit Grand Ayatollah Shariat Madari, 
the Islamic regime attempts, somehow, to suggest that Shariat Madari's "treachery" 
which was established as a consequence of his links with Sadeq Qotbzadeh, in their 
"plan to stage a coup in 1982", went as far back as his active involvement in Nojeh - 
despite the fact that the regime was never, able to prove that at the time or time after 
that.)
335lbid., p.37.
336lbid.
^"Nojeh" was the third name given to the same air base. Prior to the revolution, 
the air base was called "Shahrokhi". Immediately after the revolution, it was named 
"Hor". However, following the unrest in Kurdistan in 1979, the air base was named after 
an air force pilot by the name of "Major lyiohammad Nojeh" who was killed there in 
action (Source: Kavhan. 23 August 1979).
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out the leaders of the Islamic regime (including bombing the residence of Khomeini in 
jamaran) and occupying all the strategic centers in Teheran338, from the crowd of 
cronies and colleagues who had congregated around him in Paris.
In fact, based on information that has been revealed by many of the senior actors 
involved in "Nojeh", the role actually played by Bakhtiar, himself, apart from providing 
financial assistance and some mediation with certain tribal elements, was to a large 
extent minimal.
The actual plan in Iran was devised by a small number of former National Front/Iran 
Party members, who were acting together with a number of retired military officers. 
Prominent amongst the organizers were: Mohammad Baqer Bani Ameri339, a retired 
Gendarmerie Colonel who was in over all charge of the military wing that also included 
retired Generals Saiid Mehdiyoun340, and Ayatollah Mohagheghi341. Their efforts in exile
^Chaperon, J., &Toumier, J., Enquete Sur L'Assassinat De Chapour Bakhtiar, 
Edition 1, Paris, 1992, p. 67.
339ln an interview with the writer in London on 03/12/94, Colonel Bani Ameri 
stated that while all the details regarding the planned coup was carried out by him and 
other colleagues in Iran, they were all under the impression that Bakhtiar would taken 
steps in Europe to brief senior politicians and diplomats regarding the situation in Iran, 
in a move aimed at obtaining their tacit support for the promotion of the planned coup. 
Sadly, this was not to be, and apart from the Iraqis, no other foreign power was 
informed of what was in the pipeline.
340Former Commander of the Iranian Air Force. Reflecting on his discussions 
with General Mehdiyoun (who was arrested and released by the authorities prior to the 
coup), the Iranian intellectual, Ehsan Naraghi, in his book, "Des Palais Du Chah Aux 
Prisons de la Revolution", Balland, Paris 1991 (Translated into Farsi by Saiid Azari, 
Rasa Publications, Teheran, 1993. pps. 345-350), asserts that "simple, unaware, but 
well meaning military officers of the Iranian air force - like Mehdiyoun - were 
manipulated by 'some ambitious politicians' into participating in coup that could not, 
under any circumstance, have succeeded, given the popularity of Khomeini and the 
regime at that particular time". Naraghi quotes Khomeini as having said, "Were those 
pilots who were aiming to bomb my house and other government offices, not planning 
to eventually land somewhere?".
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was assisted by General Amir Fazli, a retired air force officer (introduced to Bakhtiar 
by General Djam), who was briefly in charge of IRAN AIR prior to the revolution.
Iin the civilian wing, the most prominent figures were: Reza Marzban342, Engineer Parviz 
Ghadessi343, Abolghassem Khadem, Javad Khadem344, and Manouchehr 
Ghorbanifar345. To complement their plan, the cooperation of many tribal leaders 
throughout Iran had been solicited through the person of Bakhtiar, himself (eg. the 
Qashqais)346.
Despite its failure, there is no question that an enormous amount of precision planning 
had gone into organizing this attempted coup, without any major external support or 
benediction. While, Iranian sources attempt to attribute the planning of this operation 
to the "CIA, Reactionary Arab regimes (inclusive of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states
341A commander with the Iranian Gendarmerie.
^Former Iran Party/ National Front colleague, and loyal supporter of Bakhtiar.
^W h o  later became the head of Neghab's Civilian Wing.
344The son of Abolghassem, and Minister of Housing in Bakhtiar's government.
345Ghorbanifar, who was to achieve fame in the "Irangate" incident, was 
introduced to Bakhtiar by Generals Djam and Mobasser, through Bakhtiar's Thurlow
Street office in London. However, according to General Mobasser (former Chief of 
National Police), "Bakhtiar had been warned to test Ghorbanifar prior to entrusting him 
with anything sensitive" (interview: 30/8/94). Given Ghorbanifar's confirmed 
connections with the Islamic regime, as made evident, later, in the "Irangate" incident, 
it is strongly speculated that he may also have been the Islamic regime's "Trojan Horse" 
in this operation. However, according to General Manouchehr Hashemi (interview, 
London, 24 April 1995), the former Director of SAVAK's 8th Political Bureau (counter­
intelligence),Ghorbanifar (whom the General knew quite well) had not yet developed 
any connections with the regime and was quite sincere to Bakhtiar at the time of the 
Nojeh Project.
^Institute For Political Research, Kodetaye Nojeh, 2nd Edition, Spring 1989, p.
42.
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and Iraq), along with tacit "EEC" approval"347", there is no other tangible evidence, 
apart from the financial assistance that were given to Bakhtiar by Iraq (at a time that the 
Iran-lraq had not yet broken out), to substantiate these allegations. On the contrary, 
according to documents seized by the radical students at the American Embassy in 
Teheran, the line previously recommended by U.S. diplomats in Iran, such as V.L. 
Tomseth in September 1979, was to keep away from all "emigres", including 
Bakhtiar348.
According to Bakhtiar, a budget of around 100 Million Tomans (something in excess of 
$12 million) was allocated for this project, which included costs for purchasing 
weapons, acquiring intelligence, and paying the cost of support elements inside the 
country, etc.349. However, the role of Iraq in having provided assistance for this 
operation was crucial. Apart from finance, not only did "Radio Iran", Bakhtiar's 
clandestine station in Baghdad became available in time, but by keeping the border 
area with Iran in a state of constant mobilization, the Iraqis were able to assist the 
plotters, by allowing them to have well maintained and fully armed fighter planes, ready 
for take off at all times.
In the end, as a consequence of the betrayal of one air force pilot350, as well as other 
corroborated evidences that had become known to the security authorities via a number
^Ibid., p. 108. It is important to point out that apart from periodical articles, there 
has been no compilation of facts regarding "Nojeh" prepared by any exile source, 
including "Neghab" and NAMIR.
^Daneshjoyan Mosalman Payro Khate Emam, Asnade Laneh Jasousi, Vol. 16,
Office of Islamic Publications, Qom, 1985, p.77.
349This was revealed during the course of many private discussions to the writer.
^Captain Iradj Soltanji, who was told to bomb Khomeini's residence in Jamaran.
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of different sources351, the attempt was foiled and a number of civilian and military 
officers, mostly from the air force, were arrested. Many of the officers, irrespective of 
the undetermined nature of their involvement in the plot were immediately executed at 
Khomeini's behest352, despite claims of protestations made to the contrary by some of 
his leading advisers353.
Organizing NAMIR____________________________________________________
Consistent with the age old Iranian tendency to look for and concentrate more on an 
individual, as opposed to a collection of individuals for leadership, the way Bakhtiar 
proceeded initially, and the eventual shape that his political organization was to take, 
were more closely reminiscent of Bakhtiar's own personal likes and past experiences, 
rather than the long debated recommendations of the organizing committees which he 
had gathered and appointed to study the best options for the launching of the new 
organization. In this respect, emulating General De Gaulle had become a way of life for 
Bakhtiar, and hence the organization was named after De Gaulle's war time movement 
against the Nazis, and came to be known as the National Movement of the Iranian 
Resistance354. It is important to note, that in terms of timing, the actual public
^eg. The Tudeh Party and the Mojahedin who had been given earlier notice of 
the proposed plan (discussions between Marzban and Rajavi's Deputy, Moussa 
Khiabani)...
352A complete list of those executed were subsequently published in August 
addition of VOICE OF IRAN, as well as in the book entitled, "IRAN: In Defense of 
Human Rights", which was produced by NAMIR in July 1983. However, it is important 
to note that many of the civilians who were arrested in conjunction with "Nojeh" were 
not executed till 13 months after the discovery of the plot.
353Bani Sadr, A., Khianat Beh Omid, Paris, 1991, p.192.
354lts acronym, NAMIR instead of N.M.I.R., was coined by the writer in 1981. 
Reason for this was that the slogan, "Iran Will Never Die", came to be identified with 
Bakhtiar, and was reflected at the end of all his speeches and other statements. Apart 
from the fact that the term -"NAMIR" was a much more 'catchier phrase than "N.M.I.R." -
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announcing of this movement did not take place until after the failure of the planned 
military operation at "Nojeh".
Due mainly to Bakhtiar's own lack of management skill and experience355, coupled with 
his confined movement and associations in Iranian society prior to his assumption of 
office356, disturbing signs of misplaced trusts and unsuitable selections in terms of 
colleagues and associates, very soon became a feature of the Bakhtiar 'entourage'. 
While, the assembling of this motley crowd served to boost Bakhtiar's ego, such that 
he was able to justly claim that while neither of his associates would acknowledge the 
supremacy of any other colleague, they were all united in acknowledging his own 
supremacy as "leader". However, apart from becoming a negative exercise in 
confidence building, what this strategy was failing to address was the setting up of a 
coherent, forward looking infrastructure, capable of coming to terms with the various
it also meant "do not die" in Farsi, and was thus conceived as a more appropriate 
acronym for an organization, whose main slogan was that "Iran Will Never Die".
355This is, even, corroborated by US Embassy reports as far back as 1954 
(Source: Daneshjoyan Mosalman Payro Khate Emam, Asnade Laneh Jasousi, Vol. 20, 
Office of Islamic Publications, Qom, 1985, p.46.
^Here, it is important to note that while Bakhtiar had been a prominent member 
of the National Front for a very long period of time, his contacts and circle of friends 
and associates was a very limited one. According to his cousin and one of his cabinet 
Ministers, Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar, Shapour Bakhtiar, who had been even cast aside by 
his own family because of his political feelings, was essentially a "loner", and a person 
who shied away from public gatherings and the like (interview in London, 2/2/94). 
Hence, when the time came for him to step forward and assume office, in choosing 
senior members of his government, he was greatly dependent on the advice and 
recommendations of his close friends and confidants - composed mainly of men of good 
intentions, but, nonetheless, of mediocre credentials. A look at the composition of his 
cabinet, with a very few exceptions, underlines the mediocrity of his choices (though 
in fairness to Bakhtiar, it must be said that men of "higher timber" were unwilling to step 
forward in his direction at that particular time. In exile, this same problem once again 
confronted him, and once again he was encircled with a motley group of conflicting 
ideologues and bureaucrats, whose only point in common was in trying to deploy the 
person of Bakhtiar in order to promote their own particular agenda and objectives.
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problems then confronting Iranian society, while at the same time presenting a general 
image that there was; also, a determined and capable leadership which was able to 
successfully come to grip with any future problems that might confront the Iranian 
nation.
The personalities tasked by Bakhtiar during the 'Initial Stage' to come up with a working 
manifesto were all Paris based357, and consisted of a mixture of exiled theoreticians and 
academics - such as ex-Tudeh/leftist sympathizers like Hossein Malek358 and Molood 
Khanlari359, and Engineer Ezat Raastgaar - all of whom had been universally opposed 
to the previous regime, and a number of close associates from the National Front and 
the "Iran Party"360. Prominent amongst the Iran Party361 associates were Rahim Sharifi, 
Amir Hossein Amir Parviz, who despite his background and past affiliations, had been
357lnterview with A.H. Amir Parviz, 28 January 1994.
^Brother of Khalil Maleki, the Leader of "Niroyee Sevom" (Third Force), a break 
away group from the Tudeh Party, that had questioned the supremacy of Moscow and 
its interferences in the affairs of the Party.
^A n  ex-Tudeh supporter who had served as a research assistant to Jean Paul 
Satre, and who was to late edit NAMIR's French language publication, "Lettre Persane". 
Also, two of Molood Khanlari's daughters Mahshid (Amirshahi) and Shahrashoob were 
also employed by the Bakhtiar organization. Mahshid, a journalist, was responsible for 
translating into Farsi Bakhtiar's autobiography, Yekrangi, originally entitled Ma Fidelite 
(Albin Michel - Paris, 1982), while her sister was in charge of NAMIR's clandestine 
radio broadcasts from Cairo (prior to her sacking following disclosures that she had 
been broadcasting leftist and Mojahedin propaganda from the Cairo base. Prior to 
heading the Cairo Station, Shahrashoob had been part of the initial team that had 
headed Bakhtiar's Paris office.).
360According to A.H. Amir Parviz (interview 28/1/94), the founding members of 
NAMIR were the following: Ahmad Mirfendereski (Bakhtiar's Foreign Minister during his 
tenure), Kazem Jafroodi (former Senator and Majles Deputy), Molood Khanlari, Hossein 
Malek, Rahim Sharifi, and Engineer Ezat Raastgaar.
361The "Iran Party" was Bakhtiar's own party, in which he had become its 
Secretary General. The Iran Party was amongst a number of political organizations and 
reputed individuals whose loose association around Dr. Mossadegh, had come to be 
known as the National Front.
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a serving member of the Ministry of Agriculture and had risen in the ranks of that 
Ministry to become its Minister, in the preceding months prior to Bakhtiar's own 
assumption of the premiership362, and finally, Ahmad Khalilolahe Moghaddam363. These 
were joined by Dr. Abdol Rahman Boroomand - Bakhtiar's closest friend and supporter 
throughout his "wilderness years" in Iran, and a number of other senior National Front 
members such as Hamid Zolnour and Mehrdad Arfazadeh, who were able to leave Iran 
shortly after the disbanding of the National Front by the mullahs.
The very first document that was printed in late 1980, following long deliberations by 
this team was entitled," Mabani Andishehave Sivasi Va Barnemeh have Ejrai Shapour 
Bakhtiar364". and was more reflective of the political orientations of its authors, though 
it has now been established that the main author was none other than one of the initial 
idealogues of the movement, namely Engineer Ezat Raastgaar365. In this important 
document, contrary to Bakhtiar's own repeated assertions that he was a "Social 
Democrat", there were important assertions attributed to Bakhtiar, himself, that he was
362Amir Parviz had become Minister of Agriculture in the government of Sharif 
Emami and continued in that position in the Military Government of General Azhari. 
Thus, when Bakhtiar himself became Prime Minister in December 1978, having stated 
that he would not be appointing any body to a cabinet post who had served in any 
previous government after Mossadegh, he was forced to exclude Amir Parviz from his 
own cabinet. However, having arrived in Paris, he was no longer barred by any 
constraints, and as such, Amir Parviz served as one of his close associates until he 
was seriously wounded in car bomb attack in London in 1987.
^ A  member of the Iran Party, whose many writings such as Hezbe Tudeh Dar 
Khedmat Erteja Va Imperialism (The Tudeh Party in the service of Reactionarism and 
Imperialism), and Baraye Aghahi Nasle Javan (For the Information of the Younger 
Generations), were widely printed and distributed by NAMIR during the initial years.
364Simply translated, it meant "The Political Thoughts and Action Programs of 
Shapour Bakhtiar".
^Interview with Engineer Ezat Raastgaar, Paris, 23 November 1994.
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a "Socialist"366. Though, it soon became very clear, that due mainly to a lack of 
organizational discipline, Bakhtiar himself had failed to read the document in advance 
of its publications, nonetheless, its distribution was to cause great confusion andunrest 
amongst many of his supporters.
From 1981-1983, the role played by Hossein Malek and Molood Khanlari was 
instrumental in shaping the presentation of Bakhtiar's movement in exile367, in that the 
majority of articles and statements that were originally produced and subsequently 
published by NAMIR, were essentially a reflection of views shared by these two 
individuals368.
According to Dr. Cyrus Amouzegar369, who served as Minister of Information in 
Bakhtiar’s government, during the initial days, some of the people who gathered around 
Bakhtiar, soon after his arrival in Paris, consisted of certain individuals, who
366NAMIR , Mabani Andishehaye Siyasi Va Barnemeh haye Ej'rai Shapour 
Bakhtiar, 1980, page 5.
367ln the 'Initial Stage", many writings by Hossein Malek, such as Ideology Va 
Farhang (Ideology and Culture) etc., were printed and distributed by NAMIR amongst 
its supporters for indoctrination purposes. Common in most of these writings was the 
overt hostility of Malek to almost everything carried out in the previous regime. This, 
was to have a negative effect on the whole progress of the Bakhtiar movement, as with 
the passage of time, it became clear that the main bastion of support for Bakhtiar was 
to come from none other than the supporters of constitutional monarchy. It is a fact that 
many nationalist groups, with sympathy for constitutional monarchy, failed to join 
Bakhtiar's movement, as a result of having come into contact with Malek. The 
"SOROODEMA" group in London, consisting of young intellectuals, univeristy 
personnel, and professional technocrats, is a case in point.
368By looking at three separate issues of a publication entitled Nameh Nehzat, 
which was produced earlier but printed by NAMIR in 1983, it will be seen that there are 
a total of 7 articles which have been authored by Malek (in his own name) and Khanlari 
(under her pen name Talaat Rokni). These articles written by Malek, were reflective of 
the main line of thought being projected by the Bakhtiar camp at that time.
369lnterview, Paris, 10 August 1994.
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subsequently rose to prominent positions amongst the monarchists, such as Dr. 
Sassanfar370, Dr. Houghoghi and Dr. Shahin Fatemi. However, most of these early 
activities took place while most of Bakhtiar's former colleagues during his brief period 
of tenure in office were still in Iran371. Signs of disagreements amongst the early 
advisers soon became evident, as most of the pro-monarchy members were for the 
creation of a more comprehensive "Council" in which Bakhtiar's role was more limited 
than that of a "Supreme Leader" - something that Bakhtiar, based on his own previous 
experience with Dr. Karim Sanjabi and Dariush Forouhar in the National Front, was 
totally unprepared to accept372. Thus, what transpired was the gradual creation of a first 
"Supreme Council" directly responsible to Bakhtiar, and another Council (later referred 
to simply as "Nehzat") which was to include key figures in what eventually became 
NAMIR. While, the orientation of Bakhtiar's "Council" was generally "Right of Center", 
the orientation of "Nehzat" - ie. NAMIR, was generally the reverse. This was aimed at 
giving Bakhtiar the "best of both worlds", but in practice, it served only to contribute to 
more inevitable chaos.
370According to Amouzegar, it was Dr. Sassanfar who coined the name of what 
was to become Bakhtiar's "Nehzate Moghavemate Melli", which sounded very much like 
De Gaulle's movement which eventually liberated France, and was the very example 
whicfyhoped to emulate.
371lt was not till the end of 1980, that most of Bakhtiar's trusted cabinet ministers, 
such as Mirfendereski (Foreign Affairs), Amouzegar (information), Razmara (Health), 
and Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar (Commerce) were able to escape from Iran and arrive safely 
in Paris.
372According to Amouzegar (interview: 10 August 1994), Bakhtiar had often 
voiced an opinion that he had always felt cheated and held back by Sanjabi during his 
National Front days. On the hand, Dariush Forouhar, during the course of a visit to 
Europe in the Summer of 1993, had spoken to Amouzegar of a consistency in 
Bakhtiar's long standing "selfishness..." - hence, the animosity that continues to remain 
amongst former National Front members belonging to the Bakhtiar and Forouhar 
camps.
144
By the end of 1980, prominent members of the "Council" were Parviz Ghadessi372, 
Javad Khadem373, Manouchehr Aryana374, Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar, Ahmad Mirfendereski, 
Manouchehr Razmara, Cyrus Amouzegar, and finally, Senator Kazem Jafroudi375. At 
the same time, the main group of actors^in "Nehzat" consisted of Molood Khanlari, 
Hossein Malek, Rahim Sharifi and Engineer Rastgaar. Apart from Bakhtiar himself, only 
Dr. Abdol Rahman Boroomand, was an original founding member of both groups, 
though later at Bakhtiar's insistence, other members of the "Council" were also 
assigned to the "Nehzat" in order to balance its composition, and prevent it from 
becoming too dogmatic.
Early Activities outside France_________________________________________
The first "Campaign Trip" made by Bakhtiar to a destination outside France was to 
London in August 1979. During the course of this visit, a programme was organized by 
a committee of Bakhtiar supporters in London. Prominent amongst the committee 
members were Parviz Amir Parviz and Mohammad Daneshkhou376. Through their 
efforts, a protest march against the recently installed Islamic government and in support 
of Bakhtiar was organized in which several thousand Iranians (along with a very large 
police presence, numbering well into the hundreds) participated. This was by far the 
largest demonstration of its kind in any Iranian opposition rally held in London before
3720ne of the main architects of the failed Coup at "Nojeh".
373A Bakhtiar cabinet Minister (Housing) and early confidante.
374Bakhtiar's Minister of Labour.
375A seasoned politician and a Bakhtiar relation (his daughter was married to 
Bakhtiar's son and they had a joint grandson).
376Father of the Financial Times journalist, Shahrezad Daneshkhou, and a
devoted follower of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, who was responsible for the production 
of the first major pro-Bakhtiar publication, entitled, Morghe Toufan.
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or since that time. During this trip, Bakhtiar was also interviewed by the London media, 
and most notably the BBC Persian Service, in which, apart from his scathing attacks 
upon the clerical establishment in Iran, certain excerpts of his speech to the crowds 
were also broadcast to Iran.
Subsequently, through the financial assistance of Parviz Amir Parviz, a "London Office" 
was set up in a flat at Thurlow Place in Knightsbridge, which was frequented primarily 
by General Fereidoon Djam, the former Chief of the Imperial Military Staff378, and a host 
of other high ranking of military officers, including Lt. General Mohsen Mobasser, the 
former Commander of the National Iranian Police Force. The establishment of the 
"London Office" was, in fact, the very first center that was set up to advance the cause 
of Bakhtiar's movement in exile. It preceded the establishment of a Paris office by 
sometime, given that even by late 1980, Bakhtiar was still conducting his affairs from 
his Paris flat (having expressed unreadiness in October 1979 about forming a 
structured organization379), while most of his advisers were meeting in make shift places 
or their own apartments. Furthermore, given that military officers, led by Djam, were the 
main users of the London Office, a precedent was also set which ultimately led to the 
establishment of "NAMIR's Military Wing" (NAMIR-MW), which aimed to develop strong 
ties with the military establishment in Iran, with a view of soliciting their support and 
involvement in any Bakhtiar inspired action against the ruling clique.
Although the 'Thurlow Place Office", did not endure for a long period of time, and was
378General Djam had been nominated by Bakhtiar for the post of Minister of War 
in his cabinet, but had refused to accept the nomination at that time.
379lnterview: Amir Hossein Amir Parviz, 28 January 1994. This revelation gives 
further credence to the assumption that Bakhtiar was more hopeful of returning to Iran 
through a different mechanism.
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dismantled following Djam's decision to cease active cooperation with Bakhtiar380, it did 
nonetheless, provide Bakhtiar with a detailed report regarding the state of the Iranian 
Armed Forces at that time. Also certain key personnel, later involved in "Nojeh" such 
as Air Force General Amir Fazll and Manouchehr Ghorbanifar were introduced to 
Bakhtiar via the London Office. In particular, playing a prominent role in this whole 
affair, was Manouchehr Ghorbanifar, who under the pseudo-name of "Souzani", was 
to play a crucial role as "project paymaster", in charge of a Bakhtiar provided budget 
that was estimated to have been around $10 million. Ghorbanifar, who was introduced 
to Bakhtiar by General Djam381, had by 1986 turned complete coat, having become a 
key figure in the "Irangate" scandal of 1986, in which he had served as an intermediary 
between the U.S. Government and the clerics in Teheran who were engaging in 
discussions for the swap of U.S. military supplies for hostages in Lebanon382.
It is important to note that during the course of the initial 18 months from 1979 to early
380According to Amir Hossein Amir Parviz (interview, 21/4/95), General Djam 
never actually came to the 'Thurlow Place Office" on more than a half dozen occasions. 
His main subordinate, Lt. General Mohsen Mobasser, came more often, and according 
to him a written proposal was prepared and later sent to Bakhtiar in Paris (according 
to Amir Parviz, the report was hand carried by the wife of Bakhtiar's cousin and close 
assistant, Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar). General Mobasser stated (phone interview, 21/4/95), 
that General Djam never received any response from Bakhtiar, regarding the proposal 
whose preparation he had supervised, and it was due to this that the "loose cooperation 
between them came to an end". A "distance" between Djam and Bakhtiar emerged 
following the start of the Iran-lraq War, when Djam began to privately criticize Bakhtiar 
for not having severed his ties with the Iraqis. During a dinner arranged by the writer, 
in 1984, at the request of Francis Fukiyama (working for RAND at the time and 
preparing a report on the Iranian Military), General Djam came out and made reference 
to this matter during the course of the evening. However, his objections to Bakhtiar's 
ties with Iraq were not sufficient enough to prevent him from writing to Bakhtiar and 
asking him to give his nephew a job in NAMIR. In a telephone interview with Djam on 
23/9/94, Djam seemed anxious to underplay any association which he might have had 
with Bakhtiar in the Fall of 1979.
^Source: General Mohsen Mobasser.
^New York Times. The Tower Commission Report, Bantam Books, New York,
1987.
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1981, the search for an organizational format had been greatly influenced by one other 
important factor which was to play a crucial role in defining Bakhtiar's subsequent 
political strategy in the following years. This was to be the outcome of debates with 
other emerging and prominent opposition figures, such as General Gholam Ali Oveissi, 
General Bahram Aryana383, Dr. Houshang Nahavandi384, and finally, with the former 
Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Ali Amini.
Competition and Disagreement with Other Opposition Leaders______________
There is no question that Shapour Bakhtiar, was the first prominent Iranian political 
figure to come out in public opposition to the Islamic regime385. In fact, Bakhtiar is even 
credited to have begun his campaign prior to his arrival in France, and at a time when 
he was still in hiding in Iran. His first cassette message, distributed in Teheran and 
reported widely by the international media, was on the day when the provisional Islamic 
government of Mr. Mehdi Bazargan held the first major referendum in which the country 
was officially converted into an "Islamic Republic" (10 Farvardin 1358 or 31 March 
1979). In this message Bakhtiar had urged people "not to take part in the voting" and 
had warned them that "by following Khomeini in this way, they would be leading 
themselves into a dark and unknown path"386. Once Bakhtiar was able to leave Iran,
383Former Chief of Staff of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, and brother of 
Bakhtiar's Labour Minister and Council Member.
^Former Cabinet Minister and Chancellor of Teheran University as well as the 
former powerful Head of the Empress's Office in Iran.
385This fact was acknowledged by Bagher Moin of the BBC Persian Service, in 
an account that was broadcast to the Iranina nation on 08/08/91 following Bakhtiar's 
assassination (interview, 3 May 1995).
^Amirshahi, M., Yekrangi, Farsi translation of Albin Michel's Ma Fidelite, Paris, 
1982, p.240.
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and establish himself in Paris in July 1979, he was again the first to come out publicly 
and state that the he would be attempting to organize an effective resistance against 
the excesses of a brutal and backward regime, that was fast revealing its true nature 
to everyone, including the outside world. Based on this and his previous background, 
Bakhtiar considered himself to be the "natural Leader of the opposition", a position that 
he was not willing to share with anyone else387.
However, by mid-1979, certain political figures from the previous regime, notably 
Generals Gholam Ali Oveissi and Bahram Aryana, as well as former Minister of Science 
and Higher Education, Houshang Nahavandi, who was himself arrested and imprisoned 
by Bakhtiar during his period in office, were actively seeking support to organize an 
effective military and civil campaign against the new regime. This emerging situation 
was further complicated by the fact that the late Shah of Iran was still alive and in 
particular communication with General Oveissi. Also, Dr. Nahavandi, who was 
previously the head of the Empress's office in Teheran was also in communication with 
the Shah, via the Empress.
Although, they were all united in their opposition to the Islamic regime, the content of 
the messages that were being disseminated by these figures were substantially 
different, in that while Bakhtiar was trying to distance himself from the Shah and the 
previous regime, the others, who were on better speaking terms with one another, were 
of the view that the previous regime "was not all bad, and that they had a proud record
387Prior to the publications of Nehzat and Ghvame Iran, on 17 August 1979, 
Bakhtiar had placed an advert in LE MONDE saying that he and a number of others 
would be putting out a daily, anti-regime newspaper called "NAMEHE ROUZ". 
According to Daneshjoyan Mosalman Payro Khate Emam, Asnade Laneh Jasousi, [Vol. 
28, p.62], this publication also enjoyed the support of Hedayat Matin Daftari's National 
Democratic Front.
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which was full of major achievements, and certainly most defensible"388.
Whether a more conciliatory and diplomatic attitude by Bakhtiar, may have assisted the 
promotion of better dialogue amongst these groups, is a matter for speculation, but as 
matters unfolded, disagreements about various issues that were based on the past, 
very soon became a subject of serious internal bickering and recriminations.
Meanwhile, by early 1980, the monarchists, as a consequence of the "anti-Khomeini 
mood" that was being cultivated by the international media due the various nefarious 
acts that were being committed by the Islamic Republic389, were starting to feel more 
self-assured and less intimidated by the aura of the Revolution that had displaced 
them. A direct result of this was the airing of their open support for the deposed Shah, 
and their utter distaste for all those who had opposed him - including Bakhtiar390. And, 
while there were open lines of communication between Bakhtiar advisers and the 
others, it was soon becoming apparent that getting them to work together under one 
roof was an impossible feat.
388This point was reiterated during the course of several discussions conducted 
by the writer with General Oveissi and Dr. Nahavandi from March-July 1980.
389eg. Torture, imprisonment, and execution of its opponents, along with the 
highly contentious and illegal occupation of the American Embassy in Teheran and the 
holding of its diplomats as hostages.
390lt is important to note that during the "London March" in support of Bakhtiar 
during the Summer of 1979 (in which the author participated), the overwhelming 
number of those taking part were supporters of constitutional monarchy and devoted 
followers of the late Shah. However, as the revolution was still in its early stages, they 
were still too intimidated to chant any pro-Shah slogans. Hence, given the composition 
of those who took part in that march, the demonstration, though pro-Bakhtiar on the 
surface, was as much a statement of affirmation for the previous regime. This was a 
very important point that was unfortunately lost to Bakhtiar and his advisers at that time.
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At the same time, Bakhtiar’s own lack of personal contact with the Shah391, coupled with 
certain controversial statements made by him regarding "the Un-Nationalistic nature of 
the Iranian Armed Forces"392 etc.393, drove a serious and un-repairable wedge between 
him and the exiled military community, as well as its leaders such as Oveissi, and many 
others.
This situation was further complicated when by early 1980, Hassan Nazih, a 
Mossadegh supporter and the former head of the Lawyers Guild in Iran, who had 
closely collaborated with Bakhtiar in his days of opposition to the Shah and was 
generally considered as one of the main political figures of the Iranian Revolution, was 
sacked from his post as the Head of the National Iranian Oil Company by the Islamic 
authorities, and forced to flee to exile. While, Nazih was, himself, willing to cooperate 
with Bakhtiar on an equal footing, he was not prepared to work under him394. At the 
same time, many former National Front colleagues and intellectuals in exile were 
expressing reluctance to cooperate with Bakhtiar, on the grounds that he had "violated 
a scared code, and had compromised his principles by accepting the title of Prime 
Minister from the hands of the Shah"395! This attitude was similarly underlined, when 
Admiral Ahmad Madani, the "Middle Class's Alternative" in Iran's first presidential
391 In a personal conversation with the author, Bakhtiar stated that he only spoke 
with the Shah on one occasion from the time that he had left Iran to the time when the 
Shah died in Cairo in July 1980.
392Meaning that the Armed Forces was under foreign (ie. U.S.) influence.
^Amirshahi, M., Yekrangi, Farsi translation of Albin Michel's Ma Fidelite, Paris, 
1982, p. 231.
394Personal discussion between Nazih and the author conducted in Nice in 
November 1980.
^According to National Front and Bakhtiar activist, Azizollah Esna Ashari, one 
of the most notable figures amongst this category of people was the British based 
intellectual Homa Katouzian.
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elections, having arrived in Paris using Bakhtiar's network (and at his expense), refused 
to form any kind of an alliance with him396.
By Late 1980, this aggravating situation was even more exacerbated when former 
Prime Minister, Dr. Ali Amini was persuaded to throiu his hat into the ring, and 
following consultations that took place between him and a number of his key advisers 
at that time397, the "Front For the Liberation of Iran" (FLI) was subsequently launched 
in 1981 (with CIA support and funding)398, in direct competition with Bakhtiar and his 
newly emerging "National Movement of the Iranian Resistance" (NAMIR).
By this time, following the death of the late Shah on 27 July, 1980, his eldest son Reza 
Pahlavi II, had on 31 October 1980, declared himself as the new Shah, and had quietly 
thrown his support behind the FLI399. Also, with the exception of Dr. Nahavandi who by 
this time had faded into the background400, all the others including General Oveissi, at 
the Young Shah's behest401, had come to accept a working relationship with Dr. Ali
396This has been corroborated in interviews with Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar, who 
escaped from Iran together with Madani, and Dr. Cyrus Amouzegar, Bakhtiar's Minister 
of Information and a close friend of Admiral Madani.
397Most prominently Dr. Shahin Fatemi and Islam Kazemieh.
398While, the original FLI manifesto was did not commit itself to re-establishing 
monarchy in lran.it was, nevertheless, composed mainly of senior monarchist figures, 
and included nearly all the prominent figures in Paris who had failed to establish any 
kind of a meaningful dialogue with Bakhtiar.
399This was due to the fact that activists in the FLI had been more willing to 
contact him and seek his views and cooperation. In this respect, the Bakhtiar 
organization, while not hostile, was very aloof, and disinterested in wanting to have any 
consultations of a serious nature with the new Shah, a personality whom they did not 
take very seriously.
400Having come to a realistic assessment regarding his disposition.
^General Oveissi's brother, Colonel Ahmad Oveissi, had been appointed as the 
Young Shah's adjutant by Mohammad Reza Shah, and had remained by his side from
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Amini, and had agreed to come under the umbrella of the FLI402. Only General Bahram 
Aryana, and his organization called "Azadeghan" (Free Souls), remained outside the 
FLI, and having achieved the dramatic (and news-making) take over in the high seas 
of three Iranian Naval Patrol Boats that had been delivered by the French government 
to the Islamic regime, he had opted for setting up of a military camp in Turkey, from 
where he was intending to woe the military establishment inside the country to rise to 
his call403. While, unwilling to have anything to do with Oveissi, Bakhtiar's attitude 
towards Aryana whom he considered as a "learned nationalist", was totally different. 
Thus, Bakhtiar not only supported Aryana financially404, he instructed both Nehzat and 
Ghvame Iran to print any articles and statements put out by Aryana. The high point of 
this relationship was reached, when in the aftermath of the seizure of the "Iranian Ship 
Tabarzin". Bakhtiar instructed all his military supporters to join Aryana405. To mark this 
as a special occasion, Bakhtiar also ordered the publication of a special issue of
the day that he was born.
^ A t  least, at the time when the movement was officially launched. In his book 
about William Casey entitled Veil, Bob Woodward refers to the fact that CIA was 
eventually given a presidential mandate to "conduct exploratory discussions with 
various anti-Khomeini exile groups to see which, if any, might be able to mount an 
opposition" (Woodward, B., Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987, Simon And 
Schuster, New York, 1987, page 111-112). Eventually, the FLI was to become the 
flagship of the CIA in the Iranian opposition, to the detriment of the Bakhtiar 
organization, with whom the CIA was never able to reach the same level of cooperation.
^Something that eventually did not work for many reasons, the most prominent 
of which was the reluctance of the Turkish government to serve as launching point for 
such activities.
^Including personal health care and hospitalization fees (disclosed in a private 
conversation to the writer by Bakhtiar himself).
^ h i s  was also confirmed by General Manouchehr Hashemi (interview, London, 
24 April 1995), who had also obtained the support of the Young Shah in Cairo for the 
joint Bakhtiar-Aryana efforts. He had subsequently taken a number of military officers 
for a special training program to Israel.
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Ghvame Iran on 25 August 1981, to underline the importance of this "Joint Strategy"406.
It can be assumed that the creation of the FLI, was partly due to the failure of Bakhtiar 
and his initial group of advisers to utilize the unique position that they had as the sole 
bearers of the opposition flag. Differences of style, rather than substance, as well as 
self righteous and dogmatic attitudes on the part of Bakhtiar, himself, and a number of 
his close colleagues, during the early years resulted in a situation, such that by early 
1981 - ie. several months still before the arrival of former Islamic President Abolhassan 
Bani Sadr and Mojahedin Leader Massoud Rajavi - the main Iranian opposition, 
consisting of traditional forces, was effectively divided into two main camps, and 
Bakhtiar, although the more credible of the two, was no longer the sole leader of the 
Iranian Opposition. This particular situation (that was to last till early 1986, when Dr. 
Ali Amini, was forced by circumstances to stand aside) was further complicated in 
August 1981 by the arrival in Paris of Bani Sadr and Rajavi.
What Bakhtiar desperately wanted was to dictate terms on his own conditions, a matter 
that was proving more difficult with the passage of time. It is often argued that a more 
magnanimous, and less dogmatic Bakhtiar, in the early days when his authority was 
unchallenged, could well have prevented the emergence of the FLI, or at least, 
lessened the effects of the numerous useless and time consuming squabbles that were 
to ensue following its establishment407.
40&The release of this statement was received warmly in military circles, and on 
1st October 1981, the strategy was able to receive the blessings of Major General 
Hassan Arfa, a leading and prestigious member of the 'Old Guard'.
^Prominent amongst these were the scathing and rather personal attacks which 
were made by Molood Khanlari in issue 28 of Nehzat (November 1982), as well as 
another scathing attack from the ex-Tudeh dignitary, Fereidoon Keshavarz that was 
printed in issue 8 of Ghvame Iran (April 1981).
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What was generally perceived to be wanted by the general public in Iran was the 
creation of the so-called "Dream Team" - ie. "The Shah/Bakhtiar Ticket". And, while 
Bakhtiar, himself, was not opposed to this, his "Cognitive Rigidity"408, towards certain 
non-issues that were reflective of his past experiences, prevented him from ever 
developing the types of personal relationships with the Young Shah and some of his 
key advisers, that would have resulted in the outcome which everybody, including 
himself in the "moderate opposition", badly wanted. This important failure in 
communication, which could easily have been avoided during the initial period of his 
activities, hurt Bakhtiar more than any other political figure with whom he was in 
competition409. While, this potentially avoidable failure did not visibly impair Bakhtiar's 
near term progress and the successful of launching of NAMIR, it did, nevertheless, 
initiate a problem that was fragmentary and contrary to the general direction of his 
objectives, for which a significant price was eventually exacted410.
Bakhtiar's "Foreign Policy” (1979-1983)__________________________________
Though Western trained and educated, the understanding of 'foreign policy' and the 
workings of modern day international politics and its complexities, were not one of 
Bakhtiar's strong points411. However, during the early years, when Bakhtiar was still
^ A  phrase that was coined by the Shah's Political Counsellor, Dr. Shahriar Ahy7 
to describe the impasse.
409This is mainly because, as the leading contender, he could have come to 
terms with the Shah, at no cost to any of his principle, and have remained at the helm, 
in circumstances that no one else amongst his competitors could have struck such a 
deal.
410From late 1979 onwards, Bakhtiar became a villain amongst nearly all the 
exiled monarchist press for his gratuitous comments and insults against the Shah and 
the former figures of his establishment.
411 In contrast with the late Shah, this matter became known to the writer in the 
first meeting that was held with Bakhtiar in October 1980.
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hopeful of regaining power, using available domestic resources, at a time when the 
Islamic republic was still unconsolidated and disorganized, he was not in need of a 
coherent foreign policy as such, apart from the good working relationship which he had 
been able to achieve with Saddam Hussein. This, is not to say that during this period, 
he did not welcome establishing contacts with other foreign leaders (eg. President 
Anwar Sadat who invited him to Egypt and gave him a radio station in 1982), but the 
fact remains that his single most immediate requirement from a "foreign" source- ie. 
finance, had been provided by Iraq.
The fact that for most of 1979-1981 he was concentrating on the internal scene in Iran, 
allowed all his political competitors in exile, an important 'lead time' for establishing 
international contacts of their own, primarily at Bakhtiar's expense.
i
By 1982, however, understanding the fact that the struggle could no longer be won in 
a 'quick fashion', Bakhtiar began focusing more attention on establishing better 
relations with key countries such as the United States, Britain, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. 
While, the subject of these relations require separate consideration, that will be dealt 
with independently in a later chapter, the fact that Bakhtiar was no longer isolated from 
receiving other view points, helped Bakhtiar in taking major steps in correcting the 
course that his organization was taking, and by establishing an acceptable "Modus 
Vivendi" with his political competitors. Thus, by August 1983, Bakhtiar had not only 
signed an "Agreement of Principles" with Dr. Ali Amini412, but had declared his open 
support for the re-establishment of constitutional monarchy in Iran, and was thus in 
position to embark on the most constructive period of his political campaign.
412Which effectively harnessed the likes of Molood Khanlari and Hossein Malek, 
and sidelined them from the main thrust of NAMIR's activities.
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Chapter 4: THE INTERMEDIATE STAGE (1983-1987)
The period from 1983-1987 marks the time in which Bakhtiar began for the first time to 
make his impact felt as leader of an organized political force. This period, coinciding 
with the beginning of the slide in the popularity of the Islamic regime in Iran, also 
marked Bakhtiar's period of popular ascendence and credibility as a national figure with 
audiences both at home and abroad. The state of the popularity of the regime, 
beginning with the time frame applicable to Bakhtiar's plans during the "Intermediate 
Stage" of his activities, is an issue which has been dealt with in pages 51-52 of the first 
Chapter. There is no question that visible signs of dissatisfaction were beginning to 
appear across the country soon after the victory of the revolution, and by the time that 
Bani-Sadr and the Mojahedin were forced to flee into exile by August 1981, they had 
become widespread and apparent. Following the ouster of Bani-Sadr and the 
Mojahedin, the last remaining member of the Grand Coalition which had toppled the 
Shah in 1979, was the Tudeh Party, which was itself finally outlawed in May 1983. 
Therefore, by the middle of 1983, all political constituencies - i.e., the monarchists, the 
National Front, the Communists, the Mojahedin, etc.- had all been banned from active 
participation in Iranian political life, and were all consequently forced into underground 
opposition against the regime. Furthermore, it is important to underline that opposition 
to the regime was not limited to just the secular political establishments. Indeed, by 
early 1983, the overwhelming majority of the Shiite Moslem religious establishment in 
places like, Qom, Mashhad and Najaf, were opposed to the nature of Islamic 
government as defined by Ayatollah Khomeini (A list of important clerics in Qom, 
Mashhad, and Teheran who had been targeted by NAMIR for cooperation against the 
regime had been prepared). Manifestations of this clerical opposition had already been 
witnessed by the unpopular humiliation that was inflicted on Grand
Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, one of the most reverend figures in the world of 
Shiism, who was implicated with Sadegh Ghotbzadeh for having plotted to overthrow 
the Islamic Republic. While, voicing open and outright opposition against any 
government (bearing in mind that even clerical opposition to the Shah took 37 years to 
manifest itself)- let alone one headed by an eminent clerical personality - ran counter 
to the traditions of the conservative clergy, nevertheless, loud voices of discontent were 
being echoed not only from supporters of the now "demoted" Shariat-Madari, but also 
by other Grand Ayatollahs and "Sources of Imitations", such as Grand Ayatollah 
Hassan Tabatabaii Qomi in Mashhad413. Thus, while the outside world continued to 
remain unaware of the true degree of dissention within the ranks of the Iranian clergy, 
it was an acknowledged fact within the Iranian clerical community, that an 
overwhelming majority of the religious constituency were opposed to Khomeini's 
interpretation of "Velayate Faghih", and the dangers of public resentment to which the 
Islamic Republic was exposing the entire constituency.
Perhaps their most successful endeavor against the Islamic regime, was the 
propaganda that the opposition movements, as a whole, were able to generate which 
had a devastating effect in tarnishing the image of the Islamic regime at home. These 
efforts were further complemented by the attitude on the part of many leading western 
democracies, led in particular by the United States. It is a fact that, at the political level, 
the relations between many of the major European countries, such as Britain and 
France, had failed to reach a "take off' stage, even prior to the exacerbation of relations
413ln his interview with the Teheran daily, Bamdaad on 10 March 1980 following 
his visit with Khomeini, Ayatollah Qomi had spoken openly about the "brutalities, 
injustices and other un-lslamic deeds of the Islamic Republic". As a result of his open 
and outright criticism of the regime (the most blatant to come from a religious leader of 
great stature), Qomi's movements were gradually restricted and eventually, he was put 
under house arrest.
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that had resulted following the seizure of the United States Embassy in Teheran and 
the holding of its diplomats as hostages.
So in summary it can be concluded that while the regime had been successful in 
consolidating its hold on power, it had nevertheless, through acts of wanton cruelty and 
barbarism, deprived itself of its earlier popular image. The most important litmus test 
which confirmed this was the popular response to Bakhtiar's call for a peaceful 
demonstration on August 5, 1983 - the Iranian Constitution Day - in which thousands 
of Iranian jammed the streets of Teheran, causing major traffic jams from the center of 
the city to the prosperous northern suburbs which was subsequently reported in the 
French daily, Le Monde, of 7-8 August 1983.
As already mentioned in the previous Chapter, by early 1982 Bakhtiar had come to a 
realistic conclusion that he could no longer count on any 'spontaneous and quick series 
of events' to turn the tide against the Islamic Republic, which had been riddled at the 
time with great organizational chaos. Moreover, by that time, he had become fully 
aware that the start of the Iran-lraq War414, and the failure of the Iraqi armed forces to
414The Iran-lraq War began with the Iraqi offensive on 21 September 1980. 
Occasioned by a boundary dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, it fundamentally 
arose because of Saddam Hussein's fear of a weakening of his absolute power base 
in Iraq by Iran's encouragement of the Shiite majority in Iraq to rise against the Sunni 
government. According to Shahram Chubin, "From Iraq's perspective the time to strike - 
preventively perhaps - was unlikely to be better than in 1980, before the revolution put 
down its roots, while its forces were in disarray, and while its relationship with both 
superpowers and most regional states were at best strained. Iraq's miscalculation was 
nearly total in that it overestimated its own capabilities while misconstruing the nature 
of its adversary and the sources of power at the latter's disposal.... Iraq's inability to 
capitalize on surprise in the early weeks of the war to military effect was not as serious 
as its failure to fashion a clear political objective. It seems to have expected a quick 
collapse of the regime, or a willingness to sue for peace, based on limited losses" 
(Chubin, S., "Iran and the War: from Stalemate to Ceasefire", in Karsh, E. (Edited), 
"The Iran-lraq War - Impact and Implications", The Jaffee Center For Strategic Studies, 
Tel-Aviv University, 1989.). However, contrary to Iraqi perceptions and those of a 
majority of its opponents, the Islamic regime used the war to harness the energies of
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take advantage of the existing state of disarray within the Iranian military establishment, 
had led to a great resurgence of popular sentiment on the part of the general 
population in favor of the regime, and against the invading "foreign aggressor", and 
those who were, by implication, tied to them415.
What this meant, in real terms, was that it was no longer possible for Bakhtiar to 
overthrow the Islamic regime as a result of some 'quick coup-like operation'. Instead, 
it had become evident that nothing short of a "longer term", well planned and organized 
strategy was likely to prove successful in dismantling a regime that was rapidly 
consolidating itself as a consequence of the Iraqi aggression416.
While the realization of this reality, is without question the most important reason that 
lay behind the organizational evolution that was to take place within NAMIR, the fact 
that such a route was taken only after a series of successive failures "in other areas", 
was a highly damaging factor, which the new organization never really came to grip
the mobilized revolutionary rank and file, settle domestic scores, while consolidating 
power at home. It was not until eight years later, when it was totally exhausted and 
facing total defeat, in wake of the tremendous international assistance that was being 
given to Iraq, that it accepted a UN sponsored ceasefire.
415There is no question that enemies of Bakhtiar, given his earlier contacts with 
Saddam Hussein and the fact that NAMIR operated a radio station from Baghdad, were 
attempting to link him
in a negative way with Iraq, thus casting doubts about his integrity as a true nationalist. 
A very notable example of this, was is in an article entitled, "The Iranian Followers of 
Saddam Hussein", written by Dr. Shahin Fatemi [who was later sacked from his position 
as deputy to Dr. Ali Amini (in the FLI)], in the 3-17 March, 1986 issue of IRAN VA 
JAHAN.
416According to A. Esna-Ashari, a Bakhtiar confidante, even at this "late date", 
Bakhtiar was uncomfortable with the idea of a setting up a new organization that would 
be involved in any long term, or protracted struggle (interview: 3 October 1994).
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with417. Indeed, many of Bakhtiar's close advisers at the time were of the view that in 
the aftermath of the various important and time consuming efforts- the most prominent
of which had been the "Nojeh Project" - Bakhtiar had, in fact, lost "heart" and had
(
become content leading the "Comfortable life of a well known statesman in exile"418.
Irrespective of any such speculations, it is a fact that by late 1981, despite a series of 
undeniable disappointments, as a consequence of a number of critical lost 
opportunities, Bakhtiar was able to bounce back, and push ahead with the construction 
of a credible opposition movement in exile, the like of which no other liberal-democratic 
group was able to match during his lifetime. Indeed, it is a fact that at its peak, in terms 
of size alone, apart from numerous cells inside the country, NAMIR had offices in 
almost all the major cities in Western Europe and North America, as well as numerous 
clandestine safe houses and offices in important neighboring countries such as Turkey 
and Pakistan419. Even in 'politically' remote countries such as India, many Bakhtiar 
supporters were able to become very actively engaged in propagating his viewpoints, 
and lobbying with the local government officials in support of his political platform.
This period, despite the fact that it did not contain some of the 'dramatic qualities' of 
the initial period, is probably the most important period of Bakhtiar's struggle in exile,
417The desperate search for a "Quick Fix", was always given greater priority than the 
need to build a solid organization, capable of enduring the times.
418This was the view that was being expressed by Dr. Cyrus Amuzegar, Bakhtiar's 
Minister of Information, as early as 1983. But this was not a universally shared view 
amongst Bakhtiar's key advisers. Everyone, almost to the man, was convinced of the 
unpopularity of the regime, and of the potential Bakhtiar enjoyed for leading the 
opposition to Khomeini. The only area of doubt centered around his ability to give 
proper leadership and management to the movement.
419lt is also a fact that by maintaining a radio station in Baghdad, NAMIR was also 
in a position to liaise with the Iraqi officials, particularly the "Iraqi Mukhaberat" (Secret 
Service) that was in overall charge of NAMIR's activities in Iraq.
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due to the fact that during this time, Bakhtiar was able to project himself in a way that 
could have seen him take power with all the semblances of a credible national leader. 
To illustrate this point, had any of Bakhtiar's previous attempts at acquiring power 
succeeded in the previous years - eg. the Nojeh Project, then the Islamic authorities 
could have always claimed that they had been overthrown by "an unpopular, externally 
instigated, military coup", given that the unsavory face of the Islamic regime had by that 
time not actually revealed itself in full focus to the general population. Furthermore, it 
is a also a fact, that without the terrible sufferings that were to ensue as a consequence 
of the protracted war with Iraq, despite the chaotic state of affairs, no serious dent had 
actually appeared in the general masses' view of Ayatollah Khomeini during the initial 
years. For example, very few people in 1980 or 1981 would actually contest the belief 
that, at the time of the Nojeh Project, Khomeini was still a highly revered and popular 
figure in Iran. However, by the mid-1980's, this perception had been drastically altered, 
and such factors as, the high casualties in the war, and others such as economic 
decline, rising unemployment, and gross violations of human right, had all made a 
serious impact on the previous popularity of Khomeini and his Islamic regime.
What this meant was that Bakhtiar's efforts were, for the first time, able to be projected 
in different terms, and also for the first time since the day that the late Shah had 
exposed him to national and international limelight420, Bakhtiar was able to be seen in 
the role that he had unsuccessfully tried to present himself, in all the years
before and after 1978. Another words, so long as Khomeini's unpopularity was not 
clearly established, it was difficult for both Iranians as well as others in the international 
community to grasp a true measure of Bakhtiar's potential as a national figure, with any
420There can be no question that the late Shah of Iran by appointing Bakhtiar as 
Prime Minister, began the process that led to Bakhtiar becoming a household name in 
both Iran as well as in "corridors of power" in the West.
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sort of a standing with the Iranian people.
The bitterest irony is that while Bakhtiar was able to demonstrate this potential during 
tlhis period, he was, for reasons to be explained in later chapters, still unable to reap 
the full rewards of his potential.
Promoting NAMIR As a Credible Organization
1. Forming the Required Structures
As mentioned previously, by late 1981, it had become fully clear to Bakhtiar that he was 
in for a much longer and a more protracted struggle that he had originally thought. 
Under these circumstances, he was aware that his own personality alone, was not 
sufficient to ensure cohesion amongst his supporters and success on the political field. 
Thus, what transpires during this period, is Bakhtiar's own personal commitment in 
seeing the promotion of NAMIR and its ability to project itself as a viable political 
organization.
CHART 1: OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION
BAKHTIAR
LONDON LIAISON OFFICE421
NAMIR COUNCIL422 MILITARY WING423 ADVISERS COUNCIL424
421Headed by Mehrdad Khonsari, and in charge of Foreign Policy Coordination.
422This was a body of some 26 members, all appointed by Bakhtiar. While, all 
decisions and policies related to NAMIR was technically supposed to go through this 
body, in actual fact, the Council essentially 'codified' Bakhtiar's various 
pronouncements into policy for the organization.
4ZThis organization, and its personnel were totally compartmented such that it 
had no contact with either the NAMIR Council or the Council of Advisers. Only Bakhtiar, 
and for a time, Boroomand were aware of its personnel and activities. However, there 
was collaboration between it and the London Liaison Office.
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As indicated above in Chart 1, by the start of this period, Bakhtiar had been able to give 
some form of an "overall" structure to his organization, given the very important fact that 
there were many amongst his followers who had refused to officially register with 
NAMIR. This matter was dealt with through dealing with these figures either directly or 
by having some intermediary in NAMIR or the Council of Advisers deal with them.
(a) The Council of Advisers
The role of Bakhtiar's "Council of Advisers" acquired great importance with time, as 
most of its members were based in Paris, and as such, were able to meet on a regular 
weekly basis with him in person425. A very important mission that was delegated by 
Bakhtiar to his "Council of Advisers", was the creation of "Special Field Committees" 
that were to draw policy plans which were to be implemented once power had been 
seized. While, these committees were formed at the behest of Council members, the 
main criteria for membership was competence in one's respective field (eg. Agriculture, 
Industry or Foreign Affairs, etc.,), and not loyalty to NAMIR or Bakhtiar. However, it was 
evident that the results of any such finding could only be utilized by some organization 
with the potential capability of making use of their research. In all some seven
and for a time, Boroomand were aware of its personnel and activities. However, there 
was collaboration between it and the London Liaison Office.
424This body, which convened every week, consisted mainly of personalities who 
had held office in Bakhtiar's government in Iran. Later, it was extended to include some 
others who were resident in Paris. Also, nearly all members of this body held a seat on 
NAMIR's Council as well. This meant, that in actual fact, Bakhtiar, himself, gave much 
greater credence to this "Kitchen Cabinet", than he did to the NAMIR Council which, at 
the best of times, never met more than a number of occasions during the course of an 
entire year.
425 Those participating in what was to become known as the "Wednesday Meeting", 
were all members of the NAMIR Council, and most had served in Bakhtiar's Cabinet in 
Iran.
committees (Banking, Petroleum, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Education, Social 
Affairs and agriculture), headed by prominent technocrats were formed, who were able 
to quickly come up with a series of reports that were then presented to Bakhtiar. The 
most immediate benefit of these reports was that they helped to keep Bakhtiar fully 
briefed of the latest state of affairs in different areas, which were all of crucial 
importance to the future of the country. Hence, he was able to direct his criticisms of 
the Islamic regime, with knowledge and authority, and as such, he was able to project 
himself as a national leader who had "a handle on all the relevant issues concerning 
the future prospects of the Iranian nation". Unfortunately, these committees did not last 
very long, and following the successful conclusion of their initial reporting during 1984- 
1985, they began to fade into inactivity and eventual dissolution.
For nearly all of Bakhtiar's period of activity in exile, the Advisers Council consisted of: 
Senator Kazem Jafroudi, Ahmad Mirfendereski, Morteza Ghadimi, Manouchehr 
Razmara, and Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar, Sadegh Sadrieh, Mohammad Moshiri, and Abdol 
Rahman Boroomand.
fbl The NAMIR Council
More than one half of NAMIR's Council members, not including those who also served 
in the "Council of Advisers" was composed of figures who were active solely within the 
confines of NAMIR, and even within NAMIR's Executive Committee, only its 
Chairman426, was both a member of the NAMIR Council and Bakhtiar's Council of 
Advisers427.
426First, Dr. Abdol Rahman Boroomand, and later another Bakhtiar crony, M. 
Moshiri.
427lt is important to note that Bakhtiar as leader of NAMIR, was himself, not the 
Chairman of NAMIR's Executive Committee.
For much of Bakhtiar's thriving period in the early to mid 1980s , the composition of the 
NAMIR Council consisted of the following individuals, listed in the groupings to which 
they had generally aligned themselves with (See Appendix 2 for more details regarding 
each of the personalities): (1) The "Boroomand Bloc" (i.e., people who voted with 
Boroomand, who were mainly of National Front/ Student Confederation origins): A.R. 
Boroomand, Ali Shakery, Mostafa (Hamid) Zolnour, Chahrokh Vaziri, Mehdi Kharazi, 
Mahmoud Hejazi, Hamid Sadr, Hassan Naghibi, Homayoun Mehmanesh, Sadegh 
Sadrieh, and Iradj Pezeshkzad. (2) The Monarchist/Traditionalist Bloc: Senator 
Kazem Jafroudi, Ahmad Mirfendereski, Morteza Ghadimi, Manouchehr Razmara, and 
Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar. (3) The "Independent" Bloc: Amir Hossein Amir Parviz, 
Mohammad Moshiri, Rahim Sharifi, Hossein Malek, and Ezat Raastgaar, Mahsheed 
Amirshahi. (4) The Tribal Bloc (most of these members voted with the Boroomand 
Bloc): Fariborz Karimi, Abdollah Ghobadian, Shahbaz Zargham Pour, and Fereidoon 
Boyer Ahmadi (the man responsible for Bakhtiar's murder, who was admitted to the 
Council as a "substitute member" in the late 1980s).
Every member of NAMIR's Executive Committee was charged with
performing a particular function -eg. there was one person in the committee who was 
in charge of one of the areas listed below:
a) Organization
b) Finance
c) Propaganda
d) Political Education
e) Operations
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CHART 2: OVERALL STRUCTURE OF NAMIR
NAMIR
NAMIR COUNCIL (26428)
NAMIR COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (5)
NAMIR COUNTRY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (5)
NAMIR COUNTRY MEMBERSHIP (UNLIMITED)
As illustrated in Chart 2, these duties, were in turn, duplicated down the line by the 
Executive Committee members of NAMIR's branches in other countries429, as well as 
those NAMIR cells that were formed inside the country. Furthermore, their exact terms 
of responsibilities were again more clearly elaborated in the NAMIR Constitution that 
was finally ratified and distributed by mid-1983.
(c) NAMIR-MW
Finally, there was the all important matter of dealing with military personnel, who, given 
their previous background and mental disposition, were totally suspicious of all 
intellectuals and technocrats, who formed the bulk of NAMIR's emerging elite430. As
428The number in the bracket refers to the number corresponding with the full 
membership of that committee.
429Who in turn, formed the relevant committees by including interested personnel 
from the membership.
430lt is a fact that most military officers blamed the intellectuals more for the 
revolution (which in their view was synonymous with the advent of Khomeini) than the 
clergy, and as such, had the tendency to see them more as the real enemy. Thus,
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Chart 1 further demonstrates, from the very day of appointing Brigadier General Amir 
Hossein Shahrdar, a highly qualified, experienced and able, officer of the Imperial 
Iranian Ground Forces to command his military office, Bakhtiar ensured that the general 
and his staff dealt with him, and only with him, well compartmented from the ranks of 
other NAMIR activists. Apart from Dr. A.R. Boroomand, prior to feuding with General 
Shahrdar, only the Head of the London Liaison Office (as explained later), for reasons 
of coordinating various plans, was allowed by Bakhtiar to be in close and constant 
contact with the Commander of NAMIR-MW.
2. NAMIR's Political Strategy (1983-1986)
Once the prospect of a quick military take over was no longer on the agenda, it was 
essential for NAMIR to adopt policies and stands, compatible with the wishes and 
aspirations of the majority of the Iranian people.
Perhaps, the most important single issue which contributed on a massive scale to 
underline the unpopularity of the Islamic regime by the mid-1980's was the continuing 
Iran-lraq War, whose futility, following the expulsion of invading Iraqi troops from 
Iranian territory, was becoming increasingly more apparent which each passing day. 
In fact, the general population never fully understood why the promise of "billions of 
dollars" in compensation had failed to sway the regime of the Ayatollah to cease 
hostilities? However, apart from what was left of the initial die hard supporters of the
getting them to cooperate with people, particularly those who had an elaborate record 
of anti-Shah activities, was essentially a non-starter, which Bakhtiar understood very 
well and never encouraged from the outset.
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Ayatollah431, hardly any Iranian was taken in with such promises as "liberating Qods via 
Kerbala"432. Thus, apart from his own personal convictions, and the constant clamoring 
of the Iraqi regime for wanting to end the war in the mid-1980's, Bakhtiar and NAMIR, 
correctly gauged the sentiment of the Iranian people to be one that was completely 
opposed to the policies zealously pursued by the Islamic regime in this crucial area.
Thus, a strategy to make "opposition to the war"433, the center piece of NAMIR's policy 
against the regime was very quickly adopted and various propaganda schemes were 
developed by the elaborate propaganda machine that had been created by NAMIR, as 
shown in Chart 3, to promote its objectives. There is no question that once again, 
Bakhtiar was the first amongst all Iranian opposition figures to declare his opposition 
to the war. He was also the first in initiating a very effective publicity campaign aimed
431 In an interview with a serving member of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the author was told that according to sources from within the Ministry, most of the 
personnel killed or injured during the first two years of the war, were staunch Islamic 
supporters of the Ayatollah, who had been the first to volunteer their services. The 
Foreign Ministry official was of the view that "Iranian people should one day construct 
a statue of Saddam Hussein in gold, for his services in having rendered the country rid 
of these unsavory characters".
432This was the famous slogan used by the Islamic regime meaning that the road to 
the liberation of Palestine (Qods) went through the holy city of Kerbala in Iraq. This 
meant that in order to liberate Palestine from the Zionists, it was essential to first 
liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein.
^Bakhtiar was committed to bringing the war to a quick termination, for he felt 
that it was serving no purpose, other than allowing the mullahs to become more firmly 
entrenched in power at home. By "opposition to the war", he meant a cessation of all 
hostilities and withdrawal of all forces to the previously established borders, on the 
basis of the 1975 Algiers Treaty, which would then be followed by a new and honorable 
peace treaty with Iraq. He did not mean capitulation, nor did he mean acceding to any 
of the demands which had been made by Saddam Hussein (e.g., re-drawing of Iran's 
borders with Iraq, and independence for the Arabs of Khuzistan, etc.). It is important to 
point out that his position was clearly understood by a majority of Iranians, and while 
there were great resentments in many quarters regarding the fact that Bakhtiar was 
receiving Iraqi funds and operating a radio station from Baghdad, there was never any 
doubt regarding what he actually meant by repeating his assertion of being opposed 
to the war, and making this a major theme of his opposition campaign against the 
Islamic Republic.
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at promoting his view. Obviously, the adoption of such a policy had the great advantage 
of being also supported by nearly all the major Western powers, as well as the Soviet 
Union, who were, first and foremost, interested in curtailing the expansion of any more 
"Khomeini-inspired" fundamentalist governments in the Middle East. Apart from the 
uniform concern in wanting to prevent the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in 
Iraq434, the West, in particular, was interested in ensuring that the war remained 
confined to those areas on land, so that neither international shipping in the Persian 
Gulf, nor the flow oil could be affected in the least way.
CHART 3: THE BAKHTIAR PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION
BAKHTIAR
HEAD OF PROPAGANDA
II II
NAMIR PUBLICATIONS RADIO
1. NEHZAT 1.CAIRO STATION
2. QYAME IRAN435 2 .BAGHDAD STATION
3. VOICE OF IRAN [English) 3.LOCAL FM stations436
4. LETTRE PERSANE [French)
5. "MAHNAMEHE ARTESH"437
6. NEWSLETTERS/PUBLICATIONS PRINTED LOCALLY438
^Through massive supply of highly sophisticated arms, including the agreement 
by France to transfer a number of "Super Etendard" fighter aircraft, equipped with 
Excocet Missiles to Iraq - something which Bakhtiar never opposed! (NEHZAT. 3 
November 1983).
435During the height of Bakhtiar's activities (1986), a special edition of Qvame 
Iran was printed for distribution inside Iran.
436ln a number of cities, NAMIR members were able to set up their own local 
NAMIR radio stations, as well as a "Local Telephone News Service".
^This was a special publication printed by NAMIR Military Wing, for distribution 
amongst military personnel inside Iran. Like the special edition of Qvame Iran, this 
publication came into being at a very critical stage during Bakhtiar's campaign.
438These publications varied according to conditions in various locations. For 
example, in Los Angeles, where there was a large Iranian population, PAYAME
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Bakhtiar was convinced that the perpetuation of the war, served only to promote the 
interests of the ruling clique in Iran, who had used the war as a means of consolidating 
their strangle hold over the Iranian people, and thus, the sooner the war was ended, 
the sooner the country could get rid of its corrupt and inept rulers439. However, it was 
not until 5 August 1983, and then only quite accidentally, that both him and NAMIR 
were to stumble on this reality in quite a dramatic fashion. During the course of a 
regular broadcast a few days before the 77th Anniversary of the Iranian Constitution 
of 1906 (ie. 5 August), "Radio Iran", the Voice of the National Movement of the Iranian 
Resistance, in a broadcast to the Iranian nation asked all people opposed to the 
regime, and to its "policy of warmongering" to gather peacefully in the streets in a 
display of solidarity with NAMIR. Though, the request was vaguely phrased in order to 
ensure no loss of face in case of no response, the appeal was tremendously well 
received and supported in Teheran, and the resultant presence of large crowds of 
people, took the regime by complete surprise, and exposed many of its 
vulnerabilities440. In a "knee jerk reaction" aimed at asserting its authority and flexing 
their muscles, the regime responded by an immediate and indiscriminate campaign of 
arbitrary arrests. However, given the lack of support for charges that it could reasonably
EMROOZ was printed and distributed on a daily basis. Given the local situation in Los 
Angeles, and the possibility of revenue through advertising, the Bakhtiar 
Organization's direct assistance to this newspaper, which was being produced more 
widely than either NEHZAT or Qvame Iran, was fairly limited. In countries like Germany, 
Turkey, or India, numerous newsletters were produced and distributed in local 
languages. In short, during this period, the message of Bakhtiar and NAMIR was being 
echoed more broadly than that of any other Iranian opposition figure or organization, 
with the possible exception of the "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran".
439This is the view expressed by Bakhtiar on numerous occasions to the writer.
^Such as their inability ( ie. what to do ) to cope with large and potentially 
hostile mass gatherings, something that the regime had had no previous experience 
of encountering.
171
levy against the various arrested individuals, the Islamic authorities had no final choice 
but to ultimately release the overwhelming majority of those it had detained.
Nonetheless, the impact of this peaceful demonstration was quickly taken note of in the 
Iranian exile communities around the world, and while Bakhtiar's reputation was further 
enhanced by taking the credit for this initiative, other opposition leaders were not, just 
the same, deflected in claiming a piece of the glory for themselves441.
Promoting "Negative Resistance”_______________________________________
A net result of this experience, was the adoption and the promotion, by Bakhtiar, of the 
"Concept of Negative Resistance" to complement his anti-war campaign. While, the 
promotion of the "Concept of Negative Resistance" was put in force as early as 
February 1984, it was not until a whole year later that they were fully articulated and 
made known to the public in Iran. Supported by a strong team of younger, and more 
active elements within NAMIR442, who had formed an "Action Group" in Paris to monitor 
its progress, this campaign that was launched in early 1985 was to lead to a series of 
events that would mark Bakhtiar's highest point of credibility and achievement as an 
opposition leader.
The Campaign of "Negative Resistance" was fully launched by Bakhtiar in a radio
^eg . Nazih, Madani, and in particular, many supporters of the Young Shah, who 
claimed that it was due to his call, in the first instance, that the whole demonstration 
had been sparked off.
442This group was, nevertheless, composed of sufficiently senior, ex-anti Shah 
activists, such as Mahmoud Hejazi, Hamid Sadr, and Mehdi Kharrazi, who were all full 
members of the NAMIR Council.
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message in February 1985443. In his message Bakhtiar asked that the Iranian people 
should adhere to the following instructions:
1. Not to deposit any money with regular banking institutions that were run by 
the government.
2. Not to purchase unnecessary items that were the sole monopoly of 
government shops.
3. To minimize their purchases of petrol and other oil products.
4. To prepare a comprehensive list of all government officials who were 
indulging in acts of corruption.
5. To identify and introduce all persons and organizations, charged with 
protecting the regime.
Given the brutal nature of the Islamic regime, this concept was specially designed to 
activate the general population in ways that would not make its opposition either 
obvious or subject to immediate retribution by the regime444.
In March 1985, in the course of his New Year's radio message to the Iranian people, 
Bakhtiar further intensified his two pronged policy of "Negative Resistance" and 
"Opposition to the War", and was greatly assisted by a most welcome anti-war
^Qvame Iran. No. 108, 15 February 1985.
444For example, in an interview with the French Journal De Dimanche on 12 
February 1984, Bakhtiar claimed that he had, in the course of radio appeal, asked the 
people of Iran to remain within the confines of their homes from the previous Friday 
morning up to 6 pm of the day after (ie. Saturday) - this meant no shopping etc. He 
claimed that according to the reports which he had received, his appeal had been "80% 
successful in 12 major cities throughout Iran". However, Bakhtiar was unable to receive 
any independent confirmation in the international press regarding his claims.
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"Fatwa"445 that was issued, in that same month, by Grand Ayatollah Hassan Tabatabai 
Qomi446 in Mashhad447.
Demonstrating Internal Support And General Credibility
Having also intensified his attacks on the Islamic regime, by rejecting any "Western 
Inspired Notion" that "moderate factions within the ruling establishment should be 
encouraged to obtain the upper hand in the battle to succeed Khomeini"448, by May 
1985, Bakhtiar was ready to embark on the most important gamble of his political 
career. In a radio message to the Iranian people on Wednesday 15 May 1985, he 
urged the Iranian people to fill the street of all major cities throughout Iran, in protest 
against the Iran-lraq War. This important gamble paid off, and at a period when his 
credibility in Western circles was beginning to wane as a consequence of 'passing time
445A religious Edict.
^Grand Ayatollah Hassan Tabatabaii Qomi, born approximately in 1910, has 
been a major figure in Iranian religious life since the early 1960s. A "source of 
Imitation", he became the leading Ayatollah in Mashhad following the death of Grand 
Ayatollah Milani, and was an ardent opponent of the late Shah, whom he had criticized 
since the early 1960s, following his decision to pursue his so-called "White Revolution". 
Having been a vocal critic of the Shah during the (mainly Khomeini inspired) riots of 
1963, Ayatollah Qomi was the only other senior cleric to be arrested with Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Like Khomeini, he was exiled (internal exile in the town of Karaaj, on the 
outskirts of Teheran) from 1963 to 1978. Following the revolution, and his triumphant 
return to Mashhad, he was the first "Source of Imitation" to publicly and openly 
challenge Khomeini's interpretation of "Velayate Faghih", and his brand of Islamic 
government (Bamdaad. 10/03/80). By the early 1980s, he was first placed under great 
pressure, with his telephone lines being cut, and later he was placed under house 
arrest. Nonetheless, his prestige is such that the regime is unable to move against him 
directly, and as a result he has been able to communicate with the outside world 
through written messages smuggled from his house and distributed in Europe by his 
son, Hojat-ol-Eslam Mahmoud Qomi. He is still a powerful figure, as well as the last 
remaining senior Ayatollah of the Khomeini era (this information and further references 
to Ayatollah Qomi have been compiled through numerous interviews with his son, 
Mahmoud, the last of which was on 28 April 1995).
^Qvame Iran. No. 111, 29 March 1985.
448Qyame Iran. No. 106, 18 January 1985.
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and a lack of any tangible results', Bakhtiar was able to demonstrate to all Iranians and 
foreigners alike, that his credibility far from having waned, was at its peak, and that he 
and NAMIR, were without question, the most credible opposition to the Islamic 
dictatorship in Iran449.
The 17 May 1985 demonstrations in Teheran and other major cities throughout Iran, 
as reported by the international press450, clearly marked the highest point of Bakhtiar's 
entire campaign in opposition. The support he obtained through his appeal came at a 
most crucial time, enabling him to piece together a most sophisticated plan of action 
that would constitute his last major effort at toppling the Islamic regime.
Attempt At Creating A Political Consensus
In the previous chapter, some aspects of conflict, competition, as well as cooperation 
between Bakhtiar and other opposition figures has been discussed. However, one of 
the greatest factors which prompted Bakhtiar to address this issue more seriously, was
^One of the Iranian government's first reactions to the 17 May demonstrations 
called by Bakhtiar was the expulsion from Iran of Mr. Trevor Wood, the Reuter 
Correspondent on grounds of "biased reporting" (Financial Times, 24 May 1985). In 
a separate message broadcast by the Islamic Republic in English at 1717 gmt on 17 
May, the Iranian government's reaction were recorded as follows: "While more than a 
million people took part in Friday mass prayers in Teheran, a few hundred supporters 
of the defunct Shah resorted to childish displays in the capital today to show their liking 
of corrupt and unrestrained monarchical ways. The silly display was completely 
coordinated with the imperialist news agencies. One of them, the bankrupt US news 
agency, UPI, reported demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of people in Teheran 
and other cities!" (Source: BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, The Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America, ME/7955/A/5, 20 May 1985).
450The demonstrations were covered by the following international newspapers: 
The Financial Times of 18 May 1985 (an article by Kathleen Evans); The International 
Herald Tribune of 18-19 May 1985; and Le Monde of 19-20 May 1985. In addition, two 
letters on this subject, written by the writer, appeared in The Daily Telegraph of 24 May 
1985 and The Financial Times of 6 June 1985.
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the increasing level of contacts that he was beginning to have with influential 
international politicians, who were beginning to sense that the Islamic Revolution was 
fast starting to lose its original luster and popularity within Iran.
Therefore, in circumstances where international attention was being forcefully drawn 
on potentially viable alternatives to the clerical dictatorship, Bakhtiar and NAMIR, both 
stood to attract a great deal of attention. So, as Bakhtiar became more exposed to a 
greater number of important politicians from the outside world, one of the most 
important alterations which he made to his agenda, was the drive 'to be seen to be 
wanting' to forge some form of a national consensus with other "democratic" Iranian 
political activists and organizations, with whom he had no philosophical differences. 
There was little doubt that, as a consequence of this initiative, his image would be 
greatly enhanced, and he would be seen in the magnanimous role of an elder 
statesman, greatly concerned with the promotion of "unity" amongst his compatriots, as 
opposed to someone who refused to accept anyone or anything other than himself or 
NAMIR.
This was particularly so from 1982 onwards451. While, in the past, Bakhtiar had a 
tendency to brush others aside, it was seen thatthis attitude was having a negative 
effect on parties - both Iranian and foreign - whom he was trying to attract for sympathy 
and assistance. So, devising a comprehensive, and at the same time genuine, strategy
451 In April 1982, while discussing the situation with a delegation of British 
Conservative Parliamentarians from the "BOW Group", whom he had invited to Paris, 
a question frequently posed to him, concerned his role and attitude with respect to 
others who were in opposition to Khomeini. This encounter, along with the discussions 
that were held, served to underline to Bakhtiar, in a most vivid fashion, the need to give 
greater consideration to the
overall presentation of his image. The same point was also made on a number of 
occasions by American officials to Bakhtiar's representative in the Washington 
discussions.
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to combat this problem became a high priority. This was particularly important, since 
Bakhtiar's main competitor452, former Prime Minister Ali Amini, had entered the active 
opposition on a platform entitled "Ashtiye Melli" meaning national reconciliation.
The strategy which subsequently emerged, was one in which Bakhtiar would speak 
positively of all democratic elements, while close advisers would maintain contact with 
principal figures in other camps, in order to enhance 'the feelings of good will', as well 
as the genuineness of the sentiments that were being expressed453. At the same time, 
these contacts awarded an opportunity for exploration and exploitation of potential 
areas of cooperation with various camps. An outstanding example of what was 
achieved was the "Agreement of Principles" that was signed between Bakhtiar and Dr. 
Ali Amini, on 19 July 1983454. In this symbolically important statement, that was signed 
following long hours of hard work and negotiations between the Bakhtiar and Amini 
teams of advisers, the two leaders agreed on the following items:
"1. The acceptance and endorsement of the Constitution of Iran (1906), and the 
unquestionable rejection of what had been imposed on the Iranian nation as the 
"Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran" through terrorism, intimidation and 
repression of the Iranian nation.
2. The confirmation of the regime of constitutional monarchy with unchallenged 
stress on the sovereignty of people and the faithful implementation of the will of 
the general public.
452ln the sense that he was appealing to members of the same constituency.
^ I t  was clear to NAMIR, that no benefit could be derived from this strategy if the 
feelings being expressed were judged to be merely tactical. While, the desire was to 
try and enhance the standing of Bakhtiar, it was felt that this could be better achieved 
through contact and persuasion, rather than conflict and competition.
454Reported in Le Monde of 24-25 July, 1983.
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3. Emphasis on the need for the separation of religion from government, with due 
respect for all religions.
4. Affirmation of respect for the national traits of the people of Iran in so far as 
it did not harm the national integrity and freedom of the country.
5. The acceptance and regard for the rights and freedoms specified in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights."455
This agreement was further capped, when Amini, Bakhtiar, and General Bahram 
Aryana, shared a common platform in Paris to mark the 77th Anniversary of the Iranian 
Constitution456, and spoke of their "common quest and efforts for the liberation of Iran", 
to the dislike of some dogmatic figures, particularly within the ranks of NAMIR - such 
as Moloud Khanlary, who did not want Bakhtiar to be openly involved with the "likes of 
Amini etc.".
On a similar note, when in an article published by The Listener on 2 November 1984, 
Baqer Moin, the current head of the BBC Persian Service, alleged that "within the 
monarchist camp, there were major differences of views between Bakhtiar and Amini, 
who were once striving to forge a united front457", once again, as a consequence of 
coordination, a letter, signed by both Amini and Bakhtiar, was sent for publication to 
The Listener, rejecting Moin’s allegation, while, at the same time, stressing the level of 
cooperation that already existed between the two former prime ministers and the son
455Voice of Iran. No. 9, August/September, 1983.
456ln August 1983.
457This is not a verbatim account of what Moin said.
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of the late Shah458. The subsequent publication of the Farsi translation of this text459, 
was a source of tremendous gratification within the ranks of both NAMIR and FLI460, 
and served to boost morale in the Iranian exile community461.
However, it is essential to point out that not all of the high level consultations that were 
being made, were leading to statements of agreement. Perhaps, one of the most 
damaging statements made by NAMIR, was following the breakdown of negotiations 
between Bakhtiar advisers and those of Reza Pahlavi, over the creation of the so-called 
"Constitutional Councils"462 in various exile communities. This announcement by 
NAMIR which was printed in NEHZAT463. became a source of great resentment 
amongst hard line monarchist elements, and only served to further intensify their 
existing hostilities towards Bakhtiar.
But Bakhtiar remained undeterred, and was seen pursuing this important strategy in a
458This text was drafted by the writer, who at the time was a close Bakhtiar 
Adviser. Following consultations with the Iradj Amini, the son of Dr. Ali Amini who 
discussed the matter with his father, the draft text was accepted and signed.
459NEHZAI, No. 95, 28 February 1985.
460Dr. Amini's "Front for the Liberation of Iran".
461 In interview with Bagher Moin (London, 3 May 1995), he acknowledged that 
this was perhaps the only occasion when the two leaders had demonstrated unity of 
purpose by co-signing a particular statement.
462This was a project that was conceived by some of the Young Shah's close 
advisers, who wanted to set up "elected Councils" in different cities, to promote the 
cause of constitutional monarchy. At the beginning Bakhtiar agreed to co-sponsor this 
project with Amini. But when signs appeared that elements hostile to Bakhtiar were 
trying to manipulate the Councils to further their own positions, Bakhtiar pulled out, and 
later denounced the Councils, as puppets organizations in the hand of corrupt and 
disreputable elements of the previous regime. His denouncement of this project, in a 
BBC Farsi interview in July 1985, sealed the fate of the Councils, and within the next
12 months, Reza Pahlavi had also disassociated himself from them.
463No. 97, 14 March 1985.
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more comprehensive way that also included important opinion makers, from outside the 
ranks of the constitutional monarchists as well. Prominent amongst Bakhtiar's targets 
for the promotion of the consensus that he was seeking, were some of his previous 
friends and associates within the ranks of the "National Front"464, as well as many within 
the ranks of the "moderate clergy" within Iran465. The only group Bakhtiar always 
condemned and refused to have any connections with, were the Mojahedin and their 
supporters in the so-called Council of National Resistance, which included certain 
former National Front figures such as Hedayat Matin Daftari, the grand-son of 
Mossadegh, whom Bakhtiar had known for many years in Iran466.
In conclusion, as Bakhtiar became more involved in a comprehensive campaign to 
project himself as the only natural alternative to the religious dictatorship in Iran, and 
as many important politicians and heads of states in Western capitals and Middle 
Eastern countries began seeing him in this light during the course of this period, 
Bakhtiar was able to act positively, and with a' great deal of self confidence, in 
projecting himself as one well capable of promoting and attaining political consensus
^'Bakhtiar's Open Call for Support to former Colleagues in the National Front", 
NEHZAT. No. 33, 10 February 1983.
465This policy towards the "Moderate Clergy" was first announced by Bakhtiar 
during the course of a speech to a group of British Conservative Members of 
Parliament in London's Carlton Club in February 1984. This theme -ie. that there were 
great differences within the ranks of the clergy in Iran, the majority of whom, like 
Bakhtiar, were against the role depicted for them by Khomeini in Iran - was consistently 
emphasized from 1983-1987, while efforts were made to expand contacts and 
communication with leading clerics, supportive of this position inside Iran.
^Once Matin Daftari- revered by the Mojahedin because of his family ties with 
Mossadegh, had joined the Mojahedin, Bakhtiar used to jokingly say in private meetings 
that "Why does Matin Daftari keep constantly emphasizing that he is the grand-son of 
Mossadegh, and not the son of Senator Matin Daftari (a right wing crony of the late 
Shah)?". In answering this rhetorical question, he always added "that when you looked 
at the genealogy of a mule, you always found that only its mother was a horse!".
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within important constituencies467, which constituted an overwhelming majority in the 
Iranian political landscape.
Promoting An Active Foreign Policy_____________________________________
During the Initial Period (1979-1983), the absence of a sophisticated foreign policy 
strategy to complement Bakhtiar's various plans and activities was a crucial factor. 
Indeed, Bakhtiar is on record for having said in a number of interviews468, that during 
the planning stages of the "Nojeh Project", he never had any conversations regarding 
it with any "major power". Only, during the final stage, prior to the start of the Nojeh 
operation, is he on record for having said that he had made a request for assistance 
to "the Americans"469, which was, in any event, ignored470. However, it is a fact that for 
the greater part of the Initial Period, Bakhtiar was devoid of the team essential for 
making the necessary contacts in the field of foreign affairs, and he, himself, was 
devoid of the necessary background and experience to successfully fill this void471. 
While, there had been some minor contacts with U.S. officials in 1979472, in which the 
father of Bakhtiar's son-in-law, Retired Major General Habibolla Mokhateb Rafii, had
467ie. the monarchists and the clergy.
468lncluding, in private conversations with the writer.
469Always unclear as to whom he was referring.
470ln a 1983 interview with David Sells of BBC Television's Newsnight 
programme, he is on record for having said that "I only asked the Americans for some 
transport facilities to deliver arms to my people".
471The man nominally in charge of Bakhtiar's foreign policy team, Ahmad 
Mirfendereski, did not arrive in Paris until more than 4 months after the failure of the 
"Nojeh Project".
472Daneshjoyan Mosalman Payro Khate Emam, Asnade Laneh Jasousi, Vols. 55, 
Office of Islamic Publications, Qom, 1985.
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acted as an intermediary473, none of these had fulfilled any purpose for Bakhtiar, and 
by early 1983, all of these low level contacts had come to a complete stop474.
Efforts to embark on any kind of a serious foreign policy program475 was also impaired 
due to two other important factors: First and foremost, most foreign governments, still 
in a state of shock given the ease with which the late Shah's regime, with Bakhtiar as 
its last serving Prime Minister, had been overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini, were 
genuinely interested in wanting to establish good relations with the new Islamic 
Republic. This meant that they were not (at least at the time) interested in 'courting any 
opposition to it'476. Secondly, Bakhtiar himself, having received the initial seed money
473Major General H. Mokhateb Rafii, a retired officer of the Imperial Iranian 
Ground Forces, upon retiring from the armed forces had been invited by the then 
Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, to come and work in the Iranian Foreign Ministry. In 
1973, upon Zahedi's appointment as Ambassador to Washington, he joined the 
Imperial Iranian Embassy in Washington, and while in that position, he was able to 
come into contact with people in the Pentagon and the intelligence community. Thus, 
he was in a position to assist Bakhtiar in the early stages, by arranging some 
introductory meetings for him. However, none of these meetings, apart from an 
introductory purpose, were of any significance, and, according to disclosures that were 
later made in meetings with U.S. officials, the General had been unable to help Bakhtiar 
make any form of a positive impression in the minds of those who had come to evaluate 
him. However, the CIA had been able to benefit from these meetings by establishing 
direct contact and updating their files.
474This was, on the one hand, due to the fact that the CIA, by 1982, was in the 
process of promoting Dr. Ali Amini's "Front for the Liberation of Iran" (FLI), in 
competition with NAMIR, and on the other hand, the Americans were still very hopeful 
of coming into some form of an accommodation with the Khomeini regime. Thus, when 
Bakhtiar came to Washington in January of 1984, no one in the CIA was prepared even 
to meet with him.
475Which meant, by inference, that you would have to be taken seriously by 
foreign governments as well.
476Here, it is important to mention that the British government -during the entire 
period of Bakhtiar's lobbying efforts, and most particularly the Foreign Office, were most 
cautious never to be seen talking with the Iranian opposition. In fact, the campaign that 
was suggested to Bakhtiar by the Liaison Office for the U.K., took note of this important 
constraint, and sought only to keep the British government informed of developments. 
However, no such restrictions existed for British members of parliament interested in 
the promotion of democracy in Iran, and it was thought best that by concentrating on
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required to finance his early activities477, was so involved in his own schemes, that he 
never actually allocated the time and effort required to seek international support, 
consultation or benediction for his various plans.
However, in the aftermath of the failures of the initial years, it had become obvious that 
it was essential for Bakhtiar to make a serious effort at obtaining international support. 
This, in effect, meant embarking on a serious lobbying effort in various important 
centers of power around the world, with a view to obtaining two key elements: moral 
support as well as financial (and other) assistance478.
Establishment of the 'Shapour Bakhtiar Liaison Office'_____________________
Beginning in January 1984, a special office, independent of NAMIR and headed by 
Mehrdad Khonsari479, was established in London for the purpose of promoting the 
foreign policy aims and objectives of the Bakhtiar organization. However, the ground 
work for the establishment of this office had effectively been in motion since Khonsari's 
first meeting with Bakhtiar in Paris in October of 1980.
From 1980-1984, reporting only to Bakhtiar himself, Khonsari had been in charge of 
promoting ties with three key foreign policy centers - Washington, London and Riyadh,
a handful of credible members of parliament, that they would be in a much better 
position to relate important issues of concern from NAMIR to the British Government, 
and provide some form of a response accordingly.
477From certain wealthy Iranians in the first instance, and from Saddam Hussein 
at a later stage.
478Apart from funds, NAMIR was in desperate need of good intelligence and 
technical assistance required for enhancing its communications with the various 
important centers of power inside Iran.
479A former Iranian diplomat and Bakhtiar confidante.
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all of which had their own priorities for closely monitoring developments in Iran.
Much earlier, in March 1982, Khonsari and Mirfendereski, had together visited the 
United States and met with senior key officials in the United States Department of State 
and the National Security Council. However, their reception was at best frosty, and 
although they were received courteously, it became quite clear to them that the newly 
established Reagan Administration was, contrary to conventional wisdom, looking for 
ways of "trying to understand the Islamic leadership", and somehow coming to terms
a t
with them. In a meeting at the State Department, Peter Constable who was^that time the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, told the Bakhtiar delegation that he considered the 
Islamic regime to be a "nationalist" one, and despite existing grievances with the United 
States, he felt that in global terms, and in particular vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the US 
and Iran were pursuing the same mutual interests in "parallel" to one another. At the 
National Security Council, Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, the Senior Director for Middle East480, 
while less naive in his appraisal of the Khomeini government, was nonetheless very 
skeptical of the true potentials of the Bakhtiar movement.
Following the first meeting with U.S. officials in March 1982, and up to the end of the 
Intermediate Period (January 1987), Khonsari held further high level talks in 
Washington on more than twenty separate occasions. By July 1985, these talks had 
been advanced to a stage that a meeting in the White House Situation Room was 
scheduled, in which very senior U.S. officials, including the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency481 and the Deputy National Security Adviser to the President of the
480Kemp, while previously a Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy, had been Khonsari's M.A.L.D. thesis supervisor.
^W illiam  Casey.
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United States482, and a number of other senior officials were present. Following that 
meeting, the ground work was set for Bakhtiar, himself, to travel to the United States 
and hold "final" talks with the National Security Adviser to the President. Following that 
visit by Bakhtiar to Washington in February 1986, a whole package of measures to 
assist Bakhtiar with his proposed plan of action was then formally approved by the 
United States Government483. The underlying reason at the time for a change in the 
attitude of certain senior White House officials, such as Admiral Poindexter was due 
to the fact that at the same time they had become increasingly frustrated with the 
Khomeini regime, they were simultaneously being presented with a viable plan of 
action, whose contents could be verified. Given that contacts with the Iranian military 
was an important component of the plan, no one in the administration seemed to have 
any problems, so long as the existence of the contacts and the viability of the plan 
could be independently established.
Identifying Foreign Policy Targets
And Making a Plausible Case For Support________________________________
The foreign policy agenda for Bakhtiar and NAMIR, entailed taking into account, and 
coming up with a plan of action with regards to those countries with a potential of 
having some kind of a major political input in the affairs of Iran. This meant pursuing a 
selective, rather than a comprehensive policy of attaining one's interest, given that 
available resources, both in terms of manpower and finance, were extremely limited.
^Admiral John Poindexter, who in late 1985 succeeded Robert McFarlane as 
National Security Adviser to the President, prior to resigning as a consequence of the 
"Irangate Scandal" in November 1986.
483lt is important to state, that USG approved Bakhtiar's plan, subject to a 
successful evaluation of its suggestions. But, where this differed from other USG 
programs, lay in the fact that this course of action was not suggested by the CIA, as an 
"information gathering operation", but by the White House as a policy measure.
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Therefore, starting in 1982, it was decided to come up with a list of "priority countries", 
with whom Bakhtiar should try and promote his objectives. From 1979-1982, apart from 
France, Iraq and Egypt, no serious contact existed between Bakhtiar and any other 
foreign government. However, as a consequence of his relationship with these three 
important countries, Bakhtiar had been able to achieve the following:
1. FRANCE: In France, he had been able to obtain political asylum, and "round 
the clock" police protection484. Furthermore, the French government had placed no 
restrictions on his contacts with the media, and had unofficially offered his organization 
a tax free status. Additionally, the French authorities were very helpful in granting 
asylum to Bakhtiar supporters and were amenable to granting visas for Bakhtiar 
contacts to visit France on short notice485. However, France never had a history of 
being a "political heavy weight" in Iran, and its interests were mostly in the economic 
field. Thus, apart from financial assistance which Bakhtiar, in any event, never 
requested, the French were as forthcoming as could be expected. In addition, Bakhtiar, 
being a "Francophone", as well as someone who was fully knowledgeable of French 
traits and customs486, he was regarded with special sympathy by many French 
dignitaries during his period of exile in France.
2. IRAQ: With Iraq, as early as May 1980, Bakhtiar had been able to secure the
484the French "CRS" were in charge of his security following the unsuccessful 
attempt that was made on his life in July 1980.
^ h e y  were helpful in turning a blind eye to questionable documentation, such 
as forged passports etc, offered by his associates. Indeed, for most of the 1980's many 
Iranian activists (particularly , active military officers) left Iran secretly for Turkey, from 
where they travelled with forged documentation to Paris in order to meet with Bakhtiar. 
After the meeting, they left France, went back to Turkey, before quietly slipping back 
into Iran. The French were most cooperative, and from time to time, they were supplied 
with "tid-bits" of intelligence that was acquired following these meetings to keep them 
happy and interested.
486Bakhtiar had been educated in Beirut and Paris, and his first wife, who was
the mother of his four children was also French.
186
operation of his first clandestine radio station. Furthermore, as a consequence of his 
visit to Iraq, prior to the start of the Iran-lraq War in September 1980, he had been able 
to secure an adequate level of funds to finance his organization and many of its 
important projects (eg. Nojeh)487. After the start of the War, difficulties arose vis-a-vis 
the amount of exposure that could justifiably been given to any continuing relationship 
with Iraq. Nonetheless, despite a number of statements from Bakhtiar and NAMIR, 
concerning the war'*88, which the Iraqis did not like, the relationship (including the radio 
station) succeeded to endure, and more importantly, further periodic funding of NAMIR 
did not come to a halt489. However, there were certain strains in the relationship that 
needed close scrutiny from time to time. For example, in the mid-1980's, the news of 
Iraq's first use of chemical weapons against Iran was reported by all the major news 
agencies in the world, and was broadcast to Iran by a number of important radios such 
as the BBC and the VOA. However, the Iraqi authorities did not allow Bakhtiar's radio 
station in Baghdad to broadcast this news in its program. Unable to achieve any 
breakthroughs in Baghdad, this matter was then raised with the Iraqi Ambassador in 
Washington (Nizar Hamdoon, who is currently Iraq's Ambassador at the United 
Nations)490. He was told that the whole aim of having a radio station was to undermine
^T h e  money which Bakhtiar received from Iraq constituted the bulk of the capital 
that was to finance the majority of NAMIR's expenditure for most of the 1980's. 
Although, the actual sum received was known only to Bakhtiar and Boroomand, the 
speculation which has been made by many of Bakhtiar's close advisers, put Saddam 
Hussein's contribution to the Bakhtiar purse anywhere from US$30 million to US$70 
million.
^ In  particular, NAMIR’s insistence that the dispute must be settled on the basis 
of the 1975 Algiers Treaty, which Saddam Hussein had unilaterally abrogated prior to 
invading Iran.
489lt is was an acknowledged fact that apart from the initial bulk sum that was 
given to Bakhtiar by Iraq, a monthly budget of around US$200-250,000 was also being 
made available to him.
490By the writer during a private meeting.
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the Khomeini regime, and to win the trust and the support of the Iranian people. So, it 
was self defeating, if NAMIR's radio was the only station that was Dot reporting this 
highly significant incident. The Iraqi official, understood this point, and following his 
intervention with Baghdad, all the imposed restrictions were lifted. This was one of 
those rare occasions when the advantage of having a second radio station was 
particularly underlined, for during this entire period, NAMIR had the luxury of stating its 
case and protecting its credibility by reporting this news from its other radio station in 
Cairo.
3. EGYPT: In a visit to Egypt shortly after the death of the late of Shah of Iran 
(July 1980), Bakhtiar had been able to strike a close friendship with the Egyptian 
President, Anwar Sadat. Sadat had offered Bakhtiar a great deal of assistance, 
including the setting up of a second clandestine radio station. He had also offered to 
give military training to elements introduced by Bakhtiar, and to lobby his cause with 
other Arab rulers. However, it was not long after their meeting that Sadat was 
assassinated, and as a result, only the commitment regarding a second clandestine 
radio station for NAMIR, was actually kept by the new Egyptian administration491.
By 1982, apart from the countries cited above, it was decided to embark upon a serious
^Here, it is important to point out that while the Baghdad station was essentially 
cost free (ie. salaries of personnel, travel costs to and from Paris, and the cost of 
telephones etc., were all paid for by the Iraqi authorities), NAMIR was responsible for 
every item of expenditure in Egypt (which at times included paying money to the radio 
authorities in order for them not to reduce the sound output of their broadcasts). Any 
failure in Egypt, on the part of NAMIR, to deal with the wants of minor officials was such 
that it could adversely affect the whole broadcast of its programs. Thus, from time to 
time, based on reports concerning audibility that was received from Iran, a technical 
expert was sent to Cairo to discuss the situation with the relevant Egyptian authorities. 
Once, a remuneration of some kind was paid (eg. a 'Cartier' watch for the Head of the 
section), then the sound improved very quickly, and NAMIR broadcasts were heard 
throughout Iran, even as far as Khorassan and Baluchistan.
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lobbying campaign that would include the following countries as well:
1. The United States
2. The United Kingdom
3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
While, the above list of countries became NAMIR's "number one" targets for lobbying, 
it was also decided that some special effort was also needed to "keep in touch" with 
Israel492, Turkey493 and Pakistan494, three very important regional states with clear 
interests in any future political outcome in Iran
The only other major international actor with serious political interests in Iran, not taken 
into consideration on the grounds of not alienating all the others, was the Soviet 
Union495.
492This was essentially dealt with Bakhtiar, himself, in private meetings with 
Israeli officials in Paris.
493Amir Hossein Amir Parviz, was asked by Bakhtiar to fulfill this function in 
Turkey. In the course of his high level discussion with former Prime Minister (now 
President) Soleiman Demirel in 1984, the Turkish authorities turned down Bakhtiar's 
request for a radio station. They cited the importance of trade links with the Islamic 
Republic, and only committed themselves to assisting NAMIR supporters with 
appropriate visas to help their immigration status etc. (interview with A.H. Amir Parviz, 
5 October 1994). Turkey was also a very important staging ground for NAMIR-Military 
Wing (MW), and although their activities proceeded without any hinderance from the 
Turkish government, many of its personnel, including three senior officers, were 
assassinated in Istanbul.
494Here, only NAMIR's Military Wing maintained an active presence. But, 
movements through Pakistan from Iranian Baluchistan were made on a regular basis, 
and NAMIR-MW personnel were on very good terms with local officials, such as the 
Pakistani police etc. All of these were short of any actual "diplomatic" contact. But the 
government in Rawalpindi never tried to make life difficult for NAMIR in Pakistan.
^Bakhtiar felt that he could always initiate contacts with the Soviet Union at the 
"appropriate time", using his Foreign Minister, Ahmad Mirfendereski, a well known 
"Russophil", with more than 30 years of experience in dealing with the Soviets, having 
also served as Iranian Ambassador to Moscow for a period of more than six years in 
the late 1960's and the early 1970's. However, during a visit to Geneva, he had been
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Achieving A Notable Breakthrough
While the campaign to lobby support for Bakhtiar had gotten off the ground by early 
1982, it was not until the annual "haj" pilgrimage of 1983 that a first major breakthrough 
was achieved.
By the middle of 1983, following more than 18 months of consultation and time 
consuming background research work by the Liaison office in London, Bakhtiar had 
been able to travel to both Riyadh (April) and Washington (May), where he was able 
to meet and discuss his plans and policies with a number of very key and important 
people. His trip to Riyadh was a particular success, in that having arrived aboard King 
Fahd's private jet496, he was welcomed by the Saudi Crown Prince, Abdollah bin Abdol 
Aziz, with whom he was able to strike a very cordial relationship497. While, in Riyadh,
introduced to a Russian Journalist by Ali Mostofi, himself an Iranian journalist living in 
Switzerland. After that meeting, Mostofi had tried to arrange a trip for Bakhtiar to visit 
Moscow. However, as revealed by Bakhtiar himself to the writer, prior to accepting any 
invitation, Bakhtiar raised this
matter with one of his American contacts, and sought the views of Washington 
regarding any such trip. The response from Washington was lukewarm and cautious, 
but not negative. However, prior to any final decision, Mostofi died of a heart attack in 
Geneva, and the whole issue was defused.
496Which was sent by the Saudi government to Le Bourget airport in Paris to 
transport him and his team of advisers (a delegation of six members in total).
^Based on the writer's experience and a series of discussions that have been 
held with many knowledgeable people on Saudi affairs, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the Saudi ruling family was in many ways, not at all displeased to see the 
Pahlavi monarchy overthrown in Iran, because they were, by and large, very displeased 
with the way that the late Shah had treated them. This was a psychological factor, and 
had more to do with the way that the Shah had always looked down on them, than on 
what he had actually done against them. Indeed, it is a fact that in reflection, the late 
Shah not only, never, ever, did anything against them, but instead, he had done what 
ever he could to
strengthen their rule in their country. However, it is also a fact that he had always 
looked down on them, for which he has not be forgiven to this date, even though his 
successors have called for the down right overthrow of the Saudi monarchy. Based on 
this brief explanation, the Saudis were originally quite pleased to see the creation of 
an 'Islamic' government in Iran, and they were most anxious to lead good and friendly
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he also met with Prince Sultan, the Second Deputy Prime Minister, and in Jeddah, he 
was welcomed by Prince Majed, the governor of the Hejaz Province, who subsequently 
made all the arrangements for Bakhtiar and his party to perform the ritual of "UMRA", 
by visiting the holy Mosque in Mecca. During the course of this trip, Bakhtiar was 
treated like a head of state, and though there was no detailed mention of any 
forthcoming assistance498, he and his delegation were made to believe that Saudi 
Arabia was anxious to pursue their contacts with them.
Producing An Anti-Khomeini Farsi Newspaper During "Haj"
In July 1984, the representative in London of the Saudi Arabian daily, &i 
Madinah^quite coincidentally500 contacted the head of the Bakhtiar Liaison office, and
relations with the Khomeini regime until such time that it became obvious to them that 
Khomeini had other plans. The riots in Mecca in 1979, and the open call for Khomeini 
that the custody of the holy shrines in Mecca and Madinah should be handed to an 
international Islamic committee, as well as Iranian attempts to add an anti-American, 
political connotation, in support of their own revolutionary message, to the annual Haj 
pilgrimage, were matters which the Saudi leadership could not ignore. Also once, the 
Iranians had been able to eject the Iraqis from Iranian territory, and had taken the upper 
hand in the conduct of the war with Iraq, the Saudi ruling family felt threatened and 
insecure. Hence, they increased their levels of support to Saddam Hussein, and 
increased their channels of communications with potentially viable Iranian opposition 
groups. According to Ahmad Al-Sheibani, a scholarly Arab writer in the employ of the 
Saudi Crown Prince, apart from Reza Pahlavi who had visited the Kingdom in the early 
1980's, the Saudis had also established contact with Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Admiral 
Ahmad Madani, and representatives of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization. However, 
of all the groups mentioned, the respect which they came to have for Bakhtiar was 
perhaps the greatest of all.
^Apart from general exchanges of view, the content of the Saudi broadcasts in 
Farsi were discussed with the Crown Prince (who was, himself unaware that the Saudis 
were broadcasting in Farsi language at all). While, not specifically mentioned, this 
conveyed the message that Bakhtiar would greatly prefer to move his main radio station 
from Baghdad to Riyadh and to broadcast on medium wave, if allowed. The only other 
area in which the Saudis could give assistance, was the financial field, which Bakhtiar 
did not mention at all during the entire course of his first visit.
499Abdol Bari Atwan, who is now the Editor of the Palestinian daily Al Qods.
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asked if he was able to lead a team of journalist to produce a Farsi version of A! 
Madinah for the Iranian pilgrims501, who were scheduled to arrive for the annual Haj in 
August of that year502.
The opportunity to produce such a publication, was like a God sent opening, for it was 
capable of demonstrating to all Iran watchers in the outside world, not only the 
unpopularity of the regime, but also the true potential of the democratic alternative, as 
presented by Bakhtiar. It is important to point out that in all the previous years since the 
advent of Khomeini in Iran, one of the most favorite "lines" used to under play the 
importance of what was being said by the democratic opponents of the regime, was to 
suggest that "they were all too Westernized, and as such, their message was not a 
potent one with the Islamic masses". Thus, the opportunity to produce a newspaper, 
targeted for an Iranian audience from inside the country, provided an opportunity and 
posed a challenge that could dispel all such doubts.
Given this background, the proposition made by the Saudi daily was accepted503, and
^Coincidental in the sense that there was no envisioned plan on the part of the 
Saudi newspaper, Al Madinah to come out with an anti-Khomeini Farsi publication. 
What they wanted was nothing more than a Farsi publication to provide information to 
the visiting Iranian pilgrims. However, the fact that such an approach was made to the 
writer, provided NAMIR with a unique opportunity for addressing a genuine 'home 
audience', and gauging their sentiments towards the regime.
501Estimated that year to be in excess of 100,000 people.
“ It is essential to point out that this contact was not due to some pre-planned 
strategy which the Saudi government had, but simply because of an initiative on the 
part of the newspaper's editor to produce a publication in Farsi for the Iranian pilgrims.
503While Al Madinah wanted to sign a contract offering a lump sum salary for
services to be performed, the Head of the Liaison Office asked that the newspaper only 
provide room and board in a top class hotel in Jeddah for the duration of the trip (in line 
with the prestige of the delegation), and that the team would then seek no salary. This 
was so that the Iranians would get to stay in a respectable hotel, and not in some 
mediocre rest house, where as it turned out, the Pakistanis who were employed to
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a team of four journalists, one typist and one photographer, all supportive of the 
Bakhtiar cause, were quickly assembled and taken to Jeddah504, where the first issue 
of "AL Madinah in the Farsi Language", with a circulation of 50,0005°5, was published 
on 27 August 1984. The content of the publication, while respectful of Islam and the 
holy ritual for which everyone had come to Saudi Arabia, was clearly unsympathetic to 
Khomeini, and carried news and analysis on Iran which would not normally have 
appeared in the Iranian press506.
The reaction from the Islamic regime to the very first issue of this publication, was both 
swift and vehement. In a statement that was issued on behalf of the "Imam"507, 
Khomeini's representative to the Haj, Hojat-ol-Eslam Moussavi Khoiniha, stated that it 
was "Haraam"508 for Iranian Moslems to either purchase or read this newspaper. Also, 
in a speech that was given great prominence by in the major Iranian daily, Kavhan. he 
launched a scathing attack on the "Saudis and Monarchists responsible for its 
production". Furthermore, at an official level, the Iranian Charge in Jeddah, in a note 
to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, protested against the publication of this
come out with an Urdu version of Al Madinah were booked to stay. He then asked 
Bakhtiar, himself, to pay the salary of the team that he was taking to Jeddah.
^Cyrus Amuzegar, a reputable journalist and Bakhtiar's Minister of Information, 
was chosen as the newspaper's editor.
s°5The largest circulation of any Iranian daily printed outside Iran to this day.
506One of the most important news items concerned the peaceful anti-regime 
demonstrations of 5 August 1983 (77th Anniversary of the Iranian Constitution), 
inclusive of comments regarding Bakhtiar's speech on that day in Paris. In another 
page, an anti-regime poem, dated 11 February 1979 (the day when the Islamic 
government was installed), written by the famous contemporary Iranian poet, Nader 
Naderpour was also published.
^ ie . Ayatollah Khomeini.
^ ie . forbidden.
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newspaper in the strongest possible terms, and urged the Saudi government to put an 
end to any further productions of this newspaper509. Perhaps, one of the most important 
aspects of these reactions was that it made the Iranian pilgrims aware of the existence 
of such a publication, and once the second issue appeared, three days later, on 30 
August 1983, almost every single copy of the newspaper was sold. This amazing 
response from the ordinary Iranians, acting against the clear instructions that had been 
given to them, was sufficient to demonstrate clearly that "even religious Iranians were 
eager to hear what others had to say, and that they were not the widely depicted 
obedient robots510, whose control was in the hand of the ruling clique in Iran"511.
However, after having come out with six issues, the Saudi government put a stop to any 
further publications of the Farsi Al Madinah. But, in exchange they had been able to 
secure a very important concession from the Islamic Republic - namely, an agreement 
from them not to stage any demonstrations in the holy cities of Mecca and Madinah512. 
Just the same, the Saudi government also asked that the Iranian team of journalists to
^Private interview with the writer and a serving member of the Iranian Embassy 
in Jeddah, in the writer's hotel room in late August 1983.
510The International Herald Tribune, on 17 November 1983, published a letter 
sent by an Iranian pilgrim with the initials "R.K.", from Jeddah, in which direct reference 
was made to the publication of "AL Madinah in Farsi", and the fact that the 
Revolutionary Guards present in Saudi Arabia were preventing Iranian pilgrims from 
purchasing the newspaper.
511 It is important to note that some 10-15% of all the Iranian pilgrims were 
estimated to be members of the Revolutionary Guards, sent to maintain order and to 
keep an eye on the various movements of the Iranian pilgrims. On at least one 
occasion during the Haj, the writer and an Iranian photographer were stopped and 
threatened in the streets of Mecca by "Islamic Patrols", and the Iranians working for 
AL Madinah were constantly followed during their visits to Mecca, in order to ensure 
that they did not speak with other Iranians. It was due to these difficulties, that 
discussions with Iranian pilgrims were usually held in make shift hospitals that were run 
by other Islamic countries, such as Pakistan etc.
512An agreement which the Iranians honored for the next two years.
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remain in the Kingdom until the Haj was over, so that they could resume publication if 
the Iranians reneged on their agreements.
Once the first three issues had come out, the Head of the Iranian team, had travelled 
to Washington and had personally briefed senior members of the National Security 
Council, and in particular, the Director of Research, Dr. Norman Bailey, of the 
developments in Jeddah. A content analysis of the publications which was carried out 
by the NSC, as well as corroborated accounts verifying the extent of panic on the part 
of the Islamic authorities, was enough to drastically alter all previous moods of 
skepticism, paving the way for the Bakhtiar team to receive a proper hearing from then 
on.
Without question, the 'Al Madinah experience' had proven without a shadow of a doubt, 
something that would never have been possible to expose or demonstrate in any other 
milieu. And, the professional way in which the Bakhtiar team conducted itself, created 
a situation in which the matter was able to be properly exploited for the benefit of the 
cause.
In addition, a copy of Farsi Al Madinah. was, on each occasion, also sent to a very 
large mailing list of Iranians in exile513, which had the added advantage of keeping the 
Iranian community also abreast of what had been achieved in Saudi Arabia. Thus, by 
the time that the team returned to Europe by early October, the position of the Bakhtiar 
organization had been greatly enhanced, and a very suitable ground work had been 
prepared, particularly in Riyadh and Washington, for the promotion of constructive and 
responsive dialogue.
513Provided by NAMIR.
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Promoting Bakhtiar in the United Kingdom
During this entire period, a major campaign for the promotion of NAMIR had also been 
started in the United Kingdom. As mentioned previously, a British parliamentary 
delegation from the Conservative Party's "Bow Group"514 had travelled to Paris in 1982 
and had met with Bakhtiar. Shortly after their return, two members of the Bow Group 
who had travelled to Paris515, and who were closely affiliated with the Head of the 
Liaison Office, began a concerted effort to promote Bakhtiar and NAMIR's democratic 
platform in Britain. From 1983-1986, with their help, and the help of others516, NAMIR 
had been able to hold a number of fringe meetings at various political party 
conferences, and had successfully lobbied Bakhtiar's cause with a cross section of 
British parliamentarians517.
514Led by Derek Praag, MEP and Keith Best.MP.
515Michael Stephen and Nirj Deva, both subsequently elected to Parliament in 
the 1992 General Election.
516Such as the present Liberal-Democratic Peer, Lord Richard Holme.
517Although, Bakhtiar had been warned by his Conservative friends (letter dated 
29 July 1985 from Nirj Deva) that any contact with the Labour or the Liberal-Democrats 
would not create a positive impression with Mrs. Thatcher, this - contrary to the advice 
also given to him by the Liaison Office- did not dissuade Bakhtiar from pursuing a 
lobbying campaign with the other political parties as well. Based on many private 
conversations with the writer on this subject, it was clear that Bakhtiar, a social 
democrat himself, was greatly deceived by the attention and the early success which 
the British Social Democratic Party achieved in its early stages. He had thus come to 
believe, that there was no way in which the British Conservative could once again attain 
an overall majority in the next general Election (1987). Thus, he did 
not want "to put all his eggs in one basket", and opted with a policy that only served to 
alienate many important supporters in the Conservative ranks away from him. While, 
the Liaison Office in London was not against the general thrust of Bakhtiar's arguments, 
it generally felt that the policy that was being pursued by Bakhtiar in Washington and 
Riyadh were short term in nature, and required the acquiescence of all the serving 
governments. Thus, it was the Liaison Office's view that Bakhtiar should not create any 
unnecessary ripples at a time when it was important to have the serving British 
government on one's side.
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Although, progress was at best very limited, given the general nature of the British 
government's attitude towards all exiled political groups518, nonetheless, the Head of 
the Liaison Office was able to promote a respectably high profile of NAMIR by meeting 
in person with a number of key senior Cabinet Ministers519, as well as the British Prime 
Minister520, during the course of various Conservative Party functions.
Recognizing the importance of Britain, as a 'knowledgeable political actor in the 
international scene', the strategy being pursued on behalf of Bakhtiar, was to keep the 
British authorities generally aware of contacts in Washington and Riyadh, while 
cultivating "Back Bench" support for Bakhtiar and NAMIR, particularly from the ranks 
of the Conservative Party, in the House of Commons521. In pursuit of this objective -ie.
518As expressed to the writer in a private meeting at the Carlton Club on 16 June 
1986, by Richard Ryder MP, who said that the British Foreign Office "did not like to 
consult with resistance groups, and preferred only to deal with governments".
519eg. Nigel Lawson, Michael Heseltine and David Mellor (while he was a Junior 
Minister in the Foreign Office) etc.
520ln a reception at the Carlton Club, when introduced to the Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Thatcher asked about Bakhtiar's general situation, and quickly noted that he had 
recently visited London. She ended by saying that he was facing a very difficult 
situation.
521There was concern at the time, not to divulge too much information to the 
British authorities. This was particularly because, in the aftermath of the defection (from 
the Soviet Embassy in Teheran) of the Soviet KGB Officer, V. Kuzichkin to London, 
there was a strong belief amongst the exiled Iranian intelligence community, that 
information obtained from him during debriefing sessions regarding Soviet activities in 
Iran, had been passed on to Teheran, resulting in the final crack down against the 
Tudeh Party in May 1983. Based on discussions at the time with many senior Iranian 
intelligence officers (such as General Mohsen Mobasser), there was little doubt in 
anyone's mind that Kuzichkin's revelations to the British authorities in London had been 
passed on to the Iranians, resulting in the expulsion of 18 Soviets diplomats from Iran 
in 1983. In subsequent discussions with General Manouchehr Hashemi, the former 
Head of SAVAK's 8th Political Bureau (Counter Espionage), the General confirmed 
(interview 28 April 1995), that while no mention is made in Kuzichkin's book of his role 
in the purges that were made of the Tudeh Party in Iran, he was, nevertheless, an 
important player, in that the information he provided the British authorities was of 
crucial significance. According to General Hashemi, the Head of the Soviet Division in 
the successor organization to SAVAK, has personally confirmed to him the authenticity
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of "attaining passive British approval", from 1984-1986, Bakhtiar, himself, visited 
London on three separate occasions, and his talks with key opinion makers, particularly 
in Parliament522 and the media523, helped project his image as the most acceptable and 
respectable alternative, that was available at the time to challenge the Khomeini 
regime.
Conclusion__________________________________________________________
Backed by a credible and democratic political organization and a whole host of very 
important and influential new relations in the international arena, and having secured 
the broadest consensus considered possible to attain, by mid-1985 when he had been 
able to demonstrate his popular credentials to both the people inside and outside Iran, 
Bakhtiar was finally ready to launch his final plan of action, which had been 
comprehensively and meticulously prepared by NAMIR Military Wing, in cooperation 
with NAMIR’s civilian elements, and put together by the London Liaison Office.
of the speculation which is made of Kuzichkin's critical role in this area. In short, as far 
as NAMIR was concerned at the time, the general perception was that British 
intelligence had a close a relationship with its Iranjan counterpart, and as such it was 
best to keep one's important cards very close to one's chest.
522And many senior British politicians such as Edward Heath and Francis Pym.
523lncluding the BBC Persian Service, which was very helpful in arranging 
interviews with Bakhtair during all of his visits to London.
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Chapter 5: BAKHTIAR'S LAST HURRAH: 
OPERATION WHITE STAR - A PLAN MISMANAGED
In the aftermath of the publication of the A1 Madinah 'In the Farsi Language'. during 
the 1983 Haj Pilgrimage, at which time, certain potential vulnerabilities of the Islamic 
regime became exposed, it further became evident, particularly in Washington and 
Riyadh, that a new appraisal of all previous perceptions regarding the Khomeini 
regime had also become possible. One direct consequence of such an appraisal, in 
Saudi Arabia, resulted in Bakhtiar being invited for a second visit to that country in 
February 1984, less than a year after his first trip in April 1983. Nonetheless, during 
the course of this visit524, which was arranged for purely "political reasons"525, 
Bakhtiar and his team were caught in somewhat of an "off guard" position, in that 
having not been given an opportunity to go beyond mere rhetoric by any major 
party, with the exception of Saddam Hussein526, and constantly under pressure over 
the previous years to project themselves as sufficiently credible alternatives to the 
Islamic regime for purposes of just receiving a serious hearing, they were somewhat 
unprepared by the prospect of being asked by a major regional actor, in quite literal 
terms, what it was which they precisely expected to gain at the end of their 
deliberations.
524Bakhtiar was received by the Saudi Crown Prince, as well as the Saudi 
Minister of Defense.
525Bakhtiar's first visit was arranged on the pretext that he wanted to go to Saudi 
Arabia in order to perform the "Haj Umra". All official visits with Saudi dignitaries were 
thus made, under the pretext that he was being received as a foreign visitor who had 
come to perform his religious duties - a rightful request on the part of any Moslem, 
which the Saudis could not deny as "Custodians of the Holy Shrines".
52eWho had pursued an indiscriminate policy of supporting almost every potential 
opposition to Khomeini.
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During the course of this visit, in which Bakhtiar was for the first time accompanied 
by the Commander of NAMIR-MW, and two military members of his staff527, it was 
obvious that some form of a military contingency plan was part and parcel of any 
ultimate strategy that he had envisaged for regaining power in Iran. While, this 
notion was completely true, it is important to point out that, until the time that 
Bakhtiar had been forcefully and directly confronted with this issue, he had failed to 
give any serious consideration to preparing such an essential blueprint that would 
outline the exact shape and form of the steps that he would need to take in order to 
secure his final objective528.
Thus, for the first time since its conception by Bakhtiar, the need for NAMIR to have 
an "Operational Plan of Action", had inadvertently come about, and it was in the 
private jet returning the NAMIR delegation to Paris in late February 1984, that 
Bakhtiar instructed the Commander of NAMIR-MW and the Head of the London 
Liaison Office to urgently draw upon all the resources available to NAMIR, and 
prepare a comprehensive plan of action for the overthrowing of the Islamic regime, 
in which Bakhtiar's specific requirements for accomplishing this mission would be 
clearly illustrated529.
Coming Up With A Comprehensive Plan of Action
527The writer was also a member of the Bakhtiar delegation.
528This was mainly due to the fact that the organization as a whole had not 
become focused on a particular objective.
529 It must also be said that what was to later become a most carefully conceived, 
sophisticated operation plan for'overthrowing' the Islamic Republic in Iran, entailing the 
cooperation of nearly all the major segments of Iranian society and political life, was 
something that had to "evolve" over a period of time as a consequence of various other 
activities, and was not something that could have originally been in mind and around, 
at the time that the organization was being conceived in the initial stages.
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Very shortly after Bakhtiar's return from his second trip to Saudi Arabia, contacts 
between him and the CIA were once again resumed, following the intervention of Dr. 
Geoffrey Kemp at the National Security Council530. There is no doubt that the 
interest shown by the Saudis, was a very important factor that helped Bakhtiar clear 
the air, and begin the start of a new chapter of "Cooperative" relations with the 
American government. But, in a way similar to what had previously been 
experienced in Saudi Arabia, the lack of a clear-cut plan of action, entailing in 
precise terms, how Bakhtiar expected to gain power in Iran, was a serious missing 
factor that was crucial for sustaining credibility and interest in his movement, during 
the subsequent meetings531. However, by June 1984, this vacuum had been partially 
filled, and what turned out to be the 'first draft' of 'Operation White Star1 was finally 
produced532.
Here, it is important to mention that during the course of Bakhtiar's second visit to 
Washington in January 1984, he was invited to a luncheon, hosted by a sympathetic
^Following a first meeting that was scheduled in Bakhtiar's home in Paris, the 
senior CIA agent who was based in Washington, and had come specifically for the 
purpose of resuming CIA contacts with the Bakhtiar Organization, after introducing 
Bakhtiar to the agent in Paris who was the "Case Officer For Iran", specifically asked 
that all of Bakhtiar's former contacts with the agency, inclusive of General Mokhateb 
Rafii in Washington, and Ahmad Mirfendereski in Paris, should be kept out of any 
further dealings with them.
531 As Bakhtiar had discovered during his earlier visit to Saudi Arabia, the lack of 
a specific plan, was not only depriving him of an opportunity to make specific requests, 
but it was also depriving him of the much needed 'Confidence building' measures, 
essential for keeping the attention of the Saudis focused on what he had to say.
532Between June 1984 and February 1986, Operation White Star, was altered and 
amended on two further occasions.
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American business man533, in which a number of senior American White House 
officials (eg. Dr. G. Kemp, and Dr. Norman Bailey534), as well as Donald Gregg535, 
the National Security Adviser to the Vice President, were invited. Following that 
luncheon, it was agreed that the Head of the London Liaison Office would continue 
to brief all these officials regarding the progress of the Bakhtiar movement, during 
his forthcoming visits to the United States. In one of those visits, sometime in the 
Spring of 1984, Donald Gregg stated that in a conversation which he had held with 
former CIA Director and ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms536, he had been told 
that it was essential for any Iranian opposition movement to demonstrate what it was 
that they could "do on the ground". Such a statement, made at a time when other 
groups such as the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), were being 
credited with abilities to inflict damage and destruction on the regime inside Iran, 
was indicative of the skepticism that existed vis-a-vis the abilities of moderate and 
democratic groups in being capable of conducting similar operations - ie. the 
prevailing notion being that while radical groups such as the Mojahedin "acted", 
groups such as NAMIR only "talked", and were thus, by inference, incapable of 
doing anything more.
Once this conversation was reported back to Bakhtiar, he decided that the time had 
come for NAMIR-MW to embark on a series of operations aimed at casting this
533Raymond K. Mason, the Chairman of the now defunct Florida based, "Charter Oil 
Company".
534At the time, Dr. Bailey was the Research Director at the NSC.
535lt was in a meeting with President Carter's National Security Adviser, Z. 
Brezhinski, that the idea of meeting with Gregg, was first suggested and later acted 
upon.
536Who had also served as Ambassador to Teheran in the mid 1970's.
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image aside, and attaining the credibility, which the movement was being denied 
due to its democratic and liberal nature. Thus, from August 1984 to May 1985, a 
total of twenty operations, primarily against targets in Teheran and a number of town 
in Azerbaijan537, as well as the hijacking of an "Iran Air" domestic flight (see 
Appendix A-for complete details), were carried out in order to demonstrate NAMIR's 
wide ranging capabilities. However, given the loss of life involved in some of these 
operations were felt to be unpopular (e.g.. the explosion attack at 'Yousefabad 
Police Station in Teheran on 01/10/84 in which two Revolutionary Guards lost their 
lives), it was decided in May 1985, to suspend all further such operations, given that 
its initial purpose - i.e., silencing critics in the US administration had been more than 
adequately satisfied.
OPERATION WHITE STAR_____________________________________________
Prepared by NAMIR-MW, 'Operation White Star' was a comprehensive plan of 
action involving the participation of selected anti-regime, tribal elements from five 
separate regions, as a catalyst to trigger the intervention of the Iranian armed forces 
in Teheran against units supportive of the Islamic regime (see Appendix 5).
While the preparation of this plan demonstrated the level of penetration which 
NAMIR had been able to make within segments of Iranian society inside the country, 
it was clear that Bakhtiar would require both funds and other 'technical' assistance, 
in order to "tie all the loose ends" and successfully implement the operation. Hence,
537Because of its proximity to the Turkish border.
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with this plan in hand, the specific requirements of Bakhtiar's lobbying campaign (in 
both Washington and Riyadh), became clearly apparent.
In his first meeting with an American official in Paris538, when he first raised the issue 
that his subordinates were in the process of preparing a comprehensive plan of 
action, so that he could then speak in specific terms about his requirements, he was 
immediately informed that "In Washington, there was a whole filing cabinet full of 
'plans', which had been submitted by numerous Iranians with fertile imaginations"! 
This remark, was a frank reflection of how Bakhtiar, himself, had been perceived by 
the CIA, who were at that very time, heavily involved in the process of "running" a 
separate (but more or less similar) program with Dr. Ali Amini. Furthermore, it 
signalled the fact that nothing short of a comprehensive and verifiable plan, capable 
of demonstrating NAMIR's organizational efforts539, would stand the remotest 
chance of altering the hard positions that were at the time being adopted against 
Bakhtiar, by unsympathetic elements in the CIA who were the main sponsors of Dr. 
Amini at the time540.
At this juncture, the role of the Commander of NAMIR-MW, and the amount of 
effective work which he had put into his organization, was able to make the 
difference. And, while his contribution formed the corps of what was being proposed, 
the project, as a whole, was presented in such a manner that had the benefit of
538The CIA case Officer in Paris.
539Particularly in the field of intelligence.
540Here, it is important to point out that the only way Bakhtiar could secure the 
cooperation of the CIA, rested with him being able to convince their political bosses to 
instruct them "from above". This is the strategy that was pursued, and it was only in this 
way that he was able to go as far as he did.
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incorporating the full support of NAMIR’s various other assets, particularly in the 
area of "Civilian Affairs", in the context of a proposed "Civilian Plan of Action", that 
was drawn up to complement the main military plan.
Although, the first draft of "Operation White Star"541, was prepared in June 1984, 
and its contents were immediately discussed with U.S. officials in the White House, 
it was not until the "top Level"meeting scheduled for the White House Situation 
Room in June 1985, when backed by supporting intelligence, regarding every 
aspect of suggestions made in the plan, that it was eventually taken seriously by the 
American government and acted upon.
In summary, the final comprehensive plan submitted on behalf of Bakhtiar in June 
1985 consisted of the following542:
1. Operation White Star (A Military Plan of Operation-see Appendix 5)
2. Political Aspects Affecting White Star.
3. NAMIR-MW Commander's Estimate of the Situation
4. NAMIR's Civilian Plan of Action (see Appendix 6)
Developing “White Star"_______________________________________________
Immediately following the meeting in which Bakhtiar's comprehensive plan for the 
overthrow of the Islamic regime in Iran, had received a full hearing by Senior U.S.
541A name that was chosen by the Commander of NAMIR-MW.
542 In addition to the segments listed below, the plan was accompanied with a 
number of detailed maps, as well as other specific details, specifically listed in the 
Index (contained in Appendix 2).
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Administration officials., on the explicit instructions of CIA Director, William Casey, 
there was a marked change of attitude in the agency's approach towards Bakhtiar 
and his colleagues. Simultaneously, explicit support was also given by the National 
Security Council for a quick assessment by the CIA of the plan, with a view of 
meeting its requirements, once its final conclusions were assessed to be positive543.
The news of the successful presentation of the plan, was a source of extreme relief 
to Bakhtiar, and following the extensive briefing that he was given in Paris, he gave 
immediate instructions for every effort to be made in order to speed up the course of 
the investigation that was going to be made of "the plan" by the Americans544. Thus, 
less than a month after the White House meeting, both the Commander of NAMIR- 
MW and the Head of the London Liaison Office were sent together to Washington in 
order to meet with American officials, and work out an exact schedule for the speedy 
advancement of the Plan.
In the meetings that ensued with representatives of the CIA, it was decided that the 
best way to proceed for securing the "confidence building measures" that were 
needed, was for the agency to meet some of NAMIR's key military and tribal ( and 
later, civilian) contacts in Paris. This, from an American administrative perspective, 
meant that each key members of the Bakhtiar staff associated with the Plan, would
543This was confirmed during the course of a discussion in 1992 between the 
writer and Howard R. Teicher, a Senior National Security Officer, who by 1985 had 
replaced Geoffrey Kemp.
544Though, he was warned by some advisers, particularly Mirfendereski (due 
mainly to his cynicism), that he should not take the Americans at face value, Bakhtiar 
was adamant to be as cooperative as possible.
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all have to be subjected to a "Polygraph" examination545, as administered by the 
CIA, in order to ensure the security of the operating network.
From August to December 1985, significant progress was made on all fronts546, and 
by the end of this period, the "Civilian Wing" of NAMIR, had also come fully on 
board, by producing its own independent plan of action (See Appendix 6), aimed at 
mobilizing all its resources for purposes of creating a positive milieu for the 
implementation of Operation White Star547.
Mounting Financial Pressures On Bakhtiar_______________________________
Throughout this entire, period beginning in 1982 when the lobbying campaign in 
Washington had started, Bakhtiar was relying primarily on funds obtained earlier for 
the advancement of his various efforts548. However, he was, at the same time, all too 
aware that his resources were becoming rapidly depleted, and in order to avoid a 
cash flow crisis in NAMIR's world wide operations549, he was anxious for "White 
Star" to be assessed as quickly as possible - ie. reach the stage in Washington,
545A "truth" exam, conducted regularly by the CIA, even on its own agents, in 
order to ensure that they are not working for the opposition. While, its results are not 
always perfect, it is still considered to be the best yardstick, that the agency uses for 
evaluating "genuineness".
^ i.e . All keiy military, tribal and Civilian aides were positively "Polygraphed", 
and discussions had advanced on ways of obtaining American technical assistance for 
waging a major propaganda campaign inside the country, in advance of White Star.
^The "Civilian Plan of Action", was written following the setting up of a special 
committee by Bakhtiar, consisting of Hamid Zolnour, Mahmoud Hejazi, and Mehrdad 
Khonsari.
548Mostly from Iraq.
549A facade that was most important to Bakhtiar, and which was to become a subject 
of major inter-NAMIR bickering later on.
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when the National Security Council could, with the CIA's positive appraisal of the 
Plan's content, go to the President and seek authorization, for the U.S. government 
to fully assist with its implementation.
In this regard, it is important to mention that Bakhtiar was hopeful that, once White 
Star, had received the "bill of approval" as a viable plan, that either he or his 
American friends at the NSC would then go to the Saudi connections he had 
cultivated, with the hope of obtaining the necessary funds required to both sustain 
NAMIR in exile, and implement the operation inside the country. Indeed, the 
alternative route - ie. for the Americans to fund the project themselves, was thought 
to be too risky and generally "un-do-able", given that releasing the funds needed 
would require congressional approval, and as such, the project could have become 
fully exposed (because of "leaks"), thereby, jeopardizing the security of all who were 
involved with it550.
Furthermore, in order to avoid any conflict of interest, Bakhtiar also hoped that as a 
consequence of all his lobbing efforts in the United Kingdom, the British government 
would also look at his position positively, thereby, at worst, keeping neutral in any 
developments that might take place on his behalf in Iran. Bakhtiar's perception, in 
the pre-Salman Rushdie period, was that the British government had great incentive 
to want to establish some form of a relationship with the Islamic regime, placing it in 
a unique position amongst Western powers to exert influence. Indeed, even the
550Also, another factor was that the U.S. Government (USG) could not afford to 
become associated with anything that might fail. Thus, by sticking to the route that was 
suggested to Bakhtiar by his advisers, he was in a position to receive crucial American 
assistance, without subjecting the USG to any "down sides", in case the plan turned out 
to be a failure.
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trade figures with Iran in early the 1980s had been so encouraging, that many 
'pundits' had seriously questioned any course of action that might "rock the boat", 
particularly, in favor of those generally termed as "pie in the sky". Based on this 
perception, no mention of the Plan was ever made in any British circle.
Thus, by the time when Bakhtiar was received at the White House in late February 
of 1986, the preliminary aspects related to the implementation of the Plan were 
all in hand, and beginning in March 1986, some financial contribution to assist the 
investigative process in both the military and civilian sectors, were made available to 
him551. However, it is extremely important, and highly delicate to point out, that while 
funds going to other Iranian resistance groups or personalities had been requested 
by the CIA, and were part and parcel of a program aimed at keeping in touch with 
Iranian dissidents for purposes of acquiring intelligence, the assistance given to 
Bakhtiar was not a CIA initiative, and was one that had come from above by policy 
makers, as a stepping stone for implementing "White Star"552.
Bakhtiar's Trip to Saudi Arabia__________________________________________
Since his previous trip to Saudi Arabia in February 1984, Bakhtiar had remained in 
close contact with his Saudi Connections553, and without divulging anything concrete
551A sum to the tune of US$100,000/month (Similar to the amount that was being 
forwarded to Dr. Ali Amini's "Front for the Liberation of Iran".
552Although, the CIA was the appropriate channel to make these funds available to 
Bakhtiar, it is both wrong and inaccurate, if this important distinction is not made 
between NAMIR and FLI. This distinction became even more significant, when by the 
end of 1986, Dr. Ali Amini was effectively "retired" by the CIA, and his entire operation 
was handed to Dr. Maouchehr Ganji, a little known and insignificant political figure, 
whose only distinction in the past had been to serve as Minister of Education, in one 
of the cabinets prior to the Islamic Revolution.
553The point of contact was an Arab writer and journalist by the name of Ahmad Al- 
Sheibani, who was (at the time) part of the entourage of Prince Abodollah, the Saudi
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about the nature of his plans, he had made his intention understood that his main 
objective was to launch an operation involving military units of the Iranian armed 
forces. However, in August 1984, he had sent the Head of the London Liaison 
Office, armed with certain obtained documents from Iran, on a special mission to 
alert the Saudi Arabian authorities about plans by the Islamic regime to create 
unrest in the holy cities during the forthcoming pilgrimage. The top secret document 
entitled, "The Creation of An Independent Brigade For Carrying Out Irregular 
Warfare In Enemy Territory", was subsequently translated into English by the 
London Liaison Office, and published in the front page of the Times, on 6 January 
1985554. This report, which was immediately translated into Arabic and presented to 
the Crown Prince, was taken very seriously by the Saudi Arabian authorities, who 
later expressed their sincere appreciation to Bakhtiar.
Nonetheless, the Saudis, themselves, were playing a very cautious game. In line 
with their usual policy of "betting on all horses", while maintaining their relations with 
Bakhtiar through an intermediary with the London Liaison Office, they were watching 
closely, to observe the degree of seriousness with which Bakhtiar was being treated 
in Washington. During this period, ie. the period between Bakhtiar's last visit to the 
Kingdom and the time when he was received at the White House by Admiral John 
Poindexter, they had refrained from extending any further invitations to him, and 
despite the fact that they were periodically informed of the progress that was being 
made, they were unwilling to take any further steps regarding funding for Bakhtiar,
Arabian Crown Prince.
554Afull account of this report, along with all the excerpts of published articles about 
it, was also published in Issue 16 of Voice of Iran, dated January/February 1985, which 
was totally devoted to this topic.
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until "the Americans had directly spoken of the subject to them"555.
This matter was further complicated by the fact that the decision which had been 
made was at the National Security Council, and that the course of action which had 
been decided upon, was one in which confidentiality was of paramount importance. 
Thus, it was, for example, difficult for an instruction to be issued to the US 
Ambassador in Riyadh, so that he could then convey that message to the Saudis, 
given that such action would have entailed certain implications which the NSC 
decision, was not able to address at that time. While, the CIA station chief in 
Riyadh, could potentially have made some mention of the Washington meeting, 
again, this revelation would only have been made to his opposite number, and not to 
levels in which any decision regarding Bakhtiar would have had to be made556.
Here, it is also important to underline another very important component of this 
whole equation. While Bakhtiar had been previously received by the Saudi Arabian 
Crown Prince, who had also provided him with a measure of financial assistance, 
this relationship was well compartmentalized within the Crown Prince's household - 
ie. the funds that went to Bakhtiar came from the Crown Prince, and not the official 
Saudi government budget. This meant, that the Saudis could always deny having 
made any payments, or alternatively deny that "the country" had any wish to topple 
the Khomeini regime, by stating that whatever financial assistance they had made 
was for purposes of assisting "a former prime minister to cope with the difficulties of 
life in exile".
555This is a matter that was underlined in numerous conversations between the writer 
and the designated intermediary, Ahmad Al-Sheibani.
556The CIA case officer in Paris did suggest such a route. However, neither he nor any 
of his supervisors in Washington, seemed enthusiastic about the proposition.
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In the end, a much earlier planned visit by Vice President Bush to a number of 
Middle Eastern Countries, came to the rescue and essentially solved the existing 
impasse. Following a hastily arranged meeting between the Head of the London 
Liaison Office, and Donald Gregg, the Vice President's national Security Adviser, 
who was accompanying Vice President George Bush on the trip, Gregg (who had 
himself briefly attended the June 1985 meeting at the White House Situation Room) 
agreed to meet with the Crown Prince and to verbally seek his assistance for the 
Bakhtiar cause. According to Gregg, no assistance was forwarded in Riyadh for 
facilitating this affair, as every step required to be taken was ultimately left for 
Gregg557.
Shortly after Gregg's return to the United States, an official invitation was finally 
extended to Bakhtiar558, and in April 1986, Bakhtiar arrived in Riyadh for a third time, 
accompanied entirely, by a civilian team559. At the end of this unspectacular visit, in 
which nothing about the Plan was either or asked or discussed, some funding, as an 
initial instalment, was made available, which in turn allowed Bakhtiar a measure of 
comfort and peace of mind to proceed with his plans.
Returning from Saudi Arabia was the zenith of "Bakhtiar's last hurrah", for having 
come up with a credible and comprehensive plan of action, he had been able to
557Sheibani refused to contact Gregg himself, and it was only through the provision 
of Sheibani's telephone number to Gregg by the writer, that he was able to contact 
Sheibani, and through him, to arrange having a meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince.
5580nly after Bakhtiar forced the issue, by writing to the Crown Prince on 18 April 
1986, and informing him of the Gregg meeting, and requesting that a meeting between 
them should be arranged.
559i.e., Without the Commander of NAMIR-MW, who was left out because of the 
internal strife that was brewing inside NAMIR between him and Dr. Boroomand (with 
Bakhtiar siding initially with Boroomand).
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receive both moral and material assistance from two powerful and important sources 
with a critical interest in Iran. All that was left, was to proceed according to plan, 
with the knowledge and assurance that the next installment of funds would be 
readily available.
However, no sooner had he returned to Paris, that Bakhtiar was to become 
inundated with a whole host of inter-NAMIR squabbles and wrangling, which would 
eventually destroy his last real chance of ever regaining the mantle of political 
power in Iran.
The Collapse of White Star
And the Beginning of the End for Bakhtiar________________________________
No single factor more than inter-organizational tension due to Bakhtiar's lack of 
management abilities, contributed to the collapse of "White Star", and with it, the 
last real chance Bakhtiar would have for mounting a serious challenge to the 
regime. In this respect, Bakhtiar was further burdened with the fact that NAMIR, far 
from being a uniform organization of like minded people, was instead a motley 
assembly of mostly egotistic individuals with different political perspectives, who had 
for various reasons560, come to accept Bakhtiar as their "leader"561. Indeed, apart 
from mostly old friends from the "National Front" days, all existing bonds between 
most of these un-orchestrated elements who had come to form NAMIR, were at best
560Mostly financial - ie. they were receiving a salary from Bakhtiar.
561A pertinent comment that was often made by Mirfendereski to describe this situation 
and underline this problem was that "you could only pull a cart with a heavy load that 
was travelling on a rocky road, with the force and the support of set of similarly sized 
horses or mules. But, if you tied the same cart to a pack, consisting of a horse, a mule, 
a sheep, and a fox, you could never hope to complete the journey".
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tenuous. It is also a fact that, throughout all the years, Bakhtiar never made any 
serious effort to improve this situation, satisfied with the notion that so long as his 
position as undisputed leader remained unchallenged, then he had nothing to worry 
about.
While, experience proved this notion to be misguided, its effects were not always of 
equal significance - ie. it was one thing when members of the NAMIR committee in 
Gothenburg or New Delhi quarrelled amongst themselves, and it was quite 
something else when the Chairman of NAMIR's Executive Committee quarrelled with 
the Commander of NAMIR-MW. Thus, while quarrelling members in Sweden could 
harmlessly argue about topics such as "the degree to which the late Shah was a 
nationalist as opposed to Mossadegh, or truly independent and not subservient to 
foreigners etc.",562 it was a different matter when those at the top echelons of 
NAMIR, could not stand to cooperate with one another.
Unfortunately, from the very beginning, disagreements emanating from petty 
squabbles and personal jealousies, with increasing tensions amongst the "elite", 
had become a common feature in NAMIR. And, what is more, while Bakhtiar was 
fully knowledgeable of the existence of these tensions, his reluctance in wanting to 
settle them, even at the cost of sacking some of the uncompromising colleagues, 
had been conspicuously apparent563. While, the pursuit of such a policy on the part
562Some of the fiercest arguments in NAMIR, centered around rivalries between 
supporters of the late Shah, and followers of the "Line of Mossadegh". These 
arguments were a major sources of tension and suspicion amongst members in all 
branches.
563There were times, when it seemed as though Bakhtiar was deliberately not 
addressing the very obvious. In response to this very matter being raised by the writer 
on one occasion, he responded by saying that "these problems are much worse in 
other organizations".
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of Bakhtiar, did not prevent the departure of certain key people during NAMIR's 
critical years, it did, however, increase the levels of organizational chaos and 
internal divisions564.
Main Sources of Internal Tension_______________________________________
From the very start of his campaign in exile, Bakhtiar was beset by a very difficult 
problem that confronts all "rising politician", namely having to configure his essential 
staff in such a way that both "loyalty" and "competence", were equally rewarded. 
During his many years of opposition to the late Shah, Bakhtiar was never really 
burdened with this problem, given that most of his activities until the fall of 1978, 
were never really taken seriously. In those circumstances, and at a time when 
almost all competent Iranians were somehow engaged, one way or another, with the 
Pahlavi regime, Bakhtiar had the luxury of surrounding himself with loyal friends and 
supporters. However, once in exile, and "constantly under pressure to produce", he 
had no alternative but to turn to people with specialized talents. The net result of 
this was that his immediate circle had to be enlarged in order to make room for 
these essentially needed "new comers", which in turn alienated many of his "Old 
friends" who had stuck by him in all the previous years. This basic dilemma and his 
inability to cope with it, coupled with Bakhtiar's own personal lack of administrative 
capabilities565, compounded matters and indirectly created an explosive situation
564lt should be pointed out that Bakhtiar, never once ventured to visit any of his 
numerous offices in Paris, just to see what everyone was doing, or making his presence 
felt to the membership.
565lt is essential to remember that since the downfall of Mossadegh, Bakhtiar had not 
served in any official capacity, and the only managerial skill he had acquired, was by 
being on the board of certain major commercial concerns, where no real management 
skill was ever expected of him.
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which eventually blew up.
Previously in Chart 1 (Chapter 4), reference has been made been made to the main 
bodies of the overall political organization that were developed by Bakhtiar for the 
aim of promoting his objectives.
Of those bodies mentioned before (ie. NAMIR, the Council of Advisers, NAMIR 
Military Wing, and the London Liaison Office), NAMIR was not only the largest body, 
but it was the one structure that was there for everyone to see. This made NAMIR's 
various actions subject to membership questioning and general approval. However, 
when it came to matters such as "planning" or "intelligence gathering"566, it was 
obvious that these functions could not be fulfilled correctly, without a large measure 
of confidentiality and secrecy.
The other three bodies were thus designed to fulfill those particular needs - eg. in 
terms of general policy, the 'Council of Advisers' was a useful forum for Bakhtiar to 
discuss, in private, various policy options, while NAMIR-MW and the London Liaison 
Office, essentially fulfilled their own particular and specialized functions, as 
elaborated in earlier paragraphs. Also, while all these bodies ultimately reported 
their findings and recommendations to Bakhtiar, even at best of times, the level of 
cooperation and coordination amongst them was never encouraging.
During Bakhtiar's early years, the role played by old Bakhtiar loyalists such as Abdol 
Rahman Boroomand and Rahim Sharifi were of primary significance. Indeed, it was
566This involved meeting and interviewing a whole host of different people, who were 
anxious to meet in secret and keep their identities known to only a limited few.
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through Boroomand, that most of the early key players, not only in Paris, but also in 
other major cities, were recruited567. In Paris, as explained earlier, individuals such 
as Hossein Malek and Moloud Khanlary (both very friendly to Boroomand) were 
setting the initial agenda, and it was not until such time that Bakhtiar was in need of 
a more sophisticated political machinery, involving more than mere political 
ideological rhetoric, that the balance began to change.
The first major setup, away from NAMIR and the particular influence of Abdol 
Rahman Boroomand568, was the Council of Advisers, which consisted essentially of 
ex-Bakhtiar cabinet ministers, as well as a number of senior diplomats and 
politicians. While, those involved in the higher echelons of NAMIR had participated 
in the earlier stages of the revolution against the late Shah, the more influential 
members amongst the advisers, such as former Foreign Minister Ahmad 
Mirfendereski and Senator Kazem Jafroudi, were not at all of the same persuasion, 
and were instead of the view that the new Bakhtiar organization should not allow 
itself to be involved in any action that would alienate the monarchist constituency, 
which according to them, was Bakhtiar's only real popular base in Iran.
These differences became even more evident, first with the formation of NAMIR-MW 
and later, with that of the London Liaison Office. Although Abdol Rahman 
Boroomand was instrumental in the recruitment of both the Commander of NAMIR-
567They came to be known as the "Isfahani Mafia", given that in most places NAMIR 
representatives, were all Boroomand nominees, and usually from his home city of 
Isfahan.
568Who had come up with the initial financing for the organization, and considered 
himself as Bakhtiar's de facto deputy.
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MW569, and the Head of the London Office, it was only a matter of time before, any 
meaningful cooperation amongst them would cease. This was, on the one hand due 
to Boroomand's lack of any bureaucratic experience and poor human relations,
ivt>"
while on the other, it reflected Bakhtiar's weakness as an administrator,^apable of 
keeping his subordinates productively in line570.
Rivalry And Competition Amongst the NAMIR Elite
Rivalry and competition amongst the "elite" of any political organization, even those 
which are banned and exiled571, is nothing unusual, and varying samples of it are 
witnessed on a daily basis in the international press. However, when the leadership 
is unable to impose order and keep the bickering parties in line, that is the time 
when chaos, with all its damaging consequences, sets in.
569Brigadier General Amir Hossein Shahrdar, the Commander of NAMIR-MW, was 
introduced to Boroomand by Rahim Sharifi (to whom he was related), and Boroomand 
was initially very supportive of the new Commander, until his interferences in his 
domain of activities became such that they could no longer tolerate one another. Over 
time, the degree of animosity amongst these men reached such a point that Boroomand 
(who was assassinated in April 1990) had told many of his close friends, as far back as 
1986, that he suspected the General of wanting to kill him. Though, this was a very 
provocative statement by Boroomand (which he had also revealed to the writer), there 
is no question that it had no substance, and was made at the time to only arouse 
opposition against the General.
570Without wanting to delve too much into the psychology of Dr. Bakhtiar, it is 
appropriate only to mention that Bakhtiar was an individual who was tremendously 
affected by sycophancy. As such, he did have the tendency to develop greater 
sympathy for those who were more able to sooth his enormous ego. Also, like most vain 
politicians, he had the potential to wonder off with illusions of grandeur. For example, 
he often liked to compare himself with General De Gaulle, and one occasion when the 
writer, in discussing the mounting tensions within NAMIR that had affected Bakhtiar's 
own personal relationship with the General, he responded by comparing his stand with 
the one taken by President Harry S. Truman, against General Douglas McArthur.
571 Such as the PLO.
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In the case of NAMIR, shortly after the establishment of NAMIR-MW in Paris in 
1983, an incident took place which was the first major sign of rift between Abdol 
Rahman Boroomand and General A.H. Shahrdar. The incident, the exact details of 
which never became fully known (not even to Bakhtiar himself), involved the 
purchase and shipment of arms from Bakhtiar to the Qashqai tribal leader, Khosrow 
Qashqai, who was eventually defeated and executed by the regime in the Fars 
Province in 1983572. The dispute centered around facts concerning the exact fate of 
the arms which were allegedly bought for a very large sum573. The only established 
matter was that a great deal of money had been earmarked and subsequently 
released by Bakhtiar, though nothing ever reached a final destination, wherever that 
eventual destination was supposed to have been574. What did, however, transpire as 
a consequence of this experience, was a great deal of "finger pointing" by all 
parties, and most particularly by Boroomand against the General and some of his 
colleagues in NAMIR-MW. Although, this episode itself faded away shortly 
afterwards, nonetheless, the degree of "mud slinging" and acrimony had been so 
intense that it was impossible to undo the damage.
572lnterview with A.H. Amir Parviz (5 October 1994).
573Estimated to be in the region of almost half a million American dollars.
574The uncorroborated account mostly expressed on this subject, is that a sizable 
amount of arms and ammunition was purchased through an intermediary in Paris. 
Delivery of the arms was subsequently made in Dubai, where a number of NAMIR-MW 
officers were tasked to accompany the shipment aboard one of the local vessels 
generally used for inter-port shipments in the Persian Gulf. It is alleged, that on nearing 
the Iranian coast, a situation arose where the ship was overshadowed by an Iranian 
Coast Guard vessel. It is said that the accompanying officers then threw the entire 
shipment overboard, so that they would not be arrested on charges of smuggling arms. 
However, many close Bakhtiar advisers, such as his cousin and cabinet colleague, 
Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar, is of the view that there was no arms in the first place, and the 
whole story was simply a device aimed at usurping the funds which Bakhtiar had 
released for this purpose.
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Because of this incident, A. R. Boroomand then took it upon himself to keep a much 
closer eye on the activities of NAMIR-MW. This entailed trying to have a thorough 
grip on the exact nature of its day to day activities. While, Boroomand may have 
indeed cleared this with Bakhtiar575, the General considered this to be a provocative 
act of infringement in his areas of responsibility, which only undermined the security 
and the efficiency of his operations.
Prior to Bakhtiar's trip to Saudi Arabia in February 1984, and the start of a drive that 
would eventually produce "White Star", Boroomand, undoubtedly, had an edge on 
all matters576. However, following Bakhtiar's return from Riyadh and his immediate 
commissioning of a major "Plan of Action", requiring the expertise of the General, in 
whose personality he had invested by taking him along to Saudi Arabia and showing 
him off as his Military Commander, a situation had evolved whereby Boroomand was 
no longer able to exercise the same degree of control as he had in the initial years. 
Nonetheless, Boroomand was sufficiently powerful to force a situation whereby 
General Shahrdar submitted his resignation as NAMIR-MW Commander in 
December 1984, and was immediately replaced by a Boroomand nominee, Colonel 
Hadi Aziz-Moradi, who was later assassinated in Turkey.
575There is no question that Bakhtiar knew and trusted Boroomand more than any 
other member of his staff. Also, both men, given their previous background, had a great 
tendency to become easily suspicious. It would thus have been quite possible for 
Boroomand to have convinced Bakhtiar that he should personally look at NAMIR-MW, 
with much greater scrutiny.
576This was not related to existing disputes between Boroomand and NAMIR, but also 
included disputes between Boroomand and Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar, regarding budgetary 
matters, in which Boroomand's decisions had been fully backed by Bakhtiar, to the 
disgust and frustration of Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar (This particular matter was reiterated 
in many conversations between the writer and a close Boroomand confidante, Azizollah 
Esna-Ashari during the mid 1980's).
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The episode leading to General Shahrdar's resignation was the arrest of a number 
of his officers in Tabriz, which he blamed on lack of proper security which he 
claimed was being constantly breached by Boroomand, through his unceasing 
interferences in the affairs of NAMIR-MW. He told Bakhtiar that Boroomand was 
contacting individual members of his staff directly and without his knowledge, and as 
such, was jeopardizing the security of his operations, as well as the structure of 
discipline within his network. He asked for Bakhtiar's firm and immediate 
intervention to prevent any further breaches of discipline or interference by 
Boroomand. When such an intervention did not follow, it was clear to the General 
that Boroomand's actions had had the support of Bakhtiar, and, therefore, there was 
no longer any other option available to him but to resign.
The effect of the General's resignation was a source of total astonishment for the 
London Liaison Office, that was then intensely engaged with the General in 
preparing "White Star". The feeling was that the General's resignation, would have a 
tremendous negative effect at a most crucial time in both Riyadh and Washington. 
Above all, the failure of Bakhtiar, himself, to have appreciated the significance of 
this matter, was perhaps the most revealing and disturbing side of the picture577.
577By that time, following a number of meetings with the CIA case officer in Paris, and 
the writer's reporting from Washington, Bakhtiar was fully aware of the significance of 
the General in his organization. So to think that he could easily replace him, while 
proceeding as before, was most naive. This matter was thus immediately raised with 
him by the writer, and the suggestion was even made that if the intention is to "fire" the 
General, he should do it in such a way that does not cast doubt on his leadership or 
decision making abilities. It was in response this to this point that Bakhtiar came up with 
Truman-McArthur analogy, and for the first time, the writer was struck by the fact that 
Bakhtiar by taking sides in this matter, in what was nothing more than a petty squabble, 
had displayed a dangerous potential of jeopardizing the outcome of the entire Cause, 
and the future success of all who were devoting their efforts to ensure ultimate victory 
for NAMIR.
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However, what had been started back in February 1984, had gained such 
momentum that Bakhtiar once again needed the knowledge and the experience of 
the General to complete "White Star", and pave the way for the advancement of his 
plans. So, by March 1985, the General was once again back in the picture, this time 
as Bakhtiar's "Military Adviser", and once "White Star" was presented in 
Washington, Bakhtiar was told that what had "swung the day" and convinced the 
Americans, was the "Commander's Estimate of the Situation, 
which had accompanied and complemented the "White Star" Plan. Thus, by June 
1985, the General was back at his position as Commander of NAMIR-MW, armed 
this time with a written specification of his duties signed by Bakhtiar, which clearly 
banned any outside interference in the affairs of NAMIR-MW, and in particular from 
any civilian source in NAMIR, apart from Bakhtiar himself.
While, a meeting was arranged between Boroomand and the General at that time, in 
order to cultivate the much needed cooperation that was vital for the promotion of 
"White Star", and to bring previous bad feelings to an end, the degree of distrust 
and resentment had become so great, that the truce that was worked out was not of 
the enduring type578.
Shortly afterwards, Boroomand, whose hands had been effectively cut off from 
NAMIR-MW, began to react by trying to "push his weight" in other areas outside his 
general scope of responsibility, and by Fall 1985 had managed to provoke a 
situation, that resulted in him becoming entangled with the Head of the London
578Meeting arranged by the writer, is an interesting indication of a situation amongst 
exiles, when all disputing parties are fully aware that their intransigence can only 
benefit their enemies, yet they are unable to alter their behavior.
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Liaison Office as well579.
As a result, the level of internal tension became such that by February 1986 when 
Bakhtiar made his "grand" visit to Washington, he was accompanied only by the 
Commander of NAMIR-MW and the Head of the London Liaison Office580.
Unfortunately, the success of the Washington trip served only to intensify the sense 
of resentment felt by Boroomand, and by the time that Bakhtiar was planning to 
embark on his third and most important journey to Saudi Arabia, in support of "White 
Star", a situation was once again provoked by Boroomand within the military office 
that required Bakhtiar's immediate intervention. When that required intervention did 
not take place, the General resigned for the second time, and did not accompany 
Bakhtiar, as he rightly should have, on the very important journey to Saudi Arabia581.
Once Washington became aware of the General's departure, the entire Operation 
White Star, which had been received with great enthusiasm, was immediately 
placed "on ice", pending the outcome of the General's position, given that its main 
architect had been cut off from the plan. During this time, Boroomand had managed
579Boroomand then started making indirect interferences in the workings of the 
London Liaison Office, by undermining its work and reducing the funds it was operating 
with, as well as bringing in others to carry out some of the same tasks being carried out 
by the office.
580Working relations between these men was always excellent, and the two men had 
tremendous respect for one another.
581 The crucial importance of the General with regards to "White Star", and the whole 
question of Bakhtiar's abilities as a leader capable of controlling internal rivalries was 
once again raised by the writer on the journey to Saudi Arabia. But, Bakhtiar, failed to 
make any sort of a positive response. However, during the course of heated debates 
that ensued over this issue, extreme insistence by the writer over this matter, served 
only to provoke Bakhtiar in a very negative way that was to affect their relationship in 
the future.
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to suggest two other candidates, both subservient to himself, as suitable 
replacements for General Shahrdar. However, vigorous opposition to the sacking of 
the General from the London Liaison Office, and the eventual comprehension by 
Bakhtiar, that without the General, he could no longer proceed as before, forced a 
situation in which Bakhtiar eventually swallowed his pride and re-installed the 
General.
But, to cure his damaged ego, he sent a letter critical of the Head of the Liaison 
Office582 (because he had failed to tow his line with regards to the General) , to one 
of his American friends who had lobbied effectively on his behalf in the United 
States, and was his main contact with the NSC. It was the sharpness and the 
frankness of the response that was given, which greatly shocked Bakhtiar, for it 
bluntly underlined his bad judgement, by stating that he should look elsewhere for 
showing recrimination583.
Although, matters were subsequently patched up, an air of suspicion had crept in 
the relationship amongst those whose cooperation and coordination was 
indispensable, if "White Star" was to have had any chance whatsoever584.
582The letter dated 20 May 1986, and addressed to Rear Admiral Max.K. Morris, was 
drafted by Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar.
583Letter from Rear Admiral Morris, dated 30 May 1986 and addressed to Bakhtiar. On 
receiving this letter, Bakhtiar telephoned the writer and complained about the fact that 
in the views of "the
Americans" all his other colleagues apart from the General and the writer were 
"AHMAGHS" (meaning idiots).
584Not content to allow things to rest where they were, Boroomand had privately 
proceeded to engage an American lawyer to help him lobby in the United States. In 
meeting at the NSC is September 1986, Howard R. Teicher informed the writer that a 
Washington based attorney had attempted to make an appointment to see him on 
behalf of Dr. Bakhtiar. He could not understand what the lawyer wanted, and he had 
in any event refused to see him. Nonetheless, he had brought the matter, in order to
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During the Summer of 1986, despite all the previous tensions, matters continued to 
proceed according to the time tables earlier agreed. Plans for some propaganda 
operations to be carried out inside Iran were advanced585, but when the scandal 
regarding the "Iran-Contra" affair forced the resignation of Admiral Poindexter and 
his team of associates from the White House, as well as the impending departure of 
William Casey from the CIA, nearly all the main sponsors of "White Star" had been 
effectively removed from their positions of influence. Whether "White Star" could 
have survived, under the best of circumstances within NAMIR, in view of the 
damage that was inflicted on the White House by "Irangate", is a matter of 
speculation.
Bakhtiar and the "Irangate" Scandal_____________________________________
In November 1986, it was disclosed that the US had, in August 1985, and 
subsequently, participated in secret dealings with the government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran involving the sale of military equipment. There appeared a linkage 
between these dealings and the efforts to obtain the release of US citizens held 
hostage in Lebanon by terrorists believed to be closely associated with the Iranian 
regime. After the initial story broke, the US Attorney General announced that 
proceeds from the arms transfers may have been diverted to assist US backed rebel 
forces in Nicaragua, known as the contras. This possibility enlarged the controversy 
and added questions not only of policy and propriety but also of violation of law. 
These disclosures became the focus of substantial public attention. The secret arms
have Dr. Bakhtiar clear it as soon as possible. When the matter was brought to 
Bakhtiar's attention, he denied any knowledge about the matter, and it soon became 
clear as to how this ridiculous, and highly embarrassing initiative had been started.
585and eventually executed in January 1987.
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transfers appeared to run directly counter to declared US policies. The US had 
announced a policy of neutrality in the Iran-lraq War and had proclaimed an 
embargo on arms sales to Iran. It had worked actively to isolate Iran and other 
regimes known to give aid and comfort to terrorists. It had declared that it would pay 
no ransom to hostage takers586.
As far as NAMIR was concerned, the arms for hostages deal had not seemed to run 
contrary to the spirit of the discussions that had taken place with regards to 
Operation White Star. The fact that any reference to this matter should have been 
made by a NSC official587, as far back as April 1986, and NAMIR's assistance 
requested to help in this effort to free the American hostages, had in fact been quite 
reassuring. It was obvious that if the US was no longer burdened with the 
constraints imposed by the hostages, then they would have much greater 
maneuverability in providing NAMIR with the types of assistance required to 
implement White Star successfully. In reporting this matter to Bakhtiar in mid-April
1986, the argument had also been made that if the US was interested in anything 
more than just the freeing of its captive citizens, then there would have been 
absolutely no reason to divulge any information regarding this whole operation to 
representatives of an opposition group committed to the regime's downfall. While, 
different interpretations have been given to US motives in beginning the process of 
negotiation with Iran over this matter, in his book entitled, Special Trust; Robert 
McFarlane, the former National Security Adviser to President Reagan, who 
(accompanied by NSC staff members, Colonel Oliver North and Howard Teicher) led
^New York Times. The Tower Commission Report, Bantam Books, New York,
1987, p. 1.
587Vincent Cannistraro.
a US delegation to Teheran in May 1986, has acceded that the so-called Iran 
initiative, was (contrary to his own preference) nothing more a simple swap of 
weapons for hostages5®5.
In Paris, however, under increasing pressure during the previous months over the 
mounting levels of internal squabbles that had greatly damaged his organization, 
Bakhtiar's attitude in receiving the astonishing disclosures that were being made in 
Washington, was one of great betrayal. Tired and confused, his immediate impulse 
with regards to "Irangate" was to try and exploit this event, by lashing out against 
the Reagan administration.
However, what he neglected to take into account, was that as far back as April 1986, 
he had himself been informed by way of a message from a Senior White House 
official, that the Americans were considering trading arms for the release of 
hostages589. In fact, they had asked if Bakhtiar was in a position to assist in this 
affair, and, moreover, with Bakhtiar's blessing and expense, a meeting had been 
arranged in July 1986 by NAMIR in Geneva between an Iranian cleric, and an 
American official to discuss possible new initiatives for assisting the settlement of 
this very issue590.
Nonetheless, Instead of adopting a position that would provide him with a "come
588McFarlane, R.C. (with Zofia Smardz), Special Trust, Cadell & Davies, New 
York, 1994.
589This matter was mentioned by Vincent Cannistraro during the course of a luncheon 
at Washington's Metropole Club with the writer in April 1986. NAMIR's incentive for 
assisting this process, as presented to Bakhtiar, was to help remove the obstacles that 
were a constraining factor in an all out American commitment for "White Star".
590The writer participated in that meeting.
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back" possibility into the new White House591, Bakhtiar over played his hand, and as 
a consequence played straight into the hands of those who were always looking for 
an opportunity of terminating any US government working relations with him592.
591 All those closely associated with White Star in the NSC had been forced to resign 
in the aftermath of the scandal. Thus, in their absence, there was no longer any political 
support for its promotion. This was in turn a serious blow and another major explanation 
for the eventual failure of the plan.
592The writer advised Bakhtiar (November 1986) , that contrary to criticizing 
Reagan publicly, it was more advantageous to try and assist him in ways possible - 
e.g., by exerting more pressure and concentrating greater propaganda efforts at 
exposing the Iranian side of the Irangate negotiations - so that he would have the 
incentive to look at Bakhtiar positively. Yet, Bakhtiar seemed to have developed a 
sudden case of amnesia, forgetting totally his own knowledge and involvement, in the 
events that he had himself been made aware of in April 1986. He clearly felt that he 
could obtain greater mileage from this whole episode, by pursuing a hostile policy 
towards an administration which had given him both support and encouragement.
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Chapter 6: The Final Period (1987-1991)
As mentioned in the previous chapter, by the end of 1986, the revelations that were 
made regarding the "Irangate" incident had led to the removal of two of the key 
figures connected with Bakhtiar's plan for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic593. 
But, despite the fact that the majority of its most important supporters in the US 
administration were no longer in their key positions, this, by itself, did not 
automatically signal an end for "Operation White Star". Nonetheless, the removal of 
key supporters in Washington, coupled with organizational disintegration at the 
managerial level, within NAMIR, had created a situation which had made any 
resuscitation of the plan almost impossible.
In October 1986, following a thorough evaluation of NAMIR's overall structure, a 
restructuring plan for NAMIR594, aimed at increasing organizational efficiency (by 
significantly reducing the size of unnecessary external structures and expenditures, 
while at the same time increasing internal presence), and reducing internal bickering 
(by re-shuffling key portfolios within NAMIR) was presented to Bakhtiar by the Head 
of the London Liaison Office. In this plan, that was submitted on 8 October 1986,
>/» particular emphasis was also made at enhancing NAMIR's
593These were Admiral John Poindexter, President Ronald Reagan's National 
Security Adviser, and William Casey the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
By mid-1987, Howard Teicher and Vince Cannistrero, two other key White House 
officials involved with "White Star" were also forced out of office because of their 
involvement in the "Irangate" scandal (Teicher was forced to leave government, and 
Cannistrero was reassigned to other duties). Only, the National Security Adviser to the 
Vice President, Donald Gregg, who was to become the American Ambassador to Seoul 
in the forthcoming Bush Administration, was to remain in his position. Gregg had been 
briefed about "White Star" from the very beginning.
594Which was prepared in consultation with the Commander of NAMIR-MW.
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propaganda capabilities595, while also improving NAMIR's relations with other 
moderate exile organizations, and in particular Bakhtiar's relations with Reza 
Pahilavi596. However, the acceptance of this plan meant that Bakhtiar would have to 
move decisively to remove a number of close friends such as A.R. Boroomand from 
key positions, while having to close down most NAMIR offices, and "lay off' a 
significant number of NAMIR salary receiving staff across the board597.
Bakhtiar's failure to act on these recommendations, subsequently led to the 
resignation of the Head of the London Liaison Office, in December 1986 (although 
his informal contacts with Bakhtiar continued to remain more or less intact for almost 
another 12 months598). Ironically, the first of several pre-planned propaganda 
operations in Iran, scheduled earlier for the promotion of "White Star", was actually 
carried out in January 1987599. Nonetheless, by February 1987, all American
595Taking into account, a report on this subject that had been prepared by 
NAMIR-MW (see Annex 2).
^T h is  plan was prepared in circumstances that had become critical, even prior to 
the break out of the "Irangate" scandal. It was felt by key advisers, such as the writer 
and the Commander of NAMIR-MW, that in order to put an end to organizational chaos, 
reduce costs and improve efficiency, nothing short of a major re-structuring of NAMIR, 
would be adequate to restore confidence and moral, both amongst Iranians as well as 
key international quarters.
597The idea was not that local NAMIR offices should be closed, but that they should 
be funded through local fund raising efforts, as opposed to continued central funding.
598This was also tantamount to the dismantlement of the London Liaison Office.
599This operation consisted of launching several helium filled balloons with 
propaganda leaflets (containing photographs of Bakhtiar, and a number of NAMIR 
slogans), from outside Teheran. These special balloons, supplied by the CIA and 
attached to a timer, were configured to carry the leaflets until such time that they were 
set for release at unspecified points over the city of Teheran. Once, the operation had 
been carried out by the specially trained personnel, maximum propaganda use of it was 
made, on behalf of Bakhtiar, by the Head of the London Liaison Office, though he was 
no longer officially connected with NAMIR. Subsequently NAMIR published an account 
of this successful operations in Qvame Iran (Issue No. 188 dated 29 January 1987). 
Apart from NAMIR affiliated media (i.e., NAMIR newspapers, radio broadcasts, and TV
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financial assistance earmarked for "White Star", came to a halt, and, with it, came 
the indication that "White Star" had, effectively been shelved. As a result, it was not 
long before Bakhtiar's cash flow problems were once again to reach a critical point. 
Only this time, there was no immediate remedy in sight.
The Break Down of Entente With Other Moderate Leaders__________________
A harmonious relationship between Bakhtiar, Reza Pahlavi, and Dr. Ali Amini, was 
always considered to be one of the main pre-requisites for the successful 
implementation of "White Star". By February 1986, when Bakhtiar had made his final 
trip to Washington, this goal had been successfully achieved. However, as "White 
Star" had begun to unravel due to inter-NAMIR petty squabbles and rivalries, there 
was also a failure on the part of NAMIR to allocate the time and effort necessary for 
keeping intact the fragile entente that had been built over time with other moderate 
leaders, and by September 1986, signs of irreparable damage were becoming 
apparent.
To begin with, by Fall 1986, fundamental changes were beginning to appear in the 
CIA run operation, "Front For the Liberation of Iran" (FLI), that was led by Dr. Ali 
Amini. This was essentially due to a decision that had been taken in Washington to 
"gently remove"600 Amini and a number of his close advisers601, from the FLI602.
programs [particularly in California] and Israel Radio, this episode did not receive any 
other coverage.
600With hindsight, it can now be seen that what the CIA wanted to establish at 
the time, was an independent link with the monarchist/constitutionalist constituency, 
minus any involvement with either the Shah or any other substantial political figure. 
The fact that the FLI had been endowed with a radio station from the start of operations 
in the early 1980s, also meant that the CIA was able to feed potential listeners with the 
type of propaganda/information which they deemed appropriate for the promotion of
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However, since early March 1986, when Bakhtiar had met with the Shah in 
Washington, relations between them had continued to improve. During the Summer 
of 1986, the Shah, along with Dr. Amini had made a visit to Bakhtiar's home, where 
they had been introduced to a number of his colleagues. In that meeting, some great 
forward strides were made, in that it had seemed that they had all been able to put 
aside the grievances of the past. More importantly, in that meeting, Bakhtiar had 
projected himself as a "conduit of reconciliation" between old critics of the late Shah, 
and the Young Reza Pahlavi603. Shortly after that visit, the Shah's Office in
their own interests. Given that what the CIA may have considered appropriate for 
shaping the views of constitutional monarchists in Iran, may not have been similar to 
views held by notable characters representing this constituency, an incentive had 
emerged to rid the FLI of the more independent figures, most likely to query some of 
their actions, and to replace them with subservient elements.
601The most prominent adviser at the time being, Mr. Islam Kazemieh, an Iranian 
journalist with an anti-Shah background, generally credited with a famous lyric which 
had said ,"Ta Shah Kafan Nashavad, In Vatan, Vatan Nashavad" (loosely translated, 
it meant that until such time that the Shah was dead, this country would never become 
a real country). By late 1986, the CIA was totally disenchanted with Kazemieh, and had 
come to the conclusion that both he and Dr. Amini would have to go. The man 
handpicked to replace them was Dr. Manouchehr Ganji, who was first brought in as a 
member of the Front's Executive Committee, though right from the beginning, he was 
put in charge of the "purse". It was a matter of time before matters were to erupt, and 
eventually, when Amini, on the advice of his close advisers decided to sack Ganji, the 
way was made clear for Ganji to break away from the FLI and rename the entire 
American operation as "Derafsh Kaviani" or Flag of Freedom. As a result, the FLI's 
clandestine radio station operating from Cairo was also renamed (becoming Radio 
"Derafsh Kaviani"), as CIA agents in Paris took immediate steps to disengage 
themselves, once and for all, from Dr. Amini and the remains of the FLI.
“ ^The writer was broadly told of this in a private meeting in Washington in February
1986. During that meeting, the writer had queried the need to have a new management 
team replacing Amini, suggesting instead that efforts could all become centralized in 
NAMIR. However, this suggestion was not well received.
603ln that he had made it possible for a process of reconciliation and 
understanding to take place between the old critics of the late Shah, in the National 
Front and the "Student Confederation", and his son, in an atmosphere of full 
agreement, as to what had been wrong in the past, and what was needed in order to 
avert the same mistakes in the future.
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Washington had issued a statement saying that after careful consultations604, it had 
been agreed that a new "Council of Advisers" would be formed, whose only 
members for the present were Bakhtiar and Dr. Ali Amini.
At first, this statement had seemed harmless enough, in that it was essentially a 
formal acknowledgement of a working relationship that had been in place for some 
time. However, Bakhtiar's reaction to this statement, which was the result of the 
internal turmoil being experienced by NAMIR at the time605, was the "final straw" that 
was to "break the back of the camel of good faith and cooperation" with the Young 
Shah. In an interview with a relatively unknown and insignificant Iranian television 
station in California in September 1986, Bakhtiar (at the behest of Boroomand and 
some of his close advisers) denigrated the statement that had been released by the 
Shah's office, and said that he was willing to serve as an "Adviser not only to the 
Young Prince606, but to any Iranian, including also the TV interviewer himself!607". 
Once this program had been broadcast, all cooperative relations between the 
Shah's office and Bakhtiar were irreversibly suspended. Despite later attempts by 
both Bakhtiar himself608, and a special NAMIR delegation609 to revive these
^Which had entailed long discussions between the Shah's Chief representative, 
Mahmoud Foroughi and Bakhtiar (and Dr. Ali Amini).
605The crux of this turmoil has been best explained by Bagher Moin (interview, 
London, 3 May 1995), who in his broadcast following Bakhtiar's assassination in 1991 
(BBC Persian Service, 08/08/91) said that Bakhtiar "Vacillated between republican and 
monarchist sentiment, thus keeping both sides disillusioned".
606Referring to Reza Pahlavi as "Prince Reza Pahlavi" and not as "Reza Shah 
II", was another important bone of contention with Bakhtiar, in his dealings with the 
Shah's advisers. Over the years, a great deal of time and semantics were invested in 
dealing with this matter, which from the point of view of many of their supporters had 
been a non issue from the start.
607Ali Limonadi of the "Iranian TV" in California.
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relations, the perceived degree of injury by the Shah, emanating from Bakhtiar's 
statement had been so great, that he was never inclined to either trust or work with 
Bakhtiar again610. The fact that the timing of this episode coincided with Bakhtiar's 
period of decline as an exile leader, also meant that the Shah was no longer 
compelled by circumstances to make any further concessions towards Bakhtiar as 
well.
In summary, through a single display of gratuitous insensitivity, Bakhtiar had, in a 
stroke, severely damaged himself by destroying a most important, but extremely 
fragile, alliance which he had himself cultivated for a number of years. Another 
important side affect of this failure in the relationship between Bakhtiar and the 
Shah, was the fact that the fate of Dr. Ali Amini was also irrevocably sealed, in that 
with the breakup of the proposed concept of the "Royal Council of Advisers", there 
was no longer any serious role that could be assigned to a personality of his calibre 
and standing. Thus, with his main backers (i.e., the CIA), already in search of a 
more purpose-built and functional replacement for the prestigious and independent 
minded Amini, the need to cling to him because of his position in the "Shah- 
Bakhtiar-Amini Triangle" was no longer there, and indeed very shortly thereafter - to
“ “ In a meeting with the Shah on 14 April 1989 (Source: Qvame Iran. Issue 248 
dated 27 April 1989).
“ “A special delegation, headed by Ahmad Mirfendereski and the then Chairman 
of NAMIR's Executive Committee, Mohammad Moshiri were sent to Washington in June 
1989 to meet with the Shah's new team headed by Dr. Ahmad Ghoreishi, who had by 
this time replaced the Shah's two former "Chiefs of Cabinet", Mahmoud Foroughi and 
Halaku Rambod, both of whom had always been very skeptical of Bakhtiar's intention. 
While, Ghoreishi, himself had been in favor of some form of reconciliation during the 
course of discussions that took place from 6-9 June 1989 (Source: Qvame Iran. Issue 
253 dated 6 July 1989), the memory of the Shah's own disappointment at Bakhtiar for 
his "breach of faith" in September 1986, was never cast aside, and as a result, nothing 
serious was to ever come of these discussions.
610Discussions between the writer and the Shah in February 1987.
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Bakhtiar's detriment611 - he was forcefully removed and retired. Needless, to say that 
the main loser in these chain of events, was none other than Bakhtiar, for he had not 
only managed to destroy the highly desirable and potentially popular "Shah-Bakhtiar 
Political Ticket", but also as a consequence of his blunder, he had managed to seal 
the fate of the only other important political figure in the Constitutionalist camp, with 
whom he could have had a serious working relationship612.
Changing Objectives: NAMIR's Quest For Survival_________________________
By mid-1987, Bakhtiar's dilemma, in the face of serious financial difficulties had 
reached a critical stage. With American and Saudi funding having dried up as a 
consequence of the failure of "Operation White Star" to take off, Bakhtiar had once 
again become highly dependent on the hand outs he was receiving from Saddam 
Hussein. However, contrary to their earlier perceptions, the Iraqis no longer looked 
at Bakhtiar in the same light that they had in earlier years, and while the continuing 
war with the Islamic Republic impelled them to continue their relations with him, it 
was obvious that they had come to consider the People's Mojahedin Organization of 
Iran (PMOI), whose leader Massoud Rajavi had taken up residence in Iraq, as a 
more useful opposition organization to the Islamic regime613. According to Senator
611Because unlike Amini, the team that was to emerge in the FLI (later Derafsh 
Kaviani) did not have any desire to work along with Bakhtiar, and were in much greater 
competition with him.
612 While, Bakhtiar may have had great debates and disagreements with Dr. 
Amini over a number of issues, it was always a fact that Amini was a man of his own 
generation, with whom he had a great deal in common. Once, Amini had gone, Bakhtiar 
was forced to come into contact with men of a later generation (and generations), with 
whom he had much greater difficulty having any form of consensus or cultural 'entente'.
613Here, it is important to point out, that the Mojahedin were much more inclined 
than Bakhtiar ever was, to do as the Iraqis wanted. Thus, the Iraqi relationship with the 
Mojahedin, was a much more complicated one than the one they had with Bakhtiar, and
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Kazem Jafroudi, a close Bakhtiar confidante, and a Member of NAMIR's Supreme 
Council, one serious implication of this development was that Iraq's financial 
contributions to NAMIR, had gradually fallen from a high of approximately 
US$600,000 per month to about US$50,000 per month by the start of the Persian 
Gulf War, after which all funding to NAMIR was completely cut off614.
On one occasion in early 1986, when the whole question of organizational funding 
was under review, Dr. Abdol Rahman Boroomand, had roughly calculated the 
monthly external expenditures of NAMIR - not inclusive of anything that was being 
spent inside the country - to have been somewhere in the region of US$650,000 - 
700,000615. It was partly due to wanting to seriously reduce these outgoings that the 
"Restructuring Plan for NAMIR" had been submitted to Bakhtiar in
October 1986. However, his failure to take account of those recommendations, at a 
time when alternative sources of funding (ie. apart from sole reliance on Iraq) was 
still available, meant that by mid-1987, NAMIR had no choice but to initiate an 
abrupt process of seriously reducing its various commitments (which meant closing 
offices and reducing staff, etc.)616. The overall effect of these cutbacks was to have 
a serious impact on morale within NAMIR, and on one occasion, in a matter that was 
to reverberate within the Iranian exile community, a group of redundant employees
included aspects such as provision of intelligence or the sabotaging of the Iranian war 
effort, which was considered anathema to people in NAMIR.
614lnterview with the writer on 23/11/1994. According to Jafroudi, the monthly 
Iraqi allotments had first been reduced to $300,000, and then to $150,000, prior to 
steadying at $50,000. A point needs to be made that while Iraqi financial ties with 
NAMIR were suspended following the defeat of Iraq in the "Persian Gulf War", their 
assistance to the PMOI were not suspended, and continued thereafter.
615Discussion with the writer.
616According to Dr. M. Razmara, this meant that In Paris alone, expenses had to 
be reduced from FF 500,000 per month to FF 100,000 per month.
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gathered outside Bakhtiar's house on the outskirts of Paris, in protest against their 
"Unfair" dismissals.
Re-Defining NAMIR's Mission: Organizational Changes_____________________
The most obvious consequence of adjusting to new circumstances for NAMIR, 
entailed a re-definition of its mission. As a result, from the period 1987 up to the time 
when Bakhtiar was savagely murdered in his villa outside Paris, NAMIR was no 
longer in a position to actively organize the operational overthrow of the Islamic 
regime, along the lines that it had planned during the "Nojeh Project" and later in 
"Operation White Star". Instead, it had little choice but to concentrate all its 
remaining assets into carrying out effective political action, capable of maintaining 
its credibility and general image in the eyes of the Iranian public.
While, this new re-definition of mission may have seemed like a significant climb 
down in comparison to the image that Bakhtiar himself had over-zealously promoted 
in the previous years, it was nevertheless, a significant mission, for which, apart 
from the Mojahedin, NAMIR's position was generally unchallenged. Even the full 
fledged entrance of Reza Pahlavi into the political ring following the establishment 
of the cease-fire in the Iran-lraq War, in August 1988, was by itself not enough 
serious to dislodge NAMIR, or force it into political oblivion. The reason for this was 
that from 1987-1991, NAMIR still continued to have access to two clandestine radio 
stations broadcasting to Iran, that were operating on a daily basis617, and a regular
617A one hour broadcast from Baghdad, and a separate 55 minute broadcast 
from Cairo (each program was broadcast twice during the course of each day). Both 
these radio stations continued to operate well into 1991. By the time of Saddam 
Hussein's defeat, NAMIR's radio (as well as the "Voice of Free Iran", which had 
originally belonged to General Gholam Ali Oveissi in the early 1980's, but had been run
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newsletter (Qyame Iran) that was being published in Paris and widely distributed in 
the Iranian exile community618. While these major assets, along with Bakhtiar's own 
personal reputation and charisma, were not enough to implement the overthrow of 
the Islamic regime, they were, nonetheless, more than adequate to keep Bakhtiar's 
name in the ring and to keep the "pot boiling". Thus, even during his final years, 
Bakhtiar was able to salvage the skeletons of his original organization, albeit with a 
much reduced capacity.
While, NAMIR's overall organizational chart did not seem to differ overtly from the 
charts previously presented in Chapter 4 (ie. Charts 1, 2, & 3), however, a great 
deal of difference, representing the significant changes that had taken place within 
NAMIR, since the abandonment of "White Star" were reflected in the composition 
and the ideological tendencies of the various remaining units.
directly by the Iraqis, with the cooperation of its able director, Touraj Farazmand, ever 
since) were closed, leaving the People' Mojahedin Organization of Iran, as the only 
Iranian opposition group with radio broadcasts to Iran (a situation that persists to this 
day). The Cairo station, headed by a very talented young journalist, Jamshid Charlangi, 
was able to struggle on almost single handedly, despite the fact that all NAMIR funding 
was essentially cut off at the end of 1990. Even prior to that, all broadcasts from Cairo, 
were essentially compiled and presented by Charlangi himself, with increasingly less 
output or assistance from those in Paris. While, the existence of these stations had 
presented Bakhtiar with an important outlet, capable of addressing audiences inside 
Iran, their overall impact was always pursuing a down ward curve during Bakhtiar's final 
years. Eventually, the Cairo station was taken over by Reza Pahlavi, prior to its 
officially going off the air.
618However, due to financial constraints, Qvame Iran, which was distributed on 
a weekly basis, and distributed free of charge to NAMIR supporters (and others in a 
well accumulated mailing list), began appearing on a bi-weekly basis (as announced 
in Issue No. 190, dated 12/2/87), and by late 1988, only on a subscription basis (as 
announced in Issue No. 237, dated 24/11/88). From December 1990, up to the time of 
Bakhtiar's death, again mainly due to increasing financial constraints, there were 
interruptions (as never before) in the publication of Qvame Iran. Finally, the production 
of the newsletter was transferred from Paris to Germany, so that its operations could 
be managed on a volunteer basis.
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CHART 4: CHANGING NATURE OF THE BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION
1987-1990
NAMIR COUNCIL
NAMIR PUBLICATIONS
1. QYAME IRAN
BAKHTIAR
PROPAGANDA
 1
MILITARY OFFICE
ADVISERS COUNCIL
RADIO
1. CAIRO STATION
2. BAGHDAD STATION
1. The NAMIR Council: During this period, fundamental changes were to take place 
in this Council. From 1987-1991, the Head of the Executive Committee was 
replaced by Bakhtiar on three separate occasions, following the removal of A.R. 
Boroomand in 1987619, and prior to his eventual return in 1991. In the immediate 
period following the collapse of "White Star", and at a time when Bakhtiar was still 
hopeful of resuming constructive dialogues with the Americans, he replaced 
Boroomand with Mohammad Moshiri (1987-1989), a close loyalist who did not 
harbor overt hostilities towards the previous regime and those who were by 
implication associated with it - ie. Reza Pahlavi. It was during Moshiri's time as 
Chairman of NAMIR's Executive Committee, that most of the pains taking decisions 
involved with the whole process of adjusting to new financial circumstances had to 
be taken. In this respect, Moshiri did fulfill the role of Bakhtiar's "fall guy", in that it 
was he who was mainly blamed for having to do what Bakhtiar, himself, should have 
done a long time before - ie. reduce the size of NAMIR's overgrown bureaucracy 
(which the visiting Head of the Voice of America's Persian Section had aptly
619A position which he had maintained from the beginning.
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described as "Bakhtiar's New Deal" program of giving everyone a job in Paris!)620.
However, only a bureaucrat himself, Moshiri was unable to make use of NAMIR's 
remaining assets, in terms of adding any new life to the organization. Consequently, 
apart from a brief period, when certain genuine attempts were made in order to 
resurrect Bakhtiar's souring relationship with the Young Shah, his period of 
stewardship was one of ignominious decline, during which time NAMIR was to lose 
nearly all its profile as a major movement capable of confronting the Islamic regime.
Moshiri's replacement as the new Chairman of NAMIR's Executive Committee from 
1989-1991, was Sadeq Sadrieh, an ex-senior diplomat who had previously served 
as Iranian Ambassador to Romania, Iraq and Germany621. During his tenure, the 
composition of the Council underwent a significant change, in that all the "Old
“ ^The point that was made to Bakhtiar on many occasions, by a number of his 
advisers, that what had inadvertently taken place'over the years, was the fact that a 
growing bureaucracy had taken the place of a resistance organization. On one 
occasion, during the bickering months in 1986, the writer had confronted Bakhtiar with 
the topic of the salary that the was paying to many of his senior advisers. He was told 
that so long as people were going to receive salaries and bonuses (eg. medical health 
plans etc.) paid by NAMIR,
which was in excess of the salaries that they would be receiving as a potential cabinet 
ministers in a potential government (with the currency exchange rates concerning the 
Rial, being taken into account), then there was absolutely no incentive for them to want 
to go back to Iran (especially given the fact that they would have to confront all sorts 
of trouble and danger etc., for a lot less pay).
^During his brief tenure as Iranian Ambassador to Germany, Sadrieh had in the 
closing days of the Imperial regime, been one of the first amongst serving Ambassadors 
to have abandoned the Shah, by signing on with the revolutionaries. Thrown out of 
office very shortly after the establishment of Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Government 
of the Islamic Republic, Sadrieh had been able to use his contacts in Germany to 
obtain an advisory position with the Mercedez-Benz Organization in Germany. He was 
introduced to Bakhtiar by Ahmad Mirfendereski, and given his previous background in 
Iraq, he soon became the main contact-man with Baghdad. Extremely ambitious, and 
always distrusted by the monarchists, Sadrieh upon entering NAMIR began a process 
of cultivating ties with the anti-monarchist lobby within NAMIR, and at a time when 
Boroomand, was being deliberately kept in the background by Bakhtiar, he was able 
to assume the Chairmanship of NAMIR's Executive Committee.
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Guard" elements (ie. people with previous connections to the Pahlavi regime) were 
removed, and replaced by mainly National Front/Student Confederation 
supporters622.
Under Sadrieh, partially successful attempts were made to revive Bakhtiar's sagging 
relations with Iraq, in order to revive NAMIR's financial fortunes; but despite all the 
various new diplomatic initiatives that were taken, lack of support and coordination 
from other sectors of the organization, and most notably the continuing 
ineffectiveness of the Propaganda wing, as well as the eventual defeat of Saddam 
Hussein in the Persian Gulf War, effectively sealed any chance of success which 
Sadrieh may have had, leading to a situation that a bankrupt organization had no 
choice but to restore Boroomand to his former position, on the promise that he 
would personally undertake to finance the cost of running NAMIR. In the short 
period, prior to his assassination in April 1991, Boroomand had not only brought in 
his own associates at every level within what was left of a disintegrating NAMIR, but 
he had, as the controller of the purse strings, also effectively reduced Bakhtiar to a 
position of titular leadership within the organization. Following Boroomand's 
assassination, and his family's reluctance to underwrite any of his previous 
organizational commitments, NAMIR was once again confronted with another severe 
financial crisis that had only become more aggravated by the time when Bakhtiar, 
himself, was assassinated in August 1991.
^ h e  Confederation of Iranian Students, was a relic of the early 1960's, when 
many Iranian students studying abroad had formed a body to express dissatisfaction 
against "the autocratic and corrupt rule of the Shah" and the abuses of his secret 
police, the SAVAK. By the mid-1980's, the bulk of its non-communist members had 
been invited by both Bakhtiar and Boroomand to join NAMIR.
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However what distinguished this period as a whole, was NAMIR's changing political 
attitude, and Bakhtiar's personal utterances, reflective of his increasing frustrations, 
in a direction away from his previously stated positions vis-a-vis the Constitutional 
Monarchists under Reza Pahlavi, and towards committed anti-monarchists623.
Whereas in the previous years, the NAMIR Council and its meetings were nothing 
more than an elaborate show piece to demonstrate nothing more than the 
appearance of "a democratic organization, endowed with a collective decision 
making process", despite the fact that no matter of great importance was ever 
discussed in its proceedings (eg. Operation White Star"), NAMIR's declining 
fortunes, during this period, was able to help make the NAMIR Council, a much 
more serious forum, where actual matters of policy were openly discussed. Indeed, 
a most pertinent example that highlights this point, is the statement made by 
Bakhtiar on 2 May 1987, in which, for the first time, he revealed his feelings of 
frustration and disappointment with the United States624. On another occasion, in 
responding to Reza Pahlavi, who had made a somewhat clumsy and provocative 
speech in Paris625, Bakhtiar brought the matter before the Council, and asked that a 
response written previously by his Propaganda Chief, Iradj Pezeshkzad, in response
“ ^This attitude on the part of Bakhtiar, was only beginning to emerge when he 
was assassinated, and as such, it was able to fully display itself.
^Qyame Iran. Issue No. 197, dated 14 May 1987. In an unprecedented speech 
before the NAMIR Council, Bakhtiar spoke of his "diplomatic frustrations", without any 
reference to "White Star" and said that, "Once they realize that we do not take orders, 
then they are bound to change their ways...". While, this statement may not have been 
indicative of anything precise, it was nevertheless a signal that all was not well with the 
state of Bakhtiar's relations with the West.
625Where he had made certain comments addressed to wealthy Iranians who 
were not supporting "the Cause", by saying that he would personally "retaliate against 
them", as well as having condemned the Nojeh Project as "uncalculated and 
dangerous" etc...
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to the Shah626, be adopted as NAMIR's official response to the views expressed by 
him627.
2. The Council of Advisers: The most important consequence of the internal 
bickering within NAMIR in the preceding years, was the growing importance of the 
role of this forum in shaping Bakhtiar's policies during the period of 1987-89, when 
Mohammad Moshiri, one of Bakhtiar's closest and most trusted advisers, also 
become the Chairman of NAMIR's Executive Committee.
Indeed, it was within the Council of Advisers, that the first discussions on having to 
come to terms with the new fiscal realities confronting NAMIR were discussed. 
Entailed in any such discussion was the ultimate laying of all blames at the feet of 
A.R. Boroomand628, who simply found the hostile atmosphere too intimidating, and 
as a result, came to the 'voluntary' conclusion that he would no longer participate in 
any further meetings.
However, by the time that Moshiri had resigned from the Chairmanship of NAMIR's 
Executive Council, a serious rift had emerged between those in the Council of 
Advisers and the NAMIR Council, on many important issues. Personal animosities 
aside, perhaps, one of the most important items over which differences of attitude 
were becoming more apparent, was NAMIR's attitude and approach towards the
626Qvame Iran. Issue No. 210, dated 12 November 1987;
627Qvame Iran. Issue No. 211, dated 26 November 1987.
“ ^This was perhaps unfair, in that Bakhtiar was equally to blame for everything 
that had gone wrong, and had been adequately warned in advance of Boroomand's 
irregular mode of behavior. However, while the majority of the Council of Advisers, 
shared a feeling of dislike towards Boroomand, they were all too considerate of their 
own positions to confront and criticize Bakhtiar directly.
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whole issue of ties with Reza Pahlavi and the constitutional monarchists. Contrary to 
views generally expressed by Boroomand supporters in the NAMIR Council, the 
Advisers were aM outspokenly opposed to any orchestrated acts of provocation, on 
the part of NAMIR, against the Shah, based on a solid conviction that only through a 
resolution of differences and the expansion of relations with Reza Pahlavi, could 
Bakhtiar (and the Shah) have any realistic chance of political success in the future.
In retrospect, there is no doubt that with the passage of time during the course of 
this period, and most particularly as Bakhtiar's role as a major political figure 
became more marginalized629, there was a simultaneous decline in the role hitherto 
played by the Council of Advisers, whose counsel, even at the best of times, had 
served a limited purpose630.
3. The Military Wina: The section which suffered the most as a consequence of 
NAMIR's worsening financial circumstances, was the Military Wing, headed by 
Brigadier General Amir Hossein Shahrdar. While, past activities conducted by 
NAMIR-MW, through its internal and external branches631, coupled with the 
operation plans conceived and drawn up by General Shahrdar, were the main 
reasons behind the interest shown by both the US and Saudi Arabia, it was obvious 
that any reduction in the budget or activities of this section would also have a direct
629Because of his increasing isolation and worsening financial disposition.
^ In  real terms, the Council of Advisers was nothing more than a weekly social 
gathering. It was an expensive luxury, which for over a period of ten years discussed 
nothing more than soft ideas, and never made any significant contribution to Bakhtiar's 
mode of action or correct decision making. Although, the Council continued, out of 
loyalty, to convene its "Wednesday afternoon meetings", even when Bakhtiar was no 
longer able to meet its salary obligations, its role and contribution was no more than 
what it had been in all the previous years.
631 External branches in Turkey, Pakistan and the UAE (Dubai).
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effect on the general marketability of Bakhtiar himself - ie. deprived of the assets 
and intelligence associated with NAMIR-MW, Bakhtiar would no longer be able to 
command the type of attention that had in the past distinguished him from a whole 
host of other political opposition figures.
However, with the effective shelving of "White Star", and the 'drying up' of Bakhtiar's 
financial resources, the fate of this section was essentially sealed, as early as the 
opening months of 1987.
It is important to note that in the preparatory years, 1983-1986, NAMIR's foreign 
policy was being coordinated in a way that could only benefit the various links that 
NAMIR-MW was trying to establish inside the country632. But, during the period, 
1987-1990, the need to raise funds had forced NAMIR to court parties in the 
international community, such as Iraq and the PLO, which were strongly despised by 
the entire Iranian Military establishment. Hence, there was no longer any form of 
policy coordination between the expression of NAMIR's political objectives and the 
constraints faced by NAMIR-MW, in the conduct of its affairs633.
What eventually transpired was the continuation of a much reduced section, devoid 
of a useful mission634, and in communication with elements whose most basic needs,
^ ie . The American connection, which was deemed essential by all in order to 
win the support of the Iranian Military establishment.
633i.e., Pursuing fraternal relations with Iraq and the PLO ran in complete 
contradiction with fostering support from within the Iranian armed forces.
634lts sole mission being one of simply maintaining links with established assets 
and acquiring general intelligence.
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the organization as a whole, was no longer able to address635.
4. The Propaganda Wing: The one section which may have been able to turn 
matters around for Bakhtiar during this final period, and transform his sagging 
fortunes was NAMIR's propaganda wing, which was the one organ whose assets 
had remained more or less intact, and in full operation (see Chart 4).
However, the lack of a well thought out propaganda strategy and an alert of team of 
propaganda specialists, meant that Bakhtiar was unable to make the necessary 
usage of the tools still available to him636, which in the least, could have been 
employed to enhance his standing in the outside world and assist his much needed 
fund raising campaigns637.
While , NAMIR's propaganda section was not short of talent, in that some of Iran's 
best known writers and broadcasters such as Iradj Pezeshkzad638 and Mehdi 
Ghassemi639, were responsible for the day to day management of its apparatus, it 
was, however, blatantly clear that both these men and others who were employed 
under them lacked an overall view of the type of strategy that would be required to
635This section was eventually wound up in December 1990 (Source: interview 
with General Shahrdar - Paris, 26/11/94)
636lt has to mentioned that to this day, no other Iranian exile group, with the 
exception of the Mojahedin, have been able to have access to the kind of propaganda 
machinery that was made available to Bakhtiar.
637By demonstrating to world leaders that he was a well known Iranian leader, 
with the means and the ability to have a daily input into Iran, etc...
^A n  ex-diplomat and the renowned author of Daii-Jan Napoleon (meaning My 
Uncle Napoleon), which is perhaps the best selling Iranian book in contemporary times.
639A talented broadcaster and ex-Tudeh Party member, turned democrat.
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enhance the promotion and the maintenance of Bakhtiar's image both amongst 
Iranians (at home and in exile), as well as the international community. This lack of 
mission meant that only limited use was made of what had become NAMIR's 
flagship.
The propaganda strategy that was developed and enacted by Bakhtiar, was one in 
which the future of the Islamic regime - and by inference that of NAMIR, was made 
contingent in a "total" way on the outcome of two separate factors:
a. The ending of the Iran-lraq War
b. The death of Ayatollah Khomeini
a. The Call for Ending the War
Bakhtiar's greatest moments of achievement in exile - 5th August 1983 and 17th 
May 1985, were both directly related to his views regarding the continuing futile war 
with Iraq, that was responsible for severe casualties, and a ruinous effect on the 
Iranian economy. On the advice of Ahmad Mirfendereski, Bakhtiar had also begun 
to employ Lenin's famous slogan of "Land, Peace and Bread", in the early 1980s, 
and this strategy had paid significant dividends, the most notable of which were the 
peaceful demonstrations which took place, at Bakhtiar's behest, in May 1985. 
However, in calling for peace, something which all Iranians wanted, there was a 
failure on the part of Bakhtiar and his advisers in the propaganda section to 
safeguard against a variety of unforseen developments, by having a number of well 
thought out contingency plans (incase of certain outcomes, such as the 
establishment a cease fire and an end to all hostilities, etc.). The most important 
development that was to take place in the international community with regards to
247
the Iran-lraq War, was the passage by the United Nations Security Council of 
Resolution 598 in July 1987, which was to create a great deal of controversy within 
the Iranian exile community, and seriously damage Bakhtiar's position as a 
'nationalist' figure.
Bakhtiar And The Controversy Around UNSCR 598________________________
United Nations Security Council 598 of 20th July 1987, had come on the back of two 
earlier efforts by the United Nations to call for a cease fire in the Iran-lraq War. The 
first, had come some eight days after the start of the War640, in the form of UNSCR 
479 of 28 September 1980, calling for a cease-fire, without linking it to a withdrawal 
forces to the previously accepted international boundaries641. Whether or not such a 
call for a withdrawal would have been heeded, from the view point of the Iranian 
government, "the members of the Security Council had a clear duty to uphold the 
principles of the U.N. Charter". Thus by appearing to condone Iraq's invasion of Iran 
, the Security Council had confirmed the Islamic regime's worst suspicions. Here, it 
is essential to point out that while Bakhtiar had not condemned the international 
body for its failure to respond responsibly in face of Iraq's blatant aggression642, a 
position taken by him on the advice of Ahmad Mirfendereski ( i.e., that the hostilities 
should cease and both sides should withdraw to border positions that had been
^Leaving the Iranian side to feel that the international community was willing 
to give the Iraqis ample time to solidify their positions inside Iranian territory, before 
calling for a cease-fire.
641 From an Iranian point of view, this omission had seriously compromised the 
position of the Security Council, and an immediate parallel was drawn between this 
decision and the Security Council's failure in 1967 to call for a withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the Arab territories which it had seized.
^Some thing which was eventually corrected by Javiar Perez de Cuellar, in the 
dying days of his tenure as Secretary General of the United Nations.
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established on the basis of the 1975 Algiers Treaty), was announced and 
subsequently held consistently throughout the war years, which made any future 
Iranian relations with Iraq, contingent on adherence to the previously agreed 
provisions of the 1975 Algiers Treaty643. However, it is essential to point out, that 
Mirfendereski, having escaped from Iran in mid-1980, had not arrived in Paris until 
28 October 1980 - more than a month after Iraq's invasion of Iran, and the statement 
of Policy drafted by Mirfendereski (with the assistance of the Iranian writer Amir 
Taheri -subsequently published also in the 1st edition of Voice of Iran - did not come 
out till 14 November 1980.The fact that no statement of substance was made by 
Bakhtiar during this gap in time - i.e., 22 September to 14 November, has been a 
matter of controversy which has prompted certain
negative speculations by Bakhtiar's enemies on the subject of his collusion with 
Iraq644.
Subsequent to the passage of UNSCR 479, for some 22 months the Security 
Council had essentially ignored the conflict, given that the fruitless stalemate which 
had set in only weeks after the war had begun, was unlikely to harm the interests of 
any third parties645. Indeed, it was only when Iranian forces had expelled the Iraqis 
and were poised to enter Iraq that the Security Council was hastily reconvened to 
discuss the war. Meanwhile, numerous peace initiatives- eg. those taken by 
President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference, and Olaf Palme, the Special representative of the Secretary General -
643lnterview with Ahmad Mirfendereski, Paris, 7 March 1994.
•“ Ibid.
645This complacency was also shared by the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, who
felt tiat a mutual weakening of Iraq and Iran, was a positive factor.
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had been undertaken, in an attempt to negotiate or mediate a settlement between 
Iran and Iraq, in the hope of ending hostilities. Also, an initiative taken by the 
government of Algeria646, had come to an abrupt end when the Algerian Foreign 
Minister and the institutional capacity which he had created to address this issue 
were all killed in a plane crash in May 1982647.
Finally, in 1984, the Secretary General succeeded in getting both parties to agree to 
a moratorium on attacks against civilian targets. This arrangement which did last for 
some 9 months648, was the last major initiative prior to the passage of UNSCR 598, 
which was adopted at a time of increasing threat to regional peace and security. 
However, UNSCR 598, fell far short of Iranian expectations, in that it was perceived 
by many Iranians to have been more advantageous to Iraq, for while not having 
named Iraq as the party which had started the war649, it called for a cease fire with 
both sides withdrawing their forces to their pre-war borders. This was contrary to the 
provisions of an earlier Security Council which had not insisted on any force 
withdrawals at the outset of war when the Iraqis had held large chunks of Iranian 
territory.
The Controversy Over UNSCR 598______________________________________
64eWith whom Iran enjoyed good relations, and which was responsive to the need 
that Iran's sense of grievance should be addressed by the international community.
^This point - as well as speculation that the Algerian Foreign Minister's plane 
had been shot down by the Islamic regime - was highlighted in an article entitled, 
"Soghoot Havapeymaye Ben Yahya" (The Crash of Bin Yahya's Plane"), printed in 
NEHZAT. Issue No. 15, dated 6 May 1982
648Until Iraq broke the agreement by launching air attacks against Iranian cities 
in March 1985.
^Something that was not dealt with till the closing days of Perez de Cuellar's 
dying days in office as Secretary General of the United Nations.
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In the inevitable debate that was to follow the passage of UNSCR 598 (See Annex 
3), from the period following its passage in July 1987, up to the time when the 
Iranian government decided to accept its provisions in a desperate attempt to avert 
a full-scale military collapse in July 1988 (paving the way for the establishment of a 
cease fire in August 1988), basic objections on the part of a number of Iranian exile 
groups (inclusive of the Islamic regime) to UNSCR 598, mainly centered around the 
following arguments:
* UNSCR 598 seemed to favor Iraq in that it called on Iran to accept a cease­
fire, and return to international borders set in 1975, prior to any kind of a settlement 
(inclusive of war reparations), despite the fact that it was Iraq which had unilaterally 
violated those borders in 1980. Thus, buy withdrawing, the Iranians stood to lose 
any leverage which they might have had in negotiating a just and honourable 
settlement.
* Article 6 of the UNSCR 598, asked the Secretary General to "explore" the 
question of forming an impartial body to inquire into the responsibility for the conflict. 
Thus, UNSCR 598 did not even guarantee the formation of such a body, whose task 
it would have been to name the culprit responsible for starting the war.650
The first public statement, highlighting the above points, was made by a newly 
formed organization, "Friends of Iran (FOI) - Campaign for Democracy and Human 
Rights", which had come to replace the former London Liaison Office of Shapour
^'Objecting to Injustice for the Sake of Long Term Peace", Voice of Iran. Issue 
No.22, Winter 1987, p. 12.
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Bakhtiar. In the first statement of its kind, printed in Kayhan (London print)651 of 22 
October 1987, the FOI citing the reasons mentioned above, stated that it considered 
the provisions of UNSCR 598, as they stood, to be "contrary to the interests of the 
Iranian nation.."652. Subsequently, this entire issue was also taken up by the Kayhan 
establishment itself, which in an editorial dated 19 November 1987, having stated 
that it was "the duty of all nationalist leaders to alert the United Nations as well as 
the big powers of the inadequacies of this resolution653", asked that the "Iranian 
Opposition should clarify its position regarding this issue".
Beginning with the FOI654, other opposition groups - including NAMIR, had gradually 
declared their positions, and by January 1988, when Kayhan devoted an entire page 
to the consideration of UNSCR 598655, the debate around this issue had obtained a
^This was an exile publication, and should not be confused with a publication 
of a similar name printed in Iran, which also had an international edition.
^ ^ h e  publication of this statement, was the "final straw that broke the back of 
all relations" between Bakhtiar and the writer, and essentially brought to an end any 
chance of a possible political reconciliation between them.
653This was, particularly, due to the fact that it had been suggested that an arms 
embargo should be placed on Iran, as a punitive measure for not having announced its 
acceptance of the resolution. The common position, first advocated by the 'Friends of 
Iran', was that "every international pressure should be applied equally to both countries 
for the sake of obtaining a just and lasting peace" (Source: Voice of Iran. Issue No.22, 
Winter 1987 and FOI Press Release, dated 22 January 1988) - a position that was also 
supported by the Kayhan editorial.
^ Kayhan (London Print), 26 November 1987.
655The entire back page (size A3 x 2) of the 7 January 1988 edition of Kayhan 
(London Print) was devoted to this matter. In an editorial entitled "Why Everyone is for 
the Implementation of UNSCR 598?", Kayhan blamed the Western Powers, who having 
seen their interests being threatened in the Persian Gulf, were behind trying to 
implementation this unjust resolution. The same editorial also condemned the Islamic 
regime, because of its lack of diplomatic skill, for having landed Iran in the current 
situation, and blamed some Iranian opposition leaders for "simply repeating all that has 
been approved by the U.N., as well as spinelessly taking refuge behind this 
organization in the hope of not alienating anybody!" (Amongst other issues carried in 
the same page, were another editorial entitled "Iran should not withdraw", along with
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position of paramount importance within the Iranian political community in exile. 
Indeed, comments regarding general dissatisfaction with this issue was not confined 
to Iranian publications, and thus, as apart of a well orchestrated campaign, spear 
headed by FOI, many comments and complaints regarding this issue had also been 
able to reach the "Letters to Editor" pages of many important international 
newspapers, such as The Guardian656. The Times657. The Financial Times658. The 
International Herald Tribune659, and The Frankfurter Alleamane660.
Furthermore, in March 1988, a petition campaign was launched by the 'Friends of 
Iran', with the assistance of the Kayhan Publications Ltd. (printers of the London 
Kavhan661) in London, in which Iranian readers of the Kayhan were urged to support 
the following text that was drafted for the purpose of petitioning the U.N. Secretary 
General:
a Farsi translation of the UNSCR 598, and the full text of a letter dated 24 December 
1987, addressed to the U.N. Secretary General by the Chairman of the 'Friends of Iran', 
which was also widely distributed amongst Security Council Members, as well as the 
members of the London Diplomatic Corps - urging them to brief their respective 
governments about the existing inadequacies in UNSCR 
598).
65612 March 1988.
65717 March 1988.
65818 July 1988.
65913 July 1988 and 30 June 1988.
66012 April 1988.
661 Kayhan. printed in London (Not to be confused with the newspaper of the 
same name printed in Iran) was founded in 1983 by Dr. Mostafa Mesbahzadeh, the 
founder of the Kayhan Publication Empire in Iran, with the financial support of Princess 
Ashraf Pahlavi. Dubbed by the Islamic regime as the "Monarchist Kayhan", it has, 
without question, become the most widely read Iranian weekly publication in exile (with 
sales of around 10,000 copies per week, and a readership of around as much as five 
times the actual subscription figures).
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"We the undersigned Iranians living abroad, bearing in mind the fact that the 
government of Iraq has once again, with the bombing of Teheran on 27 February, 
resumied its campaign of "War against the cities", which has resulted in the needless 
inhuman death of many of our innocent and defenseless compatriots (as well as that 
of many ordinary and innocent citizens of Iraq), respectfully request the members of 
the Security Council to convene a special session of the Security Council for 
purposes of amending UNSCR 598, thereby creating the appropriate circumstances 
which will make it possible to attain the support of the peace-loving people of Iran 
who want nothing more than a lasting cease fire in the hostilities, leading to an 
honourable peace and a just end to this futile war".662
By early May 1988, according to Kayhan. a staggering 1082 readers ie. Iranians of 
all political persuasions - had signed and returned the petition form, supporting the 
FOI sponsored collective action for amending UNSCR 598663.
Bakhtiar's reaction to this whole matter, was indicative of the failure of his 
subordinates in NAMIR's Propaganda wing to correctly assess the ongoing situation 
(inclusive of the mood of ordinary Iranian exiles), as well as their failure to come up 
with a proper strategy that would allow Bakhtiar to be seen as a "popular nationalist 
leader, in touch with the simple future aspirations of ordinary Iranians"664.
662Kavhan (London Print), 17 March 1988.
663Kavhan (London Print), 5 May 1988.
^ In  June 1988, a Bakhtiar supporter, by the name (or pseudo-name) of 'Arash 
Parsi" wrote a letter supportive of Bakhtiar and "his plans to overthrow the Ayatollah 
Khomeini" which was published in the 7 June 1988 edition of the International Herald 
Tribune. However, in the political situation that had become extremely charged up 
because of the various posturing related to UNSCR 598, another Iranian by the name 
of 'Mahmoud Marashi', sharply responded to Mr. Parsi's letter - printed in the 
International herald Tribune on 7 July 1988, by referring to Bakhtiar, as some one "who
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In the final analysis, Bakhtiar refused to display any sensitivity to any of the points 
that had been raised against the inadequacies of UNSCR 598, and made it a 
personal crusade to urge all Iranians "to publicize the resolution (in its original form) 
to the best of their abilities"665. Moreover, in another radio message to people in 
Iran, Bakhtiar also made a venomous attack on all parties who had expressed their 
reservations666, and consequently began a needless series of attacks and counter 
attacks667, which not only failed to serve any useful purpose, but were very 
instrumental in damaging his own credentials as a nationalist leader668.
Perhaps, no other incident, more than this, had hitherto, demonstrated Bakhtiar's 
lack of adequate political depth and sensitivity669. In addition, instead of using this
was politically dead, asserting that the future belonged to a new generation of young 
leaders...".
^Bakhtiar's radio message to the Iranian people in January 1988, the full text 
of which was printed in Issue No. 214 of Qvame Iran, dated 7 January 1988.
666Radio message of 22 April 1988, printed in Issue No. 222 of Qvame Iran, 
dated 28 April 1988.
^ In  an open letter dated 13 May 1988, which was subsequently published in a 
number of exiled publications, 'Friends of Iran' strongly responded to Bakhtiar, and in 
an atmosphere that had become tremendously charged up, was given a great deal 
"behind the scenes" support, including letters of praise from a broad range of Iranians 
that also included many die hard opponents of Bakhtiar such as Princess Ashraf 
Pahlavi (5/07/88).
^Bakhtiar had become engaged, and later outflanked, over this sensitive and 
highly emotional issue - over which there should never have been any disagreements 
whatsoever, given the fact that the critics of UNSCR 598 (with the exception of the 
Islamic regime, which, at the time, still needed to continue with the war for reasons of 
survival), were all supportive of the spirit of the resolution, and only sought certain 
adjustments to its otherwise acceptable text.
669He was to make another serious mistake of equal importance in late 1990, 
when during the course of an interview with the French daily Le Figaro, he justified 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by saying something to the effect that "Why should Iraq not 
have a larger coastal line on the Persian Gulf.."! This was to create a serious uproar,
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inadequate resolution, as another stick with which to beat the Islamic Republic670, he 
allowed himself to be sidetracked into adopting positions that were to seriously 
challenge his reputation, by assisting those who had over the years constantly 
labeled him as an "Iraqi mercenary".
There is no question that both Bakhtiar and his propaganda machine, failed to 
properly comprehend the nuances that exited between "the people's hatred for war, 
and their desire for a just peace" - ie. while, most people in Iran wanted to see an 
end to the then 7 year old Iran-lraq War, they also wanted to ensure, to the best of 
their abilities, that every effort was also made to obtain the best possible deal for 
Iran.
It was precisely over this issue, that Bakhtiar allowed himself to become outflanked. 
Indeed, while nothing more than the actual provisions of UNSCR 598 may have 
been realistically attainable, there was absolutely no reason for Bakhtiar, to validate 
its inadequacies, given that many other nationalist organizations - as well as the 
Islamic regime - had not failed to speak up about them. In fact, in a survey that was 
published in an Iranian publication printed in exile, only Bakhtiar, the Mojahedin 
Khalq, and some pro-Soviet, communist splinter groups, had unreservedly 
supported the provisions of UNSCR 598, at a time when almost every other political 
organization and publication, both inside and outside Iran, had expressed serious
and although, he later claimed that he had been misquoted, the damage was already 
done.
670For its failure in diplomacy, to better safeguard the interests of the Iranian 
people (having boycotted various preliminary sessions of the Security Council prior to 
the passage of UNSCR 598, as well as their inability to lobby enough countries, for 
purposes of ensuring a more balanced final draft of the resolution).
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reservations about it671.
Chart 5:
Positions adopted bv Iranian Political 
Organizations and Publications 
on UNSCR 598672
Internal
Political
Organization
SUPPORTS/
FAVORS
NONE
OPPOSED TO/
HAS RESERVATION
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
FREEDOM MOVEMENT 
SOCIETY FOR THE DEFENSE 
OF PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY
Exiled
Political
Organization
Internal
Publication
Exiled
Publication
PMOI673
NAMIR
SPLINTER
COMMUNISTS
NONE
PMOI Publications 
NAMIR
Rouzegar-e Now 678
FLI674
FRIENDS OF IRAN675 
MONARCHISTS 
MILITARY GROUPS 
(eg. A.R.A. 676)
ALL
Kayhan (London Print) 
Voice of Iran677 
Nationalist Publications
671Voice of Iran. Issue No. 22, Winter 1988, p.7
672Source: Voice of Iran (Tribune of the Iranian Resistance - Published by 
'Friends of Iran - Campaign for Democracy and Human Rights', Issue No. 22, Winter
1987.
673People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran.
674Front for the Liberation of Iran (Dr. Ali Amini).
675A London based human rights group, formed by the writer after splitting up 
with Bakhtiar, and responsible for the first major statement that was printed in the 
Iranian exiled press against UNSCR 598 (Kayhan (London Print), 22 October 1987).
676 "Arteshe Rahaii Bakhshe Iran" (Iran Liberation Army), a small military 
grouping, led by General Javad Moinzadeh, that had its own publication, and was 
closely associated with General Gholam Ali Oveissi, in the initial years after the 
Revolution.
677Previously, Tribune of NAMIR, but having become the "Tribune of the Iranian 
Resistance", and published in London by the Friends of Iran.
678Saudi Arabian backed and financed, supportive of the Arab position.
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Another point, missed by NAMIR's Propaganda Wing, was the fact that, as a 
consequence of the arguments which had evolved, the nationalist sentiments of 
ordinary Iranians, were being exploited by the Islamic regime in order to prolong the 
futile war, with public support (not because they wanted to continue the conflict, but 
because they felt that UNSCR 598 would not eventually settle the dispute justly). 
Indeed, at no time did the NAMIR Propaganda machine, apart from attacking those 
opposed to the UNSCR 598, try and exert any pressure on the Islamic regime, by 
condemning it for its role in not having prevented the Security Council for failing to take 
Iranian national interest into account when it debated the contents of the resolution679. 
Nor, did it ever accuse or attack the United Nations Security Council (and some of its 
members!) for its actions, in having failed to act in a neutral manner, over a matter of 
such enormous importance.
Even after the defeat of the Iranian forces in Fao, and their rapid withdrawal back inside 
Iranian territory by May 1988, when one of the most important points of contention - 
namely Iranian withdrawal from occupied positions in Fao and the oil rich Majnoon 
Islands680, was no longer an issue, neither Bakhtiar, nor any one associated with him, 
ever tried to adopt a new posture, by trying to form some form of a consensus with all 
other nationalist groups, that were highly distressed about the tremendous setbacks to 
which the country had been subjected. On the contrary, even when the Islamic regime
679lt goes without saying that NAMIR had always criticized the Islamic Republic 
for its various failures to safeguard Iranian interests. However, no special attempt was 
made to exploit, in exact terms, what the Islamic regime could have done at the U.N., 
prior to the passage of UNSCR 598 to ensure that Iranian interests would been taken 
into full consideration by the Security Council.
“ ‘’Which could theoretically have served as a means for Iran to recuperate war 
reparations from Iraq.
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had been forced, to accept a cease fire on the basis of UNSCR 598, NAMIR adopted 
a more arrogant "I told you so" attitude, oblivious of the obvious shortcomings of 
UNSCR 598681, that had eventually been forced upon the Iranian nation, in 
circumstances which were nothing short of an extreme national humiliation.
Nonetheless, it was not until such time that a cease-fire had actually come into force, 
that the inadequacies of Bakhtiar's policy of the past 8 years, came into full view. For 
almost 8 years, the Bakhtiar organization had constantly said that the perpetuation of 
the regime was directly related to its continued perpetuation of the war. In numerous 
statements, he had said that once the war was over, the Khomeini regime would not 
be able to survive the peace682. While, the hatred for war and the desire for a just 
peace, was of paramount importance to ordinary Iranians, as demonstrated by their 
positive response to Bakhtiar in May 1985, there was a definite failure on the part of 
Bakhtiar and NAMIR to have various contingency plans for a peace time scenario. As 
a result, when peace had actually come, they were left with a 'fait accompli', situation683, 
at a time when they did not even have a worked out strategy of their own to deal with 
the new circumstances.
So, in conclusion, NAMIR's Propaganda Section, was without a meaningful message 
at a critical point of transition, and as a result, the Islamic Republic was given a free 
ticket to begin a new campaign of its own to sway Iranian technocrats and Western
681 It is important at all times to underline the fact that all Iranians were supportive 
of the spirit of UNSCR 598. The only objections that were expressed had to do with 
some of its provisions (or lack of it as in the case of omitting to name Iraq as the 
aggressor).
682ln simple terms, this was the message that had been repeatedly given by 
Bakhtiar since the early 1980's.
683over whose direction they had absolutely no control
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than ever before. In short, contrary to views previously stated by NAMIR, ending the 
war, far from ending the life of the Islamic Republic, appeared to be giving it a brand 
new lease on life.
b. The Death of Avatollah Khomeini
Apart from having linked the continuation of the life of the Islamic Republic to the 
perpetuation of the war against Iraq for a period of more than seven years, Bakhtiar and 
NAMIR, had continually asserted that the integrity and the survival of the Islamic regime 
were contingent on Ayatollah Khomeini himself remaining alive684. Thus, they had 
clearly insinuated that without Khomeini, his heirs stood no chance of survival. The fact 
that Khomeini, himself, had unexpectedly continued to live for a period of more than ten 
years after the revolution, had also created an atmosphere of paralysis, in which all 
opposition groups - including NAMIR - were without a strategy to confront that situation, 
once it had finally arrived.
The fact that Khomeini died at a time when he did - ie. at a time when Bakhtiar and 
NAMIR were in a period of decline (as opposed to when they had been in a period of 
ascendence, like in 1985) - was a further disadvantage. However, this did not excuse 
the fact that the NAMIR Propaganda machine was devoid of any meaningful message 
that it could present to the Iranian people once this scenario had come about. While, 
the formation of a useful strategy may have been a difficult proposition to have worked
684Statements such as , "Khomeini's divided heirs who are devoid of credibility 
will not be able to impose themselves on the Iranian nation, once the Ayatollah is no 
longer alive", and "the death of Ayatollah Khomeini will also mark the death of the 
Islamic Republic", etc..., had been a common feature of the type of material that had 
appeared in both Bakhtiar statements, and NAMIR propaganda.
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that it could present to the Iranian people once this scenario had come about. While, 
the formation of a useful strategy may have been a difficult proposition to have worked 
out, the fact that at the time of Khomeini's death, there was no strategy and no change 
to some of the views stated as early as a decade before, was hardly reassuring.
Therefore, once Khomeini had actually died685, all that Bakhtiar could do was to deliver 
a vague message to the Iranian people, for which he had no planned contingencies. 
Apart from what had by then become repetitious rhetoric, Bakhtiar's broadcast that was 
delivered on 4 June 1989, had contained the following message, "...The Iranian people 
have become aware of the true nature of the mullahs, and they will show no weakness 
in the struggle which they have started. But, I ask them to be more vigilant than ever 
before. I strongly, advise the following to all my brothers and sisters, and particularly 
the military and security forces: Be calm, and remain neutral in the inevitable power 
struggle that is going to take place amongst Khomeini's heirs, so that you may conserve 
all your energies for the moment of action. I shall, at the right time, send you the 
appropriate messages and instructions, which will be ensure the eventual overthrow of 
this corrupt regime..."686.
Sadly, this message was not followed up with any further messages or instructions, and 
by the time that the Iranian presidential elections were being held in July of 1989, there 
is little doubt, that the only hope which the majority of Iranians had come to expect for 
any sort of meaningful change and improvement to their lives, were mostly placed on
^ In  an article entitled, "Iran's Durable Revolution", written by Elaine Sciolino, 
and printed in the Spring 1983 issue of Foreign Affairs, in discussing likely 
developments once Khomeini had died, ex-President Bani-Sadr was humorously 
quoted as having said, "If he dies!".
686Qyame Iran. Issue No. 251, dated 8 June 1989.
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the Islamic Presidential candidate, Hashemi Rafsanjani, not on any leader in exile687. 
This situation was further exacerbated, when unlike Khomeini, who had constantly said 
that "We have not made a revolution for bread and melon", Rafsanjani had taken up 
many of the slogans used by the exiled opposition, such as appealing to the general 
population's desire for economic growth and material well being, in projecting himself688.
Thus, for the second time in a period of less than two years, NAMIR's Propaganda 
Wing had failed to utilize the important resources that were at its disposal by latching 
on to new developments and thus making an impact, following the creation of the "right 
circumstances" which it had itself advocated on numerous previous occasions (ie. the 
ending of the war and the death of Khomeini).
A New Foreign Policy Agenda (1987-1990)________________________________
NAMIR's foreign policy agenda, in this period, was dictated by the urgent need on the 
part of Bakhtiar to keep his organization financially afloat, and to keep his reputation, 
as the hitherto most acceptable political alternative to the Islamic Republic, intact. But 
the passage of time, and the durability of the Islamic regime, and the economic 
prospects which were presented in the aftermath of the ending of the Iran-lraq War, 
were all factors that had seriously tarnished his standing, as a major political figure 
capable of mounting a credible opposition, in many Western capitals. Particularly, in
687ln interviewing many Iranians during the summer of 1989, the constant 
message that was received was the fact that the majority of Iranians had no choice but 
to pin their hopes on Rafsanjani, mainly because, as one Iranian technocrat living in 
France had said, "the people could not see or feel the presence of any body else 
beside Rafsanjani".
688lt was not until a much later time, when the people had come to suspect 
Rafsanjani as being incapable of delivering the promises which he had made, that 
some were reportedly willing to listen to exile leaders such as Bakhtiar or Reza Pahlavi.
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the United States, which was the only major power with a 'grudge' against the Islamic 
Republic689, the whole previous experience of dealing with an "uninspiring"690 Bakhtiar 
during the planning stages of "Operation White Star", had created a situation where 
there was no incentive to want to resume working him again691. And once key 
supporters of "Operation White Star" had been removed from office in Washington, in 
the aftermath of the "Irangate" scandal, all the main doors in America had been 
slammed 692, leaving him with no "inside" venue to pursue his requirements.
In the United Kingdom, where, in the pre-Salman Rushdie period, the British 
government had enjoyed reasonably good diplomatic relations with Iran, Bakhtiar was 
never taken very seriously, even at the best of times. While, always pursuing a 
"pragmatic policy" of dealing essentially with those in power, as opposed to those in 
opposition693 - no matter how distasteful a regime might be - the British government,
689Because of the continued holding of American citizens as hostages in 
Lebanon, and the whole host of previous "bad" experiences, such as having been 
associated with "Irangate", etc.
690 This view was confidentially expressed by a number of senior White House 
officials, including both Howard Teicher and Vincent Cannistraro.
691 According to a senior CIA contact with NAMIR in 1986, who was introduced 
as "Ken Adams" to Bakhtiar, a point was fast reaching that "the internal quarreling was 
'boring everyone' to an extent that they would be ready to drop everything and go 
home".
692lt should be pointed out that following the resignation of Admiral John 
Poindexter, as National Security Adviser to the President, neither of his successors in 
the Reagan Administration (Frank Carlucci and Colin Powel, were willing to involve the 
White House in any Iran related affair, and most particularly in dealing with Iranian exile 
groups. The CIA, on the other hand, for purposes of acquiring intelligence, had wanted 
to keep in contact with some of Bakhtiar's key advisers, such as General Shahrdar, on 
an individual basis, with the clear understanding that such a relationship would have 
nothing to do with NAMIR or Bakhtiar - something which General Shahrdar had 
declined.
693This is a point that was stressed to the writer by Richard Ryder, M.P. (the 
current Conservative Chief Whip) in a meeting at the Carlton Club, on 16 June 1986.
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with the passage of time, had become more skeptical of any realistic chance that any 
exile group might have for regaining power in Iran. As far as Bakhtiar was concerned, 
this situation was further aggravated, when, on his instructions, NAMIR initiated a policy 
of courting the Labour and the Liberal Parties, in order to enhance his profile across 
the whole spectrum of British political life694. From 1987 onwards, and particularly 
following the closure of NAMIR's London office in 1988695, Bakhtiar, no longer able to 
keep up with advancing events - the most important of which was British efforts to 
jockey for business contracts in the aftermath of the establishment of a cease fire in the 
Iran-lraq War - had fast begun the process of fading into political irrelevance696.
Bakhtiar's problems - ie. a worsening economic situation, and his inability to continue 
maintaining a high profile - were compounded by a new resurgence in the image of the 
Islamic Republic, which had succeeded in relieving itself of the burden of the Iran-lraq 
War. To Bakhtiar's extreme detriment, the governments in both Paris and Bonn, were 
also far more interested in developing business ties with Iran, which meant assisting 
the projection of the image of the emerging Iranian strongman, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as 
a "practical and moderate leader, with whom the west could work". This notion was 
cemented, when in November 1988, the German Foreign Minister, Herr Hans Dietrich
^ A  feat which had harmed Bakhtiar's situation with the Thatcher government, 
and which was made worse when in February 1987, Qvame Iran (Issue No. 189, dated 
5/2/87), carried an article attacking the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, 
while at the same time, printing a letter of support which Bakhtiar had received from the 
Leader of the British Liberal Party.
695Due to NAMIR's worsening economic situation.
^Even after Khomeini's Fatwa against the British writer, Salman Rushdie, had 
led to a break up of Anglo-lranian diplomatic ties, Bakhtiar no longer had the means to 
re-inject any life into his sagging fortunes in the United Kingdom.
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Gensher made an official visit to Teheran697, leaving no doubts that Europe was hoping 
to improve its relations with the Islamic Republic698.
This was a serious blow to Bakhtiar, and to any plans that he might have had at the 
time for soliciting French and German support for his plans of liberating Iran.
Increasingly isolated, desperately short of funds, and no longer considered a 'serious 
player1 by nearly all the major Western powers, Bakhtiar had little choice but to turn to 
the Middle Eastern enemies of Ayatollah Khomeini, in order to raise the adequate funds 
needed to sustain his campaign, and keep his hopes alive. And in this category, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, and later the PLO, were the only real choices available to Bakhtiar, who 
were endowed with the basic potentials of assisting him to achieve this objective, which 
had, by then, become first and foremost, for ensuring the survival of NAMIR699.
697The first of its kind by any major European Foreign Minister, since the Iranian 
Revolution.
^ In  the hope of improving German ties with the Islamic Republic, Gensher was 
instrumental in blocking the visit to Germany of Reza Pahlavi in December 1988, in a 
political rally in which more than 6000 Iranian monarchists participated. However, the 
official reason given by the German government, was that Reza Pahlavi's name had 
been on a list of individuals, dating back to 1986, who had been banned from entering 
Germany. When the writer, in a private meeting with the German Ambassador to the 
UK, asked on behalf of Reza Pahlavi, as to why his name had been placed on such a 
list, the Ambassador said that he would ask Bonn for a response. He duly reported 
back, that "according to Bonn, no reasons were required, as it was the sovereign right 
of any government to refuse entry to any individual". However, once the situation had 
died down, and the Germans had become aware of the reality that no major 
breakthroughs with Iran were likely, the restriction was removed and Reza Pahlavi was 
allowed to visit Germany (which he did on two separate occasions, in 1990 and 1991).
^ In  an interview, Ahmad Mirfendereski disclosed that he had visited Kuwait in 
1986 on a mission for Bakhtiar and NAMIR, where he had held very secret discussions 
with the Minister of Information, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, as 
well as the Amir. In that visit, the Kuwaitis, had displayed a great deal of sympathy for 
NAMIR's cause, but, citing "fear of Iranian reprisal in a situation where they could hear 
Iraqis guns outside their closed doors", they had declined to offer any financial 
assistance to NAMIR (Interview with Ahmad Mirfendereski, Paris, 26 November 1994).
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1. Relations with Saudi Arabia : The shelving of "Operation White Star", in 1987, 
coupled with the general inability of NAMIR to finance its routine lobbying efforts 
(particularly with the media) in key capitals such as Washington, London and Paris, had 
meant that a serious shift, in the entire profile of Bakhtiar in the West, had taken place. 
This shift, had the further negative disadvantage of affecting Bakhtiar's profile and 
relations, with countries such as Saudi Arabia.
As a result, Bakhtiar's relationship with the "Saudi Arabian Palace" officials was no 
longer aided by the fact that he was having an ongoing relationship with Washington. 
Here, it is important to emphasize that Bakhtiar's relationship with Saudi Arabia, was 
always a well compartmentalized matter. In this respect, unlike his situation in Iraq, or 
in Egypt during the time of Sadat - where all contacts had been held with official policy 
makers, going through the proper policy channels (ie. the Presidential office and the 
Intelligence Ministry) - Bakhtiar's ties with the Saudi Arabian government had been 
conducted through the office of the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, who had in turn, 
appointed an intermediary, to keep in touch with Bakhtiar and his activities in NAMIR.
In nearly all discussions that had taken place between the intermediary and Bakhtiar's 
representatives in Paris, the Saudi intermediary, had constantly emphasized the 
importance of NAMIR's connections with the Americans, and had always urged for extra 
US pressure, for the promotion of NAMIR's cause, to be exerted upon his principals in 
Riyadh700. Indeed, the Saudi intermediary had, himself, been in Paris during mid- 
November 1986, when the Irangate Scandal had become unveiled, and had, during the
700This issue has been dealt with in an earlier chapter, and previous reference 
has been given concerning the discussions held between the writer and Mr. Ahmad Al- 
Sheibani, an employee of the
Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, who had been assigned to keep in touch with Bakhtiar.
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course of his stay in Paris, become aware that the US-NAMIR relationship was going 
through a critical stage - which he had, no doubt, reported back to his principal. This 
matter, was in fact, confirmed by Bakhtiar himself, who had displayed open signs of 
anger at "What he had termed as American interference in the internal workings of his 
organization"701.
Later, when US-NAMIR cooperation over "White Star" had come to a complete end, 
Bakhtiar's credibility with the Saudis was immediately affected, in that contrary to 
before, no further word of support was likely to be spoken in his favor, to either the 
Saudi Arabian Palace or to their official channels, such as the Foreign Ministry or their 
intelligence network. Thus, according to Ahmad Mirfendereski, Saudi attitude towards 
NAMIR in the final years of Bakhtiar's activities (more or less as before), was in 
particular, a reflection of Saudi-lranian relations702. In this respect, the Iranian 
government sponsored riots in Mecca of 31 July 1987, which resulted in the death of 
more than 400 Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security officials, provided Bakhtiar with a 
new opportunity to solicit Saudi attention703. In order to utilize this opportunity and 
purposes of keeping previous ties alive, contacts with the designated Saudi 
intermediary were once again resumed, this time through the efforts of the Director of
701This was revealed to the writer, in a private conversation by Mr. Al-Sheibani 
in early November 1986. Bakhtiar, clearly uncomfortable, at the time, about the 
pressures that were being exerted upon him to restructure NAMIR into a leaner, more 
purposeful organization, had come to justify in his own mind, that the report submitted 
by the London Liaison Office in October 1986, urging Bakhtiar to proceed urgently with 
the restructuring of NAMIR, had been dictated by the "Americans". While, later he had 
little choice, himself, but to proceed along the same lines, albeit with different 
personnel, he continued to make acrimonious accusations of this nature, in order to 
cover his own inadequacies.
702lnterview, Paris, 26 November 1994.
703Confidential Briefing Paper (CBP)#1. Prepared by the Friends of Iran - 
Campaign for Democracy and Human Rights, London, September 1987, p.5.
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Bakhtiar's Personal Office, Morteza Ghadimi, a former Iranian diplomat and a 
Mirfendereski protege. After long deliberations, through, Ghadimi's persistent efforts, 
based on the continued Saudi need to "harass" the Islamic Republic, one last trip to 
Saudi Arabia was arranged by the "Palace" in 1989704. Although, no discussion of any 
substance was held during that visit, which once again entailed a pilgrimage to the holy 
shrines in Mecca and Madinah, a sum of one million dollars, was donated to NAMIR705
Having returned from Saudi Arabia, there was little else which NAMIR could do, other 
than to issue supportive messages from time to time in support of the Saudi 
government, in order to keep their lines of communication alive706. However, once Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, NAMIR was forced into an unwanted situation of having to choose to 
give precedence to its only remaining benefactor. While, making such a decision was 
most difficult and highly unwelcome by Bakhtiar, the fact remained that NAMIR's main 
benefactor over the years had been none other than the regime of Saddam Hussein707. 
So, most reluctantly, Bakhtiar had no choice but to go along with the regime that had 
supported it consistently throughout the years, and had allowed it to operate a radio 
station from its territory. The direct result of this was the burning of all bridges with
704Accompanying Bakhtiar on this trip were, Morteza Ghadimi. Abbas Gholi 
Bakhtiar, Sadeq Sadrieh, and A.R. Boroomand.
705lnterviewwith Abbas Gholi Bakhtiar, London, 2 December 1994. In a separate 
interview conducted in Paris, on 23 November 1994, Senator Kazem Jafroudi, stated 
that in the final visit to Saudi Arabia in 1989, Bakhtiar was given a personal gift to the 
sum of $2 million. He said, that he had asked for some money as security for the future 
of their joint grandson (Bakhtiar's son was at one time married to Jafroudi's daughter), 
and that he had immediately received a cheque for $200,000.
^eg. NAMIR statement condemning the explosions that were allegedly carried 
out by the Islamic Republic in Mecca - Qvame Iran. Issue No. 254, dated 20 July 1989.
707According to Ahmad Mirfendereski (Interview 26/11/94), NAMIR had received 
the bulk of its financial assistance -estimated to have neared a figure of around US$ 
60-70 million from Iraq. The total amount of Saudi contributions, according to 
Mirfendereski, was never more than US$ 3 million.
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Riyadh, a matter that became irreversible following Bakhtiar's careless and insensitive 
interview with the French daily, Le Figaro, dated 30 August 1990708.
2. Relations with Iraq: Despite the fact that relations between NAMIR and the Iraqi 
government had become adversely affected, in the aftermath of the transfer of the 
Mojahedin head quarters from Paris to Baghdad, and the growing importance that the 
Iraqis were attaching to the effectiveness of the Mojahedin, as a more credible 
alternative, no significant change had taken place in their ongoing relations. Thus, 
NAMIR had continued to receive its regular monthly payment, along with the facilities 
of radio broadcasting that had been made available as early as 1980.
During the mid-1980's, as a consequence of broadening his horizons (ie. through US 
and Saudi Arabia), Bakhtiar had been able to somewhat reduce his level of 
dependence on Iraq to an extent that in many public interviews, he could afford to 
sound critical of the Iraqi regime709. However, by the late-1980's, because of NAMIR's 
worsening financial position, he become more dependent than ever before on the Iraqi 
government, for the maintenance of his organization.
To promote its objectives, apart from the regular contacts made with Bakhtiar in Paris, 
NAMIR had felt the need to send a delegation comprising of two of its most senior 
advisers (Sadeq Sadrieh and Hamid Zolnour) to Baghdad in order to enhance relations, 
and, more importantly, to prevent the Mojahedin from sabotaging their position with
708ln which he was perceived to have taken a pro-Iraqi stance, on the question 
of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
709Text of Bakhtiar's interview with Voice of America, printed in Qyame Iran. 
Issue No. 99, dated 12 October 1984, in which he had said that his relationship with 
Iraq was good, until they had invaded Iran. He had added in the same interview that "All 
I have in Iraq is only a radio station and that is all!".
local government officials in Iraq710.
During the period from early 1987 to the time when allied forces entered Iraqi territory 
in February 1991, and when Saddam Hussein was no longer in a position to sustain 
NAMIR (having terminated their relationship with a lump sum final cash payment), 
Bakhtiar had been able to maintain his ties with Baghdad, and to use that as his only 
remaining base for obtaining the necessary funds required for keeping the chances of 
NAMIR alive. This relationship, had one further benefit, in that having been cut off 
completely from the US, NAMIR had been anxious to try and somehow associate itself 
with the Soviet Union, a country with which Iraq had maintained close links for the 
better part of the past two decades. However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Baghdad had ever responded to this request and requirement.
3. Relations with the Palestine Liberation Orqanization(PLO):
Establishing ties with the PLO, for purposes of advancing NAMIR's objectives, was 
perhaps, the most significant - and the same time extremely controversial - 
breakthrough that was made Bakhtiar in his final years.
The opening had been made possible, not by any one directly associated with NAMIR, 
but by a young, pro-Mossadegh, Iranian journalist by the name of Ali-Reza Nouri-
710According to Hamid Zolnour (interview, Paris, 7 March 1994), in their two visits 
to Baghdad during the period 1987-1989, the Iraqis had shown a great deal of respect 
for Bakhtiar as a national leader. He said that, according to people they had come into 
contact with, the amount of respect which the Iraqis had for Bakhtiar was allegedly 
incomparable to that which they had for the Mojahedin. He said that Bakhtiar and the 
Mojahedin leader, Massoud Rajavi, were never seen in the same light by the Iraqis 
(implying that Bakhtiar was considered as much more "heavy weight" personality than 
Rajavi).
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Zadeh711. Nouri-Zadeh, a London based, Iranian Arabist, had himself been in contact 
with various Palestinian groups in Lebanon, since the early 1970's, and had met and 
interviewed Yasser Arafat, on a number of occasions, including his very high profile 
visit to Iran following the victory of the Islamic Revolution. However, once the Iran-lraq 
War had begun, Arafat's, own relations had begun to sour with the Iranian leadership, 
because of his call for Arab unity and support for Saddam Hussein. The Iranians had 
retaliated by offering political and financial support to many of Arafat's more hardline 
competitors within the Palestinian ranks, such as Ahmad Jebril of the People's Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)-General Command, which was based in Syria, 
and many other Palestinian splinter groups712.
In a meeting with Arafat in February 1988713, Nouri-Zadeh had suggested that the PLO 
should not confine itself to just the Mojahedin714, and should instead try and establish 
more contact with all the popular and democratic forces that were opposed to the way 
in which the Islamic Republic was conducting policy715. Contained in the list suggested
711 Nouri-Zadeh, as a journalist for the Iraqi funded, Sudanese based Arabic 
weekly, Ad Dastour. had displayed great pro-NAMIR sentiments, and had interviewed 
Bakhtiar on a number of occasions. A farsi text of one his most important interviews 
with Bakhtiar had appeared in Issue No. 84 of Qvame Iran, dated 6 March 1984.
712Such as those invited to Teheran, in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 
Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. These included representatives from "HAMAS" 
and its leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, Dr. Fathi Ibrahim Shahghaghi of the Islamic Jihad, 
Namar Saleh of the Salvation Front for Palestine ("Fath-al-Entefazeh"), and the 
Palestinian Shaikh, Abdol Aziz Odeh (Source: A.R. Nouri-Zadeh, London, 08/01/95).
713Who had also begun displaying open hostility to Iran, by holding public 
meetings with some members of the Iranian opposition groups, such as senior 
representatives from the Mojahedin,.
714With whom the PLO had had long previous ties, dating to the years prior to the 
revolution when, Rajavi, had himself been received training in a PLO camp in Jordan.
715This suggestion also included people such as Mehdi Bazargan, who were not 
opposed to the Islamic Republic, but to the provisions emanating from "Velayate 
Faghih", as incorporated by Khomeini, in Iran's National constitution.
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by Nouri-Zadeh716, was Bakhtiar and NAMIR. Subsequent to this suggestion , a series 
of "letters of friendship" were drafted and signed by Arafat to a number of Iranian 
personalities, and given to Nouri-Zadeh, to ensure their safe delivery717. According to 
Nouri-Zadeh, prior to returning to London, he met with Bakhtiar in Paris and hand 
delivered the letter from Arafat. Subsequently, Bakhtiar's response, thanking Arafat for 
his sentiments, and expressing full support for the "right of self-rule for the Palestinian 
people", prompted a visit to Paris by Abu-Khaled718. In his meeting with Bakhtiar, Abu 
Khaled presented Bakhtiar with an ivory replica of the Holy Moslem Shrine in 
Jerusalem, and began a relationship that was to prosper in the coming months (albeit 
against the advice of the majority of his close advisers).
Despite the fact that in the previous years, NAMIR had reacted to excess acts of Israeli 
aggression against the Palestinians in Lebanon719, there had, at the same time, been 
a great deal of hostility against the PLO itself, for its alleged role in having trained 
Iranian radicals in the years prior to the Islamic Revolution720, as well as its alleged role 
in having participated against army units in the immediate period before and after 
Khomeini's victory in Iran. Indeed, the PLO was blamed by many close Bakhtiar 
advisers for having "first accepted and later masterminded the contract" from the
716Which included others personalities such as Mehdi Bazargan and some of his 
colleagues in the "Freedom Movement"(Engineer Sahabi and Dr. Yazidi), as well as 
leading clerics such as Ayatollahs Montazeri, Golpayeghani and Qomi.
717lnterview with Ali Reza Nouri-Zadeh, London 8 November 1994.
718A Senior PLO official, who had been Arafat's First Ambassador to Teheran.
719An article entitled, "Mr. Sharon - It Is Enough", printed in Issue No. 23 of 
NEHZAT. dated 9 September 1982, followed by NAMIR's official condemnation of 
Israeli brutality in the Palestinian camps at Sabrah and Shatila, printed in Issue No. 24 
of NEHZAT. dated 23 September 1982.
720Such as the Mojahedin and others.
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Islamic regime to assassinate Bakhtiar in 1980, a feat which had resulted in the murder 
of two innocent French subjects. Hence, many of Bakhtiar's key advisers - including 
Ahmad Mirfendereski and General Shahrdar - had advised against any association with 
the PLO, which had a further great disadvantage of angering the Israeli government, 
and turning their wrath against NAMIR721.
Nonetheless, Bakhtiar's lack of other options, meant that fraternizing with the PLO, 
might offer him a way out of the cul-de-sac that he was finding himself in. Following 
Bakhtiar's telegram of condolence to Arafat, on the occasion of the assassination of 
Abu Jihad by the Israelis in April 1988722, a major effort was made, by way of a 
substantial article723, to justify the policy that was being adopted by NAMIR in "warming 
up to Arafat and the PLO"724. The themes articulated in this article, which appeared in 
Qvame Iran725, were later highlighted by comments made in a speech by Bakhtiar, who 
condemned the Israeli government for its "illegal behavior" in the kidnapping of the 
Shiite Moslem cleric, Sheikh Abdol-Karim Obeid from the Lebanon in August 1989726
721This concern was later justified, when according to Ahmad Mirfendereski 
(Interview, Paris, dated 26 November 1994), the Farsi Section of the Israeli Radio, 
widely listened to Iran, began adopting an anti-Bakhtiar line.
722 Full text printed in Qyame Iran. Issue No. 222, dated 22 April 1988.
723Looking at the pros and cons of existing perceptions regarding the PLO.
^W ith great stress on the fact that many important evolutions had taken place 
within the Palestinian Movement, which was far from having been a static movement 
committed to positions adopted in the previous decades.
725lssue No. 226, dated 23 June 1988.
726Speech by Bakhtiar at a NAMIR rally in Hamburg, on the occasion of the 
Anniversary of the Iranian Constitution Day (5/8/89), the full text of which was later 
published in Qvame Iran.
Issue No. 256, dated 17 August 1989. In the course of his remarks, which particularly 
aimed to demonstrate sympathy for the PLO, Bakhtiar said that, "...I am aware that 
making these comments about the Sheikh, that the American and Israeli governments 
will continue to remain displeased with us. But, the policy of NAMIR has always been
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In the ensuing months following Bakhtiar's meeting with Abu-Khaled, the ground works 
for a meeting between Bakhtiar and Arafat were laid with the assistance of Ali Reza 
Nouri-Zadeh, and finally in November 1989, at Arafat's invitation, Bakhtiar 
accompanied by Sadeq Sadrieh and Hamid Zolnour, made an official visit to the PLO 
head-quarters in Tunis727. This visit, despite its obvious draw-backs, was nevertheless, 
considered as a major breakthrough for Bakhtiar, at a time when his star had begun to 
fade in most other places.
While Arafat's main incentive for inviting Bakhtiar, was due to his personal desire to 
infuriate the Islamic regime, from whom he had grown apart728, Bakhtiar was hopeful 
that he could use the Arafat connection to attain the following objectives:
1. For the PLO to speak on his behalf with Arab leaders in the Persian Gulf, so 
that they may assist his fund-raising efforts. In particular, Bakhtiar was hopeful that 
Arafat might have great leverage in Iraq, where his position was becoming increasingly 
more vulnerable.
2. By now, totally ignored by Washington and the West, Bakhtiar was hopeful 
that Arafat might serve as a conduit between NAMIR and Moscow, thus giving Bakhtiar 
a much needed opening with the Soviet Union729. He was hopeful of using the Soviet
one of honor and bravery, and until the day that I am alive, I shall pursue this course, 
for I believe it to be the only road that will facilitate the establishment of a democratic 
order in Iran".
727Qyame Iran. Issue No. 262, dated 9 November 1994.
^Interview with Ali Reza Nouri-Zadeh, London, 18 November 1994. It must also 
be borne in mind that Arafat might have used the Bakhtiar visit as a bargaining chip 
with the Islamic regime, to solicit their support and financial assistance. According to 
Nouri-Zadeh, Arafat, who was at the time very angry with Iran, was also interested in 
trying to influence the Islamic Republic in order to curtail its support for "HAMAS" and 
the "Islamic Jihad".
729Ahmad Mirfendereski, was always skeptical of this move, and considered 
Arafat as too much of a light-weight in Soviet eyes to successfully carry out such a
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Union, as a balancing force to redress some of the main problems he had come to 
encounter since the shelving of "White Star"730.
3. Bakhtiar felt that the level of financial assistance he sought to keep NAMIR 
above board, was not beyond the means of the PLO itself, and though he had 
presented his request for financial assistance in the context of a package coming from 
the "Persian Gulf Leaders", he was hopeful that Arafat, himself, might tend to this 
important requirement, if all other attempts were to fail.
According to Nouri-Zadeh, despite all earlier perceptions, at the end of their 
deliberation in Tunis, Arafat was greatly impressed by Bakhtiar, and having promised 
to do his best to meet the requirements Bakhtiar had outlined to him, he had also 
agreed to provide NAMIR with the following additional package:
1. Offering NAMIR, additional broadcast facilities from the PLO radio stations in 
both Cairo and Baghdad.
2. To give Bakhtiar access to any existing PLO facility inside Iran. This meant 
allowing Bakhtiar to send written material for destinations in Iran that would go through 
existing Palestinian channels in Teheran.
3. To offer training to Bakhtiar military personnel in PLO military camps.
While Arafat had genuinely taken certain steps towards helping Bakhtiar with some of 
his urgent needs, such as talking with the Soviets731 and the Iraqis, for purposes of
mission. Indeed, he considered, the whole Arafat connection as a great big "Fiasco", 
more damaging to Bakhtiar than any good it could have brought him (Interview, 1 
January 1995).
730This included both moral and financial support.
731 According to Mr. "M.S.A." (a person who does not want to be named), a Farsi- 
Arabic interpreter of Khuzestani origins, who was attached to the PLO's office in Tunis, 
Arafat had raised the matter of Bakhtiar's request with the Soviet ambassador in
2 7 5
helping Bakhtiar. However, before any of these plans could have come to fruition, 
Arafat's own position, and that of Saddam Hussein, had become gravely affected as a 
consequence of the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, and, as a result, neither were any longer 
in a position to offer what Bakhtiar had needed most - namely, an adequate level of 
funding to keep NAMIR activities alive.
Thus, by late 1990, despite all the efforts that were exerted in trying to implement 
NAMIR's new foreign policy agenda, it was clear that the net result of Bakhtiar's various 
endeavors to secure the funding he had required for the upkeep of NAMIR had been 
very disappointing. This left him with no alternative but to shut down all his activities, 
with the exception of his Paris bureau that remained open with only a skeleton staff, 
until such time that it, too, was closed following his own assassination in August 1991.
Epilogue____________________________________________________________
In the concluding years, and prior to Bakhtiar's untimely death, none of his senior 
advisers - either in the "NAMIR Council" or the "Council of Advisers" - had thought it 
likely that NAMIR was any longer capable of overthrowing the Islamic regime732. Their 
only hope was to benefit - using Bakhtiar's personal credentials and charisma with the 
Iranian people- in any upheaval that might occur inside Iran, for reasons that they
Tunisia (interview, London 30/12/94). Also, according to Nouri-Zadeh, through the 
aegis of Arafat, Bakhtiar had spoken on the phone with a senior Gorbachev aide - and 
the current Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Chief Primakov.
^ h is  was a feeling that was unanimously shared by everyone, in the Council 
of Advisers, whom the writer has interviewed during the course of his research. Most, 
had said that they had lost faith, as early as 1980, when the Nojeh Project had failed. 
Others had a dim glimmer of hope up to the mid-1980's. But, once the rot had begun 
to set in as a consequence of NAMIR's fast declining financial situation, there was no 
hope that NAMIR could ever be anything other than a political contender to contest 
political status, once the Islamic regime had been overthrown by some other force.
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would, in any event, be incapable of influencing directly.
This attitude on the part of Bakhtiar's team, was mainly due to the fact that the majority 
of those close to Bakhtiar had never ever come to grip with having the "mentality of a 
resistance fighter". Their behavior, was instead, like those of non-risk taking executives 
within a large business corporation, whose immediate impulses would be to file for 
bankruptcy at the first sign of trouble, in order not to incur greater liabilities, should their 
company continue doing business in a risky climate and environment. Moreover, 
Bakhtiar's weakness as a manager was, in itself, a major factor in creating the general 
malaise that had begun to have a disintegrating effect on NAMIR.
However, Bakhtiar's personal pride and dedication of purpose, was such that NAMIR 
was prevented from disintegrating completely by the end of 1990, when all financial 
sources eventually dried up733. By this time, he had also been able to use his various 
connections with other political groups, and major political personalities - apart from 
Reza Pahlavi and the Constitutionalists734- in order to call for the creation of 'coalition 
of all democrats', who would lead a political campaign against the Islamic republic735.
733During the worst stages of the war against the Allies, representatives of the 
Iraqi had come to Paris, and informed Bakhtiar that they would no longer be able to 
support his campaign, departing with a lump sum cash payment, in order not to leave 
Bakhtiar in a lurch.
734lt is essential to point out, that the monarchists were divided between the 
"Constitutionalists" who sought a symbolic role for Reza Pahlavi, and others ('Absolute 
Monarchists) who thought that Reza Pahlavi, himself, should act a political leader and 
lead the charge against the Islamic Republic.
^According to Engineer Ezat Raastgar and Rahim Sharifi (joint interview: Paris, 
24 November 1994), by 1991 many other political figures of the left, like Bozorgh Alavi, 
Keshtgar (of the Fadayan-e Khalq Organization), and Babak Amir Khosravi (ex-Tudeh), 
as well as other old colleagues like Hassan Nazih and Admiral Ahmad Madani, were 
calling for the creation of a "National Coalition", in which Bakhtiar would paly a leading 
role. This,according to Engineer Raastgar, was consistent with the NAMIR's earlier 
cries for being "the host party for national unity".
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Having envisioned the worse, Bakhtiar had as early as 1989, taken certain steps, which 
had opened certain possibilities, that would have allowed for his political survival, even 
under the worst circumstances736. Beginning with his participation at a Seminar in 
Munich at the invitation of the Hans Seidel Stiftung in late 1986737, Bakhtiar had 
discovered the benefits of promoting his profile as well as generating new activity and 
vitality, by personally taking his NAMIR-led campaign to areas outside Paris. In August 
1989, Bakhtiar had taken his message to a NAMIR sponsored meetings in Hamburg738, 
which were followed by his high profile visits in October and November 1989, to 
Holland739 and Tunisia740. However, it was during the course of his visit to the European 
Parliament in February 1990741, that Bakhtiar launched his last major political appeal, 
calling for the establishment of a "Committee for a Democratic Iran" to be set up by the 
European Parliament, that would in turn promote the holding of supervised free 
parliamentary elections in Iran742. It was this last call that was to become a slogan 
around which all the democratic opposition against the Islamic Republic were to make 
a positive response, though unfortunately, not while Bakhtiar himself was alive. Had 
Bakhtiar remained alive, and had he overcome the damage resulting from his support 
for Iraq, his role in the campaign for the promotion of free parliamentary elections in
736lt has to be appreciated, that known both nationally and internationally, and 
armed with a reputation as a democrat, even during his worst days, Bakhtiar was still 
better off than any other non radical/leftist competitor.
737Qyame Iran. Issue No. 181, dated 11 December 1986.
738Qyame Iran. Issue No. 255, dated 17 August 1989.
739Qvame Iran. Issue No. 260, dated 12 October 1989.
740Qyame Iran. Issue No. 262, dated 9 November 1989.
741Where he was hosted Madam Simone Veil (France), the previous speaker of
the European Parliament.
742Qvame Iran. Issue No. 268, dated 1 February 1990.
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Iran, could have been of paramount importance, and he would not doubt have been 
able to give great weight and credibility to this legitimate demand.
In the end, Shapour Bakhtiar died as a hero of the Iranian people, whose call for 
freedom and democracy he had championed honestly and to the best of his abilities for 
a period of twelve years in exile. In conversation to many close friends and 
associates743, he had revealed that part of his miscalculation, in not having properly 
preserved the financial resources that had initially been made available to him, was 
because he had thought that the struggle against the Islamic regime would have come 
to a much sooner ending. As it turned out, his death can be seen as a reflection of his 
own mismanagement and carelessness, as a concerted effort by the Islamic regime to 
murder him. Indeed he had been warned by a whole host of friends and associates on 
a number of occasions regarding the necessary security measures he should have 
employed to safeguard the security of his conversations and his person744.
Although plagued by many problems, both political and personal745, at the time of his 
brutal murder, that had drained him emotionally and financially, Bakhtiar was still the 
most acknowledged political leader of the center, who was elevated to an even greater 
position in the history of the struggle of the Iranian nation, by the Islamic regime, as a
743eg. Amir Hossein Amir Parviz (interview, 5 October 1994).
744This was done by many close advisers, including the writer, who had 
suggested great caution about his conversations over the telephone (warning him on 
more than several occasions about the use of trackable mobile phones), and about the 
necessity of always having a body guard present in the room, during the course of his 
meetings - particularly, with strangers who had come from Iran. Indeed, there was even 
the lack of a single warning device to the Police officers located in the basement of his 
house. Thus, contrary to public belief, the planned assassination of Bakhtiar by its 
perpetrators, some of whom were fully familiar with the layout of his house, and the 
inadequate conditions that prevailed there, was not a very complex affair.
745Having remarried and become a father at the age of 76.
279
consequence of the nefarious plot it sponsored to murder him in France746.
746The conclusion of the trial in France of nine people accused of complicity in 
his death, and the final verdict of the Court in December 1994, leave no doubt about 
the involvement of the Islamic regime in this affair.
CONCLUSION
The thesis presented in the previous chapters, having given detailed account of the 
circumstances leading to the formation and subsequent activities of the National 
Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR), is the culmination of an effort which has 
also aimed at presenting a more general academic understanding of an increasingly 
more active set of actors in international politics - namely, banned opposition 
movements - which have come to play an important role in the current international 
environment.
In focusing on the case of NAMIR during the years in which it was led by it founding 
leader, Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, it can be seen that the circumstances giving rise to the 
creation and development of the organization, as well as the progress of its struggles 
in the ensuing years, does provide a certain framework and pattern which a student of 
international politics may take into account in order to assess and analyze the status 
and actual potential of any other banned opposition movement operating any where 
else in the globe.
In the case of NAMIR, having observed the pragmatic application of all the underlying 
theoretical concepts and moral arguments essential to the growth and success of any 
opposing movement, as outlined in Chapter 1 (e.g., the role of concepts such as 
ideology and legitimacy, etc.), it was seen how NAMIR was also tasked to confront a 
series of more empirical issues such as the highly complex and most tedious aspects 
of setting up a brand new political organization, providing for its funding and appealing 
to the general public for its mobilization. The preceding chapters have demonstrated 
that because NAMIR was led by an internationally known and highly respected 
individual such as Dr. Bakhtiar, who was the only major Iranian political figure not to
have been tainted by the excesses of either the previous imperial regime or the Islamic 
Republic in Iran, and because of its ideological commitment to pluralism and the Rule 
of Law, the process of creating a new political organization in opposition to the 
Khomeini regime, with a dynamic following, was able to proceed at a relatively fast 
pace - particularly from 1979-1986 - due mainly to the substantial amount of funds that 
was made available to the organization because of Bakhtiar unique status.
Unfortunately, NAMIR's overall record from 1979-1991, shows that the organization's 
leadership was incapable of sustaining the high measure of success attained during 
the initial years. Nonetheless, it was seen that due to Bakhtiar's charismatic personality, 
the movement was still able to provide a credible profile so long as he, himself, was 
alive. However, the impact of Bakhtiar's assassination upon NAMIR was immediate747. 
Indeed, he had no sooner been killed than the organization became fragmented and 
slipped into ignominious insignificance. This was irrespective of efforts by many of 
Bakhtiar's subordinates, who have managed to cling on to his name and the potent 
image which NAMIR was able to project as a major actor on the Iranian political scene 
for much of the 1980's.
From a more general perspective, the thesis has shown that while political movements 
dedicated to the overthrow of their governments have existed for centuries, banned 
opposition movements such as NAMIR748, in their contemporary form, have essentially 
been a feature of the international political scene in the post colonial era - particularly
747An analysis of what has happened to NAMIR in the aftermath of Bakhtiar's 
assassination has not been provided in the thesis.
748i.e., opposition movements which are ideologically committed to such issues 
as democracy and human rights etc. (unlike certain anti-democratic, radical and 
revolutionary organizations which have emerged in certain western countries).
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in such countries where democratic norms have been regularly ignored and all forms 
of opposition to the functioning regimes have been generally repressed. As cited in 
Chapter 1, this is a point which has received particular attention in the writings of 
Burton Zwiebach (Civility And Disobedience, p. 196), where he validates the call for 
resistance against those regimes which, according to him, lose their legitimacy as a 
result of their consistent denial of the rights of their citizens.
The study having gone into some detail in order to point out the types of challenges 
which NAMIR (ostensibly the most successful liberal democratic political Iranian 
opposition movement in the post-Khomeini period) had faced in order to push ahead
L
with its plans and objectives, serves to provide the student of international politics with 
an additional framework that strives to distinguish between those "committed 
individuals and groups", and those of a "less genuine" kind who exploit the trust and 
patriotic sentiments of their compatriots in order to advance their own individual or self 
serving agendas. To assist in making such a distinction, the student of international 
politics is provided with a list of attributes with which any serious opposition movement 
must be endowed in order to make an impact within its own environment as well as in 
the international arena - e.g., a credible leadership, a cohesive organization, access 
to substantial funds, access to international opinion making bodies and individuals, 
access to means of communications enabling it to remain in contact with its own 
constituencies, and finally a highly motivated and ideologically convinced membership 
which is ready to make sacrifices for the promotion of the movement's objectives. 
Hence, it follows that those banned opposition movements which are devoid of the 
potential for developing such a configuration are incapable of making the required 
impact, and as such they are unlikely to pose a serious challenge to any functioning 
regime.
Furthermore, an examination of this nature allows any vigilant observer to take note of 
how individuals or groups who are banned from expressing their political beliefs and 
social preferences actually go about organizing themselves for the attainment of their 
objectives. Thus, by looking at the scope and complexity of any prganization, and by 
identifying the ideology of the movement and the degree of commitment to it 
demonstrated by its general membership, and finally by judging the way in which 
leadership and management is manifested within any organization, they can be in a 
position to judge not only a movement's potential appeal amongst its own people, but 
also the degree of success which that movement is likely to achieve irrespective of its
geographical location.
*
Moreover, given the inter-dependent world in which we live, this process is further 
assisted by the way in which outside actors - i.e., foreign governments and international 
organizations look at the disposition of the various opposition movements as well as 
their functioning regimes. It goes without saying that the potential success of any 
opposition movement in attaining its ultimate objectives is greatly dependent upon the 
type of support it is able to muster in the international community. Hence the 
importance of diplomacy and the role of opposition movements as non-state actors in 
international relations. While opposition movements can exist in their thousands, those 
capable of performing in a complex arena that is capable of addressing all or most of 
these criteria, are few and far in between. However, a major drawback confronting all 
banned opposition movements in this area, is the degree of vulnerability to which such 
groups are subjected as a consequence of policy developments or changes which are 
totally beyond their control. An example at point in the thesis, is the reference made to 
the changes that took place in the American National Security Council following the 
damaging disclosures that were made of the Irangate scandal. Thus, the removal from
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office of a number of key personnel, sympathetic to NAMIR and its objectives, as a 
result of matters that were purely related to the inner workings of the American political 
system, meant that years of careful diplomacy and meticulous lobbying on the part of 
NAMIR were completely wiped out.
According to the analysis made, for most of the 1980's, NAMIR was an organization 
capable of fulfilling the main criteria required by any credible banned opposition 
movement anywhere. Thus, during this period, NAMIR was successful in satisfying the 
proposition that "organizational capabilities make popular mobilizations and continued 
mastery over the popular movement possible"749.
L
From 1979-1991, according to even the most conservative estimate, the organization 
was able to have access to an overall budget of well over fifty million (US) dollars750. 
This enabled NAMIR to recruit its own professional staff and to have numerous offices 
and publications around the world and inside Iran. The fact that it was taken seriously 
by the international community, meant that it had access to two clandestine radio 
stations broadcasting into Iran from two different locations, as well as numerous radio 
stations in foreign capitals aimed at consolidating support amongst the Iranian exile 
community. Finally, as the movement championing ideologies associated with Iranian 
constitutionalism, NAMIR - unlike many of its radical competitors - appealed to 
traditional values, which are shared by an overwhelming majority of the population, and 
indeed by the mid- 1980's when the lustre of the revolution had begun to fade, there
749Farhi, F., States and Urban-Based Revolutions - Iran And Nicaragua, 
University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1990, p.94.
750Many of Bakhtiar's close advisers estimated the figure to be much nearer to 
US$ 100 million.
were increasing signs that NAMIR's message was beginning to make its impact felt 
inside the country. The peaceful anti-war demonstrations of 17 May 1985, which took 
place throughout Iran at Bakhtiar's behest, coupled with the subsequent promotion of 
"Operation White Star" in Washington in June 1985, were both instrumental in paving 
the way for Bakhtiar's successful visit to the White House in February 1986. These 
events marked the zenith of NAMIR's achievements in exile, and they were seen to 
reinforce the promise for a new era of international collaboration for the establishment 
of a NAMIR led democratic order in Iran.
Nonetheless, due mainly to severe causes of mismanagement and unchecked inter-
i
organizational wrangling751, the movement failed to achieve any of its objectives, and 
from 1987 onwards, its rapid decline was such that by the time of the death of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, the organization, contrary to its own previous assertions, 
was simply incapable of posing a serious threat to his successors. While, this failure 
may be attributed to unsuitable international circumstances752,or failure of proper 
management on the part of the organization's leadership, it may also be deduced that 
NAMIR was itself outflanked by the incoming leadership in the Islamic Republic which 
promised to adopt some of the movement's espoused goals, such as the need for 
economic liberalizations and development along with greater political tolerance.
7510ne of the main contributing factors leading to this was the inability of Bakhtiar 
to make hard choices at a time when some of his most loyal supporters were simply too 
ineffective at discharging the duties to which they had been assigned. This is a 
dilemma - i.e., "loyalty Vs effectiveness" - to which Charles Tilly in his book From 
Mobilization to Revolution (p.70) has given particular attention.
752Given that there was a general tendency on the part of most western 
governments to reach some form of an accommodation with Khomeini's most ostensible 
heir, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who assumed the Iranian presidency in July 1989.
Although, it was not long before the inability of the new Islamic administration as far as 
delivering the types of promises it had made became fully apparent to all, it was a fact 
that the momentum in NAMIR's activities had essentially run out of steam, well in 
advance of any real crisis posing a serious threat to the ultimate survival of the Islamic 
regime. Again, not being outflanked, and not allowing the organization to become 
vulnerable and susceptible through unnecessary risk taking or over-extension, are part 
and parcel of the types of responsibilities which the leadership in any banned 
opposition movement cannot ignore. In the case of NAMIR, Bakhtiar's personal 
inexperience in management and his somewhat relaxed and hands-off leadership style, 
contributed greatly to the types of inter-organization indiscipline which was responsible
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for the internal implosions that damaged NAMIR far more than any threat emanating 
from outside the organization. The episodes of internal bickering and petty jealousies 
cited in Chapter 4, which essentially sealed the fate of "Operation. White Star", the last 
pivotal turning point which could have drastically altered the destiny of NAMIR, 
underlines this very point. The lesson being that even if equipped with all the 
paraphernalia required of a modern opposition movement, all efforts will come to 
naught, so long as the bonds of solidarity, based on trust, amongst the membership 
have not been consolidated through active intervention and proper management on the 
part of the organization's leadership.
Finally, from a conceptual angle, the thesis having alluded to the long established 
historical tendency for people to rebel when they have been prohibited or deprived of 
the means of expressing their discontent753, establishes that banned opposition 
movements in contemporary international politics are the main vehicles which channel
753Gurr, T.R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1970.
discontent - i.e., social grievances and social disorientations - into organized collective 
action, which may or may not include violence. In the twentieth century, most banned 
opposition movements have been able to discover their own strategies for the 
promotion of their objectives "quite independently, based on their own experiences, 
instincts, and of course, native traditions"754. Hence, it is possible to conclude that as 
a rule, successful opposition movements are those that' are able to promote 
disobedience, thereby challenging the legitimacy755 of a functioning regime with a 
"purposive, mass based movement, coalescing with the aid of ideology, and
’ C J Y
organization to overthrow the existing government and perhaps the entire social 
order"756.
fc—  -  -  -  = i
754Laqueur, W., Guerilla - A Historical and Critical Study, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, London, 1977, p.384.
755According to M.S. Kimmel (Revolution - A Sociological Interpretation, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1990, p. 190) loss of legitimacy, in ensuring the downfall 
of any particular regime is as important, if not more, than economic difficulties or the 
disintegration of its military apparatus.
756Skocpol, T., States And Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, 
1979, p. 14.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1
A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS 
In The History of NAMIR 
1979-1991
DATE___________ EVENT_____________________________________________
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07/79 Bakhtiar launches his campaign in Paris.
08/79 First major pro-Bakhtiar rally held in London.
11/79 U.S. Embassy in Teheran is occupied and American
diplomats are taken as hostages.
04/80 U.S. attempt to rescue hostages is forcibly aborted.
05/80 Bakhtiar's clandestine "Radio Iran" begins
broadcasting from Baghdad.
07/80 Pro-Bakhtiar coup attempt is foiled and a number of military officers and
civilians are arrested.
08/80 Unsuccessful attempt is made on Bakhtiar's life by the Lebanese terrorist,
Anis Naccache.
08/80 The establishment of NAMIR is announced.
09/80 Iraq invades Iran, and 8 year long Iran-lraq War begins. Despite his
relations with Iraq, Bakhtiar in three separate statements dated 25 
September 1980,14 November 1980, and 16 February 1981, calls a 
cessation of hostilities, and the commencement of peace talks on the 
basis of the 1975 Algiers Treaty.
07/81 Bani Sadr and.Rajavi arrive in Paris. Bakhtiar condemns both and rejects
any notion of cooperation.
08/81 The Iranian Naval Vessel, "Tabarzin" is hijacked on the high seas by
members of the "Azadeghan" Organization, led by General Bahram
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Aryana (22 August).
08/81 Bakhtiar and Aryana declare in separate statements their decision to work
in unity for the liberation of Iran. Bakhtiar asks all his "military supporters" 
to report to Aryana.
09/81 Aryana moves his HQ to Turkey, near the border with Iran.
10/81 NEHZAT. the political organ of the National Movement of the Iranian
Resistance (NAMIR) begins the publication of its first bi-weekly issue.
12/81 GHYAME IRAN, the second Bakhtiar bi-weekly, aimed at a less
'doctrinaire' audience is published.
08/82 VOICE OF IRAN, the political Tribune of the National Movement of the
Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) in English, begins the publication of its first 
monthly issue.
09/82 LETTRE PERSANE. a pro-Bakhtiar monthly in French is published.
1£/82 Publication of Admiral Ahmad Madani's statement in NEHZAT.
01/83 NEHZAT condemns communique issued following the meeting between
Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tareq Aziz and Mojahedin Leader, Massoud 
Rajavi.
02/83 Bakhtiar's begins the campaign of urging all Iranians inside the country
to participate in "Negative Resistance".
03/83 Bakhtiar's open call for support to former colleagues in the "National
Front".
04/83 NAMIR supporters in Sweden are successful in bringing up the topic of
"Trade Boycott"of Iran for the first time.
04/83 Bakhtiar's message to the Socialist International - this marks the first
concerted effort on the part of NAMIR to promote its cause by contacting 
various important international bodies.
04/83 Bakhtiar's first secret visit to Saudi Arabia.
04/83 NAMIR first major assessment of the state of the Iranian Economy is
published and distributed in a major conference in London757.
757The Conference which overtly sought to promote trade with Iran, was 
organized by NAMIR, as a way of seeking attention, and then humiliating the Islamic 
regime. This ploy was to a major
extent successful, and the British Charge in Teheran (Sir Nicholas Barrington) was 
brought in, and to his embarrassment, was subjected to a situation well beyond his 
expectation.
04/83 Bakhtiar's first secret visit to Saudi Arabia.
05/83 Bakhtiar's first trip to the U.S. and meeting with U.S. officials. In a meeting
with Iranian supporters in Los Angeles, he declares his support for a 
restoration of constitutional monarchy in Iran.
05/83 Bakhtiar's first visit to the United States, where he is the first major Iranian
figure to address the Council on Foreign Relations.
07/83 Bakhtiar and Amini sign their "Agreement of Principles".
07/83 Bakhtiar signs a 5-Point Agreement on a "Declaration of Principles" with
Dr. Ali Amini.
08/83 The Fourth Anniversary of the founding of NAMIR is celebrated in Paris
in the presence of Bakhtiar, Amini and General Aryana.
08/83 First peaceful demonstration by the masses against the regime on
Constitution Day (August 5), as called by NAMIR's clandestine radio 
broadcasts.
08/83 NAMIR begins publication of "Al Madinah" in Farsi during the "Haj" Annual
Pilgrimage758.
09/83 The Foundation for Aid and Services to Iranians in Turkey is set up by
NAMIR.
11/83 First 'Joint Statement' by Bakhtiar and Amini is issued.
01/84 Bakhtiar's Second Visit to the United States in which he addresses the
Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.
02/84 Bakhtiar is viciously attacked by Rafsanjai during the course of Friday
Sermons on the ground that he was responsible for the canceling of Iran's 
outstanding arms purchase agreements with America.
02/84 Bakhtiar's Second Secret Visit to Saudi Arabia759.
758This was a Farsi supplement of the Saudi Arabian daily, Al Madinah. which 
was produced for the benefit of the Iranian pilgrims coming for the Haj. However the 
project leader, as well as the publication's editor and staff, were all members of NAMIR, 
and the tone of this publication while religious, was anti-lslamic regime. In all six issues 
of this publication (with a circulation of 50,000) came out before the Saudi authorities 
halted its production, but not before ensuring that all Iranian planned demonstrations 
during Haj were called off by the Islamic regime.
7590n the day he arrives in Jeddah, General Gholam Ali Oveissi is assassinated 
in Paris.
03/84 Bakhtiar's Second Visit to London760.
04/84 NAMIR condemns Iraqi usage of Chemical weapons.
08/84 Bakhtiar's speech on Constitution Day, reaffirms his commitment to
Constitutional Monarchy.
10/84 In an interview with VOA, Bakhtiar openly discusses his relations with
Iraq, and highlights the fact that his only relation with that regime is only 
the presence of a radio station on Iraqi soil.
11/84 NAMIR refers to Bazargan as the "Parrot" of the Islamic regime.
01/85 Bakhtiar rejects any notion of compromise with any new regime born out
of the ruling Islamic clique, and states that this is part of a "foreign 
inspired ploy", which should be rejected by all.
01/85 In a major broadcast to the Iranian people, Bakhtiar introduces his
"campaign of Negative Resistance", underlines the importance of Iran's
i
"New National Armed Forces", and signals his support for Islamic clergy 
opposed to Khomeini761.
03/85 Bakhtiar's New Year Message to the Iranian people stresses the need to
push ahead with the "campaign of Negative Resistance".
04/85 NAMIR condemns the "Holy and Revolutionary" nature of Massoud Rajavi
with the wife of his deputy.
05/85 Mass peaceful demonstrations against the Iran-lraq War take place in
Iran on 17 May, following Bakhtiar's radio broadcast urging the people to 
go out on to the streets762.
06/85 Final draft of "Operation White Star" is prepared by NAMIR-MW763.
07/85 Bakhtiar's Visits London and hold talks with Leaders of the British Labour
and Social Democratic Parties.
07/85 White House Meeting, with Bakhtiar's representative is held to discuss
the aims and objectives of "Operation White Star".
760Bakhtiar's previous visit had been in 1979, only weeks after his escape from
Iran.
761 In this respect, Qvame Iran publishes the full text of Grand Ayatollah 
Tabatabai Qomi's Fatwa against the Iran-lraq War.
762The high point of Bakhtiar's period in opposition.
763Military Wing. 292
08/85 Plans to initiate "Operation White Star" begin.
09/85 First NAMIR-MW officer is assassinated in Turkey.
12/85 Commander of NAMIR-MW in Turkey is assassinated.
01/86 VOA764 Farsi broadcast on 16 January speaks of the Islamic regime's fear
of NAMIR-MW.
02/86 Bakhtiar's Third Visit to the United States and his meeting with the
National Security Adviser to the President of the United States765.
03/86 Bakhtiar and Reza Pahlavi II hold a joint meeting with their teams of
advisers, and come to a secret agreement regarding their complimentary 
roles.766
04/86 Bakhtiar and Amini issue joint statement on the death of Grand Ayatollah
Kazem Shariat Madari.
05/86 Bakhtiar's Third Secret Visit to Saudi Arabia.
05/86 Bakhtiar's assistance is sought in trying to liberate the US hostages in
Lebanon in an effort that unveils to Bakhtiar the American involvement in 
what was to become known as the "Irangate" operation.
07/86 Internal bickering within NAMIR result in the sacking of the Commander
of NAMIR-MW. Though, he is reinstated after a few weeks, the level of 
internal bickering pick up and the chances of pushing ahead with 
"Operation White Star" begin a downward and terminal path.
09/86 A CIA run operation transmits a clandestine 11 minute film of Reza
Pahlavi from a mobile TV transmitter in Teheran.
09/86 In a TV program broadcast in the United States, Bakhtiar lashes out at the
Shah, and brings to an end the period of "Cordial Entente" which had only, 
come into full effect in March 1986.
11/86 The Irangate Scandal results in the total removal of all Bakhtiar
supporters from the NSC in Washington, and the beginning of the end in 
terms of Bakhtiar's good and cooperative relations with Washington.
02/87 All US assistance towards "Operation White Star" is cut off, and from here
764Voice of America..
765The agenda for Bakhtiar's meeting was support for "Operation White Star".
766While, this agreement was to assist "Operation White Star", the entire 
operation was compartmented from the Shah and all of his advisers.
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the period of Bakhtiar's decline as a credible alternative to the regime 
begins.
03/87 Mohammad Moshiri replaces Boroomand as Chairman of NAMIR’s
Executive Committee.
07/87 Bakhtiar expresses open support for the provisions of UNSCR 598 calling
for a cease fire in the Iran-lraq War.
08/87 Start of first major cutbacks as a result of increasing financial pressures
10/87 Controversy over UNSCR 598 begins in Iranian Exile Community,
spurring anti-Bakhtiar feelings.
07/88 NAMIR is forced to shut down London Office.
03/89 Bakhtiar's final visit to Saudi Arabia.
06/89 Khomeini dies in Iran.
07/89 Sadegh Sadireh replaces Mohammad Moshiri as Chairman of NAMIR's
Executive Committee.
07/89 NAMIR delegation visits Washington and hold talks with Shah Advisers.
No positive conclusion is made.
08/89 Bakhtiar takes his campaign to Hamburg.
10/89 Bakhtiar visits Holland.
11/89 Bakhtiar visits Tunis and meets with Yasser Arafat.
08/90 Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bakhtiar blunders in an interview with
Le Figaro, and winds up alienating many of his previous supporters.
03/91 Boroomand is restored as Chairman of NAMIR Executive Committee.
04/91 Boroomand is assassinated in Paris.
08/91 Bakhtiar is assassinated.
294
APPENDIX 2
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
OF KEY PERSONALITIES 
INTERVIEWED OR MENTIONED IN THESIS
Ahy, Shahriar: A well educated young Iranian technocrat with close American 
connections, who first served as a political adviser to General Gholam Ali Oveissi, and 
later to Dr. Ali Amini's Front For the Liberation of Iran (FLI), before joining the staff of 
Reza Pahlavi II, the Shah of Iran.
Amini, Ali: Former Iranian Prime Minister and elder statesman, who in 1982 formed the 
Front For the Liberation of Iran (FLI), with American backing. However, his operation 
was finally disbanded by the C.I.A. in late 1986.
Amir Parviz, Parviz: An Iranian businessman and an early Bakhtiar backer. However, 
after the failure of the initial military attempts to oust the Khomeini regime, he gradually 
backed out of the political arena, returning to private business.
Amir Parviz, Amir Hossein: An senior Iranian civil servant and an early member of the 
Iran Party, with strong pro-Mossadegh sentiments. Since he was appointed as Minister 
of Agriculture in the military government of Mr. Jaafar Sharif Emami and later in the 
government of General Azhari in October 1978, he was unable to serve in the 
government of Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, but in exile he joined Bakhtiar, becoming a 
member of the NAMIR Council. On 18 July 1987, he was the victim of a planted car 
bomb which he was able to survive, with relatively few injuries.
Amirshahi, Mahshid: An Iranian writer and journalist and elder daughter of Molood 
Khanlari, who was one Bakhtiar's first colleagues in Paris. While a member of the 
NAMIR Council, she translated the Farsi edition of Bakhtiar's book, "Ma Fidelite", and 
was a contributor to many of NAMIR's publications in exile.
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Amouzegar, Cyrus: Bakhtiar's Minister of Information, who later served as Editor of the 
anti regime Farsi newspaper that was printed in Saudi Arabia during the Haj in 1983.
Aryana, General Bahram: Former Joint Chief of Staff, and a leading opponent of the 
Islamic regime in exile. He founded the "Azadeghan" organization and collaborated 
closely with Bakhtiar, leading a major expedition which was successful in penetrating 
into Iran from Turkey in the early in 1980s. His organization is credited with having 
hijacked the Iran Ship "Tabarzin" from the high seas in 1983.
Aryana, Manouchehr: Bakhtiar's Minister of Labour, who served as NAMIR’s first 
publicity chief in Paris, before being replaced by Bakhtiar's cousin, Abbas Gholi 
(Bakhtiar).
L
Bakhtiar, Guive: Bakhtiar’s son, who as a French Police Inspector was responsible for 
his security in Paris.
Bakhtiar, Abbas Gholi: Bakhtiar's cousin, who served in his cabinet as Minister of 
Commerce. A member of both the Council of Advisers and NAMIR's Council, he was 
also in charge of Bakhtiar's propaganda section in NAMIR.
Bakhtiar, Shapour: Exiled Prime Minister of Iran and Leader of the National Movement 
of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR), until his assassination in Paris in August 1991.
Bani Ameri, (Colonel) Mohammad Bagher: A hard working and shrewd officer, he 
was in charge of all military activities having to do with the "Nojeh Project" in Iran. In 
exile, he was the first Commander of NAMIR's Military Office, prior to falling out with 
Bakhtiar and leaving the organization.
Bazargan, Mehdi: Leader of the Freedom Movement and the first Prime Minister of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Boroomand, Abdol Rahman: A staunch supporter of Mossadegh and leading member 
of the National Front. He was also the closest friend and confidant of Bakhtiar in 
NAMIR, and was generally regarded as the second most influential person in the
Bakhtiar organization, up to the time of his assassination in April 1991.
Djam, (General) Fereidoon: Former Joint Chief of Staff, sacked by the Shah in the 
early 1970s, and dispatched to Spain as Iranian Ambassador. A man of some prestige, 
he has essentially shied away from any public or political engagements following the 
establishment of the Islamic regime. Although, appointed as Minister of War by 
Bakhtiar, Djam had refused to take up the appointment.
Esna-Ashari, Azizollah: A close confidant of A.R. Boroomand, and a longtime follower 
of Mossadegh and the National Front. Trusted by Bakhtiar, he was given wide ranging 
responsibilities in conjunction with NAMIR activities in the UK and California.
Fatemi, Shahin: An able Iranian academic, and a leading critic of the late Shah, who 
served as the effective head of the Front For the Liberation of Iran, under Dr. Ali Amini, 
prior to his falling out with the C.I.A. in early 1986.
Foroohar, Dariush: Leader of the Iranian Nations Party, and a leading member of the 
National Front who served as Minister of Labour in the Provisional Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran from February-November 1979.
Gandji, Manouchehr: A former Iranian Minister of Education, who was chosen by the 
C.I.A. to replace Dr. Ali Amini and his American sponsored operations.
Ghadessi, (Engineer) Parviz: The most important civilian organizer of the "Nojeh 
Project", who worked closely with Bakhtiar in the early stages of the formation of 
NAMIR.
Ghadimi, Morteza: A former Iranian diplomat with ambassadorial service in Tunisia 
and Belgium. He was introduced to Bakhtiar by Ahmad Mirfendereski, and was 
subsequently invited to join the NAMIR Council. At Mirfendereski's behest, he was 
promoted to head Bakhtiar's personal office in Paris, which entitled him to a seat in the 
Council of Advisers as well.
Golpayeghani, (Grand Ayatollah) Mohammad Reza: A major "Source of Imitation"
of the traditionalist school, never favorably disposed towards the Islamic Republic, but 
never critical of it as well. However, his interpretation of "Velayate Faghih" was believed 
to be substantially different to that of Khomeini.
Ghorbanifar, Manouchehr: An Iranian entrepreneur, who was a leading member of the 
collective team in charge of the "Nojeh Project". In later years, having fallen out with 
Bakhtiar, he was acknowledged as a key mediator in the deal for the 'trading of 
weapons for hostages’, which was to become the "Irangate" Scandal.
Hashemi, (Brigadier General) Manouchehr: A senior intelligence officer in SAVAK, 
responsible for coordinating military activities between NAMIR, AZADEGHAN and the 
Shah in the early 1980s.
L
Hejazi, Mahmoud: A pro-Mossadegh technocrat of substantial intellect and ability, 
active in the anti-Shah movement, who joined Bakhtiar in the early 1980s and became 
a member of the NAMIR Council, being promoted at one stage to be in full charge of 
NAMIR activities in France. He was also a member of the selected team in charge of 
the "Civilian Plan of Action" associated with Operation White Star.
Jafroodi, Kazem: A former Senator, and a key associate of Bakhtiar in NAMIR. He was 
also closely related to Bakhtiar by marriage (his daughter was married to Bakhtiar’s 
son).
Kazemieh, Eslam: An Iranian journalist and a close confidant of Dr. Ali Amini. He was 
a leading figure in the FLl, prior to its disbanding in 1986.
Khadem, Javad: A member of Bakhtiar's cabinet as Minister of Housing, and the first 
Head of Bakhtiar's personal office in Paris. He also played a leading part in the "Nojeh 
Project". However, by the early 1980s, he had returned to private business.
Khadem, Abolghassem: (Father of Javad Khadem) A leading member of the Iran 
Party and close Bakhtiar friend, who was executed by the Islamic regime for his 
complicity in the Nojeh Project.
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Khamenei, (Ayatollah) Seyed Ali: Third President of the Islamic Republic, who was 
appointed "Leader" of the Islamic Revolution following Khomeini's death in 1989.
Khanlary, Molood: A left wing (Tudeh) Iranian intellectual, and an ardent anti-Shah 
campaigner in the years prior to the Islamic Revolution. She was a founding member 
of NAMIR and played a crucial role in its activities up to the middle of 1983. However, 
as editor of Lettre Persane (NAMIR's publication in French), with close friendly ties to 
Bakhtiar, she continued to remain as an important "behind the scenes" personality in 
NAMIR, though the degree of her influence had been severely reduced.
Kharazi, Mehdi: A pro-Mossadegh technocrat of substantial ability, active in the anti-
Shah movement, who joined Bakhtiar in the early 1980s and became a member of the 
NAMIR Council.
Khol, (Grand Ayatollah) Seyed Abolghassem: A major "Source of Imitation" of the 
traditionalist school, never favorably disposed towards the Islamic Republic, but never 
critical of it as well. However, his interpretation of "Velayate Faghih" was believed to 
be substantially different to that of Khomeini.
Khonsari, (Grand Ayatollah) Seyed Ahmad: A major "Source of Imitation" of the 
traditionalist school, never favorably disposed towards the Islamic Republic. He was 
vocal critic and his interpretation of "Velayate Faghih" was believed to be substantially 
different to that of Khomeini.
Khomeini, (Grand Ayatollah) Rouhollah: A major "Source of Imitation", and Founder 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Madani, Ahmad: First Minister of Defense in the Islamic Republic (And Commander 
of the Iranian Navy), who later fell out with Khomeini. Following his unsuccessful 
campaign in Iran's first presidential campaign, he was forced to flee, Iran.
Malek, Hossein: A key NAMIR 'ideologue', whose writings was the main source of 
inspiration for the NAMIR membership during the earlier years of the organization's 
existence.
Maleki, Khalil: Famous Mossadegh supporter and Leader of the 'Third Force" (Nirooye 
Sevom), and older brother of Hossein Malek.
Marashi Najafi, (Grand Ayatollah) Seyed Shahabedin: A major "Source of Imitation" 
of the traditionalist school, never favorably disposed towards the Islamic Republic, but 
never critical of it as well. However, his interpretation of "Velayate Faghih" was believed 
to be substantially different to that of Khomeini.
Marzban, Reza: A leading member of the Iran Party, and a close Bakhtiar supporter, 
who was executed by the Islamic regime for his complicity in the "Nojeh Project".
Mehmanesh, Homayoun: A pro-Mossadegh activist in the European based anti-Shah 
movement , who joined Bakhtiar in the early 1980s and became a member of the 
NAMIR Council.
Mirfendereski, Ahmad: A senior career diplomat, and Bakhtiar's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who was also a leading founding member of NAMIR.
Mobasser, (Lt. General) Mohsen: Former Commander of the Iranian Police Force, and 
a close friend of General Djam. Together, they were responsible for giving military 
briefings to Bakhtiar in the Fall of 1979.
Moghaddam, Ahmad Khalilollah: A leading writer, journalist, and member of the Iran 
Party, whose writings, along with those of Hossein Malek, were the main source of 
intellectual nourishment amongst NAMIR's membership in the early 1980s.
Montazeri, (Grand Ayatollah) Hossein Ali: Elevated to the status of a Grand Ayatollah 
by Khomeini, and designated as his heir. However, his outspoken criticism of the 
injustices carried out by the Islamic regime, prompted Khomeini to .remove from his 
position as his successor. Later he was denounced by the state and has since been 
placed under house arrest on several occasions.
Moshiri, Mohammad: A close Bakhtiar friend and confidant who served as Deputy 
Prime Minister during his administration. He was a member of both the NAMIR Council
and the Council of Advisers. In the late 1980s, he was also Chairman of NAMIR's 
Executive Committee.
Mossadegh, Mohammad: The great nationalist leader of Iran, whose period in office 
as Prime Minister was brought to an abrupt end, by the Anglo-American inspired coup 
of 1953. It was the legacy of Mossadegh to which Bakhtiar and many of his close 
colleagues in the National Front, and later NAMIR, had been devoted.
Nahavandi, Houshang: A former Minister of Science and Higher Education and 
Chancellor of Teheran University, he was active in the first few years following the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic, prior to withdrawing from active politics.
Oveissi, Ahmad: Younger brother of General Gholam Ali Oveissi, and an aide to Reza 
Pahlavi (appointed to that position by the late Shah from the time that the Crown Prince 
was born in 1960).
Oveissi, (General) Gholam A l i : Former Commander of the Iranian Ground Forces, 
and Military Governor of Teheran from September 1978 to January 1979. Following the 
brutal crushing of a demonstration in Jaleh Square on 5 September 1978, he was 
termed "the Butcher of Teheran". However, he was both extremely popular and a highly 
feared military officer, who never relented from opposing the Islamic regime. In 
February 1984, he and his younger brother were both gunned down in the streets of 
Paris.
Pahlavi, Reza: The eldest son of the late Shah of Iran, who as heir to the Iranian 
throne, assumed the title of Reza Shah II on 31 October 1980.
Rafsanjani, (Hojat-ol-Eslam Val Moslemin) Ali Akbar Hashemi: A close Khomeini 
protege, who served as a powerful speaker of parliament, prior to becoming the Islamic 
Republic’s Fourth President in 1989.
Raastgaar, Ezat: A key NAMIR ideologue and organizer, of leftist (Tudeh) background, 
responsible for the first published manifesto on behalf of the Bakhtiar organization.
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Razmara, Manouchehr: A close Bakhtiar confidant who served as Minister of Health 
during his administration. He was a member of both the NAMIR Council and the Council 
of Advisers. He was the younger brother of the late (assassinated) Prime Minister of 
Iran, General Haji Gholi Razmara.
Sadighi, Gholam Hossein: Mossadegh's Minister of Interior, and leading figure of 
National Front, to whom the premiership was offered in November 1978 (he was the 
Shah's first choice, prior to Bakhtiar).
Sadr, Hamid: An Austrian based pro-Mossadegh technocrat, active in the European 
based anti-Shah movement (Confederation of Iranian Students), who joined Bakhtiar 
in the early 1980s and became a member of the NAMIR Council.
Sadrieh, Sadegh: A former Iranian diplomat with ambassadorial service in Romania, 
Iraq and Germany. An ambitious man of limited capabilities, he joined the anti-Shah
f-,
movement in the dying days of the Bakhtiar government, pledging his support to the 
Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran prior to the actual accession to 
power of Mehdi Bazargan. He was introduced to Bakhtiar by Ahmad Mirfendereski, and 
was subsequently invited to join both the Council of Advisers and the NAMIR Council. 
In the late 1980s, because of his Iraqi connections, he was appointed to succeed 
Mohammad Moshiri, as Chairman of NAMIR's Executive Committee.
Sanjabi, Karim: Mossadegh's Minister of Education, who as leader of the National 
Front, signed an infamous pact, committing the National Front to Khomeini. He became 
the first Foreign Minister in Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
prior to being forced out.
Shahrdar, (Brigadier General) Amir Hossein: A most dedicated and able officer who 
was the Commander of NAMIR's Military Wing.
Shakery, Ali: A pro-Mossadegh intellectual, active in the European based anti-Shah 
movement , who joined Bakhtiar in the early 1980s and became a member of the 
NAMIR Council, as well as a member of NAMIR's Executive Committee in Charge of 
'Doctrination'.
Shariat Madari, (Grand Ayatollah) Kazem: A major ’’Source of Imitation”, and the most 
prestigious Ayatollah in Qom - next to Ayatollah Khomeini - during the Iranian 
Revolution. Subsequently, he was accused of anti-regime activities, forced to confess, 
and humiliated in public. However, up to the time of his death in 1985, he continued to 
remain an important and popular figure, epitomizing the clercial opposition to 
Khomeini's brand of Islam.
Sharifi, Rahim: A close Bakhtiar supporter and a member of the Fourth National Front 
Council. He was also a leading founding member of NAMIR, and has been the editor 
of the (still ongoing) intellectual journal. Sahand.
Tabatabaii Ghomi, (Grand Ayatollah) Hassan : A major "Source of Imitation" of the 
traditionalist school, and an outspoken critic of the Islamic Republic, who was
L
eventually placed under house arrest in his home in Mashhad.
Vaziri, Chahrokh: A Swiss based pro-Mossadegh intellectual, active in the anti-Shah 
movement , who joined Bakhtiar in the early 1980s and became a member of the 
NAMIR Council. In 1990, he published a useful book entitled, "Elites et Mirages - 
acteurs et sequence revolutionaires en Iran: 1977-1979", on the causes of the Iranian 
Revolution.
Zolnour, Mostafa (Hamid): A pro-Mossadegh activist, active with the National Front 
in the anti-Shah movement. He became a member of the National Front Council 
following the revolution, but later joined Bakhtiar in exile, where at the behest of 
Boroomand, he was promoted by Bakhtiar to become a member of the NAMIR Council 
and an important member of NAMIR's operational activities (inside Iran). He was also 
a member of the selected team in charge of the "Civilian Plan of Action" associated with 
Operation White Star.
303
APPENDIX 3
SUMMARY OF A REPORT 
CONCERNING THE ROLE OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS 
DURING THE COURSE OF 
THE SECOND WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Vienna, 14- 25 June 1993
Introduction
Fprty five years after the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948, and 25 years after the 1st World Conference on Human Rights, convened in 
Teheran at the invitation of the (then) government of Iran, the 2nd World 
Conference on Human Rights was convened in Vienna from 14-25 June 1993. But 
after two weeks of constant dispute amongst member governments, it required a 
great deal of effort and lobbying to persuade nations to support the freedoms 
already enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although the final 
declaration broadly restated support for the universal application of basic human 
rights, it contained for the first time a reference to "national and regional 
particularities", which was in no uncertain terms, a concession to repressive Third 
World countries which have refused to recognize the definition of universal 
freedoms767.
Despite the bickering that went on between Western delegates and representative 
of repressive states (such as China, Iran, Indonesia, Sudan, Tunisia), a final, 
somewhat watered down, document was eventually agreed upon, though the 
appointment of a "U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights" was effectively
767This was in line with the views expressed by many Asian and African states 
in an earlier conference held this year in Bangkok, which attempted to set an agenda 
for the Vienna Conference that would, primarily, not allow for Western governments to 
use human rights as a tool for interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.
postponed indefinitely768.
The Vienna Conference was nevertheless an extremely high profile event, attended 
by many distinguished people such as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Vice 
Presidential Candidate (Mrs.) Geraldine Ferrara, and the Dalai Lama of Tibet769, and 
irrespective of positions that are held by member governments of the United 
Nations, the setting did provide a unique opportunity for numerous 'Non- 
Governmental Organizations' (NGOs), representing human rights organizations and 
human rights concerns from all over the world, to present their cases and to create a 
greater general awareness of the specifics of human rights abuse around the world.
The NGOs in Vienna
During the course of the two week Conference, the NGOs in Vienna - such as 
Amnesty International, the Survivors Committee, and the New York based Human 
Rights Watch - had a very strong representation and were able to project a very 
high profile. Their presence in Vienna, and the platform presented by them was a 
stark contrast to the actual proceeding that was going on in the Conference halls.
Apart from Amnesty International that was able to set up a large tent on the ground 
of the UN compound, most NGOs (much smaller in size to Amnesty International), 
had set up desks in the lower ground floor of 'Austria House', where on the top 
floors, the official conference was taking place. As a result, there were close 
contacts between official representatives as well as those anxious to present their • 
particular cases. This presence was also complimented by a large presence of the 
'Press Corps' which gave wide coverage to the points of views that were being 
presented at this historic occasion.
.! i
Non-Governmental Iranian Groups in Vienna
768This was left for consideration to the U.N. General Assembly, where it is likely 
to be remain suspended for years.
769Many others such as Nelson Mandela were also initially expected to attend.
The Vienna Conference provided a great opportunity for various Iranian political 
organizations to present their view points. However, Iranian participants were not 
limited to just the opponents of the regime, but also included a very large delegation 
of 'pro-regime' elements who had come from Iran to participate in the conference.
a. The Opposition Groups:
The most organized Iranian political opposition groups present in the Vienna 
conference were the 'People's Mojahedin', the CIA run "Flag of Freedom 
Organization of Iran'- FFI (recently renamed as the Iranian Organization for the 
Defense of Basic Freedoms and Human Rights), and the Kurdish Democratic Party 
of Iran. These groups, during the course of the conference, held a number of fringe 
meetings and had various presentation desks (ie. with photographs and literature 
etc.) that were given to interested parties.
'Name Organizations' associated with some of the above mentioned groups, were 
also used to project the image of their sponsoring groups. Most notable amongst 
these were "Kazem Rajavi International Association For the Defense of Human 
Rights" (associated with the Mojahedin), and the "League of Iranian Women" 
(associated with the Flag of Freedom - whose main speakers were Fereidoon 
Hoveida, Iran's former Ambassador to the U.N. and the brother of the former, 
executed Prime Minister of Iran, Amir Abbas Hoveida and Mrs. Mir-Hosseini).
Also extremely active was the 'Kurdish Desk'770, which was mainly comprised of 
Iranian, Turkish and Iraqi Kurds. In discussion with their representatives, it was clear 
that what they all sought was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.
The Iranian Kurds were extremely vocal and stated that while they would be happy 
with autonomy in the short-term, nothing but full independence would satisfy their 
eventual requirements.
During the course of the conference there was evidence of great hostility between 
these three groups, although the Mojahedin were the least of vocal of all in
77&They had set up a tent outside the conference and also started a hunger strike 
which received a lot of publicity.
expressing their dislike for the others. The Mojahedin delegation was a 'very 
respectable looking one' who had mostly come over from Paris. They were friendly 
to Iranians whom they perceived not to be associated with any group, but stayed 
clear of all others. When a camera crew from an Iranian reporter from Los Angeles 
(representative of "MA Television", Parisa Saed) tried to interview them at their 
stand, they looked away and said that they would only conduct an interview with 
their own TV reporters!
Also present but less organized were the supporters of Reza Pahlavi II, the Shah of 
Iran. They were led by Dr. Ali Yamani, the Chairman of the Iranian Constitutionalist 
Movement in Germany, Mrs. Sima Shabahang (Pro-Monarchist Iranian Women 
Organization -Germany) and Dr. Sami and Dr. Ghazanfari (both from Austria).
During the course of the conference they had a number of interviews and distributed 
thousands of leaflets which contained various messages sent to the Conference by
i
the Shah and his aunt, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, who had been the Chairman of 
the 1st World Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran 25 years ago.
Also present were a number of individuals with no affiliation to any particular group, 
who were essentially critical of the Iranian regime's record on human rights.Most 
notable amongst these, was a man by the name of 'Ibrahim Sadeghzadeh 
Monfared', who had prepared a statement in English which he himself was 
distributing.
The most notable absentees were representatives of the former Bakhtiar 
Organization, 'National Movement of the Iranian Resistance' (NAMIR), and most of 
the republican organizations (supporters of Hassan Nazih and Admiral Madani etc.).
b. The Internal Groups:
The most important non-government Iranian representation participating in the 
conference was "The Society of Women of the Islamic Revolution", led by 'Azzam 
Taleghani'771. Accompanying them (though it was not clear whether they were
^Daughter of the late Ayatollah Taleghani, one of the most prominent leaders 
of the Islamic Revolution.
directly associated), was The Iranian Women Society, represented by 'Farideh 
Hakimy'.
Also present was another Iranian NGO, the "Journalist Welfare Syndicate" 
(Sherkate Tavone Matbooate Iran), represented by Mr. Mohammad Hassan 
Sazegara and Mr. Nader Kavoosi.
These groups were essentially there to compliment the official delegation that was 
led by the Deputy Foreign Minister Zarif. They were in essence trying to portray the 
image that the Islamic regime was not a violator of human rights and that in its own 
way, it was a major of upholder of human rights values etc..
However, their activities were not significant. When Mrs. Taleghani tried to hold a 
fringe meeting, other Iranian groups led by the Mojahedin and the Kurds broke up 
their meeting and prevented them from speaking, by alleging that they were part of 
the official delegation and as such they had no rights to be present with those who 
were protesting against the regime's human rights record. They were, however, 
successful in distributing various literature, and essentially presenting the facade 
that, unlike the times of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, that the regime in Teheran is 
no longer oblivious to the effects public opinion was having on in its future.
There were also scenes of confrontation between Mrs. Taleghani group and the 
"League of Iranian Women" (associated with the Flag of Freedom), whose main 
female representation were Mrs. Mir-Hosseini, the Coordinator of the League, Mr. 
Dancke (A german women previously married to an Iranian who heads their 
Hamburg office), Mrs. Pari Sekandary (a journalist who works for FFI's clandestine 
radio station) and Miss Leila Amir (an Iranian activist working for a media office in 
Washington, D.C.). The most notable cause of their arguments was related to the 
question of 'the Right to Dress'. This was portrayed most vividly by the manner in 
which both parties engaged in the argument, were themselves actually dressed.
There was also another desk that was manned by 'Iranian Bahaiis', who remained 
friendly, but distant with all the Iranian present. They were busy only in distributing 
their own propaganda and making sure that their message was heard.
c. Other Middle East Representations:
There was absolutely no sign of a single Jewish Organization within the confines of 
where the NGOs were active772. Another group whose absence was most notable, 
were opponents of the military regime in Algeria!
The most active of the Middle East organizations, with the best display of 
photographs and literature were the Iraqi dissidents (ie. both Kurds and Shiites).
The best funded773 were the Kuwaitis, who were campaigning for the return of their 
POWs from Iraq774, and the best lobbyists, in terms of being convincing, were the 
Tunisian opponents of President Ben Ali.
The opposition to the Saudi regime, was also present, in the form of the 
International Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in the Gulf & Arab 
Peninsula, though the literature available to them for distribution was very limited. 
One of their leaders, Mr. Adel Ibrahim, a trade unionist living in Syria, was very 
active during the course of the conference, and was able to convey a sincere image. 
During the conference, they were very busy lobbying for international support for the 
release from prison of the Saudi human rights activists Dr. Mohammad Al- Masari 
and Abdullah Al-Hamed, who are members of the Committee for the Defense of Al- 
Sharia Rights in Saudi Arabia (literature enclosed - also for other countries in the 
Gulf such as Oman and Bahrain).
Conclusion
The Second World Conference on Human Rights which was convened in Vienna 
from 14-25 June 1993, was successful in bringing various abuses of human rights 
carried out by repressive governments into international focus. It was also 
successful in giving publicity to nearly all of these claims and placing extra
772This was despite, the fact that a number of American Jewish NGOs were 
present in the conference.
773They had the best colored posters, post cards, badges etc..
774Prisoners of War. 309
pressures on various governments to amend their ways.
However, as stated earlier, the Conference did not make any sweeping progressive 
moves in the field of protecting international human rights. In fact it was seen as 
attempting to back track, and undermine some of the earlier stances that were 
agreed some 45 years ago in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
A feature of the conference which is reflective of the current mood in the 
international political scene, is the determination on the part of some Asian and 
African states, not to allow others to use 'human rights' as an issue to undermine 
their governments. However, there were evidence of equal determination by the 
Western democracies to try and get as much mileage out of this issue as possible, 
in their quest to promote their national interests775.
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775The image of Jimmy Carter's use of human rights to undermine the 
governments of the USSR and Iran have always been most vivid.
APPENDIX 4
A LIST OF OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT 
INSIDE IRAN BY NAMIR-MW 
AUGUST 1984-MAY 1985
1. Operation conducted with 35 guerrillas in Ghushchi (48km from Rezaieh) on 25.8.84 
against Basij forces for the purpose of making NAMIR's presence felt. This operation did 
receive coverage in the international press.
2. Hijacking of an Iran Air Boeing 727 destined from Tehran to Bushehr on 3.7.84, in which 
some of the passengers were released in Dubai and the plane was taken to Cairo. This was 
aimed to highlight the degree of internal unhappiness with the regime. This two man 
operation was led by a NAMIR officer (AHARY), and it received wide international coverage.
3. Attack on Khoy sugar factory on 3.9.84 by a team of two guerrillas. This was confirmed 
by three separate sources.
4. Attack on HQ of "Jond-oll-ah" in Rezaieh on 9.9.84 by a guerilla team of 15 men, 
resulting in the killing of the Head of Rezaieh's Jondollah (and others). This was 
acknowledged by different sources and was reported in The Times.
5. Attack and subsequent burning of the "Bank Sepah" in Rezaieh's Shapour Street on
28.9.84 by a team of two guerrillas. Acknowledged by several sources and reported in The 
LpndQD-
6. Attack on "Jihad Sazandeghi" by a group of 15 guerrillas on 30.9.84. Acknowledge by 
several sources.
7. Explosion at Yousefabad Police station conducted by a team of 3 guerrillas on 1.10.84 
in which two (2) Pasdars were killed. This event was reported by TheTimes and The
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Washington Times.
8. Cutting off of Electric power in Rezaieh, Shahpour, Khoi, Siah Cheshmeh, Makoo and 
parts of Tabriz by a team of 2 guerrillas on 20.10 84. Acknowledged by several sources.
9. Attack on "Bahonar Komiteh" in Rezaieh on 26.10.84. Acknowledged by the Red Lion 
And Sun Hospital in Rezaieh.
10. Cutting off of the main Tehran-Arak electrical power line for five hours by a team of six 
guerrillas on 29.10.84.
11. Attack and subsequent burning of the "Bank Tejarat" in Tabriz by a team of two 
guerrillas on 16.11.84. Acknowledged by several sources and reported in The Washington
limes.
i
12. Attack and subsequent burning of Iran Air office building in Rezaieh on 21.11.84 by a 
team of two guerrillas.
13. Attack and subsequent destruction of Rezaieh's "Hezbollahi Doctors Building " in 
Khayam Street of Rezaieh, adjacent to the Komiteh and the Revolutionary Court Offices, on
28.11.84 by a team of two guerrillas.
14. Destruction of oil pipeline leading to Khark Island (45km from Gananveh) on 5.1.85, and 
destruction of oil pipeline leading to Isfahan in the Saman area near "Zayandeh Rud" on
6.1.85 to coincide with the anniversary of Bakhtiar's accession to the premiership.
15. Attack and subsequent burning of Rezaieh sugar factory on 11.2.85.
16. Explosion in "Geesha" Komiteh of Tehran on 20.2.85.
17. Explosion in dormitory of Rezaieh's Islamic Society on 8.3.85.
18. Explosion in Rezaieh's Iran Air Building on 10.3.85.
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19. Explosion in Rezaieh's "Bank Bazargani" (Zanghaneh Street) on 10.3..85.
20. Explosion in Chemist Shop belonging to Revolutionary Guards Corps, in Rezaieh's 
Zanghaneh Street on 10.3.85.
21. Explosion of gas lines at 31 & 34 km junctions of Ganaveh and Bandar Deylam (near 
a Gendarmerie station) on 21.5.85.
313
APPENDIX 5
TOP SECRET
(25.5.85)
1. General
a. Purpose
The principle objective of OWS is the overthrow of the Khomeini regime and itsieplacement
i
with a moderate, pro-Western coalition consisting essentially of nationalist elements (ie. in 
the military, bazaar, intellectual, government employees, and amongst 
Shiite Muslim leaders).
This objective will be carried out by NAMIR, and any external assistance for this operation 
is limited only to moral, diplomatic and financial support.
T
b. Scope
(1) Committed Forces
The principal forces in OWS are selected elements amongst Iran's tribes(totalling 7500 men 
who are already pledged to fight on the side of NAMIR) located in FIVE seperate regions, 
and contacted units amongst the Armed Forces, both at the front and in other areas. In 
addition to the above, contacted loyal units amongst Police Force and Gendarmarie will also 
be taking part. Key elements in the Air Force have pledged their support for OWS. The role 
defined for the Navy in OWS is in areas where it is mainly present in the south. Their 
mission will be to secure control over port cities such as Busher and Bandar Abbas, as well 
as securing control over key .economic/strategic locations such as Khark Island.
(2) Principal Target
What keeps the Islamic Republic of Iran intact today is the armed support of the
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Revolutionary Guards(in their various forms) and units from the 'Basij Mostazefin'. These 
armed supporters of the Khomeini regime(hereby referred to as RGs), must be neutralised 
in two key areas/if OWS is to achieve its designated objective. First, the RGs units located 
at the war front, and finally those units in and around Tehran.
(3) Timing
OWS begins at a politically agreed, appropiate time ( A ) following the completion of 
Operational Readiness ( D ).
2. Mission
The mobilization of NAMIR's military and para-military forces for the purposes of freeing Iran 
from the domination of the present regime in three seperate phases, planned according to 
priority.
a. First Phase - Preparations:
Creation of organised clandestine operational and intelligence bases in the armed forces, 
and in the irregular(guerilla) units located in the five tribal areas. Planned timing of these, 
will ensure operational readiness for the next stage.
b. Second Phase - Irregular/Guerrilla Operations:
Carrying out of armed irregular/guerilla operations (for containment purposes) in sensitive 
areas for the purpose of paving towards the main operational plan.
c. Third Phase - Main Operations:
Carrying out of final operations with the support of the main units of the armed forces for the 
purposes of capturing and controlling key areas of the country and declaring the creation 
of a constitutional government.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operation:
(1) Phase 1:
Execution of combined sabotage and guerilla operations in Western Azarbaijan, inclusive
of Rezaieh, Tabriz, Jolfa, and Mianeh (sabotage will be aimed at selected sensitive targets,
, >
and guerilla operations will be carried out against revolutionary institutions. The NAMIR 
lead force for these operations will be 2000 men). Length of operations in this phase will 
be seven days.
Thus, lenght of OWS by the end of Phase 1 will be D + ( A + 7 ).
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(2) Phase 2:
Sabotage and guerilla operations, as part of a 'Deceptive Plan' will be carried out in areas 
of Baluchistan inclusive of Zahedan, Khash, Saravaan, Iranshahr and Chah Bahar. 
Sabotage operations will be aimed at selected sensitive regional targets, while guerilla 
operations will aim to strike revolutionary institutions and help take control of the main 
military garrisons of the 88th armd div, as well as the regional HQs of Gendarmarie and 
Police Forces. The NAMIR lead forces in this pahse will include 2500 men, and the length 
of operations will be six days.
Thus, length of OWS by the end of Phase 2 will be D + ( A + 1 3 ).
(3) Phase 3:
Implementation of the 'Main Plan' in the Tehran area and the declaration of a new 
constitutional government with the support of the armed forces, inclusive of the following: 
Supreme Command Staff, Ground Forces HQ, Air Force HQ, Navy HQ, Gendarmarie HQ, 
Police Force HQ, 1st inf div HQ, 2nd inf div HQ, Special Force bde HQ, First Tactical 
Fighter Wing HQ, Gendarmarie Regiment HQ, and the Police Guards HQ. Length of 
operations in this phase will be three days.
Thus, length of OWS by the end of Phase 3 will be D + ( A + 1 6 ).
b. Coordination
Increasingly unacceptables losses of human lives and deteriorating social conditions of the 
continuing war with Iraq, especially in the aftermath of the recent escalation in Iraq's 
relentless aerial bombings of civilian targets (particularly in Tehran), in addition to the 
general economic hardships imposed as a consequence of a faltering economy(eg. high 
inflation and unemployment), as well as other social restrictions imposed by the 
fundamentalists, have aided the creation of a general situation where promise of relief by 
any act or of moderate persuasion, who can deliver, is most likely to be welcomed by the 
increasingly suferring public, particularly in urban areas throughout Iran. This was clearly 
proven by the peaceful demonstrations of 17th May, 1985 that was organised by NAMIR. 
However, large scale passive public sentiments of support, such as was shown on May 17, 
by itself, is unlikely to threaten the survival of the Islamic regime, so long as force is in the 
monopoly of the state abd the public is not protected by some 'counter-force', which will 
defend it against indiscriminate brutal reprisals, such as the state has willingly shown itself 
capable of (most recent example was in the aftermath of the May 17 demonstrations). 
Thus, the alleviation of this problem and the start of meaningful operations against the 
regime rests on the involvement of already contacted, sympathetic units of the armed forces.
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Apart from a supportive international atmosphere necessary for such action, the 'spark' 
required to ease the army's entrance in to the plan will come from loyal tribal elements, who 
will be involved in sabotage and guerilla operations. These actions will then be followed 
quickly by religious 'FATWAS' of leading 'MARJAS' in the holy cities of Qom, Mashad and 
possibly NAJAF(in Iraq). Contacts with key army commanders at the front and throughout 
the country have been made, and according to our most conservative estimates, the great 
majority of officers and men will participate provided certain agreed 'signals' are worked out- 
eg. the delivery arms to tribal units will serve to indicate general 'international' support for 
OWS (A seperate report on the state of the Iranian Armed Forces will be supplied 
seperately).
4 . Administrative and Logistics
a. Logistics
(1) Military Equipment
Military equipment required in OWS is to arm 7500 tribesmen located in five major areas to 
fulfill their desiganted roles. These are the following:
-7500 individual weapons (7.62 NATO caliber G-3s, FNs, or M-14s).
-7500 Grenades.
-100 GP Machine Guns (M-60 or MAG).
-30 AA Machine Guns (cal.50).
-Communications Equipment(PRC-77s, 50 sets).
-80 RPG Sets.
The equipment (some of which have already reached final points of delivery) will be 
deployed in FIVE major areas:
A R E A  R e c i p i e n t  N U M B E R S
1. Baluchistan Baluchis N S L
U P A
2. Fars(Province) Qashqais M E T
B C E
3. Bakhtiary Region Bakhtiary Lurs E I R
R F
4. Khoramabad Region Khoramabady Lurs S I
E
5. Rezaiyeh Kurds D
 Total 7500
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(2) Delivery Options
Options for delivery are varied. The safest option, under existing circumstances, is to 
Airdrop in South Eastern Iran (Baluchistan), where receiving parties will be present to 
receive, conceal and deliver equipment to final destinations. Areas for the drops have 
already been selected and a "Drop Zone Plan" is currently available. Air drops for other 
regions not considered safe at this time, and delivery by land from Baluchistan to all other 
regions is now the only feasible option. NAMIR can provide one full C-130 crew for 
Logistical Air Operations(LOGAOPS).
(3) Logistics For Tribes
To prepare for D-day, two seperate groups will require logistical support which NAMIR must 
provide. They are primarily the tribal elements involved in the operation, and certain other 
elements linked with the Armed Forces (The Armed Forces, itself, is ca 
pabie of providing its own logistics. Thus, NAMIR's role in this regard is essentially limited 
to such action as the provision of funds for stepping up intelligence activities).
NAMIR has to make the following materials available to every tribesman involved in OWS:
1. Food
2. Clothing and shelter
3. Fuel
4. Engineering material (for sabotage action)
5. Arms
6. Communication Equipment
In addition to covering the costs of supplying the above to each tribesman, NAMIR must in 
addition make provisions to cover the costs of the tribesman family(ie. every tribesman who 
is involved in OWS) as well.
Items 1,2 and 3 are covered by NAMIR through monthly payments of a fixed salary. The 
total costing for this is provided below. Items 4,5 and 6 are not costed in this report and will 
have to be provided seperately.
(4) Cost Of Logistics For Tribes
On reaching D-day, some 7500 selected tribesmen will in all be ready to participate in OWS, 
though their actual recruitment and involvement into the operation has been planned for in 
three seperate stages. Stage 1, begins with 2500 men, with additions of
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a further 2500 men at the begining of stages 2 and 3. Each stage is seperated by a 90 day 
period. The cost of providing for the logistical needs of every man has been worked out at 
300 US Dollars per month (1USD is valued at around 620-650 Rials).
Stagel Stage2 Stage3 Nos. of men Cost (USD)
D-270 
to D-180
D-180 
to D-90
2500
5000
D-90
to D 7500
2.250.000
4.500.000
6.750.000
Total: 13,500,000
i
So far some of the above costs have already been provided by NAMIR. Roughly, USD 
9,200,000 will be required to reach D.
Other Costs (USD)
1. Transportation 5% (of remaining budget) 460,000
2. Training 3% 276,000
3. Housing 5% 460,000
4. Intelligence 10% 920.000
5. Others(bribes etc.) 5% 460,000
Total 2,576,000
Total amount required to prepare and support 7500 tribesmen for action in OWS will be
11,776,000 USD. Since, the initial presentation of this plan in April 1984, 1,200,000 
USD(approximately 100,000 USD/month) has been provided by NAMIR. Thus, the final
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amount needed at this time is 10, 576,000 USD.
(5) Armed Forces Unification Expenditures (AFUE)
This is broken into five stages covering five months:
First Month:
400.000 USD to cover internal expenditures-setting up of intelligence basis in Tehran and 
the provinces, direct payment to active and forcefully retired military personnel etc. 
Second Month:
480.000 USD (20% expansion of first month budget)
Third Month:
640.000 USD (40% expansion of second month budget)
Fourth Month:
880.000 USD (40% expansion of third month budget)
Fifth Month:
1.290.000 USD
The total cost of Armed Forces Unification Expenditures thus amount to 3,680,0P0 USD. 
In addition to these quoted figures, services approximating 2,600,000 USD for intelligence 
purposes has been provided by NAMIR.
(6) Preparatory Costs For Action Plans
A contingency budget allowance is made for the following:
1. Main Plan 10% of AFUE USD 368,000
2. Alternate Plan 10% of AFUE 368,000
3. Deception Plan 20% of AFUE 736,000
Total: 1,472,000
(7) Total Costs For OWS
1. Cost of Logistics for Tribes
2. Armed Forces Unification Expenditures (AFUE)
3. Preparatory Costs for Action Plans
11,776,000
3.668.000
1.472.000
-TOTAL: 16,928,000(USD)
b. Personnel
(To Be Provided Later)
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5.  C o m m a n d  An d  S i g n a l
(To Be Provided Later)
Distribution:
1. National Security Council,
The White House, Washington , DC
Acknowledged NAMIR
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APPENDIX 6
CIVIL PLAN OF ACTION 
FOR
OPERATION WHITE STAR
1. OBJECTIVE
To prepare the Iranian people to welcome a change of government/or 
system of government in favor of a democratic alternative along the lines 
presented by NAMIR.
2m SITUATION o f  THE REGIME
Intelligence indicates the following at this time:
The present regime has at its disposal all elements required to run a 
country like Iran (political, social, economic, and military).
There is increasing unhappiness amongst the masses, in all classes of 
society, and even amongst the revolutionary organizations and more 
important the clergy(from a social aspect), the near state of bankruptcy 
of the economy, the low state of morale amongst the military due to the 
inconclusiveness of the war and lack of spares, all point to a potential 
state of chaos.
The main factor assisting the continuation of the regime rule seems to be 
the continuing war, which has kept the military away from rural centers 
and provides the justification of the regime's inability to fulfil the 
expectations of the people by blaming it all on the war.
Nonetheless the regime is quite prepared to meet any confrontation, and 
has in the past proved its serious attitude and resolve by brutally
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crushing any resistance against its rule, irrespective of the price.
3. NAMIR'S SITUATION
Obvious disadvantages flow from the fact that the leadership of NAMIR 
is in exile, but it has powerful assets which can be used to achieve the 
objective. Its principal assets are:
1. A prestigious and popular leader whose integrity is acknowlegded.
2. Widespread public dissatisfaction with and international opposition to 
the regime.
3. Support from the Iranian tribes.
4. Support from the Bazaar.
5. Support of the armed forces.
6. Support from key elements of the clergy.
7. Effective liaison with all non-leftist/communist opposition groups.
8. Support from powerful states within and outside the region.
9. Own Radio stations.
10. Substantial fund raising capacity.
11. Lack of any other credible alternative.
4. ACTION
A. It is critical that the propositions set out in part B be demonstrated to 
the following:
1. The Clergy/the Mosques
2. The Bazaar(+supply services)
3. Government Employees
4. Mob Control Centers of Tehran entailing the assistance of the following 
groups:
a. "Meidan Dars"/ Food distribution Centers
b. Truck drivers
c. Coffee shop owners ("Ghahve Khaneh")
d. Ceremonial athletes
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5. 'Vahed" Bus Service/ Tehran Taxis
6. Printing Houses/Newspaper shops/Book shops
7. Labor Unions/ lntellectuals(students, teachers, etc.)/Hospital Staff 
(doctors, nurses, etc.)
8. Oil Industry/SteelCompany/Tobacco Industry workers/Central 
Organization for Rural Cooperatives/Cereal Organization/Sugar 
Organization/ Iran National/Gas & Electric Workers/ Textile Industry & 
others
REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
1. Pasdaran/Basij
2. Islamic Committees
3. Various Islamic Foundations
4. Islamic Societies
B. To create the atmosphere required for the objective, it is critical that 
the following be demonstrated:
1. Regime is vulnerable-not all powerful 
evidence:
a. Iraqi bombings
b. sabotage
c. civil disobedience
d. breakdown of administration
2. Regime departs from true faith- as the testimony of leading 
clerics directly and indirectly connected with NAMIR inside Iran 
bears out.
3. Regime is incompetent-subvert public sectors and providers of 
goods and services in:
a. Health
b. Transport
c. Education
d. Agriculture
e. Food distribution
f. General public administration
1Z1
4. Life will be better for all important groups(ie. groups mentioned in 
3A)
5. Life will become worse for all important groups under existing regime 
because:
a. Continuing war
b. Deteriorating Economy
c. More repression
d. Unlikely remedy under Ayatollah Montazeri
6. World opinion is with NAMIR-means of communicating this with the 
Iranian public include:
a. NAMIR Radios
b. Voice of America-Persian Service
c. BBC-Persian Service
d. Radio Israel-Persian Service
e. National Parliaments/Euro-Parliament/UN
f. Pamphlets distributed inside the country
g. Slogans-graffiti
h. Posters-photographs
i. Telephones & Telexes-see appendix 5 
j. Word of mouth
k. Mosques,Coffee shops(Ghaveh Khanehs), market places, public 
transport, taxis etc.
7. Major opinion-formers in Iran are with NAMIR
a. Armed Forces
b. Tribes
c. Baazar
d. Clergy
e. Intellectuals
8. NAMIR is well organized, and has powerful-support- this to be 
demonstrated by means of propaganda and the use of NAMIR contacts 
inside the country.
1Z1
KEY REQUIREMENTS
1. Intelligence
2. Broad ideological agreement with outside opinion formers
3. Target identification and their organization
4. Competent personnel determined to succeed
5. High moral
6. Funds
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Amouzegar, Cyrus: Paris, 7 March & 10 August 1994.
Bakhtiar, Guive: Phone discussion in Paris in March 1994.
Bakhtiar, Abbas Gholi: London, 2 December 1994.
Bani Ameri, (Colonel) Mohammad Bagher: London, 3 December 1994.
Esna-Ashari, Azizollah: London, January 1994 - April 1995 (numerous meetings and 
telephone discussions).
Ghadimi, Morteza: Paris, 8 March & 26 November 1994.
Gharabaghi, (General) Abbas: Paris, 11 August 1994 and by phone on 22 February 
1995.
Hashemi, (Brigadier General) Manouchehr: London, 28 March & 28 April 1995.
Jafroodi, Kazem: Paris, 23 November 1994.
Mirfendereski, Ahmad: Paris, 7 March & 26 November 1994.
Mobasser, (Lt. General) Mohsen: London, January 1994 - April 1995 (numerous 
meetings and telephone discussions).
Moin, Bagher: London, 4 May 1995.
Moshiri, Mohammad: Paris, 24 November 1994.
Nourizadeh, Ali Reza: London, 7 October 1994 ( plus numerous other telephone 
conversations)
Oveissi, Ahmad: Telephone interview (USA), 31 August 1994.
Raastgaar, Ezat: Paris, 24 November 1994.
Razmara, Manouchehr: Paris, 23 November 1994.
Shahrdar, (Brigadier General) Amir Hossein: Paris, 9 March & 26 November 1994. 
Sharifi, Rahim: Paris, 24 November 1994.
Zolnour, Mostafa (Hamid): Paris, 8 March 1994
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